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Benin has gained a reputation for 
leading the field in the post-Cold 
War move towards democracy in 
West Africa. Since 1959, the country 
has had eight constitutions, six 
putschs, eleven presidents and 
various experiments in how society 
should be run. In 1990, following a 
national conference which brought 
together representatives from across 
the spectrum, the Béninois opted 
decisively for a democratic system. 
Seven years on, the country has an 
air of bustling enterprise. The capital, 
Cotonou, bubbles with economic acti-
vity - though a boom in vehicle 
ownership has made it one of the 
most congested cities on the conti-
nent. Benin also has a rich culture 
and an attachment to history - as we 
witnessed in Abomey, where the 
ancient kings held sway and where a 
monarch still holds court. 
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Trade in the 
New World Order 
Trade liberalisation promises impro-
ved overall growth. The downside is 
that it pitches the weak against the 
strong, with profits amassed by the 
highly efficient few. This could threa-
ten some of the main exports of the 
South. Many ACPs are responding by 
trying to become 'leaner and mea-
ner' - and by diversifying production, 
improving marketing and attracting 
new investment. There is also a gro-
wing lobby that questions unfettered 
free trade where 'ethical' questions 
are at stake. They argue instead for a 
system which guarantees producers a 
proper price, and does not ride 
roughshod over the environment or 
employees' rights. As ACP and EU 
negotiators set about the task of dra-
wing up a successor to Lomé IV, we 
feature some of the issues they face 
in adapting to the new global situa-
tion. 
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the Courier n° 166 - november-december 1997 Rubens Ricupero, 
UNCTAD Secretary Genera 
'What is the use of preferential 
tariffs if the minimum conditions 
needed to make the most of 
them do not exist?' 
At the end of August, The 
Courier interviewed Rubens 
Ricupero, Secretary General 
of the Geneva-based United 
Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). 
The main task of this body is 
to accelerate the economic growth 
and development of developing 
countries. A former Finance Minister 
of Brazil, Mr Ricupero was appoint-
ed to head the organisation in Sep-
tember 1995. Below, he shares with 
us some ideas on how to improve 
economic growth and per capita in-
come through trade, and how a suc-
cessor to Lomé IV can make a more 
effective contribution. The resound-
ing message is that trade prefer-
ences are not enough. He suggests 
an 'integrated strategy' to help di-
versify ACP economies out of com-
modities and to boost foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
■ Eighty per cent of ACP exports 
earnings are still derived from 
commodities and the volume of 
ACP exports to the European 
Union market has declined over 
the past 20 years. What can be 
done to diversify exports and build 
up their industrial base? 
- What is needed is an in-
tegrated policy beyond commodi-
ties and foreign trade. Like you, I 
was struck, reading the Green 
Paper, that between the mid-1970s 
and mid-1990s, the ACP share of 
the EU market dropped from 6.7% 
to 2.8%. This was not exclusively 
due to ACP commodities being re-
placed by more modern products 
from Asia. The ACPs even lost 
ground in traditional areas like tea 
and coffee. These reduced export 
volumes indicate that trade prefer-
ences alone will not do the trick. 
A lot depends on the effi-
ciency of the productive system. If 
non-ACP countries, even without 
preferential tariffs, are much more 
efficient at low-cost production 
and at commercialising their prod-
ucts, ACPs will not be able to com-
pete. This is what is happening 
now. There are countries in Asia 
which were not traditional pro-
ducers of tropical beverages, like 
coffee for example, which are 
now strengthening their position. 
I don't dispute that trade prefer-
ences - and the whole structure of 
the Lomé agreement - may be 
necessary, but it's not enough. The 
legacy of successive Lomé agree-
ments is proof of this. It really is 
very striking to look at the differ-
ences between the ACPs and Asian 
countries, which were never 
favoured by preferential tariffs. 
I would like to raise a 
question I have already discussed 
with some European friends - to 
which I have never received a sat-
isfactory reply. ACP arrangements 
were always supposed to be a 
model of a new relationship, 
based on past historical and cul-
tural links, and the assumption of 
a kind of responsibility for the 
past. Despite this, they have never 
been able to generate the kind of 
regional dynamics we have seen 
involving Japan, first with East 
Asian nations and later extending 
to South-East Asia. We refer to 
this as the 'flying geese paradigm'. 
During the late 1950s, the Japan-
ese began transferring 'sunset in-
dustries' such as textiles and 
footwear to places like Korea and 
Taiwan. These countries then initi-
ated investment flows to the so-
called 'third generation' neigh-
bours like Myanmar. 
■ Why didn't this transfer of low-
cost industry occur between Euro-
pean and the ACP countries? 
In fact, Japan and the 
Asians had a lot less in their 
favour. They were former enemies 
and there were none of the old 
colonial ties. Most of the ex-
colonies inherited a whole pack-
age of institutions, and had things 
in common with Europe based on 
language, legal codes and so on. 
There are several explana-
tions for the different way things 
developed. There was the problem 
of political stability, and the kind 
of 'nation-building' institutions 
that were set up, based on one-
party rule or regional Marxism. 
There were also cultural aspects 
and the fact that Africa does not 
have the kind of investment cli-
mate that exists in Asia. I think, 
however, that at least part of the 
explanation lies in the fact that no 
attempt was made to bring about 
this kind of industrial transfer. It 
never occurred to the Europeans 
that the relationship had to be dy-
namic. The ACP-EU system was 
seen as a sort of framework that 
would more or less stabilise the 
old economic and trade links. Un-
fortunately, it didn't work, for the 
simple reason that you can't stay 
put. If you don't move ahead, you 
end up slipping back. I recently 
asked an EU representative at a 
seminar why this kind of invest-
ment was never attempted. He 
replied that European investors 
did not feel secure putting money 
into Africa because the Africans 
never offered the necessary guar-
antees. If this is true, and I think it 
is partly so, then the solution to 
the ACPs' problems lies in a much 
ï 
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more integrated approach. This 
must include FDI, but also the rein-
forcement and, in some cases, the 
creation of conditions for a market 
economy. What is the use of trade 
arrangements or preferential tar-
iffs if the minimum conditions 
needed to make the most of them 
do not exist? 
You need a productive sys-
tem to take advantage of tariffs. 
And it should supply domestic de-
mand. You can't start off by think-
ing about conquering foreign mar-
kets. This is clearly seen in some 
sectors in Latin America, for exam-
ple, where firms initially devel-
oped the capacity to service the 
local market. It was only after they 
had consolidated themselves as ef-
ficient producers at this level that 
they turned their attention over-
seas. There are exceptions, for in-
stance, FDI to trade processing 
zones, where the explicit intention 
is to produce for the export mar-
ket. But these are few and far be-
tween, and I doubt their contribu-
tion to a more integrated 
economy. You need a policy mix. 
Previously, this was not realistic 
because of widespread political in-
stability, civil strife and some seri-
ous mistakes in macro-economic 
policy. 
■ /And now? 
We are on the brink of a 
unique opportunity for a number 
of reasons -including what I would 
call the creative power of crisis. 
Practically all aspects of the nega-
tive picture I have just painted are 
slowly improving, although the 
task hasn't yet been completed. 
Some countries are still in very bad 
shape. But we are moving in the 
right direction, in terms of political 
stability, more democratic institu-
tions and better macro-economic 
policy. For the first time, there is a 
real possibility of doing something 
beyond trade. 
In the forthcoming negoti-
ations on a successor to Lomé IV, 
what is needed is a broader per-
spective. Investment will create op-
portunities, but I don't see FDI in 
isolation nor indeed, taking a lead 
role. While foreign investment is 
extremely important, it is not as 
important as building national ca-
pacity for economic production 
and export. FDI could play a cat-
alytic role in Africa, for example, 
involving companies experienced 
in the food commodity sector. 
Firms could bring the finance 
(which is generally the bottleneck 
in commodity diversification), the 
technological know-how, manage-
ment capacity and marketing links 
to include those countries in a dis-
tribution network. At the same 
time, I believe that there should be 
an effort to use FDI to build up 
networks of local suppliers - as 
happens in some industrial sectors 
where companies producing for 
export are supplied by small and 
medium sized local enterprises. 
This would create the conditions 
for the development of something 
lasting, and the capacity to export. 
It would also avoid the errors of 
the past, where FDI created 'colo-
nial' enclaves. This is clearly what 
happened in the former Zaire. 
Three decades ago, Zaire was ex-
porting about 300,000 tonnes of 
copper a year. Now the figure is 
down to less than 50,000 tonnes -
because when the troubles started, 
foreign investors withdrew, leav-
ing virtually nothing behind. 
So, I envisage a strategy 
where trade arrangements are just 
part of a wider picture. You must 
try to create the conditions to at-
tract investment - investment 
which gives priority to the industri-
al base, commodity diversification, 
food processing and textiles, and 
then move upwards. At the same 
time, you need to build national 
capacity and create what we call, 
'the conditions for a market econ-
omy.' We all know that the private 
sector should play the leading role, 
but we often forget that condi-
tions in most countries are far 
from conducive to a market econo-
my. The market economy is an ab-
straction. What is a market? It is a 
place where you have producers 
and consumers and you have to 
create enterprises, even micro-
enterprises, within it. 
Businesses do not pop up 
like mushrooms. In some countries 
you already have an entrepreneur 
culture, but this is not the norm -
and less so in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Special attention has to be paid to 
the enormous problem of techni-
cal cooperation. You need public 
institutions, not just for legislation 
and tax, but also to create the con-
ditions for training and represen-
tation of SMEs. In UNCTAD we are 
trying to set up 'National Systems 
of Innovation.' Nowadays, if an en-
terprise wants to succeed, it has 
constantly to change. And innova-
tion doesn't exclusively mean 
being able to undertake highly so-
phisticated technological work. 
Sometimes it is just the ability to 
present your product in a different 
way. 
Harvesting tea in Kenya. 
Even the ACP share of the EU tropical beverage 
market has declined meeting point 
■ Could you tell us about any par-
ticularly successful entrepreneur 
ventures in sub-Saharan Africa? 
There are several. In Zam-
bia, a women entrepreneur was 
enormously successful in building 
up a major industrial enterprise 
providing European markets with 
natural-based food colourings. She 
was able to develop a wide net-
work of providers. Because she 
had studied European markets, she 
knew of the market preference for 
non-chemical and natural prod-
ucts, and was constantly able to in-
novate in the production process. 
There is a need for this kind of 
thing. You can't think solely in 
terms of trade arrangements. It's 
clear that in the developing world, 
countries which have been able to 
upgrade their productive capaci-
ties have done so largely by trad-
ing amongst themselves, and by 
trying to integrate in a larger 
framework. This phenomenon is 
clearly seen in Asean and Merco-
sur. But it exists only at a very low 
level in Africa, notably through 
SADC in the south of the conti-
nent. 
There is enormous poten-
tial for inter-regional trade as the 
basis for industrialisation. In 
Africa, there hasn't been much of 
this because of political difficulties 
and infrastructure problems. 
■ Which is more appropriate -
'South-South' or 'North-South' in-
tegration? In the latter case, isn't 
there a danger that developing 
countries would lose out by estab-
lishing free trade zones with de-
veloped nations? 
I do not think that full reci-
procity, in a free trade agreement 
with industrialised countries, is the 
best way forward for LDCs. As I 
have already indicated, if develop-
ing nations are to engage in inter-
national trade, they first have to 
consolidate themselves as suppliers 
to the local market. How can they 
do this if they are immediately ex-
posed to competition with power-
ful transnational companies, and 
markets with low prices? You 
could accept a situation where 
LDCs allow free access in areas 
where they can't hope to develop 
local capacity - for example, elec-
tronic goods or computers. This 
would give industrialised states lu-
crative opportunities. But areas of 
labour-intensive production, whe-
re developing countries could com-
pete given the opportunity, should 
be left out of such agreements. I 
don't think that would hurt Euro-
peans. Europe is more interested 
in exporting goods with techno-
logical content and value added. 
I visited Cambodia four 
months ago. They told me there 
that, in the context of the negotia-
tions on accession to the WTO and 
ASEAN, they don't have a great 
deal to protect. Because they don't 
have much local industry, the Cam-
bodians are ready to accept many 
far-reaching liberal provisions. But 
they want to preserve the basis in 
those areas where they have have 
pinned their hopes for industriali-
sation - garments, textiles, 
footwear and so on - which could 
attract investment from neighbou-
ring countries. For them, there is 
no point in creating obstacles to 
the entry of cars or lorries, because 
they have no intention of manu-
facturing these. I feel that this is 
where some flexibility is needed. 
Europe, which has a tradition of 
progressively building a unified 
market with less developed zones 
such as the Mediterranean, under-
stands this point of view. It makes 
no sense to demand full reciprocity 
from these countries. 
'It makes no sense to 
demand full reciprocity 
from developing 
countries' 
Competition is at the heart 
of the trade debate. It's a game, 
and like all games, it requires not 
only rules and arbiters, but also 
training. An analogy can be drawn 
with the Olympics. If you or I 
wanted to run in the 100 metres, 
say, we would not be allowed to 
do so. We would have to prepare 
for the competition and reach the 
required minimum standard. And I 
want to stress a point frequently 
left out of the discussion - the 
LDCs are starting from a very, very 
low point. 
In October, we are going 
to hold a high-level meeting here 
for the LDCs: those with a per capi-
ta income of less than $350 a year 
- which is less than one dollar a 
day. There are now 48 countries in 
this category. In 1990 when the 
Paris programme of action for the 
LDCs was launched, there were 43. 
Since then, only Botswana has suc-
ceeded in 'graduating' and mean-
while, several others have moved 
down to LDC status. Of the 48, 33 
are in sub-Saharan Africa and most 
of these are ACPs. 
We may well be talking 
about integrating the LDCs into 
the world trading system, but of 
the 48 only 28 are currently mem-
bers of the WTO and just 10 have 
permanent missions in Geneva. 
How can these countries effective-
ly participate in all the UN meet-
ings here and in the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism? Dispute 
settlement is proving to be more 
important in generating trade op-
portunities than bilateral negotia-
tions, but it is very expensive and 
you need legal advice from spe-
cialised lawyers who charge very 
high rates. How can these states, 
who cannot even afford to open 
an office, fight such battles? 
I propose that we start 
with the fundamentals. We have 
to integrate these countries into 
the WTO. UNCTAD provides a lot 
of technical assistance to countries 
in the negotiating process, but we 
do not have enough human or fi-
nancial resources to do this in a 
systematic way. We have recently 
begun a project with the WTO and 
the International Trade Centre in 
Africa. Each of our. three institu-
tions deals with an area of exper-
tise to promote trade. The project 
covers four developing and four 
least-developed countries in 
Africa, and if the means were 
available, we could expand it. 
There is a curious paradox 
today. On the one hand, official 
development assistance is still 
being eroded. Indeed, it has never 
been so low. Following the deci-
sion of the United States to cut 
ODA, we have had more recent 
announcements from Germany 
and Japan about substantial reduc-
tions. And it is not true that FDI 
can replace aid. There are things 
that aid does, like infrastructure, 
health and education, that no for-
eign private investor would consid-
er doing. 
On the other hand, we 
have the renegotiation of Lomé, 
which involves some 70 developing 
counties and almost all the LDCs. 
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There are the Japanese and USA 
tariff proposals for Africa. And we 
ourselves are holding a high level 
meeting here in Geneva for LDCs -
which is a direct consequence of 
the WTO meeting in Singapore. So 
there is a proliferation of trade ini-
tiatives. Is there a way of weighing 
the effects of these against the re-
duction of ODA? Do donors be-
lieve that trade measures will suf-
fice without technical aid? And if 
technical help is needed, where 
will it come from? These are key 
questions. 
■ Is there a conflict between the 
efforts to liberalise trade globally 
and the removal of barriers to 
trade at a regional level? 
As I have already suggest-
ed, I don't think that many devel-
oping countries could proceed im-
mediately to full trade 
liberalisation. Regionalism is a step 
on the road towards that. Many 
trade specialists believe that were 
it not for European market inte-
gration, France and Italy would 
never have accepted the trade lib-
eralism contained in the GATT 
rounds. The view is that they be-
came converts to tariff reductions 
following their experience in the 
European market. So regional inte-
gration is the best way to prepare 
countries for full liberalisation. 
■ Do you believe the industrialised 
world should reduce tariffs further 
to allow easier access for LDCs? 
I fully agree with the pro-
posal of Renato Ruggiero (Secre-
tary General of the World Trade 
Organisation) which was made 
prior to the Singapore ministerial 
meeting. The idea, which UNCTAD 
has also proposed in the past, is 
that the international community 
should grant the LDCs unrestricted 
market access - in other words, 
zero tariffs and zero trade barriers. 
If people are sincere about estab-
lishing a date for the abolition of 
all barriers to trade, we could start 
by giving this treatment to the 
least developed. But I know very 
well that this is a non-starter. 
■ What is UNCTAD's position on 
'ethical' subjects now on the inter-
national trade agenda, such as 
protection of the environment and 
labour practices? 
I think they are goals for 
all countries and societies and 
should be encouraged by positive 
means. In UNCTAD, for instance, 
an expert group meeting has been 
convened on positive trade mea-
sures for the environment. How 
can you come up with trade incen-
tives to help countries adopt bet-
ter environmental measures? The 
same could be done to improve 
labour conditions. I don't think we 
should be talking about measures 
which are protectionist or could be 
seen as 'punishment', because the 
issues involved are generally very 
complicated. Take child labour, for 
instance. Subjects like this are so 
complex in terms of societies, and 
you can only find a solution with 
an enormous and gradual effort, 
through incentives. Sanctions 
would not work. I think you have 
to discuss matters which have a 
stronger social content in institu-
tions which are best prepared to 
deal with such matters. And trade 
negotiators are not the best quali-
fied people to deal with complex 
societal questions. 
'Trade negotiators are 
not the best qualified 
people to deal with 
complex societal 
questions.' 
■ Can you tell us a little about 
how UNCTAD is organised? 
We have undergone seri-
ous reform over the past two 
years. There used to be nine divi-
sions in the Secretariat and now 
we are down to four. There has 
also been a 12% reduction in pro-
fessional staff - double that of 
many other UN bodies. The inter-
governmental machinery has also 
been greatly simplified. Instead of 
a dozen commissions and bodies, 
we now have only three and they 
correspond more or less to three 
of the divisions. These divisions 
deal with globalisation and macro 
economics; trade and commodities 
and; investment, enterprise and 
technology. The fourth is a sort of 
practical arm, dealing with trade 
efficiency, modernisation of cus-
toms and so on. 
There has been a deeper 
process of rethinking the organisa-
tion's role. UNCTAD has gone 
through an identity crisis with the 
end of the long struggle for a new 
international economic order, and 
following the creation of the 
WTO. We now have a very clear 
mission: to try to help countries in 
transition, developing countries 
and LDCs in particular, to integrate 
into the world trading system and 
economy. That doesn't mean that 
everything in the world economic 
system is perfect or that you can't 
improve things. But we hope that 
through our involvement in this in-
tegration process, we can influ-
ence the changes to make the sys-
tem more receptive. 
The economy is only an in-
strument. It is formed through so-
cial choices and values - and soci-
ety has to choose the values that 
are capable of promoting and de-
veloping the poorest among us. 
Any society will ultimately be 
judged on the way it treats its 
least-advantaged members. This is 
as true for the United Kingdom or 
the United States as it is for my 
own country, Brazil. It is also true 
for the international community. 
Most of the trade negotia-
tions nowadays are done in the 
WTO. In our trade division, a large 
part of our work involves prepar-
ing countries for those talks. We 
have developed a very satisfactory 
relationship with the WTO, in 
which we take care of the pre-ne-
gotiating phase and part of the 
post-negotiating agenda. In Singa-
pore, the developing nations had 
only a defensive strategy. We are 
trying to draw up a positive agen-
da to identify new trading oppor-
tunities. For example, there are 
many developing countries that 
are able to export health services. 
And there are numerous possibili-
ties in electronics: India, for in-
stance, has the scope to export 
software. We give advice to coun-
tries participating in financial ser-
vices talks. At the implementation 
stage, we are running a series of 
projects covering trade participa-
tion, efficient enterprise develop-
ment, national systems of innova-
tion, use of technology and 
attraction of foreign investment. 
So there's a lot to do - more, in 
fact, than we can accomplish with 
OUr means. WE Interview by D.P. 
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400 participants, including many big names in ACP-EU cooperation, gathered in Brussels at the end of the 
September for a major debate on what should come after Lomé IV. The event was organised by the Euro-
pean Commission in collaboration with the Club de Bruxelles. The consultation process was launched by the 
Commission a year previously when it published its Green Paper on future relations between the EU and the 
ACP countries. In the intervening period, a number of major meetings have been staged, and the Commis-
sion has received suggestions from many interested parties. 
The first speaker at the Brussels confer-
I enee was Commission President Jacques Santer. 
He spoke warmly of the ACP-EU relationship, de-
I scribing it as 'one of the most deep-rooted' that 
Europe enjoyed. His main emphasis, however, 
I was on adapting to new circumstances. Mr Santer 
| referred to changes taking place in the EU: the 
I move towards a single currency; a more coordi-
I nated foreign policy; new provisions on conflict 
I prevention, and the prospect of further enlarge-
| ment. Founded on 'peace, solidarity and coopera-
I tion,' he said, the Union was strengthening its 
I voice in the world. But it needed to boost the ¡m-
I pact of the resources it gives to development co-
I operation. 
The Commission President acknowledged the 
difficulties facing many ACPs in adjusting to rapid glob-
alisation. To help overcome these, he called for genuine 
partnership. Development cooperation, he observed, had 
always enjoyed European public support but 'we need to 
be inventive' in finding new ways to make the system 
more effective. 
The ACP Group's keynote speaker was Matthew 
Rukikaire, Uganda's Finance Minister. He also spoke 
about the changing global context, and the way this af-
fected the conception and implementation of ACP-EU 
cooperation. 'We cannot shy way from this', he acknowl-
edged. The Minister spoke of the need to narrow the 
gap that had opened up between developed and devel-
oping countries and expressed concern about the impact 
of eroding trade preferences. 'Do we need another Con-
vention?' he then asked, answering the question himself 
with an emphatic 'yes'. The Lomé system, he argued, had 
brought many benefits - one of the less recognised ones 
being the consolidation of links among a diverse group 
of developing countries. 
Mr Rukikaire highlighted three areas he felt 
should receive more prominence in any new arrange-
ments: the role of the private sector; the environment; 
and population growth. These subjects, he believed, 
were not dealt with sufficiently in existing texts. And he 
concluded with a blunt assessment, speaking of the need 
to eliminate 'the economic and social differences which 
continue to make one partner superior and the other in-
ferior'. 
Prime Minister of France, Michel Rocard, who 
chairs the European Parliament's Development Commit-
tee, spoke next, raising a series of issues that his Commit-
tee felt were important. These included the need to im-
prove the 'partnership' concept, support 
démocratisation, provide for conflict prevention, and 
broaden the system beyond the existing 'inter-state' ap-
proach. 
He spoke of the need for a profound review of 
the content of the Convention, with a particular empha-
sis on trade. Having acceded to the World Trade Organi-
sation, he observed, it would no longer be possible for 
the ACP and EU states to operate a system of 'asymmet-
ric preferences'. It was, therefore, necessary to discuss 
other possibilities with the WTO. Mr Rocard was also pes-
simistic about the volumes of aid which would be avail-
able in future. 'At best, these will stagnate', he said, 'and 
the amount available could even fall.' In these circum-
stances, it was essential that aid be deployed very differ-
ently... and more effectively. Mr Rocard also highlighted 
the importance of decentralised cooperation, food self-
sufficiency, measures to protect tropical forests, debt al-
leviation and the role of women in development. He 
concluded on a relatively upbeat note. 'Even if the situa-
tion is grave in many ACP countries, it is not irretriev-
able.' 
The final speaker in the opening session was De-
velopment Commissioner, João de Deus Pinheiro. He 
highlighted five areas that would be central during the 
coming negotiating phase, which may be summarised as 
follows: 
- The sense of ownership. The ACPs are the 'owners' of 
their future development and this must be reflected in 
the discussions. 
- A political partnership. Europe, in forging ahead, was 
acquiring a more marked political dimension and this 
should lead to a deeper dialogue with the ACPs. 
- Bringing in new partners. Civil society wants a more ac-
tive role in the system. Reflecting this, the Commission 
would propose giving non-governmental actors the op-
portunity to participate, and there would be systematic 
consultation. 
- Geographical scope. While the move was towards co-
operation based on 'differentiation' (recognising the 
varying needs and development levels of different ACP 
countries and regions), the Commissioner was 'struck by 
the sense of ACP solidarity'. The Lomé Convention, de-
spite its shortcomings, remained a model of North-South 
cooperation. 
- The trade dimension. The options here would have to 
be weighed carefully and anything decided must be in 
line with WTO rules. There was a need, however, for 
ACPs to be given time to adapt. 
Participants at the meeting went on to discuss 
more detailed questions in five thematic 'round tables'. 
The Brussels event may have been the final 
phase of the Green Paper consultation but, as Professor 
Pinheiro pointed out, the debate was by no means over. 
The Commission would shortly draw up a set of political 
guidelines for submission to the EC Council - taking ac-
count of observations made during the consultation 
phase. This will be followed, later, by a draft negotiating 
mandate. ACP leaders will, meanwhile, be meeting in 
Gabon (in November 1997) to discuss their negotiating 
position. Formal talks between the two sides are due to 
begin in Autumn 1998. ■■ S.H. 
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by Sir Shridath Ramphal 
A former Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Sir Shridath Ramphal has been associated with ACP-EU 
cooperation since its earliest days. He was one of the driving forces behind the first Lomé Convention in the 
early 1970s and now, a quarter of a century on, he is back at the negotiating table, representing the 
Caribbean in the discussions about what should replace Lomé IV. In June, he attended a consultative session 
of the Commission's Green Paper organised in London by the UK Government. Here, we publish an abridged 
version of his speech - in which Sir Shridath spoke forcefully about the importance of ACP solidarity. 
I have been asked 
to speak from a Caribbean 
perspective on 'the argu-
ment against splitting the 
ACP'. Let me make clear at 
the outset that the 
Caribbean is now not just 
the familiar CARICOM 
Group of English-speaking 
countries but CARICOM 
enhanced by Dutch-speak-
ing 5uriname and now 
subsumed for present purposes 
into the CARIFORUM Group -
which includes French-speaking 
Haiti and the Spanish-speaking 
Dominican Republic. We are per-
haps now the most multi-lingual 
part of the ACP. 
And I must make some-
thing else clear. I am perhaps not 
the most neutral person to speak 
about the 'splitting' of the ACP 
Group. Modesty forbids me claim-
ing paternity; but I was among the 'founding fathers'. 
That 'ACP' logo - which I am glad to see has passed 
the test of time - was drawn in my office in Guyana's 
Foreign Ministry. So I speak with some awareness of 
what were ACP hopes and ambitions back in 1975. 
Lomé I was a Treaty between the European 
Economic Community as it then was and 46 countries 
of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. It was after 
we signed that Treaty in Togo that the ACP was for-
mally created by the Georgetown Agreement of 6 
June 1975. To understand how we got there - and 
what 'splitting' the ACP Group means I must recapitu-
late a little. 
Twenty-five years ago, in mid-1972, what 
were to become the ACP countries were the 'Associ-
ates' and the 'Associables' as Europe saw them. The 
pressure from Brussels was for an arrangement which 
reflected one of the 'options' the Community had 
prepared and packaged in Protocol 22 of the Treaty 
of Accession. These options included allowing 'Asso-
ciables' to join the existing 'Associates' in a revised 
Yaoundé Convention, a separate Arusha-type Conven-
tion for the 'Associables' under article 138 of the 
Rome Treaty, or a simple trade agreement. What 
eventually emerged, despite Community mythology 
to the contrary, was a sui generis agreement - the 
Lomé Convention. The fact that such an agreement 
was able to emerge from the negotiations held be-
tween 1972 and 1974 was in large measure attribut-
able to the emergence and solidarity of the ACP. 
Driving that thrust for 
ACP unity was the determina-
tion of 'Associates' and 'Associa-
bles' alike that the nature of 
their economic cooperation with 
the Community, consequent on 
its enlargement, would not be in 
the mould of 'colonial' arrange-
ments, but be responsive to their 
yearning for a new economic 
order in the world and their 
commitment to South-South co-
operation. The negotiating 
countries were there because 
history, including European colo-
nialism, brought them there; but 
the Lomé Convention was not 
about post-colonial reparation. 
Some of the European partners 
did not carry that baggage at all 
- as most of the new partners do 
not. But all carried a responsibili-
ty for cooperating with this 
group of developing countries 
whom history had brought into 
cohesion and into a unique relationship with an en-
larging, integrating Europe. 
This is not just reflective analysis. In my own 
first words at the opening of the ACP-EEC Conference 
on July 26 1973, speaking then on behalf of the 
Caribbean, I said: 
'...so long as our negotiations are conditioned 
not by the precedents of a passing era but by a re-
solve to identify a model of relationships more rele-
vant to the needs and the mood of the 1970s and be-
yond, there is no reason to doubt our joint capacity to 
devise it.... We seek from the Community arrange-
ments for cooperation in the area of trade and eco-
nomic development that are just, enlightened and ef-
fective - arrangements informed by past effort and 
experience but determined by the criteria we estab-
lish for relationships of the future.' 
And that is what we did. The result, as I said in 
Lomé, was not as just, as enlightened or likely to be as 
effective as the ACP would have wished; but the ef-
fort was about newness - a new partnership, a new 
way of cooperating for development. Europe, in the 
end, helped to make it possible, but it was ACP insis-
tence that compelled it. 
That insistence came, as it could only come, 
through solidarity forged resolutely by the ACP. In the 
short period between 1972 and 1974, ministerial 
meetings were held in Lagos, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, 
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Abidjan, Dakar, Kingston and Accra. Abidjan was 
where a united African approach to the negotiations 
was forged, with the adoption of the 'eight princi-
ples' that the ACP as a whole would subsequently 
adopt. 
At the first meeting, held in Brussels in July 
1973, each ACP region had its own representatives. 
This was the only time this happened. Therafter in 
the negotiations, they spoke to the Community with 
one voice. It was often an African voice, sometimes a 
Caribbean or Pacific one, but always one that repre-
sented the whole Group. At the final negotiating ses-
sion with European ministers, the ACP's spokesmen 
on the key sectors came from Gabon, Mauritania, 
Guyana, Fiji, Jamaica and Senegal. 
'Unity is not won easily but 
the cost of losing it 
is dear indeed' 
My point is that it was ACP solidarity, unity 
and togetherness that made the Lomé Convention 
possible at all - and made it possible as a new way 
forward, not an old way reinforced. That solidarity 
was hard won; it united Africa as never before in its 
economic relations with Europe (at least to the extent 
that they were covered by the Convention) - and I 
like to think the Caribbean made a contribution to 
that. A quarter of a century of working together as 
the ACP has not been without its strains; but who 
knows better than Europe that while unity is not won 
easily, the cost of losing it is dear indeed. 
The time has come to move on. The world has 
changed, and post Lomé IV arrangements must take 
account of these changes - as the Green Paper has in 
this respect correctly observed. But I am as certain as 
one can be of anything in these uncertain times, that 
if those updated arrangements are to be worthy of 
the efforts we are about to undertake they must be 
founded on the rock of ACP solidarity - in the inter-
est of the ACP of course, and I suspect in the interest 
of Europe too, but most of all in the interest this time 
of truly just, enlightened and effective arrangements. 
Notions of 'splitting' the ACP do not offer a pathway 
to such arrangements. 
Let me add another dimension. Europe, in its 
approach to the negotiations, can obviously con-
tribute to the 'splitting' of the ACP - even without 
wanting to. Ideas like 'differentiation', 'régionalisa-
tion' and, most pertinently, 'graduation', can work in 
this direction - though not necessarily so. But let it 
not be forgotten that for all its closeness to the Lomé 
process, the ACP does not exist solely on the basis of 
the Lomé Convention. It can be split only by the ACP 
itself, as Europe can be split only by Europe itself. I 
have talked already about the Georgetown Agree-
ment - the ACP's organic instrument. It is instructive 
that when last month, South Africa acceded to the 
Lomé IV, our 71st ACP member country simultaneous-
ly, but separately, signed the Georgetown Agree-
ment. South Africa became a member of the ACP 
Group not by signing the Convention but by signing 
the Agreement. That Agreement does not end in Feb-
ruary 2000. Under it, the ACP countries are obliged 'to 
define a common stand for the ACP Group vis-a-vis 
the EU' on these matters. 
So let us think positively of new arrangements 
between the EU and the ACP Group of countries -
which is today the most structured example of 
North/South economic cooperation. With imagination 
and a willingness on all sides to be creative, post-
Lomé arrangements can be a model that accommo-
dates the needs of the peoples of all the partner 
countries as we go into the 21st century. That very 
South African experience of joining Lomé has demon-
strated the capacity of the Convention to accommo-
date quite substantial differences in the situation of 
ACP states. 
The Caribbean countries wish to negotiate 
such arrangements, and will not lack in imagination 
and creativity. But we will not lack either in resolve to 
protect the interests of our people. We will not be im-
pressed by arguments which sacrifice or imperil those 
interests on the alter of fashionable doctrine. We will 
insist on our special needs as small states, impover-
ished in real terms, being acknowledged for the reali-
ty they are. We will seek this in the interest of human 
security in the Caribbean. We will seek it in the inter-
est of sustaining our democracies - some very old, 
some very new. We will demonstrate why these two 
objectives must be pursued in tandem. 
'Indiscriminate and insensitive 
ideology masquerading 
as the new order' 
For us this is no theoretical exercise in future 
planning. We are living through the terrible experi-
ence of the threat to our small societies and fragile 
economies at the level of bananas - the kind of threat 
that arises for people, some among the-poorest, when 
arrangements designed to redress inequality - like the 
Banana Protocol - are threatened by indiscriminate 
and insensitive ideology masquerading as the new 
order. The Caribbean does not seek a future dominat-
ed by a culture of preferences; but it does seek a fu-
ture. We believe we have a right to do so; and the EU 
has a responsibility to help us. We look specially to 
Britain for understanding and practical support in this 
matter. 
Bananas are a warning to us of the serious im-
plications of the post Lomé IV negotiations. A part of 
that warning is what we must do to live in this new 
world; what dangers we must guard against; what 
opportunities we must take; above all, what we must 
do to prepare ourselves for the vicissitudes of the fu-
ture. But it should be a warning to the EU too of 
what must not be undone; how the best of Lomé 
must be strengthened; how the rest of Lomé must be 
improved and how new approaches and arrange-
ments must enhance this unique partnership between 
almost half the world's countries, WE S.R 
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of North-East Somalia 
A pilot survey, conducted by three researchers' in the Bari area of 
Somalia, provides some useful data about literacy levels and educa-
tional provision available locally. Since the overthrow of the Siad 
Barre regime in January 1991, Somalia has had no central govern-
ment and in parts of the country, clan conflicts are still taking place. 
However, Bari, which is in the far north-east, is largely peaceful. It 
has a functioning regional administration and significant trading 
links with the countries of the Arabian peninsula. 
The survey, the re-
3 suits of which were publi-
shed in August, highlights 
' the scale of the challenge 
facing the authorities, nota-
bly in broadening educatio-
nal access for young people. 
: The researchers interviewed 
411 randomly selected 
adults over a ten-day period 
in March. The latter answered a se-
ries of questions about their own 
education needs and literacy levels, 
their children's schooling and their 
radio-listening habits. 
Information about 1263 
children was gathered in the inter-
views. Of these, only 14% were re-
ceiving formal schooling with boys 
outnumbering girls by almost two 
to one. The researchers acknowled-
ged that the overall percentage of 
children in 'official' schools in the 
region was probably less, since the 
sample was weighted in favour of 
urban areas. Significantly, 37% of 
children were receiving Koranic 
tuition and 15% were involved in 
other educational activities. These 
' Main findings of an education survey in the 
Bari area of Somalia, conducted by A. Abdi 
(UNDOS), J. Antoine and A. Khan (World View). 
figures underline how non-formal 
approaches to education have 
been developed to fill the gap left 
by the public authorities. 
Allowing for overlaps (chil-
dren getting both formal and non-
formal tuition, or both Koranic and 
other non-formal education), just 
over half the sample was benefi-
ting from some schooling. 48% re-
ceived no structured education and 
among girls, the proportion was al-
most two-thirds. 
Replies to questions about 
their own educational achieve-
ments revealed that two thirds of 
adults can read and 60% have 
basic literacy and numeracy. Inter-
estingly, the percentages for 'de-
clared' and 'proven' literacy were 
almost identical - which shows that 
the people of Bari are honest in re-
plying to questionnaires. 
The proportion of adults 
who had received further educa-
tion in one form or another was 
encouragingly high (38%). Here, 
the gender bias was reversed, with 
significantly more women than 
men involved. More than 40% of 
respondents (male and female) 
were able to speak a second lan-
guage. 
Selected survey results 
Children (sample 1263) 
Receiving formal schooling 
Receiving Koranic education 
Involved in other educational activities 
Total receiving education 
Adults (sample 411) 
Declared literate 
Declared numerate 
Both literate and numerate 
Involved in further education activities 
Speak other languages 
Number 
178 
471 
194 
653 
278 
262 
246 
157 
167 
% of total 
sample 
14 
37 
15 
52 
68 
64 
60 
38 
41 
% female 
34 
38 
35 
37 
45 
45 
43 
49 
42 
In replies to questions 
about their educational needs, 
many interviewees revealed wider 
preoccupations including, not sur-
prisingly, the desire for peace, the 
restoration of legitimate govern-
ment and a better quality of life. 
More specifically, subjects such as 
getting a job, having access to eve-
ryday materials, and the possibility 
of migrating were mentioned. 
Concerns about water supply and 
managing during drought periods 
rated highly in this arid region. As 
for education, people naturally 
wanted better opportunities both 
for themselves and their children. 
A desire was also expressed for im-
proved access to information. 
78% of respondents said 
they had listened to radio at some 
point during the preceding year 
(70% in the previous week and 
54% the previous day). 68% of 
households had radio sets but a si-
gnificant number of people were 
unable to use these at times becau-
se of power cuts or difficulties in 
obtaining batteries. Over half of 
those questioned felt that radio 
should be used to broaden educa-
tion in Somalia with many suppor-
ting the idea of specific pro-
grammes for this purpose. 
Given these replies, the re-
searchers suggest that radio is pro-
bably the best medium available 
for developing education, particu-
larly in the countryside and in 
areas containing internally-displa-
ced people. As a practical measure, 
they recommend that educational 
programmes should include the 
provision and distribution of batte-
ries, and of 'wind-up' or solar 
power radio sets. 
Given that Bari is one of 
the most peaceful and organised 
regions of Somalia, the figures for 
young people's education make 
worrying reading. It may be pos-
sible to learn to read and count 
without structured teaching, but it 
is obviously a lot more difficult. In 
this context, the fact that literacy 
rates among adults are higher than 
school attendance rates among 
children should ring alarm bells. 
The educational vacuum left by the 
civil war may have been partially 
filled (mainly by the religious au-
thorities) but it is still the case that 
a new generation is growing up 
with less access to schooling than 
their parents enjoyed. WB S.H. 
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industrial enterprises: a new approach 
by Fernando Matos Rosa" 
Since the first Lomé Conven-
I tion came into force, the 
main concern of the partners 
has been to create the right 
I conditions for the balanced 
development of the develop-
ing states in question. How-
ever, as preconceived ideas 
of development have 
evolved and the instruments 
and mechanisms of support 
^^™ have become more spe-
cialised, it is natural that today's 
concerns are no longer exactly the 
same as yesterday's. What was per-
ceived as a priority 30 years ago is 
probably still a priority today, but it 
has now been incorporated into a 
broader, more harmonious whole 
which encompasses new priorities 
as well. In any case, the ultimate ob-
jective - providing the people of de-
veloping countries with improved 
well-being and living standards -
can no longer be left to the initia-
tive of governments alone. It is just 
as much - and indeed increasingly -
a matter for society and the private 
sector, given the important role the 
latter plays in job creation. To 
achieve the goals of development, 
there remains a need to create new 
enterprises, develop trade and, of 
course, continue building the basic 
infrastructures and get them work-
ing. Similarly, we need to improve 
the business environment, basic ed-
ucation and vocational training. The 
Centre of the Development of Indus-
try (CDI) certainly has a part to play. 
The CDI was set up 20 
years ago, at a time when the 
Lomé Convention was still in its in-
fancy. The place of the private sec-
tor and SMEs in development was 
different then. In most cases, they 
were seen as 'important but not 
essential'. The CDI, in those days, 
presented itself as a 'marriage bu-
* Deputy-Director of the Centre for the De-
velopment of Industry in Brussels. 
reau', encouraging the establish-
ment of joint ventures with Euro-
pean partners. Its success was mod-
est, bearing in mind the conditions 
that existed at the time. 
Confronted by recent 
changes, the CDI has successfully 
adapted to its new priorities. Calls 
upon its services have increased 
over the years, from about 190 ac-
tions in 1993 to more than 600 in 
1996. New projects now account 
for only a third of the total, the re-
maining two-thirds being existing 
projects, with the assistance of the 
Centre being sought for rehabilita-
tion or expansion of business activ-
ities. The most important point to 
note is that 60% of the projects 
are strictly local, with no foreign 
partners. The concept of partner-
ship itself has, in any case, 
changed, moving away from a 
straightforward joint venture with 
a participating interest in the capi-
tal, towards a broader concept of 
technical and commercial partner-
ship. 
The CDI has developed a 
comprehensive service approach, 
very close to the firms, in the 
framework of its role as a provider 
of direct assistance to industrial 
companies. As far as existing en-
terprises are concerned, it is rare 
for problems to be exclusively due 
to production factors. The CDI, 
therefore, carries out an in-depth 
expert analysis of the enterprise 
before embarking on long-term 
assistance. On the other hand, 
where new ventures are con-
cerned, it plays a critical part in 
finding the right scale for the pro-
ject and taking the right market 
approach. This comprehensive, 
multifunctional service philosophy 
is an example that is still virtually 
unique among multilateral institu-
tions. It is a form of assistance de-
signed to be highly diversified, 
covering every phase of the pro-
ject cycle, from conception to pro-
duction, with the exception of fi-
nancing. 
Although it is not itself a 
financial institution, the CDI works 
closely with the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB). Within the frame-
work of the Lomé Convention, 
good operational coordination is 
ensured both with the bank and 
with the European Commission. 
The Centre also cooperates with fi-
nancial development institutions 
(especially in Europe), such as the 
EDFI Group (40 projects in 1996), 
the International Finance Corpora-
tion (IFC) and the African Develop-
ment Bank (ADB). This is not to 
mention our work with large num-
bers of development banks, risk 
capital funds and guarantee funds 
in the ACP states. In this area, the 
CDI's role in helping to set up fi-
nancial packages is expanding 
rapidly and is much appreciated by 
promoters. In addition, the Centre 
is able to provide advice on project 
financing options, while encourag-
ing improved project structuring 
by reference to the characteristics 
of, and markets for, the products 
in question. 
Collaboration which is 
appreciated 
It would be wrong to see 
the role of the CDI as being merely 
that of an administrative facility. 
Half its executives are actually em-
ployed in technical functions. 
These are extremely important for 
new projects (conception, estab-
lishment and production) and ex-
isting ones, where the issues are 
restructuring, rehabilitation and 
the expansion or diversification of 
industrial units. 
Although a good number 
of the Centre's actions originate in 
requests from promoters, most 
arise from the CDI's own initia-
fl 
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tives. For some years, the CDI has 
implemented a policy of concen­
trating on specific sectors and sub-
sectors which offer the potential 
for creating and developing enter­
prises in the ACP states. One exam­
ple is agro-industries, which ac­
count for about 40% of its 
activities. The CDI has organised 
propagation, contact and promo­
tion schemes in various subsectors, 
ranging from production of pack­
aging to the export of organic 
farming produce (including fruit 
and fruit processing, specific di­
etary products, etc). A further ex­
ample is the production and pro­
cessing of meat, poultry and 
ostrich. Other sectors benefiting 
from the Centre's services are 
skins, leather, footwear, wood­
working, textiles, clothing and or­
namental stones. 
At present, more than 40% 
of the CDI's activities originate 
with initiatives in specific sectors. 
Others arise from the industrial 
fora which it organises jointly with 
the European Commission. In these 
cases, the issue is the monitoring 
and establishment of contacts in 
order to consolidate projects that 
come into existence between Euro­
pean and ACP partners. 
As the CDI's services are 
based in Brussels, it has established 
Industrial operation in Fiji. 
Confronted with recent changes the CDI has 
been able to adapt to the new priorities 
many contacts within the ACP 
countries and the Member States 
of the Union. As far as the former 
are concerned, these networks are 
in the form of more than a hun­
dred branches, while in the latter 
the CDI has signed cooperation 
agreements with 42 European pro­
motion, development and trading 
institutions, both regional and na­
tional. The Centre thus maintains 
active, daily cooperation with the 
various instruments and mecha­
nisms of development cooperation 
in Europe. The activities of the CDI 
here are well known and appreci­
ated by most European institutions 
- which are involved in the joint fi­
nancing of the bulk of its projects. 
It should be noted that a European 
or ACP partner does not have to 
approach the CDI directly. Its ACP 
branches or partner institutions in 
Europe can arrange the establish­
ment of contacts and the prepara­
tion of the files. 
The Centre's activities and 
the number of projects it assists 
have increased year by year. This 
prompts a thought for its future. 
Since the institution is clearly ori­
ented towards the private sector 
(98% of projects have private-sec­
tor partners), it will be important 
to ensure that future needs are 
satisfied, and that it is ready to 
deal with the changes resulting 
from economic recovery in a good 
many ACP countries. Already, 
more than 50 ACP states have 
recognised the development of 
the private sector as being impor­
tant or very important for their 
economies. The CDI, for its part, 
will have to speed up the decen­
tralisation of its activities. This has 
already been done in a small num­
ber of ACPs, working in conjunc­
tion with the European Commis­
sion. 
It will also be necessary to 
broaden the mandate of the Cen­
tre (presently confined to industry) 
to include the service sector, con­
verting it to a centre for the devel­
opment of business. This, of 
course, will involve providing assis­
tance to local institutions, voca­
tional and technical training de­
partments, financial institutions 
involved in project evaluation, and 
companies supported by risk capi­
tal and guarantee funds. 
Even though the develop­
ment of private economic activities 
is not a universal panacea, the IMF 
is predicting a 6.4% growth rate 
for the developing countries dur­
ing 1998 - much higher than Eu­
rope's 2.8%. The prospects are en­
couraging and, to the extent that 
it can with the resources available 
to it, the CDI aims to plays an ever 
more active role as a reliable part­
ner in development. WM F.M.R. 
the Courier n° 166 - november-december 1997 
fl The fight against AIDS 
ten years on 
by Marijke van Hemeldonck* 
Dynamism and generosity are the hallmarks of the European Union's 
development policy. The same is true of its anti-AIDS campaign 
which is characterised by flexibility, the competence of the services 
who deal with the subject, and the remarkably democratic way in 
which EU institutions operate. 
Back in 1981, it was 
I no more than a rumour or 
I perhaps two ignoble ru-
I mours replete with preju-
I dice and racism. The first 
I was that a terrible plague 
I was threatening public 
I health world-wide, affect-
I ing, in particular, a poor, 
weak population in the 
Caribbean. The second was that in 
this new disease, the gods had 
placed a curse on certain sexual 
minorities. We didn't want to be-
lieve it was all happening. 
Around 1984, the rumour 
was confirmed by science. The 
human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) was tracked down and iden-
tified and, for the first time since 
the great epidemics of the Middle 
Ages, all humankind seemed at 
risk from an unknown pandemic 
of terrifying proportions. Everyone 
was horrified, but this time we be-
lieved it. 
We went into action, and 
it was not long before the EU insti-
tutions (in many cases well in ad-
vance of the Member States) 
began to take the HIV/AIDS factor 
into account when working out 
and implementing their actions 
and programmes. 
A political challenge 
The size of the political 
challenge could be measured by 
the obstacles that stood in the way 
of intervention by European or 
government agencies. In the initial 
stages of the epidemic, there was 
much political activity in an at-
tempt to define a legal framework 
which would allow the disease to 
be kept in check. Public health poi-
* Former Member of the European Parlia-
ment. 
icy had to be reoriented, health 
structures strengthened, and social 
and civil solidarity with AIDs vic-
tims developed. But the public, the 
press and the decision-makers 
were not yet fully aware of the 
gravity of the problem. Any politi-
cal decision meant taking a risk, 
because everything was so unfa-
miliar - so it required extraordi-
nary courage and commitment. 
Moreover, it was possible that EU 
action might come up against the 
argument put forward by at least 
two Member States at the time -
which was that the Treaty of Rome 
did not give the Community any 
competence in the area of health 
policy. 
Vice-President Lorenzo Na-
tali was the first to take on the po-
litical risk. He resolutely set the 
Commission on the road towards 
intervention, giving more empha-
sis to the spirit of the Treaties than 
to their letter. He went before the 
European Parliament's Develop-
ment Committee to explain his ap-
proach, arguing that, under the 
Lomé Convention, Europe had a 
duty of solidarity and concern for 
the welfare of people living in the 
developing countries. This led to 
the launch, in mid-1987, of the 
Commission's AIDS programme. 
This was initially set up in the 
framework of cooperation with 
the ACP states but from 1988, it 
was extended to cover all develop-
ing countries. 
The approach attracted 
wide support from the EU institu-
tions and the Commission services. 
Indeed, a few MEPs broached the 
subject at the ACP-EC Joint Assem-
bly in autumn 1984. The Assembly 
discussed the issue but was unable 
to recommend a policy because of 
the disinformation emanating 
from the national authorities in 
the countries concerned. For its 
part, the European Parliament ac-
tively encouraged the Commis-
sion's action with budgetary pro-
posals from the Development and 
Research Committees and other 
specific resolutions. 
On 23 July 1986, the Coun-
cil of Ministers, in turn, gave its 
backing. With this, the European 
Union became the World Health 
Organisation's main partner in the 
campaign against AIDS, and the 
top donor in global terms - there-
by proving that it is much more 
than merely a 'Common Market'. 
Institutional flexibility 
A special Health/AIDS Unit 
was set up in the Commission's De-
velopment Directorate-General 
(DG VIII). Thanks to particularly 
well-informed officials, and a 
group of experts from outside, the 
EU was able to adapt and redirect 
its strategy in line with develop-
ments in knowledge about the dis-
ease and experience acquired in 
the field. 
What initially appeared as 
an urgent operation in response to 
a lightning-fast epidemic, evolved 
over time into an integrated poli-
cy. The original 'public-health 
problem' was quickly recognised as 
a society-wide problem encom-
passing aspects such as poverty, in-
equality and social status. 
It is estimated that some 
30 million people are HIV-positive 
and 90% of these are in the devel-
oping countries. Given the extent 
of this disaster, it was imperative 
to deal with the most pressing and 
essential aspects: prevention pro-
grammes, the security of blood 
supplies, support for research, and 
strengthening of the health sector. 
The most urgent issues were to as-
sess which health problems were 
specific to women and children, to 
eliminate risk factors and to moni-
tor fresh outbreaks of other trans-
missible diseases among exposed 
populations. To this end, from 
1987 onwards, the EU has distrib-
uted more than ECU 159 million to 
365 programmes in the developing 
countries, particularly for preven-
tion and support actions. 
S 
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There is still no effective 
vaccine but, in the industrialised 
countries, recent developments in 
the treatment of sufferers affords 
a measure of hope. The prospects 
for HIV-positive patients in the de­
veloping countries, however, re­
main a matter for grave concern. 
There seems to be no relief for 
their suffering and that of their 
families. Public-health systems are 
collapsing, social budgets are ex­
hausted, the pool of qualified per­
sonnel is diminishing, people are 
drifting away from the countryside 
towards the towns (with the land 
they leave behind reverting to 
desert), children are receiving no 
education and the traditional 
structures of family and local com­
munity solidarity are being erod­
ed. At the most recent Davos Sum­
mit, President Nelson Mandela 
called on international donors to 
take account of the long-term 
socio-economic consequences of 
the pandemic. 
The EU's anti-HIV/AIDS 
campaign is well regarded by 
other specialised agencies in the 
field, including UNAIDS (the UN's 
common action against AIDS) and 
the World Bank - which are its 
partners in the developing coun­
tries. The image of the Vice-Presi­
dent of the Commission, Manuel 
Marin, willingly giving blood at an 
EU-funded blood bank in Uganda, 
was seen as symbolic of Europe's 
ongoing commitment to the fight 
against AIDS. 
Media aspects aside, the 
role of democratic dialogue in the 
campaign against the disease can­
not be underestimated. Since the 
crisis emerged, representatives of 
ordinary people have been given 
information, formed associations 
and been consulted about the 
AIDS programme, through the 
Joint Assembly and the European 
Parliament. The ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers, the Commission and the 
Member States have met on a reg­
ular basis for consultations aimed 
at improving their cooperational 
approach. And through close col­
laboration with NGOs, the EU has 
been able to extend its action, en­
abling it to reach those who might 
be regarded as on the 'bottom 
rung' of society's ladder. So, while 
the pandemic clearly represents a 
serious threat to family structures 
and society, the effort mobilised 
against the 'plague' has also 
prompted democratic innovation. 
The desire to preserve human dig­
nity amid distress, to respect indi­
vidual choice and differences, and 
to protect the weak and under­
privileged have led several states 
Vice-President Manuel Marin visiting the Nakasero 
Blood Transfusion Centre, in Kampala, which was 
rehabilitated with EDF funds 
to pay more attention to the rights 
of the individual, to expand social 
protection and to build a more tol­
erant society. 
It cannot be denied that, in 
the long term, AIDS is a threat to 
the very basis of society and tradi­
tional culture in developing coun­
tries. However, EU aid has caused 
family and local structures and tra­
ditions to be reexamined or re­
modelled, communications to be 
adapted and modernised, and cul­
ture and concepts of life itself to 
be looked at more closely. 
The EU, together with 
other bodies, is involved in the or­
ganisation of an international col­
loquium on Religion and AIDS 
which will be held in Senegal. This 
is in response to a wish expressed 
by the Joint Assembly which called 
on traditional and religious leaders 
to carry out a review of the human 
condition and basic values, to up­
date their precepts and practices 
to take account of HIV/AIDS, and 
to guide citizens towards solidarity 
and tolerance. 
In the ten years since its 
campaign against AIDS began, the 
EU has demonstrated the democ­
ratic vigour of its institutions, the 
flexibility of its interventions, the 
vigilance and competence of its 
staff and, above all, its genuine 
commitment to development and 
to people in distress. Ten years of 
action, however, have not prevent­
ed the disease from progressing 
and the scourge is still with us. This 
year, solidarity will again be ex­
pressed in the form of new budget 
appropriations, new strategies and 
new initiatives. Even the worst Eu-
rosceptic cannot deny that the 
'Common Market' - the predeces­
sor of the Europe of the Twelve 
and forerunner of the European 
Union - has developed a humanist 
strategy to combat AIDS. βΙ M.V.H. 
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El The vagaries of history 
Abomey, some 130 kilometres from Cotonou, is today the main town 
of the Zou district of Benin. In former times, it was the seat of a pow-
erful kingdom. The local chief, Dan, is reputed to have exclaimed in 
exasperation: 'Enough - you'll soon be building on my stomach!', re-
ferring to the ambition and impatience of Aho, grandson of the chief 
of Aliada, another kingdom to the south. His words were prophetic. 
Sometime later, Dan's mortal remains would be buried in the foun-
dations of an Aho house. 'Dan ho mé' means literally, 'in Dan's stom-
ach', and from this, it is said, came the name 'Dahomey', the country 
that is now known as Benin. (This story may be apocryphal. There 
are other interpretations of 'Dahomey', depending on which witch-
doctor you ask). What is not disputed is that Aho founded the king-
dom of Abomey, derived from 'Agbomé' which means 'fort precincts' 
in the fon language. From the fortifications, a town developed and 
there is widespread agreement that this is Benin's 'mother-city'. A king, to-
gether with his court, still reigns there amid relics of the past. These include 
sad reminders of the area's importance during the slave trade, which saw 
thousands forcibly transported to the Americas. 
A visitor to Benin will also be struck by the widespread freedom 
of speech. Gone are the days of Marxism-Leninism and the atmosphere is 
now very businesslike. Nowhere is this more striking than at the 'Djonké' 
roundabout in Cotonou, where you can hire a taxi and go all the way to 
Nigeria. The Naira (Nigeria's currency) is as acceptable here as the CFA 
franc. Indeed, Benin's capital is a showcase of economic liberalism. The 
roads seem to be filled with vehicles - a never-ending stream of cars and 
lorries, and hundreds of motorcycles that dance an intricate ballet as 
they weave in and out of the traffic. During the rush hour, central Coto-
nou is gridlocked. The city has not been able to cope with the increase in 
vehicle ownership which has tripled in Benin in the space of eight years. 
The old bridge spanning the lagoon groans under the weight of the traf-
fic. It is a part of the main route linking Cotonou with Nigeria in the 
West and Togo in the East. Paradoxically, given the air pollution, Coto-
nou and its port are the lungs of the national economy - and they have 
never been so busy. 
Politically, events have turned full circle in Benin with the return 
of Mathieu Kérékou to the Presidency. Having held power for 18 years 
during the Marxist-Leninist period, he bounced back to defeat the demo-
cratically-elected incumbent Nicéphore Soglo. There are few signs, how-
ever, of an economic 'U-turn' - which is significant for businesspeople, in-
cluding the many who are involved in the informal economy. The era of 
state economic management has passed and those who were regarded 
as dissidents during the Marxist-Leninist period have been 'rehabilitated'. 
Privatisation, begun under the first Kérékou regime and pursued under 
Soglo, is continuing. Trade, transport and the informal sector are all still 
'surfing' on the wave created by burgeoning consumerism. Now, as be-
fore, the country's main economic activity is trade with its neighbour, 
Nigeria. In 1996, earnings from trade and transit activities accounted for 
almost 50% of GDP. Agriculture and industry accounted for 38% and 
13%, respectively. 
Mathieu Kérékou won the second round of the March 1996 presi-
dential election with 52.5% of the vote against 47.5% for Nicéphore 
Soglo. His victory deserves to be seen as a measure of the country's politi-
cal dynamism. As yet, there are not very many examples in the Third 
World of incumbent presidents being beaten in a free and fair poll. In 
fact, the margin of victory was small - just 95,000 votes out of approxi-
A relic of the Marxist-Leninist era. 
Red Star Square 
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Kérékou's return to power should 
not be seen as an indictment of 
the democratic process, but rather 
as evidence that the system is run-
ning smoothly. Kérékou himself 
used a rather apt analogy when he 
said during the electoral cam-
paign, that the 'chameleon' had 
climbed back to the top of the 
tree. In fact, he chose the 
chameleon emblem because it is 
the symbolic animal of Akaba, one 
of the ancient kings of Abomey. 
But reassuringly for business, it 
suggests that old rulers have 
adapted to new circumstances. 
The number of political 
parties involved in government re-
flects the mood of electoral rest-
lessness which characterised the 
1996 campaign. There are no 
fewer than eight parties in the ad-
ministration (and 48 overall in this 
nation of just five million people). 
Although accepted as being 
broadly fair, significant shortcom-
ings were observed in the way the 
poll was conducted. These includ-
ed a lack of polling-station equip-
ment, the late opening of polling 
stations and multiple cases of 
fraud in the first round. Indeed, 
the Constitutional Court issued a 
statement to the effect that 'the 
unsatisfactory organisation' was 
'likely to compromise the legality 
and transparency of the elections'. 
It recorded fifteen types of irregu-
larity and also declared null and 
void 22.8% of the votes cast in the 
first round. 
At the same time, the re-
sults demonstrated the popula-
tion's geniune interest in the coun-
try's affairs. The vote confirmed 
the defeat of the outgoing presi-
dent, whose support had collapsed 
in the centre of the country, and 
the re-emergence of General 
Kérékou. Benin's democratic 
model, which first sprung to the 
attention of the world at the na-
tional conference attended by the 
'great' and the 'good' of the coun-
try in the early part of this decade, 
has been reconfirmed. Since the 
end of the Cold War in 1989, Benin 
has gained the reputation as a 
leader of the democratic move-
ment in West Africa. 
A smooth path 
to liberalisation 
Benin's transition to 
democracy was triggered by the 
economic collapse which led to the 
downfall of the previous system 
for managing public affairs. The 
results of the national conference 
may have been extraordinary, but 
it should not be assumed that re-
newed political stability means all 
the obstacles to sustainable devel-
opment have been overcome. The 
initial transfer of power from 
Kérékou to Soglo could be attrib-
uted to the financial collapse and 
the rebirth of open politics. The 
popular view is that the explana-
tion for the recent swing back to 
the country's old leader lies in the 
former government's failure suffi-
ciently to change the way in which 
public affairs were administered. 
Owing to its geographical 
position, Benin is a gateway to the 
sea for the landlocked countries of 
the hinterland and, as mentioned 
earlier, it earns about half its in-
come from commerce and the re-
export of goods. Most of these 
transactions, however, take place 
in the informal economy, which 
means that revenue from taxation 
Cotonou Port. 
Half the country's GDP comes from 
re-export activities 
does not reflect the tonnages ex-
ported. 
Two thirds of the working 
population is involved in agricul-
ture, notably in the cotton sector. 
Benin is one of the top cotton-
growing countries in Africa (in 
third place behind Egypt and Mali) 
and is the eleventh largest produc-
er worldwide. 15 years ago, the 
country produced just 14,500 
tonnes of cotton and a decade 
ago, like the rest of the economy, 
the sector was struggling, record-
ing a deficit of CFAF 6 billion. An 
overhaul was initiated in 198S, 
when Benin launched its structural 
adjustment programme. By 1991, 
production had soared to 177,000 
tonnes. The problem now was that 
the growers were surpassing the 
country's ginning capacity. The 
1990-1991 season produced a cot-
ton surplus worth CFAF 2 billion 
with the cotton gins only able to 
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cope with 140,000 tonnes. The 
Rural Development Ministry re-
sponded by authorising the set-
ting-up of new ginning units by 
private investors, thereby allowing 
the gradual liberalisation of the 
sector while safeguarding the fi-
nancial equilibrium of Sonapra 
(the National Agricultural Devel-
opment Association). Production 
figures jumped by 33% in 1996 
reaching 350,000 tonnes - al-
though the ginning capacity of 
Benin's twelve factories is still only 
300,000 tonnes, even working flat 
out. 
Cotton is thus a key driving 
force in the country's economy. 
The quality of the product is highly 
regarded and it sells well on the 
international market. As men-
tioned, the problem since structur-
al adjustment was initiated, is that 
more raw cotton is being delivered 
than local industry can handle. 
And institutional reform of the 
sector, involving the transfer of 
management of raw-cotton gin-
ning facilities - formerly adminis-
tered by regional rural develop-
ment action centres - to Sonapra, 
has not solved the problem. The 
sector's economic contribution is 
nonetheless impressive. Between 
1991 and 1994, exports of cotton 
fibre and cotton seed accounted 
for more than 74% of the total 
value of Benin's exports. In 1995, 
the proportion rose to 87%. 
Food crops are also doing 
well with marked increases in the 
production of beans and, more re-
cently, pineapples. According to 
ministry sources, bean production 
rose from 44,000 tonnes in 1988 to 
62,000 tonnes in 1992. Overall, 
agriculture has expanded at an av-
erage annual rate of 4% over the 
last two decades. Finance Minister 
Moïse Mensah, who is a former 
rural development minister, told 
us; 'When there is enough rainfall, 
Benin is now self-sufficient in 
terms of food'. It might even be 
possible for the country to become 
a net exporter of foodstuffs, par-
ticularly focusing on the neigh-
bouring Nigerian market, but for 
this to happen Benin would have 
to overcome certain constraints. 
These include insufficient water 
management, poor training and 
supervision structures, environ-
mental degradation, bush fires 
and the absence of land legisla-
tion. 
Privatisation of public com-
panies continues apace. This has 
been a donor 'requirement' since 
1988 in the context of efforts to 
reorganise and stabilise the bud-
get under the structural adjust-
ment plan. The cement, brewing, 
textile and tobacco sectors have all 
been sold off. Indeed, six major 
public companies had already 
gone over to the private sector be-
fore the end of the first Kérékou 
administration. The process of lib-
eralisation continues, much to the 
delight of foreign companies (82% 
of investment comes from abroad). 
The industrial fabric is still in its in-
fancy and low levels of domestic 
saving and investment have a lot 
to do with this high figure for for-
eign involvement in the economy. 
Viewed as a success by the IMF, the 
privatisation process has also en-
abled companies to start operating 
again at a profit, now that fixed 
price systems have been abolished. 
Public investment programmes in 
the 1997 draft budget look set to 
allocate substantial sums to the 
production sector. 
Fuel from Nigeria. 
The prices charged at these 'petrol stations' 
cannot be bettered 
The informal economy 
Informal trade between 
Benin and Nigeria still provides a 
livelihood for a significant propor-
tion of the population, particularly 
amongst the Yoruba, who are re-
puted to account for 70% of the 
re-export trade in textiles from 
Benin to Nigeria. 
Trade between the two 
countries involves a large number 
of other goods as well and Yoruba 
saleswomen can always be seen at 
the travelling fairs and markets 
along the border with Nigeria. The 
Beninese sell rice, spirits and ciga-
rettes to the Nigerians and in re-
turn, purchase vehicles, beverages, 
radios and, above all, petrol. 
Benin's customs authorities esti-
mate that some 300,000 litres of 
fuel - the equivalent of 60% of 
Benin's imports - cross the border 
illegally every day. 
Drivers and 'zemidjans' 
(riders of taxi-bikes) take advan-
tage of such smuggling activités, 
to the detriment of the state's cof-
fers and those of Sonacop (the Na-
tional Petroleum Product Market-
ing Company), which has the 
official monopoly on fuel distribu-
tion. There are thousands of out-
lets for Nigerian petrol along the 
borders with Nigeria and Togo. It 
is a business which the Nigerians 
prize highly because they are paid 
in CFA francs - which are convert-
ible while the Nigerian naïra is 
not. The state turns a blind eye 
and allows the situation to contin-
ue because petrol smuggling pro-
vides a living for many unem-
ployed workers as 'street-corner' 
traders. 
The 'black' economy is part 
of everyday life in Benin and has 
increased in size in the wake of 
company closures and cutbacks in 
public service. Many of those who 
have lost their jobs try their hand 
at commerce, setting themselves 
up as pavement traders. The trou-
ble is that as the informal sector 
goes from strength to strength, 
the state loses ever more revenue. 
Nevertheless, mouths are fed and 
social tensions are moderated 
somewhat. From a trading stand-
point, Benin is clearly an 'entrepôt' 
state. Scarcely 20% of imports are 
consumed locally, the remainder 
being re-exported to landlocked 
countries in the hinterland. Special training and qualifications are not required -
if you want to earn a living in public transport, all you 
need is access to a motorcycle. The zemidjan (taxi-
bike) sector has prospered in the economic turbu-
lence. Unemployed university graduates can earn 
enough to support themselves and civil servants can 
boost their monthly income. A journey in Cotonou 
will cost you CFAF 100 - or perhaps more, depending 
on the length of the trip and whether or not you 
know the dialect. The 'taxi-bikes' run from five in the 
morning until well into the night and have stolen the 
show from conventional public transport. The riders 
are easily recognisable in their yellow tops. 
'I've got a piece of paper to prove I've passed my 
exams, but I don't have a job , one of these young en-
trepreneurs told us. 'But if someone were to offer me 
a job right now, I would refuse it. I can earn more 
than enough riding my bike!' A quick calculation con-
firms that he is right. A taxi-bike operator can earn 
CFAF 5,000 daily (and up to CFAF 10,000 on a good 
day), grossing perhaps CFAF 150,000 a month. The 
busiest time of day for most zemidjamen is the rush 
hour when civil servants, school pupils, traders and 
housewives are out and about. 
There is never a shortage of customers - and the bike 
riders have no hesitation in upping the fare when 
buses are in short supply during peak periods. Their 
trade is highly valued by the Beninese and the sector 
is well-organised. Proof of this is the fact that com-
fortably off civil servants are investing in bikes which 
they 'lease' to the zemidjamen. In most cases, the rid-
ers sign a proper contract before the competent au-
thorities. Our driver confided that the bike he rides 
belongs to a secondary school teacher, and he pays 
CFAF 1,500 a day to the owner in rent. After two 
years, the bike will be his. He arranges his day so that 
he earns the owner's CFAF 1,500 early in the morning 
and then has the rest of the day to work for himself. 
Even bound by such a contract, the zemidjan rider 
does well. This 'industry' is also helped by Cotonou 
having a distribution centre for two-wheeled vehicles 
of all kinds. 
The zemidjamen's day begins at five in the morning. 
Around ten o'clock, he breaks for a breakfast of 
beans and maize flour. This keeps hunger at bay until 
about one in the afternoon. After another break, 
work recommences at 2.30 and goes on until 5 p.m. 
when the children come out of school and civil ser-
vants leave for home. At around 10 in the evening, it 
is time to call a halt, wash the bike and, before taking 
it back to the owner, fill it up for CFAF 1000. When all 
expenses have been deducted, the rider can expect to 
take home a net profit of at least CFAF 4000. At this 
rate and by working six days a week, he can earn 
CFAF 100,000 a month. 
The petrol, purchased from itinerant dealers, will al-
most certainly have beerhsmuggled in from Nigeria. 
No other suppliers can compete on price. The system 
is highly organised, enabling petrol to be sold at CFAF 
150 per litre (the official Sonacop pump price is CFAF 
275). The system suits everyone concerned (except 
perhaps, Sonacop): the customers appreciate the flexi-
bility that this mode of transport gives them and the 
zemidjamen make a reasonable living, while looking 
forward to the day when they can own their bike 
themselves. 
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Sadly, the prospering of 
the cotton sector and the informal 
economy is not reflected in the 
country's social indicators. Accord-
ing to a recent UNDP study, 55% 
of those living in towns and cities 
survive on less than CFAF 66,000 
(ECU 100) per annum. In rural 
areas, the situation is even worse, 
with households getting by on an 
average of just CFAF 56,000 per 
annum. With more than a quarter 
of the working population in 
urban areas now unemployed, the 
situation is giving the government 
increasing cause for concern. An-
other headache for the govern-
ment is the voluble criticism it has 
encountered from the opposition 
concerning its ambitious national 
employment programme. This was 
launched in June 1996 with a 
promise to create 20,000 jobs. The 
opposition has formed mainly 
round the party led by Rosine 
Soglo, who is the wife of the for-
mer President. 
Not the least of the gov-
ernment's challenges is clearing 
the salary arrears owed to civil ser-
vants. These result from the prob-
lems encountered by the Finance 
Ministry in the 1980s. The debt has 
still not been fully settled and, de-
spite the fact that a plan to bal-
ance the accounts enabled CFAF 
5.8 billion to be paid over in 1996, 
there are still CFAF 10 billion out-
standing. 
Boosting tourism 
Tourism currently makes 
only a small contribution to 
Benin's economy (2.5% of the GDP 
in 1993), but the combination of 
culture and economics looks set to 
make it a more powerful factor in 
the country's economic and social 
development. Benin has a rich and 
varied heritage, capable of meet-
ing a wide range of demand (spas, 
cultural and safari tourism, etc.) -
were it not for the poor condition 
of the road network which hinders 
development of such activities. 
The potential for develop-
ing tourist facilities is far from fully 
exploited and the majority of in-
teresting sites are still awaiting im-
provement. The hotel system is 
limited and accommodation is un-
evenly distributed over the country 
as a whole. More than 75% of 
boarding establishments are con-
centrated in the area around Coto-
nou. The other eleven provinces of 
the country have a wide range of 
interesting sites, however, in terms 
of tourism potential. These include 
the Ouémé forests in the Zou dis-
trict, the Birni forest in Atakora 
and the Kpassezoumé forest. His-
tory tells us that it was in the last 
of these that King Kpassé disap-
peared, turning into an iroko. Fur-
thermore, the lack of holiday vil-
lages prevents possible tourist 
destinations from benefiting from 
wider development. If capacity 
could be increased, resorts should 
be able to offer services more com-
petitively, at lower cost. Since the 
abolition of the National Tourism 
Working out of Ganvié, the 
women, meanwhile, preserve and 
sell the fish. They are past masters 
in the art of navigation, paddling 
their flimsy vessels with their long 
square sails confidently from hut 
to hut or as far as Abomey-Calavi, 
the embarkation point for tourists 
going to Ganvié. And they carry on 
a profitable trade - awaiting 
nightfall so that they can steer 
their launches from lake to lake as 
far as Nigerian territorial waters, 
where they sell their wares and 
smuggle in others. 
and Hotel-Trade Office (Onatho) in 
1987, the private sector has taken 
over the task of tourism develop-
ment. 
The jewel in Benin's 
tourism crown is the lake city of 
Ganvié located in a picture-post-
card setting. Situated on the 
North-Western shore of Lake Nok-
oué, upstream of the Só River, 
Ganvié (literally, 'protected com-
munity') was a refuge in earlier 
times, for those fleeing from the 
slave hunters who held sway in the 
surrounding kingdoms, particularly 
Abomey. Ganvié has been called 
'the Venice of Africa' and its in-
habitants (ganvienus) are not just 
fishermen but fish breeders as 
well. They 'cultivate' the fish in 
beds specially prepared in the shal-
lows (akadjas) of the Lake using 
lopped-off branches. It is the men-
folk that 'harvest' the 120 or so 
species which inhabit the lake. 
Partial view of the Gulf of Benin. 
In terms of tourism development, existing 
potential is poorly exploited 
Tourism has developed 
over the last few years and the au-
thorities have now become in-
creasingly aware that this should 
be a distinct part of the national 
economy. One tip for visitors. If 
you stop somebody and ask the 
way in this land of King Béhanzin, 
you will not hear the words 'street' 
or 'avenue' being used. People 
here will talk instead about the 
first, second or third 'von'. MM M.F. 
ï 
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Liberalism rehabilitated ^ 
The political career of 
Benin's Prime Minister, 
Adrien Houngbédji, has cer-
tainly had its ups and 
downs. This doctor of law 
was condemned to death 
under the Marxist-Leninist 
regime (1972-1990) because 
of his support for liberalism. 
He escaped from prison and 
took refuge in Gabon, going 
on to practise as an interna-
tional lawyer, before returning to 
his own country in 1989 under a 
general amnesty. He then threw 
himself into politics. He took part in 
the 1990 National Conference and 
founded the PRD (Democratic Re-
newal Party), which won 19 seats in 
the 1995 legislative elections. Elect-
ed President of the National Assem-
bly, it was not long before he found 
himself in conflict with President 
Nicéphore Soglo. He stood for the 
Presidency in 1996 and polled 
strongly (19% of the votes in the 
first round) before standing down in 
favour of Mathieu Kérékou. The lat-
ter was duly elected and appointed 
Adrien Houngbédji to the new post 
of Prime Minister. As leader of the 
Kérékou II government since 4 April 
1996, Mr Houngbédji has to tread a 
delicate political path, working with 
a fragile coalition of eight political 
parties. Although public opinion 
would describe him as a future pres-
idential candidate (the next poll is in 
2001), the opposition is scornful, 
dubbing him the 'Prime Minister 
without power'. President Kérékou, 
they point out, is also the head of 
government. We began by asking 
the Prime Minister to review his first 
15 months in office. 
- As you are aware, the 
Prime Minister is responsible for 
coordinating government action 
and institutional relations. In that 
sense, my office (the 'Primature') 
acts as an intermediary, overseeing 
sensitive issues which generally in-
volve a number of ministerial de-
partments. We have done a great 
deal of such work in the first year 
of our five-year mandate and the 
results have been significant. I be-
lieve we have had a genuine im-
pact on the daily lives of Benin's 
citizens. 
Let me give you an exam-
ple. It is well-known that the gov-
ernment is anxious to relaunch the 
country's economy, and there has 
been a great deal of behind-the-
scenes work to turn political will 
into political fact. Our efforts in 
this area have rapidly enabled us 
to set up an economic-promotion 
fund, and the state's contribution 
- CFAF 1.5 billion - has already 
been released. The money will be 
used to finance small and medium-
sized businesses, to boost our 
economy. 
What is more, the govern-
ment has been responsible for set-
ting up a 'business formality' cen-
tre - a kind of 'one-stop shop' 
enabling people to complete all 
the formalities involved in setting-
up a business in just one place. We 
hope that both domestic and for-
eign economic operators will ap-
preciate the advantages they can 
gain in terms of time saved and a 
more efficient management of 
their affairs. 
This is not all. The Head of 
State has entrusted us with various 
overseas missions on behalf of the 
government and this has allowed 
us to gain the support of develop-
ment partners in financing various 
socio-economic projects. We have 
also acted as mediator in a success-
ful search for a peaceful solution 
to a neighbour's political crisis. 
On 24 April, the President 
appointed me as the government's 
official spokesman. Under the 
terms of the decree, I have been 
given the job of making the pub-
lic, both at home and abroad, 
aware of what the administration 
is doing, explaining its programme 
to the country's citizens and using 
media opportunities to speak on 
issues of national concern. In this 
context, my department is current-
ly drawing up a common commu-
nication strategy. The idea is to es-
tablish a fruitful dialogue between 
the government, the country's citi-
zens and all those who are in-
volved in development here. So 
the Primature will be at the centre 
of communication policy, creating 
the proper channels whereby our 
people can be informed about the 
administration's actions, decisions 
and concrete achievements. 
■ You were previously President 
of the National Assembly and 
today you are Prime Minister. 
What was the reason for the chan-
ge? 
- I don't think there is any-
thing particularly surprising about 
a former President of the National 
Assembly becoming Prime Minis-
ter. Life in politics is, by nature, 
very fluid and events move on. 
But I would point out that 
our political grouping played a key 
role in the support given to Presi-
dent Mathieu Kérékou during the 
changeover of power in 1996. It 
was at that stage that the Head of 
State decided to appoint a Prime 
Minister, responsible for coordi-
nating government action and in-
stitutional relations - and he chose 
me. 
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■ The next presidential election is 
set for 2001 and you are widely 
seen as a person with political am-
bitions. Have you any plans? 
-This is still 1997, and I be-
lieve very sincerely that it is prema-
ture to talk about political ambi-
tions for 2001. My current concern 
is to put all my efforts into making 
the President's five-year mandate 
a success. You know, of course, 
that my party has made a commit-
ment to support General Kérékou 
throughout his term in office. Per-
sonally, I have a deep sense of ho-
nour and am a man of my word, so 
I am giving my full attention to 
carrying out my duties responsibly. 
■ There is a great deal of specula-
tion in parts of the international 
media about your relations with 
the President. What is the position, 
exactly? 
- There you have it. You 
have chosen precisely the right 
word: speculation. My relations 
with the President are most cordial 
and are conducted in an atmos-
phere of mutual trust. An ongoing 
concern of both of us is to solve 
the day-to-day problems of our 
compatriots and to launch our 
country on to the world scene in 
order to bring it genuine economic 
progress. That's about it. Every-
thing else is just trivia and specula-
tion. 
■ Moving on, now, to Benin's eco-
nomic situation, isn't the cross-bor-
der smuggling between Benin and 
Nigeria a drain on your country's 
exchequer ? 
- The issue of smuggling 
across that particular frontier is 
not as clear-cut as it might seem. 
The customs services do their best 
and I could give you a simplistic ex-
planation, but the reality is some-
what more complicated. You see, 
ethnic groups with similar cultures 
straddle the border between the 
two countries. So there is a kind of 
Osmosis' in the frontier region. 
Customary ceremonies on the 
Benin side may draw in people 
from the Nigerian side, and vice 
versa. Indeed, depending on 
where you are in relation to the 
border, you will often find families 
in which some members live in 
Benin and others in Nigeria. So 
there are two 'populations' living 
alongside one another, sharing a 
common culture, and not paying 
attention to a man-made frontier, 
which they don't regard as having 
any significance. It is as if the peo-
ple there are already experiencing 
the integration which is so strong-
ly advocated by the ECOWAS - al-
though they are doing it in their 
own way, of course. 
■ Does Benin have a role to play in 
promoting a spirit of goodwill bet-
ween French- and English-spea-
king countries in Africa ? 
- Owing to its geographi-
cal position and its port, Benin is a 
transit point for landlocked coun-
tries, such as Niger, Burkina Faso 
and Mali. We also take on the ex-
cess when Togo's and Nigeria's 
ports are overloaded. Likewise, on 
land, goods being transported be-
tween Togo, Ghana and Nigeria 
go through Benin - so you could 
say that we are a buffer between 
the French- and English-speaking 
countries in West Africa. 
■ Benin is famous for its cotton 
production and relies heavily on 
this commodity for export income. 
This makes you particularly vulne-
rable to movements in internatio-
nal prices. How do you see the fu-
ture for this sector? 
- We are currently address-
ing the problem of overhauling 
the cotton sector and our case is 
being considered by our partners 
at the World Bank. In the context 
of the structural adjustment pro-
gramme that we have signed with 
our partners, we have undertaken 
to establish a new sectoral strate-
gy. The aim is to strengthen the 
role of cotton producers and re-
duce the part played by the state, 
by creating a joint venture to take 
care of the essential production 
and marketing functions. We are 
also in the process of setting up a 
special fund for the cotton sector. 
■ Turning, finally, to the Lomé 
Convention, what is your assess-
ment of EU-Benin relations? 
- Generally speaking, co-
operation with the EU is most sat-
isfactory. As you know, we have 
just come to the end of the 7th 
EDF, which is worth CFAF 87 billion 
to us. The sectors eligible for fi-
nancing under this programme 
were infrastructure, which re-
ceived half of the resources, 
health, which got a quarter and 
rural development which was allo-
cated 15% of the total. To see 
what the funds have meant to the 
health sector, you have only to 
visit the Porto Novo Hospital in the 
Ouémé region. So the 7th EDF has 
made a great difference to devel-
opment in Benin. In March, we 
signed agreements under the 8th 
EDF. The money allocated to us -
which amounts to CFAF 76 billion -
will be distributed in more or less 
the same way as the sums we re-
ceived under the previous pro-
gramme. 
The opportunities made 
available to us through the 8th 
EDF will enable us to invest further 
in the road network, privatise 
highway maintenance and set up a 
toll system. I don't know if you 
have seen the road between 
Parakou and Djougou, which is 
now almost completed. We have 
also rehabilitated a large number 
of rural routes. 
Another priority is to 
adopt land reform measures. Work 
on this is currently under way and 
five laws are before the National 
Assembly. It is our aim to have this 
reform, and a decentralised admi-
nistrative system, in place in Benin 
by the end of the year. MW 
Interview by M. F. 
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mJÊ General information 
I Area: 112,622 km
2
 
Population: 5.4 million 
I Population growth rate: 3.1 % per annum 
I Population density: 30 inhabitants per km
2
 
I Urban population: 40% 
I Official language: French 
I Currency: CFA Franc (the country is in the 
I monetary zone of the Central Bank of West 
J African States). ECU 1 = FCFA 659 
I Political structure 
Ï Independence: 1960 
I President: Mathieu Kérékou 
Prime Minister: Adrien Houngbédji 
Political parties: There are said to be about 100 politi-
cal parties of which 48 took part in the 1995 legisla-
tive elections. Eight parties are represented in the 
government. 
With the 'Conférence des forces vives de la Nation' 
which was held in 1990, Benin undertook a democrat-
ic transition which had a significant impact on the 
wider West African region. Since then, power has 
been transferred peacefully following elections on 
two occasions. This is viewed as promising for the 
country's infant democracy and contrasts with what 
has happened in some other states in French-speak-
ing Africa. In August 1996, a law was adopted on the 
organisation of territory for administrative purposes. 
This divides Benin into 12 'départements' (there are 
currently 6). 
Economy 
GDP: $4.75 billion (1994 figure) 
GDP per capita: ECU 285 
Main exports: cotton (78% of the total), oil (10%, in 
the form of re-exports) 
Benin's economy is closely tied to the fortunes of the 
autonomous port of Cotonou through which 80% to 
90% of the country's total trade passes. As the main 
transit point for trade with neighbouring Nigeria, the 
port is a pole of attraction generating widespread 
economic activity. In 1994 it handled almost 1.5 mil-
lion tonnes of goods. 
Social indicators 
Life expectancy at birth: 51 (UNDP estimate) 
Population with access to drinking water: 68% 
Sources: UNDP, Eurostat, International Trade and Develop-
ment Statistics (European Commission), World Development 
Report, 1995. 
Adult literacy: 33% 
Enrolment in primary education: 66% 
Religions: Animists 50%, Christians 15%, Muslims 15% 
Human Development Index rating: 0.368 (146th out 
of 175) 
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in Benin is high, and the 
population is predominantly 
young. Females outnumber 
males. Two-thirds of the in-
habitants live below the 
poverty threshold and the country is 
placed 146th out of 174 in the 
UNDP's Human Development report. 
A key reason for this lowly position 
in the 'league table' is the poor 
state of the health sector. The gov-
ernment is keenly aware of the 
need to improve the situation and, 
in 1996, it set up the Ministry of 
Health, Social Protection and Female 
Affairs (MSPSCF). It has been given 
the task, over the next five years, of 
improving families' social and sani-
tary conditions. This is seen as im-
portant if Benin is to overcome the 
economic, social and political chal-
lenges it faces. It is obviously the 
job of the state to establish health 
policy, coordinate implementation 
and supervise management. But the 
state of the people's health is not 
just a matter for the authorities. 
Everyone, be it professionals, civil 
society 'actors', institutions or com-
munities, must be involved. 
Generally speaking, Benin 
enjoys food security, with about 
95% of the minimum daily calorie 
intake per inhabitant provided by 
locally produced staple foodstuffs. 
There is some malnutrition, how-
ever, mainly on account of the 
drop in individual purchasing 
power. It is thought that between 
10% and 20% of children up to 
five years of age are affected, al-
* Article prepared from documents supplied 
by the Ministry of Health and the EC Delega-
tion in Cotonou. 
The Porto Novo Hospital 
EU aid aims to improve hospital administration 
and the operation of surgical and laboratory 
though the proportions vary from 
one region to another and accord-
ing to one's social class. 
The figures published by 
the UNDP in 1996 showed that 
adult life expectancy was just 48.7 
years. The mortality rate for chil-
dren of less than one year was put 
at 98.6 per thousand while the fig-
ure for those up to the age of five 
was 162 per thousand. Overall, 
there is a high morbidity rate, and 
environmental conditions are de-
clining. 
As for ailments, endemic/ 
epidemic maladies predominate 
(40% of the total incidence of dis-
ease). These include malaria, which 
alone is responsible for 31.7% of 
all disease cases, and various forms 
of gastroenteritis. The latter, 
linked to poor hygiene and faecal 
contamination of water supplies, is 
one of the main causes of death in 
children of four and under. Access 
to drinking-water remains poor, 
particularly in rural districts, 
household refuse removal is 
patchy and disposal of waste 
water is still largely insufficient. 
On top of this, industrial effluent, 
estimated at over 77,000 cubic me-
tres per year for the city of Coto-
nou alone, is discharged untreat-
ed. 
Benin aspires to good gov-
ernance - and sees this as including 
the right to life and health, the 
right of women to play a part in 
government and the right of the 
weakest in society to receive pro-
tection. The country has set itself 
the objective of boosting access to 
health services and improving their 
quality. It also wants the people to 
play a more active part in commu-
nity affairs and to make greater 
use of the health facilities that do 
exist. The approach is based on 
policy options for the sector which 
were agreed in 1989 and reiterat-
ed at a Round Table in January 
1995. The aim is to ensure basic 
care for the population as a whole 
and to take the steps needed to 
minimise the negative impact of 
structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) on those who are least privi-
leged. 
Aware of the importance 
of the role women have to play in 
the health sector, the MSPSCF has 
been actively promoting this role. 
The ministry believes that literacy, 
information and health-education 
programmes should help women 
assume a higher profile within the 
family and in the national devel-
opment effort. Investing in 
women's potential, and offering 
them new goals, appears the best 
way to contribute to economic 
growth and human development 
overall. 
Despite their numbers 
(52% of Benin's total population) 
and the fact that they are impor-
tant in economic terms (32% of 
farmworkers and over 90% of 
those working in trade), women in 
Benin are still subject to a wide 
range of legal, political, socio-cul-
tural and economic constraints, 
and 80% of them are illiterate. 
Under the terms of its so-
cial protection programme, the 
government is committed to pro-
moting national solidarity and im-
proving the administration of in-
ternational aid. The MSPSCF 
intends to implement a policy 
based on 'holistic citizen care'. This 
entails reducing poverty within 
families and the community at 
large, removing obstacles to the 
development of children (particu-
larly those living in difficult condi-
tions) and providing the conditions 
to enable handicapped people to 
return to school and follow socio-
vocational programmes. It is also 
aimed at reintegrating society's 
'misfits', displaced people and 
refugees, protecting groups that 
A 
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are at risk, creating family-orient-
ed mutual associations and social-
security systems, and targeting in-
ternational aid more towards 
those who are most deprived. 
Between 1989 and 1993, 
Benin's health strategy emphasised 
prevention and remedial work. 
The former included vaccination, 
mother-and-child health, family 
planning, hygiene/clean-up opera-
tions, information, education and 
communication. The latter in-
volved the establishment of a 
pharmaceuticals policy, the over-
haul or setting-up of health infra-
structures and tackling sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs). One 
achievement of the policy was the 
administrative restructuring of the 
Health Ministry, but by no means 
all the problems identified in 1989 
had been solved by the end of the 
four-year period. Following on 
from the conclusions of the above-
mentioned Round Table, it was 
therefore decided to refocus 
health policy and adapt it to the 
process of decentralisation in 
which Benin was already involved. 
EU support 
European Union support 
for Benin's health policy is part of 
its global cooperation strategy ini-
tiated in 1961 under the first Euro-
pean Development Fund. Since 
1991, EDF intervention has been 
linked to support for structural ad-
justment, the latter including a sig-
nificant commitment to health 
provision. 
The Lomé IV indicative pro-
gramme provides, as one of its 
focal points, for intervention in 
the public health sector to consoli-
date the sectoral policy established 
under Lomé II. The interventions in 
question fit into the overall frame-
work of the new national health 
strategy. The aim is to improve the 
day-to-day running of the health 
system (particularly in districts in 
the south of the country - Ouémé, 
Mono, Atlantique), to mitigate the 
social impact of structural adjust-
ment and to step up the campaign 
against AIDS. Specific objectives in-
clude the refurbishment and 
equipping of existing infrastruc-
tures such as district hospitals and 
community health centres. Men-
tion should also be made of sup-
port (amounting to ECU 11 million 
spread over four years) for the 
Porto Novo district hospital, the fi-
nance being aimed at improving 
hospital administration, and surgi-
cal and laboratory services. 
The health component, set 
out in protocols to the EU's sup-
port programme for structural ad-
justment in Benin, is designed to 
back up the government's efforts 
and more specifically, to pay for 
recurring non-wage costs in the 
sector. The medium-term objective 
is that these costs should be 
brought within the national bud-
get, with a transparent system of 
revenue collection, operated in ac-
cordance with the priorities identi-
fied by the authorities. 
CFAF 1.36bn was ear-
marked under the first SAP sup-
port programme. Initially, it was 
intended that these funds should 
be available in 1992 but they did 
not come on stream until 1994. 
The protocol for the second SAP 
(1994-95) was worth a total of 
CFAF 3.323bn to be spent in two 
separate programmes. The first 
tranche contained CFAF 958m, tar-
geted at non-wage health costs 
foreseen in the national budget. 
The second made a further CFAF 
1.05bn available for non-wage 
health costs, and CFAF 450m to 
support state intervention in 
health centres, maintenance and 
restoration work, and other oper-
ating costs. CFAF 50m was spent 
on an audit agency to monitor and 
supervise the operation, and funds 
were provided for refurbishment 
of social infrastructures and fur-
ther development of human re-
sources. 
These three successive pro-
grammes of support for the health 
sector have enabled progress to be 
made, but the observable results, 
particularly in terms of the impact 
on the population, have not 
matched expectations. A lot is jus-
tifiably expected from the reor-
ganisation that is currently under 
way - which should lead to better 
management and an improved ca-
pacity to put funds to good use. 
Indeed, there are already signs of 
this happening and the expendi-
ture of the Health Ministry for the 
1997 budget year has been in-
creasing. 
What does the new 
millennium hold in store? 
National health policy is 
set to develop in five main areas 
over the next few years. The first 
element is the decentralisation of 
health structures and the expan-
sion of cover. 
The quality and accessibili-
ty of health care in outlying re-
gions needs to be improved and 
the plan is to move away from the 
existing 'pyramidal' set-up. 'Health 
zones' are to be established, each 
with its own web of services, the 
regional hospital providing the 
focal point. However, the tasks, 
objectives and operation of such 
zones have still to be clarified. 
At national level, decision-
making is still highly centralised 
and this is accompanied by signifi-
cant shortcomings in the manage-
ment of human and financial re-
sources, infrastructures (including 
their maintenance), operational 
planning and coordination of for-
eign aid. Any solution to these 
problems must necessarily include 
structural reforms (improved or-
ganisation, decentralisation and 
operationally-based distribution of 
responsibilities). 
In health, the public sector 
dominates. Private operations 
have long 'gone it alone' with very 
little integration into the national 
system. In future, it will be neces-
sary to promote this sector's devel-
opment and enable it to provide 
better health cover for the popula-
tion through the operational inte-
gration of its activities. 
In 1989, Benin drew up a 
national pharmaceutical policy. 
This will be pursued and consoli-
dated, particularly through the 
launch of a major campaign aimed 
at increasing awareness of the 
risks involved in self-medication 
and in taking medicinal products 
that are not controlled or are sold 
illegally. A new pricing system for 
essential medicines will be set up, 
as will a system to regulate the tra-
ditional pharmacopoeia. 
A second area for atten-
tion will be consolidation of man-
agement capabilities. In addition 
to a lack of qualified personnel, 
there are major shortcomings in 
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terms of infrastructure and equip-
ment administration. Schemes 
have been outlined to place func-
tional infrastructures, which fit in 
with the socio-economic realities, 
at the disposal of both the people 
and health-sector staff. 
A review of financing pro-
cedures will be the third main area 
dealt with under Benin's health 
policy. Between 1990 and 1993, 
about 3% of the national budget 
was allocated to health. This was 
one of the lowest proportions in 
the world (assuming no account 
was taken of health-related expen-
diture falling under other budget 
headings which included the cost 
of hospitalising soldiers and civil 
servants, and of maintaining 
health centres). 
Under the terms of Benin's 
third SAP, the country committed 
itself to increasing this share to 
5.8% in the interim and to 8% by 
the end of the programme period. 
The interim objective was sur-
passed in 1996 (5.9%) and for the 
current year, the proportion is ex-
pected to increase marginally to 
5.95%. 
The 1980s in Benin were 
dominated by economic and finan-
cial austerity, and in 1988, the gov-
ernment was forced to opt for a 
broadly-based community financ-
ing system, involving cost recovery 
from all areas of the public health 
sector. 
The funds generated as a 
result of this policy are used to 
provide fresh supplies of medicines 
and to help pay for the operation 
of the health system. It is estimat-
ed that 7% of the sector's total re-
sources come from community fi-
nancing provided by the people. 
Foreign aid for the health 
sector also increased after 1990, al-
though recent years have seen 
some cutbacks. Ironically, the 'ab-
sorption capacity' for this assis-
tance - insofar as it is earmarked 
for prevention, combating disease, 
and training - has been poor. 
A number of reasons can 
be cited for this: a certain lack of 
flexibility, the ponderous nature of 
some management structures, ad-
ministrative lethargy and a failure 
to comply with rules and proce-
dures laid down by donors. 
A sectoral finance policy is 
vitally important and any such pol-
icy should take account of the con-
tribution made, not just by the 
state and its development part-
ners, but also by local communi-
ties. 
The fourth area to be ad-
dressed is improving the integrat-
ed treatment of the principal dis-
eases. Given the precarious nature 
of Benin's socio-health indicators, 
a number of programmes have 
been set up to combat the main 
causes of mortality and morbidity. 
These include projects to improve 
hygiene, clean-up operations, cam-
paigns to combat endemic diseases 
that can be treated by vaccination, 
and STD/AIDS prevention. An 'In-
formation-Education-Communica-
tion' (IEC) programme, which tar-
gets the population in general and 
certain vulnerable groups in partic-
ular, is a cornerstone of this ap-
proach. 
Finally, given the high 
rates of maternal and infant/juve-
nile mortality, more attention will 
focus on improving reproductive 
health. There are various reasons 
for such high mortality rates - the 
overall policy is ill-defined, there is 
no real strategy or structure for 
training personnel and refresher 
courses, health services are some-
times underused for geographical 
or financial reasons, infrastructures 
are dilapidated, some staff lack 
motivation, and the quality of the 
care can be poor. 
The Eighth EDF 
The underlying objective 
of the Eighth EDF is to improve 
basic health care for the popula-
tion (particularly the most under-
privileged and vulnerable groups). 
The strategy is to establish a pool 
of experience and guarantee a de-
gree of fairness in the way re-
sources are shared out. About a 
quarter of the ECU 120.5m ear-
marked for Benin's national indica-
tive programme in the second 
phase of Lomé IV will be targeted 
at the health sector (broadly de-
fined to include water supplies, hy-
giene and clean-up operations.) 
In outlying areas, resources 
will mainly be directed towards 
implementing the government's 
decentralisation policy (promoting 
the establishment of health zones) 
and local development operations 
aimed at improving the quality of 
health care and taking the needs 
of the people into account. By in-
tegrating existing private struc-
tures, the strategy should also help 
develop alternative health systems 
and consolidate activities in the 
public sector. This may lead to 
some state involvement in the pri-
vate medical sector, for example in 
the form of 'association' contracts. 
Such contracts could also be drawn 
up with local communities, church 
bodies and other grassroots organ-
isations. 
Meanwhile at the centre, 
and at intermediate levels of the 
health system, work done in recent 
years will be consolidated through 
the provision of institutional sup-
port. This will go to central and 
district services to improve the ad-
ministration of sector budgets, en-
hance human resources and make 
better use of property and other 
assets. Public-health programmes 
relating to blood transfusion (pro-
viding secure blood supplies), in-
formation/education, and AIDS 
will also be stepped up. Under the 
decentralisation programme, the 
necessary measures will be taken 
to improve the legal, regulatory 
and ethical framework of services 
provided by the private sector. 
Similarly, improvements in the 
quality of health care and living 
conditions in urban areas will be 
monitored, to cater for the in-
crease in population in major 
towns and cities. WW ed M.F. 
A 
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Renaissance du Bénin party 
A tenacious opposition 
It is as if Benin's opposition 
had gone into exile in Chica-
go. According to the coun-
try's press, Nicéphore Soglo 
and his team are over there 
putting the finishing touches 
to their strategy for retaking 
power. However, although 
the former president (he was 
defeated in the second 
round of the most recent 
presidential elections by 
Mathieu Kérékou, by a mar-
gin of only 97,000 votes) is currently 
living in the US, his wife is still at 
home, either leading the Benin Re-
naissance (RB) party, which she set 
up and leads, or in the National As-
sembly, as part of the Democracy-
Action parliamentary grouping. 
Since Mathieu Kérékou returned to 
power, Mrs Soglo, a barrister by 
training, has become a significant 
figure in the radical opposition to 
Kérékou's government. Her party 
currently has 26 parliamentary 
seats, following the defection of 
other opposition groups which pre-
ferred to support the administra-
tion. We met Mrs Soglo at her villa 
in central Cotonou where the to-ing 
and fro-ing of the party faithful is 
proof that political enthusiasm still 
exists, despite the party's fall from 
power. President of the RB since last 
February's national council, she dis-
misses the allegations of those who 
would discredit her, accusing her of 
wanting to take over the political 
group in her husband's absence. She 
reminds us that she was present at 
its very creation, while the former 
president did not join until 1994. 
Mrs Soglo maintains that she has no 
personal political ambitions and 
began our meeting by giving The 
Courier an overview of the years 
when her husband was President of 
the Republic. 
and my' husband, in particular -
has been heavily criticised for not 
having a social chapter in its pro-
gramme, and for the state of the 
nation's economy - which, inciden-
tally, was in ruins when we came 
to power. We inherited a country 
where the banking system no 
longer functioned - just one strik-
ing example of the legacy be-
queathed to us. The four main 
banks were bankrupt, with a debt 
of CFAF 660 billion, which generat-
ed a charge of some CFAF 10 bil-
lion per day at the Central Bank of 
West African States. 
Discharging this debt was 
the Soglo regime's primary objec-
tive so that Benin could take ad-
vantage of new credits to re-
launch the economy and enable it 
to pay its dues at the various re-
gional levels on time. If one is 
aware of the size and scope of the 
problems facing our countries, the 
social chapter, which includes the 
campaign against unemployment, 
could obviously not have been im-
plemented immediately. Society in 
even the developed countries is 
currently split owing to the crisis. 
In addition, in the wake of a con-
spiracy mounted by our political 
opponents and promoted through 
the media, responsibility for the 
devaluation of the CFA franc was 
attributed to our political group. It 
was a completely unjustified alle-
gation because the decision to de-
value was taken in Dakar by all 
Heads of State of countries in the 
franc zone. 
■ If you don't mind, can we now 
talk about General Kérékou's re-
turn to power after a break of six 
years. Do you think that political 
and constitutional freedoms are 
still being respected? 
- Allow me first to take - As for political freedoms, 
stock, as it were, of the years when I would say yes, because you can 
President Nicéphore Soglo was in see that I am at liberty here today, 
power. Our political grouping - and am able to express myself 
freely. We fought hard for that 
privilege! In the immediate after-
math of our electoral defeat, we 
had to deal with a raid on the 
President's residence. He was to be 
arrested and there were various 
trumped-up charges alleging that 
we had stolen state vehicles. It was 
a real conspiracy, I can tell you! 
Not only that, but high-ranking 
figures in the administration and 
in state companies, who had been 
appointed under Soglo, were dis-
missed by the new government 
and replaced by inexperienced 
politicians and other such people -
a genuine loss for the country. 
And those who demonstrated 
their support publicly for the for-
mer regime were quite simply 
deleted from the administration's 
files. How can you run a country 
like that? 
You also mentioned consti-
tutional freedoms. Well, since Pres-
ident Kérékou returned to power, 
constitutional power censures it-
self. We don't hear anything about 
the Constitutional Court any more, 
and we don't even know if it still 
exists. Under Soglo, the Court was 
systematically involved in affairs of 
state. There were sometimes even 
suggestions that we had 'govern-
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ment by judges', given that there 
is no appeal against the decisions 
of the Court. Its prerogatives are 
based on certain chapters in the 
Constitution, the most significant 
of which concern human rights 
and violations of the Constitution 
itself. During the first legislature, 
the National Assembly voted in a 
Constitutional law giving outra-
geous powers to the highest court. 
In fact, these texts were adopted 
simply to thwart President Soglo, 
and the results were not slow in 
coming. The Court intervened di-
rectly in the executive. For exam-
ple, the Constitution states that 
the President is responsible for set-
ting the date of the first and sec-
ond rounds of the presidential 
elections. As things turned out, in 
the second round, the Constitu-
tional Court told us when the elec-
tions would be held, in violation of 
the Constitution. It also declared 
null and void some of the votes 
cast and the President's appoint-
ments to the College of Magis-
trates, despite the fact that the 
President is guarantor of the Con-
stitution. So you see, there is no 
doubt that the Court intervened 
directly in the executive during 
President Soglo's five years in of-
fice! Nowadays, it is virtually invisi-
ble, and the same might be said of 
certain sections of the press. 
■ 'Certain sections of the press', as 
you put it, have called into ques-
tion your active role in the man-
agement of Benin's affairs sug-
gesting you may have had an 
influence in the appointment of 
certain ministers. In simple terms, 
they accuse you of having been 
the reason for President Soglo's 
downfall. 
- Admittedly, I did, per-
haps, get into bad habits, but let 
me explain precisely what hap-
pened. First of all, Nicéphore Soglo 
and I have been married for 45 
years. Second, we found ourselves 
in exceptional circumstances. My 
husband was seriously ill when he 
came to power and he nearly died. 
Those who criticised my presence 
close to him did not know just 
how seriously ill he was, and we 
were unable to enlighten them. 
Later, we held a press conference 
to give an explanation. I was so 
afraid for his health that, when he 
was better, I simply carried on fol-
lowing him around in order to 
take care of him. 
■ There have been allegations of 
misappropriation of public funds 
during the run-up to the election 
and afterwards. Some observers 
suggest that this was also a key 
factor in bringing down the Soglo 
regime. What are your views on 
this? 
- These accusations refer 
to a sum of CFAF 10 million, which 
I am said to have used to go to 
France for my health. Some minis-
ters in the current government 
seized upon this and parliament 
debated the topic for several 
weeks. I never even set eyes on 
that money. It is just a conspiracy, 
and you can see further evidence 
of it in Cotonou, where utter non-
sense about us has been scrawled 
on the walls. Curiously, though, 
those who conducted this defama-
tion campaign are those currently 
in power - and members of their 
extended family have taken over 
entire sectors of Benin's economy 
without a word of criticism being 
spoken. But during Soglo's time at 
the helm, trumped-up charges 
were made to discredit the powers 
that be at the time. 
■ How would you assess the eco-
nomic reform programme imple-
mented in Benin? Do you see it as 
a basis for your country's economic 
development? 
- There is a lot that has to 
be done. The people of Benin face 
up to economic difficulties with 
stoicism, because they are power-
less. They realise that the promises 
made during the election cam-
paign are unrealistic. Dahomey 
was long referred to as 'Africa's 
Latin quarter', and is, I believe, 
currently falling behind other 
countries which have not had our 
potential. So we have to go back 
to our roots and take stock of pre-
sent circumstances - otherwise we 
will stagnate. Another thing we 
must do is stop thinking that we 
have to stay dependent on certain 
powers which still control our fu-
ture and make decisions in our 
place. That has to change, other-
wise no one should be surprised if, 
in the next few years, an army of 
angry young men emerges across 
Africa. What have they got to 
lose? That is what I am most con-
cerned about. It must be stopped. 
■ Would your party - Renaissance 
du Bénin - be prepared to enter 
government if invited? Would you 
favour 'cohabitation' with the cur-
rent government? 
- We are not the only op-
position party. Others can take 
part in government if they wish! 
There is no secret about our 
party's position. The answer is no! 
Our parliamentary group - Democ-
racy Action - had 35 members 
when President Soglo was in 
power but, over time, some have 
gone over to the opposite camp. It 
began with the Union for Democ-
racy and National Solidarity (UDS), 
whose leader, one of President 
Soglo's former ministers, left, tak-
ing five of his parliamentary sup-
porters with him. Others have left 
since and now we have only 26 
members in our group. Now, how-
ever, we are among friends, by 
which I mean that we can be true 
to our political choice. 
■ Do you feel your party has a suf-
ficiently solid base to win the next 
presidential election? 
- Benin's citizens opted 
freely for change at the 1996 poll. 
As I mentioned at the beginning 
of this interview, I currently have 
no political ambitions, and this 
gives me a great sense of freedom, 
which was not the case two years 
ago when my husband was in 
power and when we had to face 
our critics on a daily basis. At the 
moment, this is not a question of 
immediate concern to me, but it 
should be a concern for those who 
are presently running the country. 
We wish them every success be-
cause all our interests are at stake. 
■ Yet you do oppose the current 
regime? 
- Oh yes, and the party I 
lead is certainly capable of making 
a bid for power, even if its presi-
dent has no personal ambitions in 
that direction. ^B Interview by M.F. 
A 
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The political system in Benin is democratic, with an elected President and elements of parliamentary govern-
ment. The current framework is characterised by a powerful executive, a National Assembly having to steer a 
delicate course (with a coalition of various parties represented in government) and a judicial system which is 
still trying to find its feet. Having seen eight constitutional texts, six putschs and eleven Presidents come and 
go since 1959, the people of Benin warmly embraced the democratic option following the National Confer-
ence held in February 1990. The transition involved some hard bargaining, leading to a political compromise 
with President Mathieu Kérékou, who had been re-elected as President of the Republic in February 1989. 
Now, seven years on from the Conference, Benin arguably offers a model of how to run a democracy on the 
African continent. 
Among those who played an 
important part in the transition were 
representatives of the archdiocese of 
Cotonou, and in particular Mgr Da 
Souza. He served as President of the 
Sovereign National Conference and 
subsequently headed the High Council 
of the Republic during the presidency 
of Nicéphore Soglo before his resigna-
tion in 1993. According to Abbot 
Théophile Villaça who received us at 
the archdiocese of Ouidah in place of 
Mgr Da Souza, who was unwell, 'one of the 
aims of the Church is to heighten awareness 
among Christians so that they may fully as-
sume their responsibilities in the management of soci-
ety'. The Church in Benin has acted as custodian of de-
mocratic values, not just through the sermons of its 
preachers, but also through a series of pastoral letters 
dealing with the economic, political and social difficul-
ties that have afflicted Benin. One, in particular, high-
lighted the responsibilities incumbent upon Christians 
faced with the challenge of democratic renewal, and 
the demands of democracy. 
During periods of severe turmoil, especially in 
the Marxist-Leninist era, the Church was not shy about 
becoming involved in politics and in questions of how 
society should be governed. 'At that time, we used to 
say to the revolutionaries that Benin belonged to all of 
its citizens', Abbot Villaça told us. 'We would argue 
that we all had a duty to take part - followers of the 
traditional religions because of their convictions, Chris-
tians and Muslims because of their faith'. The Abbot 
spent 10 days in prison for subversion, following inter-
ventions like this. He even dared to include the 'sedi-
tious' topic of 'Christian thoughts on Marxism' in the 
curriculum of the Catechism and Training Centre which 
he runs. 'We got involved in 1990,' he explained, 'be-
cause things had gone too far'. Seized with Marxist fer-
vour, the authorities had nationalised the private 
Catholic schools. While the Church did not formally op-
pose this particular decision, it decided to speak out 
more generally in order to provoke a national re-
sponse. 
In Africa there are numerous examples of the 
Catholic Church getting involved in politics. In addition 
to Mgr Da Souza in Benin, names such as Mgr Monsen-
gwo in Zaire and Mgr Albert Ndongmo in Cameroon 
spring to mind. In addition, many ordinary members of 
the clergy have paid a high price for defending the 
weaker members of society - in Rwanda for example. 
Why is it that the Church has become increasingly ac-
tive in the politics of countries in the process of transi-
tion? According to Abbot Villaça, whether in Zaire or in 
Benin, the stance taken by the bishops was a response 
to the difficult conditions experienced in many African 
countries. As a general rule, he acknowledged that the 
Abbot Théophile Villaça 
Church's mission was not to take sides or 
meddle in politics: its job was to 'safe-
guard the truth and defend the common 
good'. This was the message delivered by 
Pope Jean-Paul II when he visited Benin in 
1993. The Pope indicated that even if the 
Church in Benin had taken upon itself a 
temporary mission of a political nature, it 
should lose no time in returning to its true 
function. 
How does the Church view what 
has happened in Benin in the meantime? 
Abbot Villaça expressed disappointment. 
'After everything this country has been 
through, the impact - in terms of regener-
ating the country - has been less than anticipated. In 
fact, you could argue that it has largely been a failure. 
Instead of working together so that the country can 
make genuine progress and begin to rebuild, the politi-
cians have been busy battling for power. An illustration 
of this lack of cohesion is the number of candidates 
who stood in the presidential election. In their mani-
festos, they all promised "genuine progress". But the 
same people then stab each other in the back and seem 
ready to run the risk of setting North against South, or 
provoking ethnic divisions. That is what we find so dis-
heartening about politics.' The Abbot went on to stress, 
however, that the Church would always be there and, 
without necessarily meddling in politics, would 'always 
make the voice of truth heard - by condemning what is 
not right about the country'. It was in this context that, 
after the National Conference, the Church, in collabora-
tion with Unesco, set up the Institute for Human Rights 
and the Promotion of Democracy in Benin. 
Upheavals at the National Assembly 
Since 1990, Benin has had one constitutional 
referendum, two general elections, two presidential 
polls (each leading to a change at the top) and a cohab-
itation experiment between the President and an oppo-
sition majority in the National Assembly (in 1995-96). 
Taken together, these events suggest that there has 
been significant democratic progress. They also offer a 
lot of useful material for those interested in the interac-
tion between the three 'poles' of power : the executive, 
the legislature and the judiciary. 
The Constitution stipulates that the President of 
the Republic is elected for a five-year term with the 
possibility of re-election for a second term only. The 
vote is by universal suffrage in two rounds, the second 
one being a 'run-off' between the top two candidates 
in the first ballot. The President is head of both the 
state and the government and thus has considerable 
powers. The country's other main democratic institution 
is the National Assembly, although its powers are weak-
er given that the system is weighted so heavily in the 
President's favour. The Assembly is frequently the arena 
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for verbal sparring matches - confirming, if proof were 
needed, that democracy is alive and kicking in the 
country of King Behanzin. 18 of Benin's 48 political par-
ties are represented there with eight currently in the 
governing coalition. With so many parties, alliances are 
constantly being forged... and broken. As a result the 
government is always having to 'fish' for votes to main-
tain a majority in the chamber. 
One effect of this interplay of parties in the As-
sembly, according to its President Bruno Amoussou, is a 
tendency to focus on the principle of structural adjust-
ment rather than the content of the actual pro-
gramme. Mr Amoussou chided the opposition for 'shift-
ing the debate' in this way. 'Discussions in the Assembly 
should concentrate on the details of the policy - where 
it is perfectly natural to have differences of opinion -
not whether the structure of the economy needs to be 
adjusted.' He added: 'We are, however, still in the early 
stages of learning about the democratic model.' 
Despite the successful transition to democracy 
in Benin, there is still inefficient management of public 
affairs in certain fundamental areas relating to long-
term development. This indicates that the 
country needs to continue implementing re-
forms if the new democracy is to fulfil its po-
tential. The fact that a dominant bureau-
cratic system still exists, remaining 
effectively unaccountable to the democratic 
and legal institutions, is a prime example of 
these unresolved administration problems. A 
programme of reforms is envisaged which 
will limit the powers of central government. 
Decentralisation is planned with more re-
sponsibilities being passed down to local au-
thorities. 
The President of the Assembly also 
observed that there had been a marked shift 
in the composition of the legislature follow-
ing the most recent elections. A lot of 'new blood' had 
arrived and, commensurately, few incumbents had got 
back into Parliament (just 17 out of 64). This electoral 
phenomenon of 'all change' had strengthened the re-
solve of the newly elected deputies to reflect the con-
cerns of the people. 
The work of the second elected National As-
sembly, which convened in 1995, has coincided with 
the beginning of the decentralisation process men-
tioned earlier. This should open up new political oppor-
tunities for the development of other models for man-
aging public affairs at a local level. The pace of reform, 
however, is affected by political rivalries and the con-
stantly shifting alliances within the legislature. The re-
ality is that political parties here lack a national base. 
According to one opposition member, they are little 
more than 'electoral clubs', at the service of their re-
spective leaders. The main aim of the latter, it is said, is 
to make a name for themselves in their own 'patch', re-
lying on tribal connections. And regional interests are 
uppermost when it comes to coalition-forming... and 
switching allegiance. 
The National Assembly has 83 seats from 18 
electoral districts. Although there are 18 parties repre-
sented, most members gravitate towards one of four 
'poles'. The 'pole' groupings are: 
- the Party for Democratic Renewal (PRD), led by Prime 
Minister Adrien Houngbédji; 
- FARD-ALAFIA, which brings together former and cur-
rent supporters of President Kérékou; 
- the 'Democratic Alliance' composed of the Social De-
mocratic Party of Bruno Amoussou (National Assembly 
President) and the party 'Our Common Cause' led by Al-
bert Tévoédjré, current Minister for Planning. 
- The opposition 'Democracy and Action' (numbering 
about 28 deputies)- consisting of the Benin Renaissance 
Party led by Rosine Soglo (wife of ex-President Soglo) 
and other small groups; 
There are also 10 non-aligned deputies, one of 
whom represents the Benin Communist Party. 
The other guardian of democratic values is the 
Constitutional Court. Set up in 1990, this has, up to 
now, proved to be highly independent. Following accu-
sations of intimidation and manipulation of the results 
during the presidential election, for example, the Court 
examined whether the election process had been con-
ducted properly, and invalidated certain results. It also 
acted as aribiter on the occasions when President Soglo 
and the National Assembly disagreed on budgetary is-
sues. Generally speaking, the Constitutional Court has 
acquired a reputation for impartiality. 
The country's judiciary consists of 
eight Courts of First Instance, a single Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme (Constitutional) 
Court comprising three chambers - judicial, 
administrative and budgetary. The trouble 
is that there are not enough judges - just 
178 to serve a population of five million. 
The problem is exacerbated by a lack of re-
sources, which means that only about half 
of the magistracy is actually dealing with 
cases at any one time. Judicial recruitment 
all but came to a halt following implemen-
tation of the third structural adjustment 
programme. The result is that the country's 
ability to dispense justice has been seriously 
impaired, with legal proceedings taking up 
to three years to settle. 
Arguably, it was widespread mismanagement 
of public affairs, more than anything else, which 
prompted the collapse of the old system and the move 
to replace it with democracy. This mismanagement had 
resulted in economic stagnation, and some would say 
collapse, driving the ancien regime below 'the mini-
mum threshold required for political legitimacy'. As a 
result, it was forced to concede to the forces of democ-
ratic change. 
Some progress has since been achieved in im-
proving public administration but more efforts are 
clearly needed, and new reforms must be brought in, 
before Benin can claim to be managing its affairs in a 
truly efficient manner. The crisis in the courts is just one 
example. The consolidation of judicial independence 
deserves to be lauded but with the actual institutions in 
such a poor state, and needing to be brought up to 
scratch, substantial investment is obviously needed. 
In terms of political power, there is also an issue 
of checks and balances. The Church - which played a 
major role in the démocratisation process - has with-
drawn from active involvement in political 'manage-
ment'. Meanwhile, the Constitution restricts the scope 
of action enjoyed by the National Assembly, which has 
powers only to propose minor changes to the budget. 
The executive (which draws up the budget), seems to 
have the upper hand and, some, at least, would argue 
that these are not the most propitious circumstances for 
continuing healthy, democratic development. WU M.F. 
Bruno Amoussou, 
President of the National 
Assembly 
A 
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A breath of fresh air... but still 
some way to go 
The creation of numerous 
privately-owned newspapers 
in Benin has caused radical 
upheaval in the press world. 
However, of the 170 news-
papers registered with the 
Ministry of the Interior in 
1990 - the year of the Na-
tional Conference - barely 
half have appeared more 
than a handful of times, and 
publications that appear 
only sporadically are legion. 
This freedom of scope -
where exposing scandals in 
the political and financial 
worlds plays a major role - has 
brought a breath of fresh air to the 
media in Benin, with caricatures and 
other 'sketches' of political figures 
finding their way into the daily pa-
pers. A private television channel 
(LC2) and radio station (Golf FM) 
have also begun broadcasting -
without authorisation from the High 
Authority in charge of audiovisual 
and communication media. Benin is 
not a country where journalists are 
imprisoned for their opinions. So all 
in all, it could be said that there is 
genuine press freedom here. Those 
working in the information and 
communication sectors belong to 
one of two major associations: The 
Association of Journalists in Benin 
(AJB) and The Union of Journalists 
of the Independent Press in Benin 
(UJPB). 
Since the National Confer-
ence, the legislative framework 
governing the media has been 
clearly defined, with press free-
dom written into the new consti-
tution. The High Authority for au-
diovisual and communication 
media was set up in July 1994 with 
the aim of releasing the press from 
the straitjacket it was forced to 
wear during 18 years of 
Marxist/Leninist rule. Its job is to 
develop and defend the freedom 
of the press, and to regulate the 
media. In pursuit of its objectives, 
the High Authority drafted a bill 
authorising the creation of private 
radio and television stations. This 
measure should have been passed 
at the beginning of this year, but 
the bill is still being considered in 
the National Assembly. The delay, 
it is said, has been caused by a re-
quest to include a special clause re-
lating to offences against the 
Head of State and the authorities -
a proposal which has been reject-
ed by the UJPB. The latter is a pri-
vate press association (counterpart 
to the AJB which represents the 
'official' press) and it is campaign-
ing against the measure, arguing 
that its sole aim is to gag the 
media. However, the proposal has 
won the support of all political 
parties, both government and op-
position. The Constitutional Court 
meanwhile, is backing the journal-
ists. It has rejected the proposition 
and has asked the National Assem-
bly to review the law relating to 
detaining journalists on remand 
and to offences against the Head 
of State. 
According to Brathier 
Léon, Chairman of the AJB and 
chief editor of the daily newspaper 
La Nation, 'the private press in 
Benin is no longer taking orders'. 
Things are a little more complicat-
ed for the official sector. They 
have a public service to perform 
and are obliged in principle to re-
flect all points of view. Mr Léon 
says that even in the state-run 
media, 'the Head of State cannot 
exert direct pressure given that the 
government is a coalition of vari-
ous political parties.' From this per-
spective, the picture is one of sig-
nificant press freedom. According 
to Mr Léon, 'the situation is quite 
different from that of the Soglo 
era, when the Head of State made 
forays into the handling of infor-
mation. Now, the issue is more one 
of how the press should handle its 
new-found liberty.' 
While press plurality may 
have been achieved and recog-
nised in the legislation, the battle 
for the abolition of restrictions on 
radio and television broadcasts 
continues so that these two sectors 
can take their rightful place in the 
democratic system. The reality is 
that both the print and audiovisu-
al media are struggling to keep 
afloat. Beninese society in general, 
and private sector companies in 
particular, are not in a position to 
allocate large sums to advertising. 
Television. 
The private sector now has a foot in the door 
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Security versus independence  I
in Benin, the manage-
ment of printed and au-
diovisual communication 
involves a number of dif-
ferent players. On the Official' 
side, one finds the government 
and its various departments (in-
cluding the High Authority) and 
the National Assembly. 
Since 1989, freedom of thought 
and expression has been a legal 
right written into the constitu-
tion. It is a liberty which some in 
government (past and present) 
are still uncomfortable with. 
This is reflected in the ambigu-
ous nature of press legislation -
especially insofar as it concerns 
the audiovisual sector. It also 
helps to explain the lack of sup-
port available to the indepen-
dent press - which is still in its 
infancy and is thus particularly 
vulnerable. A prime example of 
official ambivalence during the 
previous Soglo administration 
was the decision to go back on a 
commitment to give tax conces-
sions to privately-owned news-
papers. It was a U-turn that hit 
the papers very heavily. Similar-
ly, the government has still 
taken no action on the bill pre-
sented by the High Authority in 
1994 designed to break the 
state monopoly on radio and 
television broadcasts. Indeed, 
when the measure was laid be-
fore the National Assembly, it 
attracted support from just one 
elected member. Under Benin's 
Constitution, both the executive 
And producing newspapers and 
television programmes is a very ex-
pensive business. There are also 
problems in distribution which is a 
costly exercise. In fact, newspapers 
are only regularly available in the 
capital, thanks to the absence of a 
reliable distribution network in 
the rest of the country. According 
to Hervé Djosse of Le Citoyen, an 
independent paper, this state of 
affairs forces proprietors of eco-
nomically vulnerable media com-
panies to sell their services to polit-
ical or other interest groups 
looking for an outlet to dissemi-
nate their ideas. The result is that 
and the legislature are involved 
in the law-making process, and 
the High Authority, striving to 
preserve its independence, has 
submitted its bill on press assis-
tance (which was envisaged in 
the 1992 draft budget) to both 
government and Parliament. 
Besides the institutional players, 
there are two associations of 
journalists, reflecting the divide 
that exists in Benin between the 
independent and state media. 
State-controlled newspapers 
offer journalists satisfactory 
working conditions and job se-
curity, but make it difficult for 
them to remain independent. As 
for the privately-owned press, 
Hervé Djossé observes that they 
have to pay a high price for 
their independent principles. All 
too many of them swiftly find 
themselves in a position where 
they can no longer resist the fi-
nancial pressures. Another fac-
tor is that private newspaper 
owners have had no journalistic 
training, having embarked on a 
newspaper career simply to 
avoid unemployment. Indeed, 
one could argue that the main 
problem is not so much the lim-
its imposed by ambiguous legis-
lation but a crucial need for 
proper training. The challenge 
now facing the Beninese press is 
to remedy this lack so that jour-
nalists from the independent 
sector can play a valid role in 
the democratic system. 
the publications in question com-
promise their independent status. 
In straitened economic cir-
cumstances, the only potential 
source of reliable income is the 
state. But the state - that is to say 
the government in power at any 
given time - has no real interest in 
seeing its policies and methods 
criticised. According to the General 
Secretary of the UJPB, 'in return 
for state support, journalists work 
under a certain degree of self-cen-
sorship. This is hardly the most 
solid basis on which to develop a 
critical and analytical press.' 
The audiovisual sector has 
not been spared the upheaval that 
has affected the media. The ORTB 
(Radio and Television Broadcasting 
Office in Benin) suspended its 
broadcasts for two days as part of 
a campaign to repeal the law de-
termining its legal status. The 
point at issue was that it was 
being forced to change from an 
'office' to a legally and financially 
autonomous national company -
part of the liberalisation of the au-
diovisual sector promised by the 
government. There was serious 
concern within the ORTB about 
the implications of such a move. 
The private TV sector, as 
mentioned earlier, already has a 
foot in the door with the indepen-
dent channel LC2, but it too faces 
frustrations. The head of program-
ming for the new channel - which 
sees itself as a 'non-elitist' televi-
sion company - told us that the 
'necessary infrastructures have 
been in place for two years now. 
All we are waiting for is for the 
government to grant us our broad-
casting licence.' 
So despite the recommen-
dations of the National Confer-
ence, the state continues to hold a 
dominant position in the audiovi-
sual sector with most TV and radio 
broadcasts still effectively under its 
control. This is significant, given 
that the broadcast media (notably 
radio) are the most accessible for 
the majority of the population. So 
far, only five rural radio stations -
with a broadcasting range no 
greater than 100 km - have been 
authorised. In a cash-strapped soci-
ety, these stations have to pay 
their operating costs from their 
own resources, and this inevitably 
limits their ability to broadcast on 
a regular basis. 
State radio and television 
channels also face financial con-
straints. These reach a larger audi-
ence than newspapers since they 
do some broadcasts in the various 
local languages, but most of their 
output is in French, which 40% of 
the population do not understand. 
It is important to take this into ac-
count when plans are being drawn 
up to improve the democratic 
management of public affairs in 
Benin. It goes without saying that 
democracy cannot be consolidated 
if people do not have access to the 
most fundamental information on 
how their country's political sys-
tem works. IH M.F. 
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Every year, during the rainy 
season, Daagbo Hou Non 
plunges into the waves. He 
strikes out for the New 
World to pray for those de-
ported from the Gulf of 
Guinea and who died in slav-
ery, their souls remaining in 
the voodoo fold for safe 
keeping. The spirit of 
voodoo is said to have trav-
elled with them on the road 
to exile. Daagbo Hou Non is 
the supreme chief of the 
voodoos, and he acts as me-
diator with the world be-
yond, as adviser and even as magis-
trate. His Ouidah concession, the 
site of a former Portuguese fort a 
few kilometres outside Cotonou, is 
now an evocative museum to the 
slave trade and it is always busy. 
The site was one of the main em-
barkation points for slaves and is 
now the centre of the voodoo cult. 
Different religions co-exist here and 
the visitor will find a remarkable sa-
cred-python temple immediately op-
posite the cathedral where Mon-
signor Da Souza, president of the 
national sovereign conference of 
Benin, preached in 1995. 
Another prestigious place 
with strong historical connections 
- Abomey - is the site of the 
palaces of the ancient kings of 
Danxone and here, one finds the 
vestiges of Dahomey's regal histo-
ry preserved. The kingdom of Da-
homey is still in existence, the 
hereditary royal line having sur-
vived through twelve generations 
to the modern day. We met the 
current king, His Majesty Ded-
jalagni Agoli-Agbo. He was 
flanked by his ministers, the most 
important of whom is the Mingan 
or 'Prime Minister'. One does not 
address His Majesty directly. The 
Mingan (a retired former postal 
employee) acts as intermediary 
and interpreter for the king, al-
though the monarch is himself a 
man of education. 
The king's court - or, 
rather, his 'government' - is made 
up of seven 'ministers', whose 
portfolios include finance, de-
fence, information and state af-
fairs. Why seven? According to the 
Mingan, 'cosmogony and geoman-
cy require the king to be engaged 
on a specific activity every day of 
the week. Depending on their 
role, each day the ministers have 
to perform certain tasks to con-
tribute to the kingdom's durabili-
The voodoo religion aspires to recognition just 
like other faiths. 
Daagbo Hou Non, voodoo high priest 
Far from being regarded as an opponent of 
modern political power, the king has contributed 
to the country's stability. 
The current king, H.M. Dedjalagni Agoli-Agbo 
ty'. At this court, all positions have 
a cultural significance. For exam-
ple, the Mingan - who is descend-
ed from a royal line - and his ret-
inue, are always placed on the 
right of the king, whereas the 
Méhou - the interior minister -
and his retinue are on the king's 
left. 
Far from being regarded as 
an opponent of modern political 
power, ti.e monarchy is said to 
have contributed to the country's 
stability. When Dahomey was con-
quered, the colonial authorities 
made use of this traditional power 
base - which has never been called 
into question - to provide a firmer 
foundation for its policies. The ap-
proach continued when the coun-
try became the independent 
Benin. As the Mingan recalls: 
'Royal power was consulted by the 
Republic's government, even 
under the Marxist regime, and its 
ministers are conscious of royalty's 
role in preserving and promoting 
traditional cultures'. Life at court is 
organised in accordance with the 
old traditions. 
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Tradition is also being kept 
alive by the art, songs and dances 
of the Amazon warriors (in former 
times, the personal guard of Da-
homey's king), which are now 
being learned by new generations. 
Indeed, Benin is a land of culture, 
music, dance and folklore. Two 
traditional royal feasts are organ-
ised every year during the dry sea-
son - the 'Djahonou', which lasts 
13 days, and the 'Gandahi'. The 
latter, which involves festivities 
spread over three and a half 
months, is staged at the central 
palace (now a museum for the 12 
royal lines) and culminates in a 
procession of sumptuously robed 
priestesses representing the last 12 
kings of Dahomey. The ceremonies 
are marked by offerings to the 
spirits of the ancestors and 
strengthen the links between roy-
alty, followers of the voodoo cult -
of which Benin is the traditional 
home - and the current authori-
ties, who are invited to attend. 
Voodoo 
According to the supreme 
medicine man - the chief juju 
priest, Daagbo Hou Non (whose 
name means 'sea god' in the Fon 
language), 'all of Benin's territory 
is voodoo. When the ancestors 
were shipped off irrevocably into 
slavery, they came and laid down 
their voodoo here. This means that 
the religion's umbilical cord is in 
Benin and nowhere else'. Voodoo 
worshippers are numbered among 
the 20 ethnic groups in the coun-
try, each speaking a different di-
alect, although they communicate 
with one another in Fon, the lan-
guage of the street, or in French, 
the working language. 
In addition to his role in 
voodoo rites, the Daagbo Hou Non 
is consulted by the rest of the pop-
ulation about more worldly con-
cerns. In the event of drought or a 
road accident, before the rainy 
season and during harvest, he acts 
as high priest, making offerings 
and sacrifices to the voodoo divini-
ty to request permission or protec-
tion. Daagbo Hou Non's role is 
passed on from father to son. 
It was Nicéphore Soglo's 
administration which first institut-
ed a 'national voodoo day'. This is 
the day when, as mentioned 
above, the voodoo dignitary 
strides into the sea to meet the an-
cestors who were taken into slav-
ery and sent to the Americas. He 
dedicates his prayers to the eternal 
rest of their souls. A bill is current-
ly before the Benin National As-
sembly to designate a day once 
again for the voodoo religion -
which aspires to recognition like 
other faiths, while maintaining its 
independence from the political 
regime. 
The python temple 
Most of Benin's population 
adheres to traditional beliefs 
which involve diverse and complex 
rites. There are, for example, the 
so-called 'cinq-cinq' (people who 
Sacred sites and temples can be found 
throughout Benin 
have five scarifications on either 
cheek) who worship the pythons. 
They are the guardians of the tem-
ple in whose precincts more than 
100 such snakes are buried. They 
practise certain rituals and, in par-
ticular, pay homage to a 400-year-
old tree called 'Iroko'. According 
to legend, it was in the sacred 
Ouidah forest that King Kpassé 
was transformed into Iroko. Ani-
mals are sacrificed at the foot of 
this tree. The altar in the python 
temple - which is home to a divini-
ty through whom the snakes are 
addressed - is out of bounds to 
any uninitiated visitor. The laws to 
be observed in the temple are ex-
tremely strict and anyone violating 
them must enter a purification hut 
to be washed with certain decoc-
tions which are supposed to get 
rid of evil spirits. 
Every seven years, a great 
ceremony takes place in Ouidah. 
Its aim, according to our guide, is 
to 'purify Benin', using the huge 
sacred earthenware jar from the 
temple. Medicine men from all 
over the country attend the cere-
mony and, chanting incantations, 
capture evil spirits (embodied by 
infusions) in the sacred jar. When 
the ceremonies are over, these ma-
lign spirits which threatened Benin 
are thrown into the sea. Next, holy 
water is drawn from a place 
known as 'the slave road', to puri-
fy and protect the community. 
Benin clearly has a great 
wealth of culture. It is the cradle 
of the voodoo cult and each vil-
lage stages its own spectacular fes-
tivals and festivities. Throughout 
the country there are sacred sites 
and temples of great significance 
to the population. Anyone setting 
out to learn more about Benin's 
history and cultural heritage will 
find a lot to choose from but the 
starting point should certainly be a 
visit to the museums at Abomey 
and Ouidah. M M.F. 
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Improving transport links 
I Cooperation between Benin 
and the EU began in 1961 
with the first EDF. Since 
then, the country has bene-
I fited from aid totalling ECU 
I 446 million, not to mention 
I the ECU 13 million or so it 
has received in the form of 
loans from the European In-
I vestment Bank. Benin has 
enhanced its credibility in 
I the eyes of the international 
financial institutions (obtain-
I ing increased support as a 
result). There are various 
reasons for this improved interna-
tional standing: elections successful-
ly conducted for the National As-
sembly in March 1995, and the 
Presidency in March 1996, develop-
ments resulting from the démocrati-
sation process, and the fact that the 
government has abided by the 
terms of the structural adjustment 
programme agreed with its foreign 
investors. As for EU cooperation, the 
focal area for funding is the road in-
frastructure and, in particular, the 
transcoastal route linking the four 
countries bordering the Bight of 
Benin. The road stretches from 
Ghana to Nigeria, passing through 
the French-speaking countries of 
Togo and Benin on the way. It is 
strategically important, particularly 
in the context of efforts to achieve 
economic integration within ECOW-
AS, and to reduce transport costs. 
As a result, upgrading the highway 
has been made a priority. 
The stretch of the 
transcoastal road between Hilla-
condji and Cotonou never fails to 
take motorists using it for the first 
time by surprise. It is the only toll 
road in French-speaking Africa. 
'Have your money ready', proclaim 
the signs. The charge is CFAF 400 
for cars and CFAF 500 for heavy 
goods vehicles. 
Approximately 93 km of 
road will be improved and mod-
ernised between the Godomey 
crossroads in Cotonou and Hilla-
condji, a town on the border with 
Togo. 
This work will make a sig-
nificant contribution to traffic 
flows on this key East-West link, 
and should help to improve trade 
between Cotonou and other re-
gional centres in the country, espe-
cially in the South of the Mono 
region. 
Since 1993, the EDF has fi-
nanced a number of other major 
road projects: Séme to Porto-Novo 
(12.7 km), Parakou to Djougou (72 
km) and Béroubouay to Malanville 
(168 km). Built under the auspices 
of the Agency for Urban Works 
(Agetur), these projects generated 
numerous jobs for Benin's young 
people, who were taken on to do 
the resurfacing work. It is worth 
pointing out that Benin is the only 
French-speaking country in Africa 
to employ the paving technique, 
emulating the methods used in Eu-
rope. EU aid to the road sector is 
mostly concentrated in the Zou, 
Atlantic, Mono and Ouémé re-
gions - in other words in the south 
of the country - with infrastruc-
tures in North Benin being fi-
nanced through bilateral German 
and Swiss cooperation agree-
ments. 
Management of road in-
frastructures is mainly based on 
maintaining and upgrading exist-
ing routes, in accordance with the 
policies set out in the structural 
adjustment programme. Such ef-
Improving the Djougou to Naititingou road bénin 
forts to improve the network also 
fit in with the country's macro-eco-
nomic objectives. 
One of these objectives is 
to open up rural areas. Maintain-
ing and asphalting country tracks 
is, therefore, an important part of 
the overall scheme. 380 kilometres 
of rural roads are maintained each 
year, with work being carried out 
both before and after the rainy 
season. In addition, 580 kilometres 
of new country roads are being 
built. The route between Athiémé 
and Adjaha - which joins up with 
the transcoastal highway leading 
to Lokossa on the Benin-Togo bor-
der - is a good example of how 
such infrastructure policies are 
helping to open up rural regions. 
In an area primarily given over to 
agriculture, the villagers are finally 
able to send their produce to mar-
ket. In the past, it sometimes 
ended up rotting where it lay, sim-
ply through lack of adequate 
transport. 
Opening up the interior 
also benefits the cotton industry, 
which is the mainstay of the coun-
try's economy. The whole cotton 
production process, from ginning 
to weaving - takes place in the 
same plant. The road network al-
lows all the cotton harvested in 
the region to be transported to 
the dozen or so processing plants -
which are located mainly in the 
south. It is worth mentioning at 
this point that the National Agri-
culture Promotion Company (Son-
apra) - which relies more than 
most on good road links - is grad-
ually opening its doors to private-
sector investment in line with the 
structural adjustment objectives. 
Rural development and 
decentralisation 
Another important area of 
Benin-EU cooperation is rural de-
velopment in the narrower sense. 
The current policy has emerged 
from a lengthy process of negotia-
tion which began in 1989. A study 
on the future of the rural sector 
was carried out at the time of 
Benin's National Conference. Its 
objectives included redefining the 
role of the state (by looking at 
ways of reducing government in-
volvement), and focusing on the 
drive to ensure adequate food 
supplies. This provides the context 
for the Mono Region rural struc-
turing programme which is funded 
by the 7th EDF. This aims to im-
prove the people's standard of liv-
ing by providing institutional sup-
port for local authorities, and 
improving water supplies (nine 
water distribution 'mini-networks' 
and 20 wells). 
In the framework of de-
centralisation, European support is 
also directed to local schemes 
which aim to increase people's in-
Moise Mensah, National Authorising Officer 
'Our relations are characterised 
by a mutual desire to be true partners 
in development 
volvement in economic, social and 
political development. EU aid in 
this sector is targeted at support-
ing basic social infrastructures. In 
concrete terms, this means provid-
ing advice to village communities, 
training managers (of loan funds, 
tontines, seed banks, etc.) and pro-
viding institutional support for the 
establishment of structures which 
can gradually 'come on stream' 
once the decentralisation law has 
been passed by the National As-
sembly. The stakes involved in such 
a reform are high, given that its 
aim is to 'democratise' local au-
thorities and redefine the role of 
the state. The latter is moving to-
wards a very different kind of rela-
tionship with its newly empow-
ered citizens. Under the plans, 
town and village councils will be 
representative local bodies with 
the power to decide on all local 
development issues. 
The 8th EDF 
Schemes funded in Benin 
under successive EDFs have tended 
to focus on infrastructures, rural 
development and the national 
health system. This approach will 
be maintained under the 8th EDF, 
which has an overall budget of 
ECU 120.5 million. 55% of the re-
sources will be devoted to trans-
port, with more assistance being 
provided for road networks and 
maintenance. A further 20% will 
be allocated to public health facili-
ties - in particular enouraging ac-
cess to generic drugs. The remain-
ing 25% is earmarked for urban 
and local development projects. 
This distribution of funds 
underlines the importance that is 
attached to improving infrastruc-
tures, whether in transport, health 
care, or some other social policy 
field. The weakness of infrastruc-
tures continues to be one of the 
biggest hurdles to developing the 
African continent. Moïse Mensah, 
National Authorising Officer of the 
EDF, and someone who is well 
aware of the problems (he used to 
be Rural Development Minister) 
expressed warm appreciation of 
the relationship his country enjoys 
with the EU. 'No further proof is 
needed of the value and effective-
ness of our cooperation agree-
ments with the EU. We understand 
each other perfectly and our rela-
tions are characterised by a mutual 
desire to be true partners in devel-
opment'. He reported-that efforts 
to achieve structural adjustment 
were progressing satisfactorily - a 
claim borne out by a recent survey 
which found that up to 80% of 
measures had been implemented. 
'As for future cooperation', he 
added, 'I hope the EU will be sensi-
tive to our regional concerns, both 
at WAEMU and ECOWAS level.' Mr 
Mensah concluded by confiding 
that he hoped to see European co-
operation extended to prospecting 
and drilling for natural resources. 
These, he believed, offered enor-
mous potential. On the basis of re-
search already carried out, it is 
thought that Benin's subsoil con-
tains 5.5 billion barrels of petrol-
eum deposits and more than 90 
billion cubic metres of natural 
gas. m M.F. 
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The barometer is set fair, 
but will the good weather 
last? 
Anyone stepping ashore for 
the first time in Côte d'Ivoire 
is sure to be impressed by 
the hustle and bustle of eco-
nomic activity. He or she 
may well want to know 
where all the dynamism 
comes from - and at least 
part of the answer is that 
this West African nation is 
going through a process of 
economic recovery after 
more than a decade of stagnation. 
In 1997, the growth rate is expected 
to be more than 7%. People may 
also be surprised to learn that, tak-
ing the country's size into account. 
Côte d'Ivoire is second only to Aus-
tralia as the most popular destina-
tion for immigrants. 30% of the 
population is of foreign origin. And 
it has lofty ambitions for the next 
millennium, preparing confidently 
for what it regards as its future role 
- as the economic hub for all of 
West Africa. 
Preserving political 
stability 
When President Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny died in late 
1993, many observers predicted an 
uncertain future and a difficult 
transition for Côte d'Ivoire. The 
man who had led the country since 
independence in 1960 had estab-
lished a climate of social peace and 
political stability. Did anyone really 
want this equilibrium to be under-
mined in a bitter war of succes-
sion? It was difficult, at the time, 
to predict how things would go. 
There were those with a certain in-
fluence, and particular interests, 
waiting in the wings to see how 
things developed - in the hope of 
stepping out into the political 
limelight. Others were preoccu-
pied with defending positions of 
privilege. With a 'new deal' in the 
offing, the country's shaky political 
scene certainly gave some cre-
dence to those who feared for the 
future. The situation had become 
extremely complex as a result both 
of the transition to a multi-party 
system and the economic decline 
which began in the 1980s. 
Fortunately, the dark 
clouds dispersed, and Côte d'Ivoire 
- unused to major political up-
heaval - proved the harbingers of 
doom wrong. It skilfully negotiat-
ed the change in direction and em-
barked on a new era. To whom or 
what can the relative success of 
this transition be attributed? Was 
it thanks to the skill and ability of 
the politicians or the maturity and 
peace-loving nature of the peo-
ple? From the events which imme-
diately followed the death of Pres-
ident Houphouët-Boigny, the 
reasons for this orderly 
changeover are still unclear. 
Côte d'lvoire's constitution 
had made provision, in the event 
of a power vacuum or the death of 
the Head of State, for the Presi-
dent of the National Assembly to 
assume the top position. Henri 
Konan Bédié who held this post, 
automatically assumed power. The 
opposition was not at all happy 
with this, preferring the establish-
ment of a caretaker government 
and a complete redefinition of the 
rules of the political game - in the 
shape of constitutional and institu-
tional reforms. Understandably, 
the run-up to the presidential elec-
tion held some two years later, in 
October 1995, was a rather tense 
period. 
The main opposition par-
ties - the Côte d'Ivoire Popular 
Front (FPI) and the Republican 
Rally (RDR) boycotted the poll. This 
left the field clear for the election 
of the incumbent, Konan Bédié, of 
the Côte d'Ivoire Democratic Party 
(PDCI) who took 95% of the vote. 
The PDCI is the political group that 
has been in power for more than 
40 years. In the eyes of the inter-
national community, Côte d'Ivoire 
had satisfactorily come through its 
first post-Houphouët-Boigny presi-
dential election without mishap. 
The political crisis that would have 
undermined the country's stability 
and credibility, compromising its 
prospects of economic revival, had 
been avoided. 
Some insiders, particularly 
those without a close attachment 
to the PCDI, took a more sanguine 
view of the transition period. After 
such a long economic recession, it 
was vital, they believed, for the 
country to 'make up for lost time', 
and its capacity to do this, they 
felt, had been well and truly com-
promised. The view they expressed 
was that no progress was possible 
until the rules governing politics 
were made more transparent, with 
the process of démocratisation 
being speeded up. The mindset of 
those holding the reins of power. 
Abidjan University. 
Students have regularly voiced their dissatisfac-
tion, sometimes violently, making life hard at 
times for the university authorities côte d'ivoire 
I he emolem ot the governing party-
The PDCI is a big political machine and has 
a massive advantage. 
they argued, had to change, and 
that change had to be reflected in 
concrete action. With 147 seats in 
the National Assembly as against 
14 and 10, respectively, for the 
RDR and FPI, the PDCI had a big 
political machine and massive ad-
vantage. This does not appear, 
however, to have dampened the 
fervour of the opposition, which 
assumed its role enthusiastically. 
Indeed, it succeeded in extracting 
a promise from the government to 
reform the constitution in a num-
ber of disputed areas including the 
arrangements for a caretaker pres-
ident in the event of a power vac-
uum, the criteria governing eligi-
bility for president, the 
organisation of elections, the sta-
tus of the opposition and the fi-
nancing of political parties. 
Those close to President 
Bédié have confirmed that one of 
his concerns has been to ensure 
that calm prevails in Côte d'lvoire's 
democratic system. His proposals 
to include opposition representa-
tives in government have given 
people a lot of food for thought. 
Several opposition members have 
admitted to having difficulties in 
striking a balance between their 
own political strategy and their 
genuine desire for reconciliation 
and consensus. 
In a country where the dis-
tribution of the various ethnic 
groups within government plays 
an important role, it has been pos-
sible, up to now, to maintain the 
idea of national unity, with only a 
few dissenters. To preserve the cli-
mate of peace, which is essential 
for Côte d'Ivoire to achieve its 
much-trumpeted economic ambi-
tions, the population as a whole 
needs to preserve and develop its 
model of political equilibrium, 
bringing in all the major ethnic 
and political components. The next 
presidential election, scheduled for 
2000, will be a good opportunity 
to assess progress in this direction. 
Diversification of the 
economic base 
Balanced and stable eco-
nomic development can be 
achieved only if the problems asso-
ciated with relaunching a country's 
economy can be overcome. This is 
not something unique to Côte 
d'Ivoire - it is a lesson that has 
held good for most countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa since indepen-
dence. Côte d'Ivoire actually 
achieved and was able to sustain 
an impressive economic perfor-
mance for the first 20 years, on the 
basis of what was essentially a lib-
eral economic policy. It opened up 
the country to inward investment 
and enabled its agricultural sector 
to prosper through exports. Some 
commentators dubbed this Côte 
d'lvoire's economic 'miracle', and 
comparisons were even made with 
Japan. With a consistent growth 
rate of about 8% and a per capita 
income significantly higher than 
the average for West-Africa, the 
country managed to get itself into 
the group of so-called 'intermedi-
ate-income' states. 
Côte d'Ivoire gets its for-
eign-currency reserves from agri-
cultural export income. The main 
ones are cocoa, coffee, cotton, oil-
palm products, hevea wood and 
other timber. In volume terms, 
cocoa and coffee are easily the 
country's most important raw ma-
terials. In the cocoa sector. Côte 
d'Ivoire managed to catch up with 
and overtake Nigeria and Ghana. 
Production increased from 179 000 
tonnes in 1970 to between 950 000 
and a million tonnes today. This 
makes it the world's top cocoa-
producing country. It is also the 
fifth largest exporter of coffee 
after Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia 
and Mexico. Together, the two 
crops have enabled the country to 
consolidate its economic develop-
ment, with relatively few prob-
lems. 
It would be wrong, howev-
er, to paint too rosy a picture of 
the benefits derived from these 
key agricultural products. In the 
late 1970s, the world price of both 
suffered unprecedented falls. 
Combined with other structural 
factors at home, the effect was to 
plunge Côte d'Ivoire into deep cri-
sis. This was the start of a long pe-
riod of decline which was reflected 
in higher unemployment, large-
scale migration from the country-
side to urban areas and a scaling-
down of investment programmes. 
The country contracted colossal 
loans in an attempt to bail out ex-
porters and reduce the growing 
macro-economic imbalances. The 
crisis revealed just how fragile the 
economy really was, with its heavy 
dependence on a few export prod-
ucts and vulnerability to world 
price fluctuations. The recovery 
would prove to be a long, drawn-
out process. 
There were those who be-
lieved that the country would be 
on its knees for an even longer pe-
riod but in 1994, the economy 
began to show signs .of recovery. 
Economic reforms implemented 
over a number of years began to 
bear fruit, and there was the 
added bonus of rising commodity 
prices. At last, Côte d'Ivoire was 
able to start making money again 
January 1994 also saw a 
devaluation of the currency vis-à-
vis the French franc, which affect-
ed all the countries in the CFA 
franc zone. In many respects, this 
was a godsend for Côte d'Ivoire, 
providing a big boost to the econ-
omy. One objective of the adjust-
ment - provided everything went 
according to plan - was to re-
launch exports and investment. 
The government took a number of 
'flanking' measures aimed at coun-
teracting the likely inflationary 
and negative social impacts of de-
valuation. There was a price freeze 
on certain essential items and 
wage rises were kept in check. 
Prices paid to producers for export 
products were also raised slightly, 
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made to boost funds for social pur-
poses. Of course, devaluation in it-
self does not exactly help people 
to deal with their everyday prob-
lems, especially in a country which 
already has a reputation for very 
high living costs. Quite the reverse 
in fact. Families found that their 
weekly budgets did not go as far 
as before, while young people 
were left muddling through as 
best they could - hoping no doubt 
that the economic revival needed 
to restore their fortunes would not 
take too long to get going. 
Students have regularly 
voiced their dissatisfaction, some-
times violently, making life hard at 
times for the university authorities. 
The government is confi-
dent of growth of about 7.5% this 
year and believes that Côte 
d'Ivoire has the potential to 
achieve a rate soon which is in 
double figures. Multi-sectoral re-
covery policies are currently being 
implemented, with a view to 
strengthening, diversifying and lib-
eralising the agricultural base, ex-
ports, services, mining and the pro-
motion of private investment. 
Brimming with confidence, Prime 
Minister Kablan Duncan believes 
that his country is set to become 
the economic giant of the region, 
if not the continent. 
Côte d'Ivoire is, first and 
foremost, an agricultural country 
and agriculture is still one of the 
key pillars of the economy. In 
1994, the sector generated at least 
30% of GNP and 40% of export in-
come, providing employment for 
two thirds of the workforce. Pro-
grammes aimed at consolidating 
and diversifying farming are in 
progress. Apart from the coffee 
and cocoa that everyone has heard 
of, the country's farms offer a 
wide range of other produce to 
consumers and traders. The gov-
ernment's objective is to achieve a 
higher level of food self-sufficien-
cy. In the past, they were often 
criticised for paying more atten-
tion to cash crops than to satisfy-
ing the nutritional requirements of 
the local people. Items such as 
yams, maize, rice and plantains are 
in great demand and, if you visit 
the renowned maquis (small-scale 
catering establishments), there is a 
good chance that you will see, 
smell (and perhaps taste) at least 
one of these local foodstuffs. Steps 
have been taken to increase and 
improve production, and there are 
plans to restructure distribution 
networks taking account of where 
the population is concentrated. 
The expectation is that these mea-
sures should soon produce results. 
Given that the population growth 
rate is about 3.8%, it is essential 
for the government to increase an-
nual food production at a rate of 
between 4.5% and 6% between 
now and 2000. Côte d'Ivoire also 
intends to expand and intensify 
the production of onions, soya and 
potatoes. 
A banana plantation at Nièky. 
Côte d'Ivoire is, first and foremost 
an agricultural country. 
As well as having imple-
mented major reforms in coffee 
and cocoa (see the article entitled 
Manoeuvring for position), the 
government is looking closely at 
other sectors, and major privatisa-
tion programmes have been set in 
motion. The areas targeted include 
palm oil, with Palmindustrie being 
privatised to optimise exportable 
quantities of oil-bearing produce, 
and cotton, where the aim is to 
achieve an annual production fig-
ure of 300,000 tonnes and profit 
from the healthy state of the 
world market. Discussions have al-
ready begun with donors and com-
panies interested in investing in 
cotton about the way liberalisa-
tion should proceed. In the expec-
tation that these new privatisa-
tions will bring positive 
opportunities, some planters have 
already taken steps to organise 
their businesses more efficiently 
and safeguard their interests. In 
the pineapple sector, the authori-
ties are seeking new markets. The 
same approach is required for ba-
nanas given the constraints im-
posed by the evolving global mar-
ket and, in particular, the erosion 
of trade preferences resulting 
from the GATT Uruguay Round. 
Côte d'lvoire's economic 
development may have been agri-
culture-based for many years, but 
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the country also has significant -
and unexploited - mineral wealth. 
In the past, these resources attract-
ed little interest from politicians, 
despite the discovery of petroleum 
and gas deposits in 1980. In March 
1994, two new hydrocarbon fields, 
called Lion and Panthère, were dis-
covered by the US company UMIC 
(United Meridian Company). Other 
deposits (Foxtrot Bélier and Espoir) 
have been located in the Atlantic 
coastal region. Current production 
capacity is estimated at between 
20,000 and 25,000 barrels per day 
(bpd) - a figure which far exceeds 
national consumption require-
ments. The development of the oil 
sector fits in with one of the gov-
ernment's objectives, which is to 
guarantee that the country is inde-
pendent in energy terms. The au-
thorities would like to see produc-
tion reach 40,000 bpd (and 30 
million cubic metres per day of 
gas), enabling it to export energy 
to the wider region. 
Other mineral resources 
the government is keen to exploit 
include gold, nickel, manganese, 
platinum-bearing tantalite and 
iron. Exploiting these should result 
in substantial added value for Côte 
d'lvoire's mining sector, and a di-
versification of the country's ex-
port income. There are plans to 
give greater incentives to the min-
ing sector. New codes governing 
investment in mining and petrol-
eum have been drawn up with a 
view to attracting foreign compa-
nies that specialise in prospecting, 
extraction and processing of these 
hitherto unexploited sources of 
wealth. 
Like all African nations, 
Côte d'Ivoire aspires to much more 
than merely leaving underdevel-
opment and economic stagnation 
behind. It has its sights set on be-
coming an industrialised country, 
like those in South-East Asia, with-
in a generation. Asia chose the im-
ages of dragons and tigers to rep-
resent the power of their 
economies - which emerged in 
spectacular fashion in the 1980s. 
Côte d'Ivoire, meanwhile, has cho-
sen the elephant as the symbol of 
its intentions. The first step, if it is 
to conquer foreign markets and 
attract foreign investment, must 
be the establishment of a primary 
product-processing industry capa-
ble of high performance levels. 
Uncertainties 
Although the revival of 
Côte d'lvoire's economy and the 
much-talked-of prospects for the 
future are a source of satisfaction, 
many observers feel that the gov-
ernment should tread cautiously. 
Admittedly, at 7% plus (which is 
above most other African coun-
tries), growth is on target, but the 
economy, nonetheless, shows 
some signs of weakness. The im-
pact - which has still to work 
through - of all the economic re-
forms that have been implement-
ed, will be decisive. In the mean-
time, only a brave person would 
dare predict the repercussions for 
the economy of a sudden drop in 
world cocoa and coffee prices. 
Debt is perhaps the great-
est threat to economic stabilisation 
and the achievement of Côte 
d'lvoire's lofty ambitions. The 
amount the country owes is reason 
enough in itself for concern. At 
the end of 1996, the figure was a 
staggering $18 billion, external 
and internal debt combined. In 
local cash terms, the devaluation 
of the CFA franc had the unfortu-
nate effect of doubling the 
amount involved, which is denomi-
nated in foreign currency. Servic-
ing a debt of this size requires a 
sizeable proportion of the state 
budget every year. This does noth-
ing to reduce the economic imbal-
ances, and there are fears that so-
cial programmes and policies 
designed to encourage productive 
investment will not be sufficient to 
compensate for the effects of the 
debt burden. Debt reduction is al-
ready on the agenda in negotia-
Privatisation of Palmindustrie is under way 
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tions with the international agen-
cies but current discussions with 
the World Bank and IMF have 
been somewhat rancorous. The 
Bretton Woods institutions are 
making debt rescheduling condi-
tional on 'good economic house-
keeping' and accelerated liberali-
sation, but the government is 
having difficulties implementing 
the required programmes. It looks 
as if the problem will be around 
for some time to come. 
According to agronomists, 
the government, as in other agri-
culture-based countries, will also 
have to take steps to prevent sig-
nificant soil erosion in the future. 
This is something which needs to 
be taken into account when imple-
menting agricultural development 
programmes and strategies. An-
other area where attention is 
needed is the country's forests -
which are truly an 'endangered 
species'. Deforestation is continu-
ing, thanks to ill-thought-out tim-
ber exploitation and uncontrolled, 
illegal occupation of protected 
forests by businesspeople wanting 
to develop coffee and cocoa plan-
tations. It is estimated that be-
tween 100,000 and 150,000 tonnes 
of these crops are produced in pro-
tected areas! Preservation of Côte 
d'lvoire's forests must include the 
drafting and enforcement of a 
suitable land law applying to rural 
areas. This is something which is 
currently lacking. 
Finally, if the current 
promising progress is to continue, 
the government needs to monitor 
the success of social programmes 
whose aim is to ensure a reason-
ably fair distribution of the results 
of growth. This is important if they 
are to avoid social and even politi-
cal déstabilisation. 
It is suggested that crises 
come in cycles. Côte d'Ivoire has 
made a good start in recovering 
from the crisis of the 1980s/early 
1990s - and would naturally like to 
disprove the theory by maintain-
ing its development momentum 
over the longer term. MM κ.κ. Daniel Kablan Duncan, Prime Minister 
'Aiming to become a new industrialised 
country within a generation' 
Daniel Kablan Duncan is no newcomer to Côte d'lvoire's political scene. In 1990, he was Economics and Fi-
nance Minister and, in 1993, President Bédié appointed him Prime Minister, a post of great responsibility in a 
period of delicate political transition. After the 1995 elections, he was reappointed Prime Minister and also 
took charge of the National Plan and Industrial Development portfolios. Côte d'lvoire's economic resurgence 
began in 1994 as the result of a combination of favourable factors - notably the rise in world prices of the 
country's main export commodities and the devaluation of the CFA franc. These aspects aside. Côte d'lvoire's 
'Number 2' is a skilled strategist. We began by asking him to give us a brief outline of the economic policy 
which has enabled his country to begin getting back on its feet again. 
- The first thing I 
should point out is that we 
had a very strong economy, 
with high growth, during 
the first 20 years following 
independence. The average 
figure was 7% per year. 
After that, we suffered an eco-
nomic crisis, which began in 1981 
and went on until 1993. During 
that period, the GDP figure fell by 
0.1% per year, although there was 
a short time between 1985 and 
1986 when the outlook seemed a 
little brighter. The economy was 
out of balance and we implement-
ed adjustment programmes in an 
attempt to revive the trend to-
wards growth and make the econ-
omy competitive again. These 
structural measures were supple-
mented by the devaluation of the 
CFA franc in January 1994, and 
there was indeed an improvement 
in the currency position that year, 
which ran on into 1995. In 1996, 
rates were not as good but the 
economy continued to grow. The 
upward trend began in 1994 with 
2% growth, jumping to 7% in 
1995 and 1996. This year, we esti-
mate it will be 7.5%. Obviously, 
this revival can be attributed par-
tially to the rise in prices of our 
main export commodities, such as 
coffee and cocoa. But it is due, 
above all, to the fact that we have 
diversified basic aspects of our 
economy and implemented re-
forms in a number of other sec-
tors. Côte d'lvoire's economy is 
now more competitive and a great 
deal more attractive to private in-
vestors. 
Our unambiguous choice 
of private investment as the dri-
ving force for growth is one of the 
priorities of our economic policy. 
This contrasts with the two 
decades following independence, 
when we relied on the public 
rather than the private sector to 
promote growth. We aim to en-
courage prosperity through a pro-
gramme of privatisation, awarding 
public works contracts to the pri-
vate sector, and encouraging com-
panies to locate in Côte d'Ivoire. 
Meanwhile, we will help those al-
ready here to develop and export 
their produce. 
■ Are you satisfied with the cur-
rent rate of progress of your re-
forms? 
- Let's just say that we are 
ready to move on after the initial, 
fundamental stages. Implementing 
reform is a never-ending task and 
now we have to make sure that 
we stay ahead. A lot of effort has 
already been put in, but we obvi-
ously have many tasks facing us in 
the future. As regards our past 
achievements, we have overhauled 
the public finances, enabling us to 
release savings. In 1996, we had a 
surplus of CFAF 200 billion - more 
than 3% of GDP - whereas, in 
1993, the deficit was CFAF 93 bil-
lion. Then, of course, there have 
been privatisations enabling us to 
attract know-how from outside, 
generate increased resources and 
thereby help the private sector 
play its part in the country's 
growth. The quasi-public compa-
nies are still at the restructuring 
stage. We have also begun to lib-
eralise the important area of do-
mestic and foreign trade through 
price liberalisation, together with 
a properly functioning system of 
competition. And we have estab-
lished a more appropriate regula-
tory code, installing a 'competition 
commission' to act as conciliator. 
These are important parts of our 
economic programme. 
On top of this, we have 
passed a new investment code, a 
special code applying to the oil 
and mining sectors, and a more 
flexible and attractive labour code 
for companies wishing to transfer 
to Côte d'Ivoire. In the monetary 
field, we have implemented mea-
sures which we hope will result in 
more effective control over the 
economy. Evidence of this is the 
fact that the inflation rate, which 
was 32% at the time of the CFA 
franc devaluation in 1994, fell to 
7.7% in 1995 and has been run-
ning at just 3.5% since last year. 
We also need to implement legal 
reforms, particularly to improve 
Côte d'lvoire's commercial-law en-
vironment. 
■ In connection with the business 
environment, you have made a 
number of trips abroad to encour-
age investors to look more closely 
at Côte d'Ivoire. What real invest-
ment incentives does your country 
offer? 
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- We have produced a 
leaflet giving 20 good reasons why 
investors should consider Côte 
d'Ivoire seriously. One key reason 
is our political and social stability, 
which is fundamental for investors' 
security. Then there is the fact that 
the country is opening-up. In addi-
tion to this, there are the infra-
structures: our ports and airports 
offer easy international connec-
tions and our communications and 
télécoms system means that com-
panies transferring here should ex-
perience few problems. Further-
more, Côte d'Ivoire is the gateway 
to West Africa. We have two or-
ganisations in this region: the 
WAEMU with 60 million con-
sumers, and the ECOWAS, covering 
16 French-, Portuguese- and Eng-
lish- speaking nations. Many com-
panies have their headquarters in 
Côte d'Ivoire, which enables them 
to operate in most of these coun-
tries. 
■ Concern has been expressed 
about the fact that foreign in-
vestors are free to acquire signifi-
cant holdings in your country's 
companies. Are you making any 
efforts to encourage home-grown 
investment? 
- I don't believe that a 
country can develop its full poten-
tial on the basis of foreign invest-
ment alone. What you need to do 
first is encourage domestic devel-
opment and ensure that the way 
your own investors are treated 
serves as an enticement to foreign 
investors looking to set up part-
nerships in the private sector. So 
we are keen on stimulating 'home-
grown' investment. I will now an-
ticipate your next question and tell 
you what we actually offer our do-
mestic investors. First, the new in-
vestment code we have introduced 
is just as profitable for them as for 
foreign investors. Second, we are 
in the process of reorganising our 
business environment, for both 
small and medium-sized compa-
nies. Government help with organ-
isation and equipment has en-
abled an SME federation to be set 
up. We also aim, through training, 
to help companies improve their 
management methods. We will 
offer finance via a national enter-
prise fund and help them gain ac-
cess to credit more easily, either in-
side or outside the country. The 
domestic private sector represents 
at least one third of investments 
made in Côte d'Ivoire, but can 
doubtless be developed further. 
■ Domestic companies are not as 
competitive as their foreign rivals 
when it comes to gaining con-
tracts, issuing shares or undertak-
ing capital investment. In these cir-
cumstances, isn't there a danger 
that they will be excluded from 
key economic sectors? 
- This is a very fair ques-
tion. In fact, we have been trying 
to organise the domestic subcon-
tracting sector. When big compa-
nies win a contract, they cannot do 
everything themselves and have to 
subcontract part of the work. So 
Côte d'lvoire's companies must 
start to perform better, their man-
agement methods must become 
more rigorous and they must meet 
deadlines - in order to establish 
their credibility once and for all. 
Domestic companies make up 80% 
of all firms established here, but 
they are mostly SMEs and they 
only have an 18% stake in the 
country's wealth. Our objective is 
to bring this above 30% by 2005. 
Having said this, there are certain 
domestic companies which operate 
on the international scene and 
look set to become 'multination-
als', at least in an African context. 
We have to do everything we can 
to increase their numbers. 
■ It is clear that Côte d'Ivoire is be-
ginning to find its feet again, but 
aren't you worried that everything 
might collapse under the burden 
of domestic and foreign debt? 
- You have touched on a 
subject of major concern. Côte 
d'lvoire's debt is approximately 
$17 billion. Domestic debt reached 
CFAF 8 billion, and the govern-
ment has spent the last three years 
paying back the arrears it owed to 
the private sector. That part is now 
settled and we are keeping up 
with the current payments. 
As for the foreign debt, 
there are three main components: 
bilateral, trade and multilateral 
debt. Let me begin with the bilat-
eral debt. In 1994, within the Club 
of Paris, we managed to have the 
debt rescheduled. 5% of it was 
cancelled after the CFA franc de-
valuation and we obtained an ex-
tension of the term up to 30 years. 
During those discussions, we 
agreed with our partners to rene-
gotiate some of the conditions 
during 1997, the requirement 
being the proper implementation 
of the triennial consolidated struc-
tural adjustment programme. As 
that programme has been running 
smoothly, we will soon be meeting 
with the Paris Club. We hope then 
to renegotiate what are known as 
the 'Lyons terms', which grant us 
even further concessions, with 
80% debt cancellation. As regards 
the trade debt, the Economics and 
Finance Minister signed a 'recy-
cling' agreement with the Club of 
London in May, and 8% of the 
debt was cancelled. This was the 
culmination of two years of nego-
tiation. As for the multilateral 
debt with the IMF, World Bank 
and ADB, Côte d'Ivoire is eligible 
for inclusion in the initiative that 
aims to readjust the burden on the 
poorest heavily indebted coun-
tries. Once the new structural ad-
justment arrangements have been 
settled, we expect to be able to 
benefit from this new instrument. 
Negotiations on the debt stock will 
not take place until 2000, but we 
expect Côte d'Ivoire to be in a bet-
ter position economically by that 
time. 
■ Although the country is experi-
encing growth, this is not yet 
being reflected in improved living 
standards for many people. How 
do you propose to tackle the social 
aspects? Can you channel some of 
the fruits of economic revival to-
wards the poorest members of 
society? 
- I mentioned earlier that 
we lived through 13 years of eco-
nomic crisis and that growth did 
not start again until 1994. Three 
years is too short a time to achieve 
a complete turn-around after such 
an experience. However, the re-
newed growth is now enabling us 
to release resources for investment 
in basic sectors such as education, 
health, employment and infra-
structure. 
70% of our children are 
currently in full-time education 
and our aim is to get the figure 
above 90% by the year 2000, with 
all children receiving full-time edu-
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cates half its budget to education. 
We take the view that people are 
a country's main source of wealth. 
In 1963, we had just 463 students; 
now there are 61,000 - so you can 
see how far we have come. Anoth-
er priority is to step up our adult 
literacy campaign. Approximately 
56% of adults cannot read and we 
hope to bring this figure down to 
around 10% between 2005 and 
2010. These are some of the basic 
challenges we face. Only a well-
educated population - and I would 
include here, in particular, the fe-
male population - is capable of 
making a true contribution to de-
velopment. 
We have also implemented 
important measures in the field of 
health. If you have the time, you 
should tour the country and visit 
our teaching-hospital centres and 
community health clinics. There 
you will be able to see for yourself 
how much we have already 
achieved. During the crisis, child 
vaccination rates fell to 30%, but 
we have already brought this fig-
ure back up to 50% and expect it 
to reach 80% by 1998. We antici-
pate total coverage by 2005. Infant 
mortality rates are also declining 
markedly. So the government has 
concentrated its efforts on these 
two key areas of health and edu-
cation. 
At the same time, we are 
extremely concerned about the 
unemployment rate. We have to 
create jobs in the private sector 
because public administration sim-
ply cannot take on any more re-
cruits. On the contrary, we are try-
ing to cut back our civil service. 
People must be encouraged to go 
into business for themselves and 
we have set up social funds to help 
young people, the unemployed or 
those who have had little or no 
education. The scheme will apply 
to both the countryside and the 
towns and cities. 
■ What are your feelings about 
the recent World Bank report 
which highlights Côte d'Ivoire. It 
talks about increasing poverty lev-
els, lower purchasing power, cut-
backs in education and reduced ac-
cess to health care for much of the 
population? 
- Poverty is an area we 
have certainly been looking at. It 
was agreed, in the context of 
agreements with the Bretton 
Woods institutions, to review the 
poverty situation here so that 
donors could offer better support 
for our economic revival and help 
distribute wealth across the popu-
lation as a whole. The study was 
based on figures from Côte 
d'lvoire's National Statistical Insti-
tute, and it caused a great deal of 
fuss. People didn't really under-
stand what we were saying and 
what the figures meant. The re-
port said that relative poverty 
stood at 33% and absolute poverty 
at 10%. Well a recent report re-
vealed an overall poverty level of 
12% in Western Europe which is a 
pretty high figure for developed 
countries. What this shows is that 
it is not an easy problem to solve. 
Also, the World Bank representa-
tive who produced the study led us 
to understand that his conclusions 
had been misinterpreted. Com-
pared with other countries in 
Africa, I can assure you that Côte 
d'Ivoire is not really that badly off. 
The figures have to be viewed in 
relative terms. 
■ Nonetheless, the cost of living is 
high here if one looks at it in 
terms of people's actual purchas-
ing power. 
- Yes, of course. When we 
devalued, there was obviously a 
drop in purchasing power. The 
role of devaluation is to suppress 
external demand so as to promote 
exports and breathe new life into 
the economy. There were accom-
panying measures to ease the 
pain, but purchasing power takes 
time to catch up. If you look at the 
figures, you see that Côte d'Ivoire 
is the only country in the franc 
zone where there have been three 
successive wage increases in 1994, 
1995 and 1996. The increase has 
been 15% for the low-paid and 
5% for workers on higher incomes. 
But wealth can be distributed only 
insofar as more jobs are created. 
There are unemployed people or 
students who have finished their 
studies and have no job who are 
A country market. 
The cost of living is high if one looks at it 
in terms of people's actual purchasing power 
kept by their parents. When all 
family members are working, in-
come increases dramatically. How-
ever, things have begun to change 
and employment has now risen by 
10%. We hope that, by 2000, the 
country will be back to its former 
situation. Of course, the effects of 
liberalisation need to be recog-
nised. When a government imple-
ments a liberalisation policy, this 
initially leads to increased prices -
but the effect progressively wears 
off. Foodstuffs are the most impor-
tant component in our price index. 
So it is particularly important that 
we boost agricultural productivity. 
■ What is the state of your rela-
tions with the country's private 
sector? 
- It was obvious from the 
moment that we decided to base 
our growth strategy on the private 
sector, that we would need to lis-
ten to them, understand their con-
cerns, and offer them support. 
Since 1991, under the terms of a 
presidential decree, the govern-
ment has been involved in a pub-
lic-private sector liaison committee 
chaired by the Economics and Fi-
nance Minister. This brings togeth-
er the key figures involved in the 
economy and politicians to discuss 
economic policy and the strategies 
that should be adopted. We have 
also established a private-sector 
committee chaired by the Prime 
Minister. These two structures aim 
to promote contact and discussion, 
and whenever major decisions 
have to be taken, the private sec-
tor offers its opinion. For example, 
we are in the process of preparing 
fiscal provisions for adoption in 
1998, and the private sector has al-
ready submitted a document sum-
marising its misgivings about the 
finance law. When measures to re-
move certain taxes were being dis-
cussed, work was carried out joint-
ly by the state and the private 
sector. When we had to modify 
the legal system, a commission 
which included the private sector, 
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the government and donors was 
set up. The private sector was also 
involved in the education reform 
law and takes part in consultative 
meetings with universities. So you 
see, it has a voice in many areas. 
■ Do you just hear this voice or do 
you actually listen to what it says? 
- Ask representatives from 
the private sector and you will see! 
The government certainly feels 
that it not only hears but also lis-
tens to what is said. We take the 
private sector's concerns into ac-
count, as far as we are able. Of 
course, it is not possible to meet all 
the demands on our resources. If, 
for example, it was suggested that 
taxation should be reduced to 
zero, this would clearly be very dif-
ficult to implement! Incidentally, 
the tax take of the government, as 
a proportion of GDP, has fallen 
from 23% in 1993 to 18% today. 
Taxation fell by CFAF 125 billion -
to the benefit of Côte d'lvoire's 
production sector. This helps to ex-
plain the significant role played by 
private enterprise in the economy. 
Private investment accounted for 
69% of total investment in 1996. 
■ It has been suggested that Côte 
d'Ivoire could become an African 
version of South-East Asia's 'drag-
ons' and 'tigers'. Are you opti-
mistic that this is likely to happen? 
- We all want the best for 
the country in the future, as the 
President himself has often stated. 
We anticipate that Côte d'Ivoire 
will be one of the new industri-
alised countries by about 2025 -
within a generation. That is why 
we speak in terms of the 'African 
Elephant', which is our national 
symbol. We want to be the best, 
but we don't doubt that there are 
others in Africa who can help the 
continent throw off the burden of 
underdevelopment. We have to 
adopt a multi-faceted approach, 
with areas where growth is con-
centrated, promoting economic re-
vival throughout Africa. The conti-
nent has a wealth of natural 
resources. Its human resources con-
tinue to grow and we are anxious 
to become part Of the world econ-
omy. I have no doubt that Africa 
will emerge onto the world scene. 
Underdevelopment does not have 
to be its inevitable destiny. 
■ Earlier, you mentioned educa-
tion as being essential for develop-
ment. With this in mind, how do 
you view the current crisis in Côte 
d'lvoire's universities? 
- I believe that this is 
linked to the crisis in society, which 
itself stems from the long years of 
economic recession and from polit-
ical change. Students feel the ef-
fects of the crisis, too, and express 
their dissatisfaction in their own 
way. We understand this, but it is 
important to be able to talk and to 
work out a solution. Violence is 
not the answer. We have to work 
together, and the President aims 
to meet the students personally to 
discuss the crisis. That said, eco-
nomic growth will make it easier 
to formulate a suitable approach 
to the unemployment problem, 
which is even now showing signs 
of improvement. As for the re-
sources available to the universi-
ties, the government has invested 
nearly CFAF 30 billion in equip-
ment, to improve living conditions 
on campus and to promote decen-
tralisation. I also support improve-
ments in teaching quality and the 
quest for excellence. We feel that 
the crisis will be resolved some-
what when students' general liv-
ing conditions show an improve-
ment. 
■ Lomé IV expires in February 
2000. In your view, what key fac-
tors are involved in redefining the 
relationship, in order to make it 
more effective? 
- Anything built by hu-
mans is capable of being im-
proved. I should stress that Côte 
d'Ivoire has profited from the rela-
tionship with the EU in trade, fi-
nancial and technical terms. We 
have taken on board the sugges-
tions contained in the Commis-
sion's Green Paper, and have also 
set up a national committee to dis-
cuss the future of the Convention. 
Documents on this subject have al-
ready been published. Côte 
d'Ivoire would like a number of 
improvements. First, on the trade 
side, the preferences granted 
under Lomé will disappear on ac-
count of globalisation and the role 
that the WTO looks set to play. We 
are calling for flanking measures 
to be implemented at a financial 
and technical level. We also be-
lieve that EU countries should 
open up their markets more, be-
cause liberalisation strategies in 
the Northern and Southern hemi-
spheres are not in balance. Many 
markets remain relatively closed to 
the products, such as textiles or 
manufactured goods, that we 
make. The fact that some non-tar-
iff barriers continue to exist shows 
that all developed countries - and 
not just EU ones - are fearful of 
the effects of liberalisation. Who-
ever it was that said 'Trade but not 
aid' hit the nail on the head! We 
must promote trade by opening 
up markets in the West for our 
countries' processed products. And 
we have to step up cooperation in 
the private sector because, given 
that levels of government aid are 
falling, growth can be stimulated 
only through foreign investment. 
So we have to encourage this op-
tion by removing a lot of the red 
tape. We need to guarantee ex-
ports and investment to enable 
companies in industrialised coun-
tries to cooperate more easily with 
their counterparts in the Southern 
hemisphere - with a view to set-
ting up partnerships and accelerat-
ing development. This is a priority 
for cooperation in the future. In 
terms of financial cooperation, re-
sources are limited, but the rela-
tionship with the less affluent 
countries must continue to enable 
them to purchase equipment and 
promote their own development. 
Another approach would be to 
step up decentralised cooperation 
involving local communities and 
NGOs. This will help to bring peo-
ple together. HÜ Interview by K.K. 
s 
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manoeuvring for position 
Alain Gauze, Minister for 
Raw Materials, occupies a 
key post in the Côte d'Ivoire 
government. His ministry's 
main tasks are to draft and 
monitor marketing policy for 
basic agricultural products, 
and to find ways of consoli-
dating Côte d'lvoire's share 
of, and position in, foreign 
markets. He also takes the 
lead in international negotia-
tions for agreements on 
basic agricultural products 
and monitors high value-
added investment promotion 
in the context of industrialisation 
linked to the farm sector. A former 
diplomat based in Brussels, he plays 
a very active role in the various or-
ganisations representing coffee- and 
cocoa-producing countries and has a 
reputation for the skilful manage-
ment of the government's reform 
programme in this sector. 
There is no disputing the 
strategic importance of coffee and 
cocoa to Côte d'lvoire's economy. 
These two raw materials - dubbed 
the country's 'green gold' because 
of the big contribution they make 
to development - have long been 
an important barometer of the na-
tion's overall economic health. 
World commodity prices are erratic 
by nature. As a result, they con-
stantly undermine domestic eco-
nomic strategy and make it impos-
sible to forecast future 
developments. Despite this, Côte 
d'Ivoire has, by and large, been 
able to make a profitable living 
from its two main agricultural 
products. Coffee and cocoa prices, 
which were at their lowest during 
the long years of crisis the country 
experienced in the 1980s and early 
1990s, have bounced back to rea-
sonable levels - and indeed, there 
is now talk of a coffee-price explo-
sion. 
Coffee and cocoa now rep-
resent a third of agricultural 
added value, about 7% of gross 
domestic product and some 46% 
of the total exports. The two sec-
tors provide jobs for 60% of the 
working population, and there are 
about three million small-scale 
planters. Côte d'Ivoire is by far the 
world's largest producer of cocoa, 
with a weighted average of 
950,000 tonnes per annum. Peak 
production sometimes reaches 1 
million tonnes. It is also the 
world's fourth largest source of 
coffee, with an average annual 
production figure of 250,000 
tonnes. 
The challenge of 
liberalisation 
The wave of privatisations 
currently sweeping the country has 
also left its mark on the coffee and 
cocoa sectors. Since 1993, the gov-
ernment has gradually been play-
Guy Alain Gauze 
ing a less influential role in the 
production and management sec-
tors and, encouraged, if not 
'forced', by the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions, liberalisation of the cof-
fee/cocoa sector is continuing 
apace. Caistab - the more familiar 
name for the Agricultural Produce 
Price Maintenance and Stabilisa-
tion Fund, which used to exercise 
significant control over the domes-
tic and foreign marketing of cof-
fee and cocoa, has been partially 
privatised under this scheme. The 
aim is for the state no longer to be 
the principal player in the man-
agement of production, particular-
ly where the domestic and foreign 
marketing of these products is 
concerned. This important link in 
the chain is already run by private 
economic operators who currently 
manage most activities in the cof-
fee/cocoa sectors. The same opera-
tors also control on-the-spot pur-
chases in rural districts, transport 
coordination, the supply of sacks 
to peasant farmers, marketing, 
and ancillary activities related to 
shipping the product from Côte 
d'lvoire's ports. Alain Gauze says 
that government involvement is 
now limited to defining and set-
ting up the regulatory and institu-
tional framework needed for the 
sectors to operate smoothly and 
harmoniously. In his opinion, the 
private sector must progressively 
take on even greater responsibili-
ty-
It will be some time, how-
ever, before the effect of coffee 
and cocoa liberalisation on the 
country's economy - and on the 
situation of planters and private 
companies - can be assessed. On 
the domestic marketing side, liber-
alisation has brought with it the 
closure of buying and collection 
centres controlled by Caistab, 
meaning that much of this 
agency's administrative burden has 
been eliminated. This measure has 
promoted greater fluidity in pur-
chasing and has facilitated the 
transport of produce from collec-
tion centres to ports of shipment, 
much to the satisfaction of han-
dlers and export companies. As 
things stand, Alain Gauze believes 
the results of liberalisation are 
positive overall, although he ac-
cepts that there has been a decline 
in product quality since Caistab's 
agents, who used to be responsi-
ble for quality control upstream, 
were superseded. It should be pos-
sible, he thinks, to solve this prob-
lem in due course. Meanwhile, 
there have been some difficulties 
over the management of sack dis-
tribution by private companies, 
and peasant farmers have been 
complaining. 
The government envisages 
extending the liberalisation 
process to coffee/cocoa exports. 
The Finance and Economics Minis-
ter, and his Agriculture counter-
part, have already begun negotia-
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tions with donors, although some 
problems have been experienced. 
According to well-informed 
sources, the radical approach of 
the World Bank - which is calling 
for accelerated liberalisation - is 
not in line with the government's 
more gradualist approach. In the 
coffee sector, the principle of total 
liberalisation is taken for granted 
and the authorities are committed 
to fulfilling their obligations with-
in the next year or two. On the 
Cocoa plantation 
How can the technical mechanisms of the world 
market be explained to the small-scale 
peasant farmer? 
other hand, owing to the volume 
of production and the high stakes 
involved, the treatment of the 
cocoa sector is causing serious ten-
sions. The Washington agencies 
have indicated that the processing 
and recycling of part of the coun-
try's debt, together with the 
granting of agricultural structural 
adjustment credits (CASA), depend 
on Côte d'lvoire's compliance with 
their demand for a speeding up of 
the liberalisation process. The Min-
ister for Raw Materials, seeking to 
put these disagreements into per-
spective, stressed that the World 
Bank and IMF recognised the need 
for controlled liberalisation, taking 
account of Côte d'lvoire's particu-
lar circumstances. The Bretton 
Woods institutions, he claimed, 
were aware of the potential conse-
quences of an unsynchronised 
process. 
The future of the Stabilisa-
tion Fund is the subject of much 
controversy. This instrument is re-
garded as a key symbol of the 
Houphouët-Boigny era, but it has 
also been attacked on the grounds 
that it has not been operated 
transparently, and has been fierce-
ly criticised by producers who are 
keen on speedy restructuring. 
At present, it is being ex-
amined by high-ranking World 
Bank officials, who are known to 
favour its outright privatisation. 
But will the Côte d'Ivoire govern-
ment agree to losing its majority 
stake in the system? Although the 
authorities do not have too much 
trouble accepting the idea of in-
depth reform to comply with the 
recommended liberalisation pro-
gramme, they do not wholeheart-
edly favour the complete disap-
pearance of the Fund. As Alain 
Gauze commented, Caistab 'is an 
instrument whereby we can make 
the most of our policy for market-
ing coffee and cocoa on foreign 
markets, and it has proved its 
worth. Given the globalisation of 
the economy, its functions and at-
tributes ought to be refocused to 
meet new competitive challenges.' 
He sees a risk in liberalising a sec-
tor which generates close on a mil-
lion tonnes of cocoa per annum 
without establishing a regulation, 
control and promotion mechanism 
to determine the rules of the 
game and to ensure that these are 
obeyed. 
In addition, Caistab is re-
garded by many of its champions 
as a safeguard. It is seen as a pro-
tection for the country's farmers 
against the more predatory pri-
vate-sector agents - whose com-
mercial appetites have been stimu-
lated by the prospect of a 
wholesale 'abandonment' of an in-
dustrial sector to the vagaries of 
market forces. So should it be dis-
mantled or reoriented? Only time 
will tell which view will prevail. 
Mobilisation and the 
stockmarket 
Three factors govern price 
formation: supply (the volume of-
fered to the market), demand, 
which corresponds to the driving 
force of consumption, and the 
amount in stock. Together, these 
are known as the 'market funda-
mentals'. A country with control 
over supply can influence prices 
through its marketing strategies -
for example, by deciding to 'flood' 
the market. By doing this, it would 
create a disturbance probably 
leading to lower prices. This, of 
course, would not favour the pro-
ducer nation, and Alain Gauze 
stressed that to influence world 
prices in a way which was 
favourable to the producing state, 
it was necessary, either individually 
or working as a group of ex-
porters, to devise a rational mar-
keting strategy - which takes ac-
count of world stocks and 
consumption patterns. The basic 
point here is that it is the flow of a 
product on to the market which 
determines its price. 
So what has Côte d'lvoire's 
policy been on this? As regards 
coffee, the government decided in 
1993 - in the context of negotia-
tions between producer and con-
sumer members of the Internation-
al Coffee Organisation (ICO) - to 
set up a market intervention 
mechanism known as the 'reten-
tion plan'. Under this arrange-
ment, African, Asian and Latin 
American producers held back 
20% of their exportable produc-
tion volume, forcing consumer 
countries - which used to hold 22 
million sacks of coffee in reserve -
to draw on these to meet their 
needs. By bringing world coffee 
stocks down to 8 million sacks, 
producer countries managed to 
boost prices and influence the 
market. An immediate conse-
quence was that African robusta, 
which used to sell at significantly 
below the basic production cost, 
tripled in price on the London fu-
tures market. The stocks held back 
were then gradually released in 
line with market requirements and 
producer countries were able dras-
tically to reduce their reserves -
thereby avoiding the high cost of 
storage. 
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world market, however, revealed 
the limits of the retention plan, 
forcing Côte d'Ivoire to employ a 
different market regulation mech-
anism - export limitation. This is 
effectively a quota system. Set up 
by the Inter-African Coffee Organi-
sation (IACO) whose 25 members 
are all ACP states, this programme 
for limiting exports was presented 
to the Asian and Latin American 
producers in January 1997. They 
have agreed to try it out in the 
context of the Association of Cof-
fee-Producing Countries (ACPC). 
Both the robusta and arabica mar-
kets have now stabilised at prices 
which, for the most part, ensure a 
profit margin for the various pro-
ducer countries. This, in turn has 
had a positive spin-off for the 
small-scale peasant farmers, ac-
cording to Alain Gauze. What is 
not clear is whether the rise in cof-
fee prices is exclusively due to the 
self-imposed disciplines adopted 
by the producer states. 
It is also worth noting that 
Côte d'Ivoire sells its coffee and 
cocoa under the 'PVAM' (medium-
term future sales policy) system. 
How can the technical 
mechanisms of the world market 
and the importance of the issues 
at stake be explained to the small-
scale peasant farmer, whether in 
Côte d'Ivoire or elsewhere? In rural 
areas, illiteracy levels are still high 
and government efforts to inform 
the main agents involved in the 
sector have some way to go. To 
achieve better results, the authori-
ties plan to support the OPAs 
(Agricultural Vocational Organisa-
tions) and are preparing to rein-
force their awareness-campaign 
efforts. 
The processing challenge 
Can a country seriously as-
pire to economic development if it 
contents itself merely with supply-
ing unprocessed raw materials to 
the international market? Econom-
ic history provides few examples of 
successful development based sole-
ly on primary production. On the 
contrary, relying on just one or 
two agricultural products for the 
bulk of one's national income is a 
very high risk strategy. It can lead 
to complacency and stifle the 
imagination of key players in soci-
ety, who may adopt the mindset 
that 'their' traditional product can 
be relied on to 'bring home the 
bacon'. This, in turn, may mask the 
country's potential in other areas 
by discouraging initiative. And 
when things go wrong (for exam-
ple, if world prices fall), the result 
is likely to be macro-economic dis-
ruption, and increased fraud both 
within the domestic system and in 
relations with foreign partners. In 
the case of Côte d'Ivoire, it is per-
fectly clear that the entire econo-
my catches cold when the world 
coffee and cocoa price mechanism 
sneezes. This was true in the past 
and is still true today, although 
new trends involving globalisation, 
a greater emphasis on competi-
tiveness, and market integration 
suggest that the landcape is 
changing quite radically. 
Aware of the risks in rely-
ing too heavily on primary activi-
ties, the authorities in Abidjan 
have included a progressive coffee 
and cocoa processing option in 
their economic programme. By the 
end of the century, the country 
aims to be processing 50% of its 
A coffee plant. 
The aim is that by the year 2000, 
30% of Côte d'lvoire's production 
should be processed locally. 
cocoa and 30% of its coffee local-
ly. Currently, Côte d'Ivoire trans-
forms 180,000 tonnes of cocoa and 
15,000 tonnes of coffee a year into 
higher value products. The Minis-
ter for Raw Materials justifies the 
policy by pointing out how little 
Africa has benefited from the in-
crease in world industrial produc-
tion that has occurred in recent 
years. The idea is that the industri-
al added value created will have a 
positive impact on national 
wealth. Côte d'Ivoire, he adds, in-
tends to increase its manufactur-
ing output, consolidate its ind-
ustrial fabric, promote a regional 
development policy, create jobs 
and increase the amount of tax 
revenue generated by finished or 
semi-finished products. 
Mr Gauze also believes 
that more home-based coffee 
bean processing will lead to re-
duced supplies of this product on 
the international market, thereby 
putting upward pressure on fu-
the Courier n° 166 - november-december 1997 
fl côte d'ivoire 
I
The European Community's 
Directive 241 of 1973 stipu-
lates that only cocoa-de-
rived products may be used in the 
manufacture of articles sold under 
the 'chocolate' name - with an ex-
emption for certain countries. The 
basic principle derives from similar 
WHO and FAO rules. These two or-
ganisations are responsible for in-
ternational legislation on products 
intended for human consumption. 
Some EU Member States, including 
the United Kingdom, Denmark 
and Ireland, manufacture choco-
late which includes up to 5% veg-
etable fat other than cocoa butter. 
These products may not be sold as 
chocolate in other EU countries 
which apply the basic rule. This sit-
uation, of course, conflicts with 
the idea of the single market. Ac-
cordingly, the European Commis-
sion has submitted a proposal 
aimed at harmonising the rules 
(see The Courier No. 158, July/Au-
gust 1996). Under its draft direc-
tive. Member States who wish to 
do so are authorised to use a maxi-
mum of 5% of vegetable fats 
other than cocoa butter in the 
chocolate products they produce. 
Moreover, EU countries may not 
prohibit the sale on their territory 
of so-called 'chocolate' products 
manufactured lawfully in another 
Member State. Some experts be-
lieve that this could lead to a 
'downward harmonisation' 
throughout the EU and a drop in 
demand for cocoa beans. 
In Côte d'Ivoire, the authorities 
fear that such a measure could 
have disastrous consequences for 
their economy. According to the 
Minister for Raw Materials, it 
would mean a drop of approxi-
mately 200,000 tonnes in Euro-
pean consumption of cocoa beans, 
and a loss of the order of $800 mil-
lion for his country. A recent study 
published by the International 
Cocoa Organisation states that, 
from 2000, there will probably be 
a one-billion-dollar drop in export 
income for all African, Asian and 
Latin American producer countries 
if the proposal is adopted. This 
raises real fears for producing 
The chocolate debate: 'pure' versus 'diluted' 
countries, many of which are in 
the throes of structural adjustment 
and have big debts to service. They 
are obliged to use a proportion of 
their export income to stabilise 
their macro-economic and finan-
cial situation with a view to 
achieving further national devel-
opment. Replacement of cocoa 
butter by alternative vegetable 
substances such as illipe fat, shea 
butter, palm oil or coconut oil 
would cause international cocoa-
bean prices to drop. 
For a country such as Côte d'Ivoire, 
the impact of such a directive 
could also be prejudicial to em-
ployment policy and industrialisa-
tion targets. Added to this is the 
worry that other countries such as 
the US, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia may follow the European 
trend in order to remain competi-
tive. 
Despite its fears, the current Côte 
d'Ivoire Minister for Raw Materi-
als, in his capacity as ACP 
spokesman, expressed confidence 
in the 'farsightedness' of MEPs and 
members of the EU Council. They 
are well aware of the issues at 
stake here', he said, 'and will find 
a balanced, long-term solution'. 
According to some observers, the 
big question is whether the argu-
ments in favour of 'pure' chocolate 
can prevail over the power of 
multinational groups which sup-
port the new rule. The sums in-
volved are very substantial. There 
are some industrialists who attach 
a great deal of importance to the 
'pure' nature of chocolate and 
they are also campaigning against 
the draft directive. A meeting of 
several of those concerned took 
place in Abidjan this year, in the 
presence of President Konan 
Bédié. While waiting for the Euro-
pean institutions to examine the 
case, the Côte d'Ivoire government 
has introduced a lobbying strategy 
which they say is aimed at making 
both decision-makers and con-
sumers in Europe more aware of 
their problem - and of what exact-
ly is at stake. The 'chocolate war' 
continues! 
tures prices. The same is true of 
cocoa. If a significant proportion 
of Côte d'lvoire's raw production is 
effectively taken out of the inter-
national system because of local 
processing, the remaining cocoa 
beans exported without value 
added should command a higher 
price. And given that it is the bean 
prices on the futures market that 
determine the prices further up 
the production chain, the result 
should be better returns on semi-
finished products such as cocoa 
butter. 
The question which arises 
is whether the conditions for 
adding value 'at home' have been 
met. According to the Minister, 
Côte d'Ivoire must continue mod-
ernising its industrial sectors and 
be prepared to implement a con-
tract-allocation policy which, as far 
as possible, would involve domes-
tic companies. A number of local 
firms - and large multinational 
groups - wishing to establish pro-
cessing plants to Côte d'Ivoire are 
said to be waiting in the wings. It 
is reported that the Swiss groups 
Klaus Jacobs and Nestlé, the Amer-
ican giant Cargill, the French Choc' 
Arbin company and a number of 
others have already submitted ap-
plications to the Côte d'Ivoire au-
thorities. At the same time, they 
are seeking to form partnerships 
with local industrialists." 
Further challenges for the 
government include getting to 
grips with production costs, and 
finding markets for the processed 
products which should be coming 
on stream as the new policy is im-
plemented. 
Côte d'lvoire's leaders are 
keen to stress that they have faith 
in the policy of expanding domes-
tic processing in the country's two 
main agricultural resources. They 
refuse to be put off by the unhap-
py experience of a number of Latin 
American and Asian countries in 
this area. HE κ.κ. 
fl 
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I Laurent Gbagbo 
|3| 'We have a multi-party 
system - but it is not 
gg true democracy' 
The accuracy or otherwise of 
this assertion, by Côte 
d'lvoire's main opposition 
leader, is bound to be of in-
terest to those who want to 
know more about this West 
African country's current 
level of political develop-
ment. The political climate 
has undoubtedly changed since the 
death of President Houphouët-
Boigny, the single-party system hav-
ing given way to political pluralism. 
But Laurent Gbagbo - a historian by 
training and leader of the opposi-
tion Popular Front (FPI) - believes 
that progress towards 'genuine 
democracy' in Côte d'Ivoire is still 
too slow. He also thinks that many 
of the government's economic 
choices need to be re-examined, as 
he explains in the following inter-
view. 
■ Côte d'Ivoire is experiencing re-
newed growth and many of the 
economic indicators look good. 
Which of the government's eco-
nomic policies do you disagree 
with most? 
- Côte d'Ivoire is certainly 
experiencing renewed growth, 
but, contrary to what you might 
believe, not all the economic indi-
cators are good. Is there anyone 
nowadays who knows what the 
real unemployment figures are? In 
this country, we do not count the 
number of jobless, we count those 
who are in work. We have a popu-
lation of 14.5 million, approxi-
mately 8 million of whom live out-
side the towns and cities. In urban 
areas, only about 390,000 people 
earn a living from the 'modern' 
sector - public administration and 
the private sector taken together. 
That's a disastrous figure! All the 
rest of the urban population is ei-
ther directly or indirectly unem-
ployed, depending on whether 
they are involved in the 'informal' 
economy. So, you see, the unem-
ployment indicator is nowhere 
near as good as the government 
might have you believe. Further-
more, studies conducted by inter-
national institutions show that be-
tween 40% and 70% of the people 
live in varying degrees of poverty, 
depending on how the figures are 
calculated. Even if you take the 
lower percentage, that amounts to 
5 million souls living in poverty -
which is far too many! And then 
there are the 10% defined as ex-
tremely poor, who do not even 
have the basic minimum with 
which to survive. Let's look at it a 
little more closely. What does eco-
nomic growth in Côte d'Ivoire ac-
tually mean? In OECD countries, an 
extra half point in growth brings 
with it more jobs and further de-
velopment, but this is not happen-
ing here, even with growth run-
ning at 7-8%. Our economy is 
based solely on coffee, cocoa and 
timber exports so we are heavily 
dependent on export income from 
these commodities. One of the 
dangers which comes with such 
dependence is, for example, that 
we have virtually no forests left. At 
the time of independence, they 
covered 16 million hectares. Now 
the figure is less than 2 million. 
This is not just an economic, but 
also an ecological disaster! Growth 
in Third-World countries needs to 
be viewed with extreme caution. 
For instance, growth in Congo, 
Gabon or Nigeria - based exclu-
sively on petroleum exports - does 
not necessarily lead to internal de-
velopment. 
■ The government maintains that 
the economic revival dates only 
from 1994, and that people must 
be more patient and work harder 
before they begin to feel the ben-
efits. 
- The government's analy-
sis differs fundamentally from 
ours. We do not believe that the 
country is out of the woods yet. If 
we were to hear today of prob-
lems on the New York, Paris or 
London exchanges leading to a fall 
in coffee or cocoa prices, then you 
would soon see growth here com-
ing to a dead halt - and it would 
be unconnected with anything we 
do in Côte d'Ivoire. As long as we 
are unable to control the prices of 
the commodities we sell, we will 
not be able to view the crisis as a 
thing of the past. This is why it is 
imperative to move on from ex-
porting unprocessed primary prod-
ucts to exporting semi-manufac-
tured or finished goods with a 
high added value. If we can suc-
ceed in doing this, we will be able 
to influence the prices ourselves. 
■ But isn't it the case that the gov-
ernment's programme includes the 
objectives of economic diversifica-
tion, product conversion and sup-
port for the private sector? 
- These days, the market 
economy is part of everyday life, 
for everyone. The government can 
hardly claim credit for inventing 
the idea. However, when it comes 
to diversification, there is still no 
solution in sight. This debate has 
gone on since 1960. Since then, 
our agricultural production has ad-
mittedly expanded to include ba-
nanas and pineapples, but the un-
derlying economic logic in these 
sectors is the same as with coffee 
and cocoa. It is income from pri-
mary products over whose prices 
we have absolutely no control. As 
for coffee and cocoa, there are 
various factors which influence 
how well they are doing - the cost 
of labour, climatic conditions, 
price-fixing and even the fluctuat-
ing dollar. Recently, movements in 
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the dollar have favoured exports 
of our raw materials, which are 
priced in this currency, but it also 
puts us at a disadvantage in terms 
of our debt because more than 
half of that is in dollars. Of the fac-
tors I mention, the only one over 
which we have any control is 
labour. Can we reasonably speak 
of having emerged from crisis 
when we actually control only one 
of the four key elements which af-
fect the foundations of our econo-
my? The debate over product di-
versification has been going on for 
37 years, but what has really been 
done? All we have succeeded in 
doing is diversifying a little into 
sectors which are as uncertain as 
those we already relied on. So we 
find ourselves obliged to negotiate 
access to the European market 
under the Lomé Convention 
arrangements. 
■ In concrete terms, what alterna-
tive economic policy would you 
advocate to bring Côte d'Ivoire out 
of this 'crisis'? 
- The only possible ap-
proach is to convert our products 
and industrialise. But to achieve 
this we must first equip the coun-
try with basic services: electricity, 
water, gas, telephones, roads and 
so on. This implies the adoption of 
a genuinely decentralised ap-
proach and is obviously only feasi-
ble as a long term, planned strate-
gy. The political decision to adopt 
such a strategy, however, must be 
taken now. 
Second, we ourselves have 
to create a market. It's no good 
deceiving ourselves with refer-
ences to the 'African elephant'. 
The 'dragons' of Asia developed 
because the Americans needed to 
counterbalance the influence of 
China and the Soviet Union by 
opening up their market to manu-
factured goods from Asia. That op-
portunity is closed to us today so 
we have to expand our internal 
market and, above all, take advan-
tage of the size of our regional 
market - by which I mean the 200 
million inhabitants of the ECOWAS 
countries. We have to accelerate 
the process of creating a single 
market. 
Another problem we face 
is what direction agricultural pro-
duction should take. In the devel-
oped countries, the task of the 
farming sector is, first and fore-
most, to feed the people. Here, it 
supplies foreign markets, provid-
ing them not with essential food-
stuffs but with a surplus. For exam-
ple, less than 2% of Côte d'lvoire's 
coffee is actually consumed here. 
Agricultural yields have to be in-
creased through modernisation of 
the sector, particularly with a view 
to improving production tech-
niques. In the US, which is not a 
socialist country, less than 6% of 
the population works in agricul-
ture, but they manage to feed the 
entire American population and 
export to the rest of the world. 
Another issue we have to address 
is the unresolved contradiction be-
tween agriculture and forestry. 
The first is destroying the second. 
Forests are an essential part of the 
ecosystem, but this country has 
never taken the time to look seri-
ously at the problem. 
Two or three sectors then 
have to be chosen for industrialisa-
tion, which the state should en-
courage. For instance, I think the 
pharmaceuticals sector should be 
Unauthorised street hawkers 
in the streets of Abidjan. 
The vast majority of the urban population is 
either directly or indirectly unemployed' 
included. A number of studies 
have shown that many of our na-
tive plants have enormous poten-
tial for combating certain diseases. 
And related to this, I believe that 
the level of scientific research in 
our universities needs to be raised. 
Why do we hang back from trans-
lating theoretical study into practi-
cal technology? I would even look 
favourably on lending to support 
this type of action, which could 
only be to our profit in the longer 
term. 
■ You have just returned from a 
tour of the country. What was the 
purpose of this trip? 
- I have been making fre-
quent trips like this since 1990 be-
cause, although we may now have 
a multi-party system, we still do 
not have genuine democracy in 
this country. Our attempts at con-
solidating a democratic system are 
not yet complete. You can see this 
in the fact that the opposition has 
practically no access to the media. 
No-one mentions us on TV or 
radio. In response to this situation, 
we have set up a few newspapers 
of our own, but not everybody can 
read them given the high illiteracy 
levels and people's low purchasing 
power. So we have to go out to 
meet the people in the regions on 
a regular basis. By doing this, we 
learn about their problems, needs 
and priorities, and get our party's 
message across. This fs the only 
practical way of getting to know 
the people. 
■ You are often critical of the 
electoral code. What are your real 
chances of becoming a credible 
political force in the short term ? 
- We are critical not just of 
the electoral code but of the en-
tire system. Let me explain the 
general philosophy that applies in 
Côte d'Ivoire - which also prevails 
in many other African countries. In 
Africa, those who are actually in 
power think that to organise elec-
tions and lose them is humiliating. 
So they use all the means at their 
disposal - both legal and illegal -
to prevent the opposition from 
winning a victory, even if that is 
the will of the people. In African 
elections, a large majority of the 
victories go to those who actually 
organised those elections. You can 
say that this is due to fraud but 
more important is the philosophy 
that underlies such fraud - which côte d'ivoire 
requires anyone in government to 
hold on to power come what may. 
This is a dangerous philosophy 
that generates tension wherever 
you care to look. In Liberia in 1985, 
Samuel Doe organised the poll and 
claimed 51% of the vote although 
opinion surveys suggested he had 
just 15% support. This led to the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1989. 
In Burundi, an election brought a 
Hutu to power and some his dis-
contented compatriots killed him, 
leading to civil war. In Congo Braz-
zaville, we have witnessed a con-
flict aimed at preventing democra-
cy. Sassou N'Guesso and Lissouba 
are fighting because each wants to 
eliminate the other before polling 
takes place. It seems that everyone 
is willing to take part in elections -
so long as they have no rivals! I 
could cite other cases, but the 
basic point I am trying to make is 
that we cannot yet count ourselves 
as a democratic nation. 
Côte d'Ivoire is one of those coun-
tries where, because of internal 
and external pressures, a multi-
party system has been set up - but 
democracy has still to make a 
showing. 
It needs to be understood 
that elections should enable peo-
ple to express themselves freely on 
political issues and to choose those 
they want to implement the poli-
cies. It is absurd in this country to 
allow the government to organise 
elections, as might happen in 
France, for example. Many politi-
cians here are so immature that 
they are incapable of abandoning 
their party allegiance in order to 
fulfil the role entrusted to them by 
the institutions. I would therefore 
like to see Côte d'Ivoire set up a 
truly independent electoral com-
mission. 
Let me tell you about an 
image I often use when I go out 
and speak to people: I tell them to 
imagine that we are getting ready 
for a football match. Our oppo-
nents, the PDCI, are in green and 
white, whilst we are in blue. Then I 
notice that the referee is also 
dressed in green and white. In 
fact, he turns out to be the PDCI's 
centre forward and the team cap-
tain. How can that be? What I 
want is a referee dressed in black. 
That is a basic principle. In France, 
people don't worry that the Interi-
or Minister is responsible for or-
ganising elections, because the de-
mocratic system is functioning 
properly there. In our country, if 
you are a high-ranking civil ser-
vant, you feel duty-bound to have 
a party affiliation - and to cam-
paign for the party in power. Party 
supporters should not be entrust-
ed with organising elections. 
■ Some months ago, the President 
suggested that government should 
be opened up with opposition 
members being consulted. How 
did you react to this proposal? 
- I think it was a very gen-
erous gesture to offer us the 
chance of playing some part in 
governing the country. I believe in 
man's generosity but, because we 
are in politics, I am bound to won-
der what lies behind this particular 
proposal. The idea of broadening 
the scope of government in this 
way came, I should stress, from the 
PDCI, not from us. The President 
first floated it at the PDCI Congress 
in late October 1996. We respond-
ed at the beginning of November 
by stating our concerns, the most 
fundamental of which is that the 
rules governing the running of 
elections should be redefined. A 
month later, a government dele-
gation contacted us to discuss is-
sues we wanted examined. They 
promised to come back to us but 
nothing has happened since that 
meeting. The ball is therefore in 
their court. We have said neither 
yes, nor no, and are still waiting 
for them to return for further 
talks. 
■ The PDCI has been the main 
party in power for many years. In 
order to have a credible political 
alternative, doesn't there need to 
be a genuine alliance of the most 
representative opposition parties? 
And isn't wrangling within the op-
position likely to dent your credi-
bility? 
- The PDCI has been in 
power for 40 years. That might 
give it strength, but it is also its 
weakness. How can we be at-
tacked? Perhaps because we don't 
have the experience? This is the ar-
gument that all parties in power 
use, but it just doesn't stand up 
any more. Tony Blair is Prime Min-
ister in Great Britain and the coun-
try has not foundered simply be-
cause of the lack of experience of 
government. I am as experienced 
in government as he was at the 
time of the election. On your point 
about the opposition, it is true 
that there are 90 political parties 
in this country but, in truth, there 
are only three that have significant 
public support and that are repre-
sented in National Assembly: the 
PDCI, the FPI and the RDR. I do not 
advocate restricting the number of 
parties because I am all for greater 
freedom. It is for the people to se-
lect the political groupings they 
want. 
Moreover, no party in the 
world is unaffected by internal di-
visions. Take, for example, the 
French Socialists. Their entire histo-
ry has been punctuated by dis-
agreements. Human nature being 
what it is, people flock to you 
when they think you are going to 
win but, if you look like losing, 
they will turn against you. People 
generally do not favour the loser, 
hence the old Latin saying 'vae vic-
tis' (woe to the vanquished). As 
long as one is in opposition, one 
will always have internal problems. 
This is what it boils down to. The 
PDCI has just as many problems in 
fact, but its dissenters keep quiet 
because ultimately they are look-
ing for immediate material re-
ward. A government supporter 
who has not been elected to par-
liament can hope to become a 
member of the Economic and So-
cial Council, or an adviser to the 
President. This is why the parties in 
power like to give the impression 
that everything is in order. They 
conceal any divisions because they 
are all attracted by the prospect of 
gain. On the other hand, tensions 
appear more acute in opposition 
because many politicians have an 
eye on the posts I have just men-
tioned. Just cast your mind back to 
those major political parties that 
we once thought were all-power-
ful: the ones led by Kwame 
N'Krumah, Sékou Touré, Modibo 
Keita, Moussa Traoré or Mobutu. 
Where are they now? For our part, 
we are perfectly calm in our 
knowledge of the history of men, 
humanity and Africa, and we are 
making steady progress. 
I am delighted to be able 
to contribute to your publication, 
as we have so much to learn from 
the European Union and the way 
in which it is being structured. I 
would like West Africa's ECOWAS 
to be just as successful. That is our 
major challenge for the future. ΛΜ 
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I the sirens of destiny 
Situated on the edge of the 
forest and the savannah, 
some 250 kilometres from 
Abidjan, Yamoussoukro is 
preparing to become the 
true capital of Còte-d'lvoire. 
Besides being the birthplace 
of the nation's 'father'. Presi-
dent Houphouët-Boigny, the 
town is blessed with numer-
ous other assets which may 
help it soon to become a 
centre for African research. 
Following the death of 'The 
Old Man', worries were expressed 
about how much interest the coun-
try's new authorities would show in 
the town designated as the new 
capital. But recent political decisions 
suggest that this multi-faceted cen-
tre is destined to have an important 
role in the political and economic 
life of Côte-d'lvoire. 
In March 1983, a law 
adopted unanimously by the mem-
bers of the Côte-d'lvoire Parlia-
ment established Yamoussoukro as 
the political and administrative 
seat of the country. The nation 
thus witnessed its fourth change in 
capital in the space of a century. 
The first was Grand-Bassam, which 
was designated as the colony's ad-
ministrative centre in 1893. The 
governors had already established 
their base there and it was strate-
gically well-placed as a centre of 
trade. In 1899, the town was struck 
by a major yellow fever epidemic. 
Large numbers of residents, includ-
ing Europeans, succumbed to the 
disease and because of this, the 
colonial authorities decided to 
transfer the capital to Bingerville 
(then known as Santey). The trans-
fer was carried out in 1900. Abid-
jan then took over in 1933-34, in 
itself spectacularly embodying the 
economic progress made by Côte-
d'lvoire during the 'golden' years. 
50 years later, the coastal city 
made way for Yamoussoukro. 
Some time has passed since 
the decision was taken in Parlia-
ment, yet Yamoussoukro remains 
capital in name only. The adminis-
trative and decision-making cen-
tres of the country are still located 
in Abidjan and only two symbolic 
sessions of the Cabinet have ever 
been held in the newly designated 
seat of government. Some local 
people believe that it is all bound 
up in politics, and point to what 
they see as a steady deterioration 
in the town over the last few 
years. They are unhappy at the 
fact that there has apparently 
been a slow-down in the public 
works programmes. The authori-
ties respond that implementing 
such a huge project successfully re-
quires time. The first priority, they 
argue, is to do the groundwork 
needed for a gradual changeover. 
And President Konan Bédié him-
self recently gave a keynote 
speech promising to accelerate the 
transfer of the capital and com-
plete the work begun by his pre-
decessor. This is one reason why 
Jean Konan Banny has been ap-
pointed Resident Minister in Ya-
moussoukro. Mr Banny described 
his role to us as involving 'ideas, 
coordination, harmonisation and 
action'. It is a big task for this for-
mer Defence Minister who comes 
from Yamoussoukro and whose 
long experience of politics in Côte-
d'lvoire should prove useful in 
achieving his goals. Yamoussoukro 
can at last dare to dream of its fu-
ture role, historical circumstance 
and favourable politics having 
worked in its favour over the 
years. 
Religion, science and 
peace 
The story of the town be-
gins at the start of the century 
when French troops set up a post 
in the village of N'gokro. They 
later renamed it Yamoussoukro in 
tribute to Queen Yamousso - who 
was renowned for her authoritari-
anism and for the important role 
she played in soothing tensions be-
tween local people and the 
colonising French. History also 
records that the village of Yamous-
soukro was one of the strongholds 
in the countryside revolt against 
the violations carried out by the 
new settlers. Houphouët-Boigny 
set up the African Farmers' Union 
here, the movement which would 
later become the Democratic Party 
of Côte-d'lvoire (PDCI). It was also 
in Yamoussoukro that he estab-
lished the African Democratic Rally 
(RDA) in an effort to involve other 
African peoples in solidarity ac-
tions. The current mayor, Konan 
Fernand, explained to us with ob-
vious pride that Yamoussoukro can 
therefore claim to be one of the 
birthplaces of black African evolu-
tion. 
It was not until 1962 that 
the first moves were made to 
transform this sleepy settlement 
into a major metropolis. Construc-
tion began on major hew roads 
and buildings, under the watchful 
eye of Houphouët-Boigny himself. 
The aspirations of the president 
for his home town were, by now, 
clear to the public. 
The imposing and now fa-
mous Our Lady of Peace Basilica, 
set in an area of 130 hectares, is a 
powerful indication of the impor-
tance of religion here. The im-
mense structure was built in the 
The Agricultural Training and Research Centre 
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late 1980s. It is a work of architec-
tural splendour constructed using 
the most modern technologies -
but its astronomical cost made it 
controversial both within and out-
side the country. More 'down to 
earth', but no less important, is the 
Grand Mosque a few hundred me-
tres away. This was built in the 
Moroccan style during the first 
phase of the work undertaken in 
the town. The local Baule religious 
tradition does not appear to have 
suffered from this cohabitation be-
tween Islam and Christianity. The 
celebrations and rites of Baule 
worship have lost none of their 
splendour and enthusiasm. This 
comfortable mingling of different 
religious traditions is one striking 
aspect of the social organisation of 
Yamoussoukro. And the beauty of 
the religious sites and festivals is a 
'draw' for tourists. 
Yamoussoukro has also be-
come a centre for technology. 
Schools have been built to train 
the nation's future élite in wide-
ranging disciplines such as civil en-
gineering, technical training and 
agronomy. 
Nor has secondary educa-
tion been forgotten. Various col-
leges and professional training 
centres are working to prepare 
students for further education. Be-
yond training, the objective is to 
set up a special framework for sci-
entific research. No expense ap-
pears to have been spared. In fact, 
in terms of equipment, there 
seems little to choose between 
these ultramodern centres and col-
leges in the West. But in focusing 
on the material needs, the sugges-
tion is that the country's decision-
makers may have neglected the 
human resources needed to 
achieve scientific excellence. 
Yamoussoukro also has the 
good fortune of being a centre -
at least symbolically - for peace. 
Most of Côte d'lvoire's citizens be-
lieve that President Houphouët-
Boigny's main achievement was his 
permanent quest for peace at both 
national and international level -
his preferred 'weapon' being dia-
logue. A large international peace 
centre has been built in the south-
west of the capital for UNESCO. 
Federico Mayor, representing this 
institution, suggested in 1989 that 
an international Houphouët-
Boigny peace prize should be 
awarded to acknowledge the ef-
forts made by groups or individu-
als toward peace. This idea was 
duly taken up and laureates have 
included Yasser Arafat, Yitzak 
Rabin, Nelson Mandela, Frederik 
De Klerk, King Juan Carlos of Spain 
and former US President Jimmy 
Carter. The Resident Minister sees 
the honour as a kind of first step 
towards winning the Nobel peace 
prize. 
A number of peace accords 
seeking to resolve conflicts (for ex-
ample relating to Liberia, Sierra-
Leone and Angola) have also been 
signed in the capital of Côte-
d'lvoire. Only a philistine could 
come away from Yamoussoukro 
unaffected by its unique atmos-
phere - combining abstraction, ra-
tionality and peace. 
In terms of economic infra-
structure the town shows consider-
able promise. The farming poten-
tial of the area is already known, 
and the steady transformation of 
the village into a modern city con-
tinues. 
Looking on the bright 
side 
For many years it was the 
custom of Côte-d'lvoire to mark 
the anniversary of the country's in-
dependence by selecting a differ-
ent town every year as the venue 
for the celebrations. This tradition 
of rotating festivals, based on the 
Israeli model, was designed to 
stimulate public-spiritedness, rein-
force national unity and 'show the 
government at work' to people in 
different parts of the country. 
However, the economic crisis of 
the 1980s forced politicians to 
abandon the practice. Taking ad-
vantage of the upturn, President 
Konan Bédié recently decided to 
reinstate the rotating festival and 
chose Yamoussoukro as the venue 
for the relaunch. This is seen as an 
acknowledgement of the memory 
The Houphouët-Boigny Foundation. 
Quest for peace through dialogue 
of the man whom most citizens 
believe was the architect of the 
country's economic progress. Re-
grettably, things have not gone 
entirely to plan and the prepara-
tions for the event were not com-
pleted in time. Wisely, the decision 
was taken to put back until next 
year the festival scheduled for Au-
gust 1997, even if this caused dis-
appointment locally. Explanations 
vary as to why the postponement 
was necessary. Some say that too 
much was expected too quickly. 
Others believe the project was 
poorly conceived. Whatever the 
cause, it is clear that better plan-
ning was needed. Jean Konan 
Banny did not seem overly per-
turbed by the decision to post-
pone. Pragmatically, he acknowl-
edged that the decision would 
irritate those who stood to gain fi-
nancially from the festival. It was a 
frustrating situation, he said, but 
too much should not be made of 
it. Revealing his rural origins, he 
observed: 'Sometimes it looks as if 
it will rain but the storm never 
breaks'. 
Mr Banny certainly does 
not accept that this 'glitch' will 
cast a shadow on the town's ulti-
mate destiny. Transferring a capi-
tal, he insists, is an event for a gen-
eration, undertaken for their 
children. So the town's modernisa-
tion will continue at an unhurried 
pace. The second section of the 
motorway linking Yamoussoukro 
to Abidjan will soon be completed 
and there will be operational im-
provements to the airport, which 
already meets international stan-
dards. You might say there are 
two appointments to be kept: one 
next year and the other with his-
tory. ■■ κ. κ. 
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'We are a country that is open to the outside world, with an age-old tradition of welcoming people'. So the 
political leaders in Côte d'Ivoire like to remind everyone. It is true that, in contrast to other African countries, 
the liberal policies adopted since independence and the economic progress achieved enabled Côte d'Ivoire to 
attract foreign investors. But the economic crisis of the 1980s nonetheless reduced the volume of direct in-
vestment, despite the rich potential of many of the country's economic sectors. Aware of the numerous ben-
efits private investment could have on an economy which is having to cope with declining official aid, the 
Côte d'Ivoire authorities have decided to take action. The cards have been clearly laid on the table: improve 
the performance and competitiveness of the economy by implementing policies specifically designed to en-
courage investment. In pursuit of this approach, a special department has been set up, attached directly to 
the Prime Minister's office. 
It is not surprising 
that the Plateau district -
an area milling with busi-
nesspeople and the nerve 
centre of political and 
economic life in Côte 
d'Ivoire - should have 
been chosen as the home 
of CEPICI (the Centre for 
promoting investment in 
Côte d'Ivoire). This has set up 
shop on the fifth floor of one of 
the high-rise blocks that have 
turned the Plateau into a mini 
Manhattan. The Centre, which 
was established by a legal decree 
in September 1993, and has been 
operational since July 1994, sees 
itself as 'the true home of the in-
vestor' and has become an im-
portant focus of attention. The 
role assigned to it is likely to be fundamental in im-
plementing one of the government's key strategies -
to make the private sector a vehicle for nationwide 
growth. 
One of the Centre's primary tasks is to simpli-
fy the formalities investors have to go through - by 
improving reception facilities and providing more in 
the way of information and assistance. It's job, there-
fore, is to supply detailed and reliable literature on 
the various sectors of activity, information on invest-
ment, employment and taxation rules, and statistical 
data. It is also responsible for identifying and high-
lighting profitable sectors which offer good invest-
ment opportunities, while ensuring that investors are 
aware of the various incentives made available by the 
government. Examples of the latter include the new 
data banks and the electronic exchange network, 
both of which have made a major contribution to 
speeding up information management. 
Another aspect of the work carried out by 
CEPICI is the organisation of promotional events such 
as specialised seminars, information campaigns and 
forums. These are staged both in Côte d'Ivoire and 
abroad. The Centre thus acts as a sort of middleman, 
bringing together companies looking to set up part-
nerships and aiming to simplify the whole process of 
foreign businesses working together, merging or sign-
ing subcontracts with national companies. Lastly, it 
acts as a liaison point between the authorities and the 
private sector, easing relations between the two sides 
through 
sions. 
regular dialogue ses-
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CEPICI: establishing a special relationship with 
private investors 
By opting for this 
unique structure, the govern-
ment is striving to eliminate the 
problems which face companies 
wanting to set themselves up in 
Côte d'Ivoire. The aim is for 
CEPICI to establish a special re-
lationship with foreign in-
vestors. The country's inhabi-
tants are well aware that for 
both international institutions 
and the business community, a 
plethora of largely disorganised 
and uncoordinated structures 
represents one of the major ob-
stacles to private investment (in 
Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere in 
Africa). 
Only time will tell whether this government-
led economic information tool can accomplish its mis-
sion with the resources it has been given. Its success or 
failure will ultimately be gauged by future levels of 
private investment in the country. 
There are those who view intervention by the 
authorities as undermining the autonomy of the Cen-
tre which, in any case, does not have an independent 
status. This view is disputed by M. Koffivi, one of the 
General Managers of CEPICI, who insisted: 'the fact 
that our organisation is run under the authority and 
supervision of the Prime Minister actually works to 
our advantage'. To be fair, the authorities are now 
meeting deadlines and following appropriate proce-
dures on a more consistent basis so that today, a com-
pany wishing to set itself up in Côte d'Ivoire can get 
through the relevant formalities far more swiftly. Not 
so long ago, the process could take at least two years. 
And information is now much more freely available. 
The CEPICI also benefits from the promotional work 
done by the President and the Prime Minister during 
their trips overseas. They are keen to stress that their 
country is politically and socially stable, has adequate 
infrastructures, has enjoyed impressive growth rates 
since 1994, protects investments and occupies a strate-
gic geographic position in the region. These efforts to 
encourage foreign investment, we were assured, are 
beginning to bear fruit and, as a result of this, the 
Centre expects to raise its profile worldwide. ■■ κ.κ. 
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General information 
Area: 322,463 km
2 
Population: 14 million (of 
whom 35% are recent im-
migrants) 
Urban population: 45% 
Population growth rate: 
3.8% 
Population density: 43 in-
habitants per km
2 
Economic capital: Abidjan 
Yamoussoukro  Political capital 
(since 1983) 
Official language: French. There 
are also some 60 local languages, 
of which the most important are 
Dioula and Baoulé  Atlantic Ocean 
Economy 
GDP per capita: ECU 520 (1995 esti-
mate) 
GDP growth rate: 7.2% (1996 esti-
mate) 
Inflation rate: 6,5% 
Balance of payments (current ac-
count): ECU 300 million 
Main exports: cocoa 35% of total 
exports, wood 11%; coffee 10% 
The Basilica of Our Lady of Peace 
at Yamoussoukro 
Currency: CFA Franc (the country is 
in the monetary zone of the 
Central Bank of West African 
States). 1 ECU = FCFA 659 
Political structure 
Presidential system. The President 
of the Republic is elected by uni-
versal suffrage for a five-year man-
date. Multi-party politics were in-
troduced in 1990. The last 
presidential election took place in 
October 1995 with the legislative 
poll being held the following 
month. 
Political parties: Parti Démocra-
tique de la Côte-d'lvoire (PDCI-
RDA - the party in power), Front 
Populaire Ivoirien (FPI); Rassemble-
ment des Républicains (RDR) 
Head of State: Henri Konan Bédié 
Prime Minister: Kablan Duncan 
Life expectancy at birth: 52.1 years 
Enrolment in primary education: 
71% 
Adult literacy: 39.4% 
Human Development Index rating: 
0.368 (145th out of 175) 
Social indicators Sources: UNDP (Human Development 
Report), Economic Intelligence Unit 
Religions: Animists 50%; Christians (The Economist), 
15%; Muslims 35% European Commission 
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fl EU-Côte d'Ivoire cooperation 
Shared development is 
the way forward 
by Gabrielle von Brochowski" 
In recent years, EU-Côte 
d'Ivoire cooperation - reflect-
ed notably in the European 
Development Fund (EDF) -
has concentrated on three 
main sectors: rural develop-
ment/environmental protec-
tion, decentralisation/region-
al development, and health. 
Between 1991 and 1996, 
Community resources allo-
cated to Côte d'Ivoire 
amounted to approximately ECU 
520 million. 
In the early 1990s, world-
market prices for coffee and cocoa 
fell dramatically - a bitter blow for 
Côte d'Ivoire since these two com-
modities form the basis of its ex-
port trade. European Commission 
aid, therefore, principally took the 
form of Stabex transfers, which 
were intended to offset the reduc-
tion in export revenue. These 
amounted to ECU 269.6 million be-
tween 1990 and 1993. From 1994 
onwards, however, thanks to an 
upturn in prices for these two key 
products, and as a result of the im-
plementation of corrective mea-
sures, the Côte d'Ivoire govern-
ment has had no further need of 
Stabex support. Under the 7th EDF 
(1992-96), the country had a bud-
get of ECU 112 million for its Na-
tional Indicative Programme (NIP). 
Additional Community aid has 
been in the form of support from 
the Structural Adjustment Facilities 
(SAF) (ECU 77m), aid for refugees 
from Liberia (ECU 1.4m), and funds 
managed by the European Invest-
ment Bank (ECU 57 m). There was 
also a European Commission bud-
get allocation for environmental 
protection (ECU 4.15m), support 
for banana growers (ECU 34.8m), 
food aid (ECU 49.6m) and compen-
sation payments made under the 
terms of the fishing agreement 
* Head of the EC Delegation in Côte-d'lvoire. 
(ECU 2.5m for 1994-97, and ECU 
3m for 1997-2000). 
Transition from the 7th to 
the 8th EDF 
Projects financed with 
Community funds under the 7th 
EDF concentrate on three sectors: 
agriculture and rural development 
(49% from Stabex transfers, 38% 
from NIP funds), regional develop-
ment and support for decentralisa-
tion (24% from the NIP, 36% from 
the SAF) and health (10% from the 
NIP, 49% from the SAF). Under the 
8th EDF (1997-2001), Côte d'Ivoire 
will receive programmable aid 
amounting to ECU 120 million in 
its NIP. Consistent with past activi-
ties and the government's pro-
gramme, the main areas of con-
centration will be decentralisation 
and regional development (35% to 
40%), health (25% to 30%), and 
rural development/environmental 
protection (25% to 30%). Aside 
from these sectors, help will be 
available for private-sector devel-
opment in the form of support 
aimed at improving the SME envi-
ronment, and for the better or-
ganisation of certain buoyant sec-
tors, such as tourism and textiles. 
Regional integration will also fea-
ture along with specific actions 
such as the African anti-drug pro-
gramme and the cultural-initiative 
support programme. Meanwhile, 
Côte d'Ivoire will benefit indirectly 
from a proportion of the financial 
contributions that the European 
Commission plans to make to the 
Commission of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU), to promote regional in-
tegration. 
Support for structural 
adjustment 
Five structural adjustment 
support facilities, amounting to a 
total of ECU 77.2 million, were ap-
proved during the 7th EDF (1992-
96). These took the form of Gener-
al Import Programmes (GIPs) and 
were part of the structural adjust-
ment programme agreed between 
Côte d'Ivoire and the main donors. 
Generally speaking, this strategy 
has yielded positive results: there 
has been a marked increase in pri-
vate and public investment, do-
mestic savings have doubled, the 
inflation rate has fallen, measures 
have been introduced to liberalise 
domestic and foreign trade, new 
labour and investment codes have 
been adopted and a number of 
public enterprises have been either 
privatised or restructured. All that 
remains is for the government to 
boost public expenditure control, 
restructure the tax system and en-
sure a fair distribution of growth. 
The specific objectives of 
the 5th GIP include improvement 
of the balance of payments situa-
tion (by financing imports), a con-
tribution to the state budget, sup-
port for reforms in the health 
sector and promotion of decentral-
isation. The last two are regarded 
Over a period of 30 years, 80% of Côte d'lvoire's 
primary forest has disappeared 
B 
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as crucial to the economic and so-
cial viability of the country's 
macro-economic programme. Re-
cently, the Commission mobilised 
ECU 25m for Côte d'lvoire's 5th 
GIP. This funding is consistent with 
other Community interventions in 
Côte d'Ivoire and previous GIP 
funding. The current programme 
aims to support the government's 
medium-term (1996-98) macro-
economic reforms. A mid-term ap-
praisal of the results to date, 
scheduled for the last quarter of 
1997, will determine how re-
sources are allocated in 1998. A 
number of ideas are being dis-
cussed, including further develop-
ment of the private sector and 
help for education. 
Rural development and 
environmental protection 
The driving force behind 
Côte d'lvoire's spectacular eco-
nomic growth in the 1960s and 
1970s, agriculture is now responsi-
ble for 34% of GDP and 48% of 
exports, providing employment for 
more than two-thirds of the work-
ing population. The main crops are 
cocoa - Côte d'Ivoire is the world's 
premier producer - coffee, hevea 
wood (rubberwood), oil palms, ba-
nanas, pineapples, cotton and 
sugar. The expansion of agricul-
ture has, however, led to the im-
poverishment of the land (over a 
30-year period, 80% of primary 
forest has disappeared), a deterio-
ration in soil quality and environ-
mental degradation. To counteract 
this, European Commission sup-
port aims to preserve natural re-
sources and promote sustainable 
development. This involves moni-
toring the necessary progress of 
agricultural production systems to-
wards more intensive and competi-
tive farming methods, thereby 
guaranteeing rational land man-
agement, conservation of existing 
resources and a more professional 
approach on the part of those in-
volved in the farming sector. 
Intervention under the NIP 
of the 7th EDF, combined with 
Stabex transfers, has provided the 
funds needed to finance training 
programmes in improved farming 
methods, more intensive rice-
growing and forestry protection 
activities. Technical assistance has 
also been made available. The 
Stabex mechanism has made it 
possible to implement major re-
forms, in collaboration with other 
donors. As part of its contribution 
to negotiations between the 
World Bank and the Côte d'Ivoire 
government on agricultural struc-
tural adjustment credit, the Com-
mission played a decisive role in 
defining and setting up a new cof-
fee and cocoa marketing system, 
providing greater transparency 
and a better balance between the 
private sector and the Agricultural 
Produce Price Support and Stabili-
sation Fund (Caistab). It is uncer-
tain, however, whether this new 
external marketing system will sur-
vive, given the pressure being ex-
erted by the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions who are seeking full 
liberalisation of the coffee and 
cocoa sectors. 
On the basis of the new ex-
port management scheme, the 
Commission has supported full lib-
eralisation of domestic marketing 
and Caistab's total withdrawal 
from this sector. A guarantee 
fund, which includes a Community 
contribution of ECU 6.5 million, 
has also been provided to make it 
easier for producer organisations 
to gain access to bank credits. In 
addition, the Commission has 
helped the government to prepare 
a new law on cooperatives, in col-
laboration with all operators in-
volved in agriculture, and this is 
due to be voted on by the end of 
1997. Its objective is to enable 
agricultural vocational organisa-
tions to become genuine economic 
operators. 
With a view to diversifying 
agricultural production, significant 
support has been given to produc-
ers of bananas, pineapples and 
other fruits. Electricity supplies 
have been installed at production 
sites, plantation access roads have 
been restored and training 
schemes implemented. The assis-
tance has also covered reconstruc-
tion of the central fruit market in 
Abidjan's port area, the setting-up 
of a transport and investment 
guarantee fund, and improvement 
of standards relating to the quality 
of agricultural produce. 
In the stockbreeding sec-
tor, the Commission has financed 
more far-reaching activity by the 
Ranch de la Marahoué and the Na-
tional Sheep Centre. These are two 
subregional centres for selecting 
and distributing local breeds, and 
for training young stockbreeders 
and helping them to set up on 
their own. The future of such de-
velopment tools, in the current cli-
mate of less state involvement will, 
to a large extent, depend on the 
success achieved in handing re-
sponsibility over to vocational or-
ganisations. 
The European Commission 
and other donors with a presence 
in Côte d'Ivoire have made envi-
ronmental protection one of their 
main priorities. Their joint ap-
proach has assisted the govern-
ment and enabled it to implement 
measures to protect national 
parks, halt the rapid degradation 
of the environment, campaign 
against deforestation and prepare 
plans aimed at developing and 
managing protected areas. Howev-
er, the environmental situation re-
Grading bananas ¡n Bonoua. 
The EU has provided fruit producers 
with valuable support 
COMOE I 
k» ....■ 
COMOE · côte d'ivoire 
mains a cause for concern and re-
quires renewed commitment from 
both the state and from donors. 
Over the next few years, rural de-
velopment and the environment 
will be retained as a key area of 
concentration under the 8th EDF. 
The allocation of between 25% 
and 30% of the NIP for this area 
translates into between ECU 20m 
and ECU 30m. The programmes to 
be financed will concentrate on 
providing support for agricultural 
vocational organisations, promot-
ing agricultural-credit and rural-
land policies adapted to the needs 
of individual production sectors, 
and supporting institutions con-
cerned with environmental issues. 
An examination of agricultural 
credit, one of the key factors in-
volved in helping the country's 
farmers become more professional 
in their approach, has already 
been initiated, in collaboration 
with the Economics and Finance 
Ministry. Meanwhile, a study joint-
ly financed by the French Develop-
ment Fund and the Commission, 
using Stabex funds, has been initi-
ated to explore all possible av-
enues and suggest solutions. It is 
hoped that this review will lead to 
a definition of agricultural credit 
policy and provide guidelines for 
the Commission's activities in the 
sector. EU support for regional-de-
velopment and decentralisation 
policy, and for health, has a part 
to play in creating a more 
favourable socio-economic envi-
ronment via a direct contribution 
to rural development. 
A hospital at Bingerville. 
EU programmes provide local populations 
with better access to healthcare and with 
refurbished equipment 
Decentralisation and 
regional development 
In terms of decentralisa-
tion and regional development, 
the Commission's aim is to support 
the government in its efforts at 
ensuring that social and economic 
development between the regions 
is more balanced, with a view to 
achieving greater national cohe-
sion. Under the 7th EDF, approxi-
mately 24% of NIP resources were 
allocated to financing the Coastal 
Communities Development Sup-
port Programme (PDCC) featured 
in the box. 
The wholesale food market 
scheme at Bouaké, a town at the 
centre of Côte d'lvoire's trade with 
other countries in the sub-region, 
is a pilot project whose success in 
terms of management and prof-
itability will be decisive for the 
country's future network of 
wholesale food markets. Costing 
approximately ECU 22m, the mar-
ket is financed partly by the EDF 
(about ECU 14m) and partly by the 
Côte d'Ivoire government. It will 
be managed by a joint investment 
company. 
Under the 8th EDF, the 
main concerns are regional devel-
opment and decentralisation. The 
35%-40% of the overall budget al-
located here represents between 
ECU 42m and ECU 48m. Commis-
sion support will relate essentially 
to drawing up plans of action and 
establishing economic infrastruc-
tures in five regional capitals with 
a population in excess of 600,000 
inhabitants (San Pedro, Daloa, Odi-
enné, Korhogo, Bondoukou). Sup-
port for strengthening decen-
tralised bodies (new towns and 
villages, communities and regions) 
will be focused on the organisa-
tion of local elections and in the 
setting-up of representational 
structures. Decentralisation policy 
will also receive funding under the 
structural adjustment facilities, al-
though the amounts in question 
have not yet been finalised. 
Health 
Where the health sector is 
concerned. Commission interven-
tion targets a more robust health 
policy, promoting a partnership 
with associations, the 'liberal' pro-
fessions and local communities -
aiming at delegated health-service 
management. The country already 
has a relatively well-developed 
health infrastructure, but the ma-
jority of health indicators are un-
satisfactory. The government, 
therefore, aims to provide the 
population with easier access to 
health services and to improve the 
quality of care by maintaining and 
developing infrastructures, achiev-
ing better management of the sys-
tem, and overhauling personnel 
training schemes. 
The Commission's support 
programme is assisting Côte 
d'lvoire's health ministry to pro-
vide basic care and essential medi-
cines, and to make services more 
widely available and affordable. 
Activities include technical assis-
tance at both central and regional 
level, support in providing essen-
tial medicines, refurbishing and 
equipping national blood transfu-
sion infrastructures, carrying out 
specific studies in the health sector 
and implementing awareness and 
training programmes. 
In parallel, in the context 
of the integrated healthcare devel-
opment project, the Commission 
has supported the provision of na-
tionwide health services in Côte 
d'Ivoire. At the end of September 
1997, services covered five out of 
the 10 regions (nearly two-thirds 
A 
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The Coastal Communities 
Development Programme 
The Coastal Communities De-
velopment Programme (PDCC) 
- originally covering 16 loca-
tions, and now 20 - aims to as-
sist local communities in plan-
ning their activities, managing 
their financial resources and or-
ganising their land. A wide 
range of projects has been set 
up. In some cases, communities 
receive the money they require 
to carry out work themselves, 
in others, the central govern-
ment does the work for them. 
The 120 or so projects already 
financed by the PDCC include 
school refurbishments and the 
construction of urban roads, 
airstrips, haulage depots, abat-
toirs, maternity hospitals, mar-
kets and drainage canals. 
The PDCC has a 'private initia-
tive development' component 
which provides resources for 
studying and setting up techni-
cal assistance programmes and 
financial tools tailor-made for 
small formal or informal enter-
prises. The intermediary is an 
NCO, the Côte d'Ivoire devel-
opment and investment fund 
of the country). The aim is to pro-
vide better health cover for all citi-
zens, in terms of both quantity 
and quality, using the available re-
sources and those which can be 
mobilised. The 25%-30% of NIP 
funds allocated to health (making 
it the second priority) will amount 
to between ECU 25m and ECU 
36m. It is expected that Communi-
ty support will relate essentially to 
the consolidation of actions al-
ready begun in the South West 
and Midwest of the country, and 
to improving the management 
tools set up under the 7th EDF in 
three other health regions. Sup-
port will also be given to the de-
(FIDI), which extends loans and 
provides accounting services, 
advice and training. 
The PDCC has enabled a unique 
partnership to be set up be-
tween the government, local 
communities and the European 
Commission. With a view to 
achieving effective decentrali-
sation, the project encourages 
local authorities to identify 
their priorities and their most 
urgent infrastructure projects. 
The Commission, however, does 
not become directly involved in 
choosing equipment or proce-
dures. The real challenge is to 
demonstrate that communities 
in Côte d'Ivoire have reached 
the stage of development that 
enables them to evolve further 
on their own. The success, to 
date, of the project is under-
lined by the high quality of the 
work that has been undertaken 
and the fact that the infrastruc-
tures built - though sometimes 
on a small scale - have had a 
significant social and economic 
impact. 
■ 
velopment of partnerships, the 
provision of top-quality private 
medicine and the development of 
instruments aimed at rationalising 
Health Ministry management at 
the centre. 
The main areas of Côte 
d'Ivoire and European Commission 
cooperation demonstrate a com-
mon concern for sustainable and 
shared development - improved 
healthcare access; regional devel-
opment and decentralisation to 
help communities take charge of 
their own welfare and future; and 
agricultural development to en-
sure both a bigger return for pro-
ducers and environmental conser-
vation. All parties agree that sus-
tainable and shared development 
is the ultimate goal, although dif-
ferences in approach sometimes 
arise. This is an indication that EU-
Côte d'Ivoire cooperation has 
evolved into a genuine partner-
ship. The two sides are partners in 
a dialogue who can listen to one 
another's views on objectives. As 
equals, with mutual respect, they 
are able to discuss the ways in 
which the interests of the popula-
tion can best be served by cooper-
ation. The new partnership envis-
aged for the post-Lomé IV era is 
already slotting into place, ^G.V.B. 
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fl The battery of facts and figures on the in-
creased marginalisation from world trade of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific group, and particu-
larly of sub-Saharan Africa, makes dismal reading. 
Although it has 10.2% of the world's population, 
sub-Saharan Africa only secures one per cent of 
world trade. The ACP's share of the EU's import 
market declined from more than 7% in 1975 to 
3.5% in 1995 and even this share was still depen-
dent on a few basic commodities traded by just a 
handful of ACP countries. In 1995, 47% of ACP ex-
ports to the EU originated in just 12 countries, rep-
resenting just 6.8% of ACP population. 
Lome's trade preferences from the virtual 
free access to the EU market for industrial goods 
and very good access for agricultural produce are, 
by tradition, bigger and better than those offered 
to other developing regions. The special protocols, 
notably on sugar and bananas, have enabled the 
economies of some ACP nations to move ahead 
and have raised their standard of living. 
But the value of such benefits is being un-
dermined by what is happening both inside and 
outside the European Union. 
Internally, the meltdown of ACP trade pref-
erence has been hastened by the EU's courting of 
other developing and transforming regions, like 
the Mediterranean, Latin America, Central and 
Eastern Europe and some Asian nations. Externally, 
the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) latest ruling 
on the EU's common banana market arrange-
ments, deemed to discriminate in favour of the 
ACPs, is being viewed as something of a test case 
for the future of preferential ACP access to the Eu-
ropean Union market. 
More generally, the decline in demand for 
the sort of commodities traded by the ACP states 
does not bode well as European consumer- demand 
for processed and manufactured goods rises. It 
seems that this trend increasingly favours other 
low cost regions of the world such as South East 
Asia, which is several rungs up on the trading lad-
der. 
On a brighter note, the very fact that the 
Lomé Convention is being overhauled, with the 
recognition that the trade chapter has helped just 
a few ACP states, is inciting much debate on how 
trade arrangements in a future cooperation agree-
ment might be better modelled. In drawing this 
up, the parties will take account of positive devel-
opments such as the proliferation of regional ac-
cords in all ACP regions and private sector develop-
ment, as well as of the growing role of the WTO in 
regulating world trade. 
Ahead of the talks on a Lomé IV successor, 
we sound out the views of some trade experts -
academics, NGOs and civil servants - on how better 
to integrate the ACPs into this changed world 
economy, to stimulate growth and sustainable 
development. Bl D.P. 
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bananas 
I Windward islands banana 
I exporters say that the recent 
I WTO ruling on certain as-
I perts of the EU's organisa-
I tion of a common market in 
I bananas puts in peril the 
I livelihoods of many of their 
I farmers. Criticism has gone 
I further, questioning the abil-
I ity of the WTO system to 
I represent the trading inter-
I esfs of small developing 
I countries. The banana deba-
HHHI cle has strengthened the 
view of many Lomé watch-
ers that a successor to the present 
Convention must be compatible 
with WTO rules. The following arti-
cle by the WTO Secretariat gives an 
insight into the WTO's dispute set-
tlement procedure and the banana 
case - which is regarded by some as 
something of a 'test' for the future 
of ACP preference in the EU market. 
Not yet three years old, the 
WTO has already received more 
than 100 requests from members to 
initiate consultations on trade dis-
putes. This compares with just 300 
in GATT's 47-year history. Under 
GATT, trade disputes sometimes re-
mained unresolved in view of the 
consensus needed to adopt panel 
reports. Under WTO rules, however, 
panel and Appellate Body reports 
are adopted automatically unless 
there is a consensus amongst all 
WTO members not to do so. 
Since the entry into force of 
the WTO on 1 January 1995, consul-
tation requests have been filed by 
both developed and developing 
countries and have covered every-
thing from automobiles and com-
puters to export subsidies, colour 
television receivers and agricultural 
products. The United States, the Eu-
ropean Union and Japan - the 
world's largest traders - have filed 
more than half of the requests, 
whilst Mexico, India, Thailand and 
Brazil have been frequent users of 
the dispute settlement system. To 
date, developing countries have 
filed requests in 31 cases and have 
been the subject of 38 complaints. 
In four instances, groups of WTO 
member countries have filed re-
quests against another WTO mem-
ber. One such case concerns a com-
plaint by five countries - developed 
and developing - against the Euro-
pean Union's banana import 
regime. 
On 25 September 1997, the 
World Trade Organisation's Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the 
panel reports and the Appellate 
Body report concerning the Euro-
pean Communities' regime for the 
importation, sale and distribution 
of bananas. The case before the Dis-
pute Settlement Body of the WTO is 
The WTO Secretariat in Geneva 
widely recognised to have been one 
of the most complicated to date. 
With five complainants and 20 
countries reserving their 'third party 
rights' to intervene in the dispute or 
to make presentations and in some 
cases, submissions to the panel, the 
dispute and subsequent appeal 
have been the focus of enormous 
activity in the WTO over the past 
year and a half. The panel investi-
gating the complaint prepared four 
separate reports of several hundred 
pages each. Although there have 
been disputes involving several 
complainants in the past, and even 
multiple reports, to date this is the 
only GATTA/VTO dispute with as 
many claims, examining as many 
measures, and involving as many 
WTO agreements. The findings and 
conclusions of the panel span some 
100 pages in each of the reports. 
Inconsistency 
The panel established on 8 
May 1996 at the request of Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and 
the United States, was the first time 
that the EC's banana import regime 
was contested in the WTO. Under 
the WTO's predecessor, the GATT, 
the EC's banana import measures 
were twice examined. The first time 
was in 1993 and concerned the vari-
ous national banana import systems 
of the EC's member states. The sec-
ond panel started later the same 
year and was terminated in 1994. It 
concerned certain aspects of the 
then newly-introduced EC common 
organisation of the market in ba-
nanas. In both cases, the complain-
ing parties were the same: Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela. The first 
panel report found certain aspects 
of the systems of the EC member 
states and the second panel report 
found certain aspects of the com-
mon organisation of the banana 
market after 1 July 1993, respective-
ly, to be inconsistent with GATT 
rules. Neither of these reports was 
adopted by the GATT Council be-
cause of a lack of consensus by the 
EC and those GATT governments 
which benefited from the Lomé 
Convention. Full agreement was 
necessary under GATT procedures 
to adopt recommendations made 
by dispute settlement panels. 
When the WTO panel re-
ports and the Appellate Body report 
were adopted by the DSB at its last 
meeting in September 1997, the EC 
emphasised its commitment to the 
WTO's Dispute Settlement Under-
standing and accepted the recom-
mendations of the panel and Appel-
late Body reports. It also reaffirmed 
its commitment to its obligations 
towards the 71 African, Caribbean 
and Pacific countries which are sig-
natories of the Lomé Convention. 
At the September meeting, 
the EC told the Dispute Settlement 
Body that it will announce its inten-
tions on the implementation of the 
the Courier n° 166 - november-december 1997 
fl dossier 
reports' recommendations that it 
bring its banana regime into con-
formity with WTO rules at the next 
meeting of the Dispute Settlement 
Body, scheduled for 16 October 
1997. 
It must be emphasised here 
that the reports and the Appellate 
Body report, which substantially up-
held the findings of the panel re-
ports, did not find fault with the 
principle behind the EC's Lomé Con-
vention. Under the WTO, waivers 
concerning trade preferences or ex-
tended time limits for abiding by 
WTO obligations have been extend-
ed to numerous WTO members. In a 
decision taken in October 1996, 
WTO members reaffirmed a GATT 
1994 decision and agreed that Arti-
cle I of GATT would be waived for 
the fourth ACP-EC Convention of 
Lomé until 29 February 2000. In 
essence, this means that the provi-
sions of Article I of GATT 1994, the 
most-favoured-nation rule, by 
which tariff and certain other tariff 
concessions must be extended to all 
other WTO members on an equal 
basis, does not apply. The EC, there-
fore, is permitted, until the year 
2000, to provide preferential tariff 
treatment for products originating 
in ACP States as required by the rel-
evant provisions of the Fourth Lomé 
Convention, without being required 
to extend the same preferential 
treatment to like products of any 
other WTO member. 
The panel reports and the 
Appellate Body report did not ques-
tion the validity of the Lomé Con-
vention or the EC's right to continue 
its preferential trade arrangement 
until the year 2000. However, the 
reports found that the EC's banana 
import system is inconsistent with 
GATT in that the tariff quota alloca-
tions, particularly to ACP countries, 
are contrary to GATT Article XIII 
(concerning the non-discriminatory 
administration of quantitative re-
strictions). They also found that the 
EC's licensing procedures-which in-
volve the purchase of EC and/or ACP 
bananas in order to obtain rights to 
import Latin American bananas or 
those from other countries - are 
contrary to the non-discrimination 
provisions of the GATT. The waiver 
which had been granted was found 
to permit the tariff preferences 
for ACP countries, but not the 
other inconsistencies. Furthermore, 
through the impact of the system 
on the service suppliers of the com-
plaining parties, the banana import 
regime was also found to be incon-
sistent with Articles II (Most-
Favoured-Nation treatment) and 
XVII (National treatment) of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices. 
The case and decisions de-
scribed above have resulted in enor-
mous public interest in many parts 
of the world and have especially 
raised the concerns of certain devel-
oping countries dependent on ba-
nana exports for their livelihood. 
The rules, as represented by the 
WTO, were negotiated by all WTO 
member governments for all WTO 
members. To say that the WTO's dis-
pute settlement rulings favour some 
and go against the interests of oth-
ers, is to question the set of rules 
which 132 countries have now rati-
fied and adopted in their national 
legislatures and parliaments. If the 
system is to remain fair and impar-
tial, so that all 132 WTO Members 
gain from the benefits of trade, 
these rules must be the basis of dis-
pute settlement. To deny certain 
countries their legal benefits and 
potential earnings from their ex-
ports would set a precedent that 
could in the future easily work 
against those countries which now 
claim that the rules should be 
changed to incorporate their con-
cerns. Developing and least-devel-
oped countries benefit in many 
cases from extended time limits for 
compliance with WTO obligations. 
Moreover, WTO members are al-
lowed to take measures in support 
of developing and least-developed 
countries providing they do so in a 
way that does not breach the rules 
of the multilateral trading system 
which the WTO represents. The 
panel reports state the following in 
their final remarks: 'The fundamen-
tal principles of the WTO and WTO 
rules are designed to foster the de-
velopment of countries, not impede 
it. We conclude that the system is 
flexible enough to allow, through 
WTO-consistent trade and non-
trade measures, appropriate policy 
responses in the wide variety of cir-
cumstances across countries, includ-
ing countries that are currently 
heavily dependent on the produc-
tion and commercialisation of ba-
nanas.' M 
Windward Island 
response  I
The Windward Islands banana 
exporting countries say that they 
will battle on to retain their toe-
hold in the European market, 
now threatened by the WTO ruling: 
The economic consequences of the loss 
of our only market for our principal ex-
port commodity would be horrendous 
for us. Bananas are more than just a 
commercial operation and a contributor 
to our economic development. They are 
the very basis of the social structure of 
our rural socety, and should we lose this 
industry, there would be inevitable eco-
nomic and social disruption unimagin-
able and incalculable'. These were the 
words of Dominica's Prime Minister, Edi-
son James at a High Level meeting of 
the Windward Island Banana Exporting 
Countries held in Roseau, Dominica's 
capital, on September 11-12, 1997. He 
said that they had been penalised for 
'doing the right things'. 'We have ad-
hered to the highest labour standards, 
permitted free trade union activities, 
outlawed all forms of exploitative 
labour, ensured that workers are paid a 
living wage, and avoided the excessive 
use of chemical inputs in our produc-
tion'. He further stated: We also feel 
betrayed by the WTO, because we 
joined the Organisation believing that 
its primary purpose was to bring about 
improved living standards and equity 
and fairness in international trade; that 
it would be one which would ensure 
that the rule of the jungle, in which the 
powerful ride roughshod over the small-
er members of the trading community, 
would not be condoned. What we find 
is that the WTO has ended up"being a 
system in which the legitimate interests 
of the small countries will always be sac-
rificed once they conflict with those of 
the major players. In Brussels, Ambas-
sador to the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States, Edwin Laurent, ex-
plained that the doomed licensing sys-
tem was essential to a remunerative 
price for Windward bananas. Whilst 
counter to the ethos of 'trade not aid', 
he warned: 'the scope of the ruling goes 
way beyond bananas and could have as 
yet unclear implications for several 
other import arrangements for agricul-
tural goods, as well as the future devel-
opment cooperation agreements be-
tween rich and poor countries.' He 
added: The experience of the case has 
exposed blatant shortcomings in the 
(WTO disputes) system. These must be 
addressed in any reform, including the 
necessity to take into account the im-
pact of decisions especially when, as in 
this case, the affected countries have 
vulnerable and fragile economies. If it is 
already too late for our banana case, 
maybe the right improvements can yet 
be made to a system which would be 
helpful to the participation of small de-
veloping countries and reassure them 
that the system is not structurally 
weighted against them. ' 
A 
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by Philippe Van Damme* 
The increasing marginalisation of the ACP group (particularly sub-Saharan Africa) in world trade is discussed 
elsewhere in this dossier. From the European Union side, one response to this problem comes in the shape of 
new approaches to trade-related development projects, aimed at helping ACP nations take on the growing 
international competition. Here, one of the European Commission's trade strategists explains what is being 
done. 
Marginalisation in 
world trade may have 
wider developmental reper-
cussions since it is now 
recognised that trade is at 
the centre of the develop-
ment process. Trade devel-
opment is indeed the most 
efficient way of generating 
the resources needed for 
self-financed development. 
It is thus a major contribu-
tor to the achievement of 
the ultimate objective - which is to 
make development aid redundant. 
Trade alleviates balance of pay-
ments burdens and facilitates 
structural changes. It can make a 
major contribution to social devel-
opment and poverty alleviation, by 
creating jobs and enhancing in-
comes, by broadening the eco-
nomic and social horizons of rural 
communities, or by giving access to 
new technologies and skills. 
Glowing statistics from 
Southeast Asia and from countries 
as far apart as Chile and Mauritius, 
illustrate that trade is the most 
powerful engine for growth. It is 
thus the ideal vehicle to achieve 
the overall objective of 'sustain-
able economic and social develop-
ment' enshrined in Article 130u of 
the Treaty on European Union (the 
Maastricht Treaty). 
The central role of trade in 
development was reiterated in the 
revised Lomé IV Convention. In Ar-
ticle 6a of the text, the contracting 
parties 'recognise the fundamental 
importance of trade in energising 
the development process' and 
'agree to give high priority to the 
development of trade with a view 
to accelerating the growth of the 
ACP States' economies and to inte-
grating them into the world econ-
* European Commission, DG VIM.5 (Trade and 
Services Development), with thanks to David 
Jones for helpful comments. 
omy in a harmonious and gradual 
manner.' 
Strategic approach 
Although efforts have 
been made by all donors to pro-
vide support for trade develop-
ment, evaluations of some of the 
major past projects have shown 
that, without a coherent strategy, 
trade development projects often 
lacked relevance, effectiveness, 
and efficiency at the executing 
stage. They were poorly designed, 
lacked mutually supportive inputs, 
operated in hostile environments 
and did not evolve over time. This 
led to inappropriate selection of 
beneficiaries and vehicles for inter-
vention. 
There were essentially two 
types of weakness. First, projects 
only provided a partial analysis of 
problems and an inconsistent 
range of services. Any progress 
made within the project ran the 
risk of being nullified or even 
negated by exogenous variables. 
In many cases, crucially influential 
variables such as government poli-
cy or supporting services were 
merely 'assumed' to be conducive 
and moving in the right direction. 
The other main drawback 
was that support provided was 
largely channelled through cen-
tralised trade development organi-
sations, or government ministries. 
This led to the development of in-
stitutions which were both locked 
into government control and lack-
ing in the quality of service and 
staff required by exporters. Institu-
tional mindsets reigned. 
The ability to nurture any 
form of evolutionary and sustain-
able development was lost. In 
turn, this meant a loss of credibili-
ty and the bodies in question were 
increasingly ignored by their tar-
get clients - the private sector. 
Learning from experience 
The dynamic that drives 
the trade development process is 
the integration of three levels of 
influence and three major actors -
the government and the trade en-
vironment, enterprises and the 
market, and the middle level of 
service providers and institutions. 
All are interlinked and need each 
other if trade is to be competitive: 
Initially, a sound and pre-
dictable macro-economic environ-
ment and a reliable legal frame-
work to reduce investment risk 
and ensure fair competition are 
needed. A conducive environment 
- which is vital if market opportu-
nities are to be exploited - entails 
the alleviation of anti-export bias 
and institutional inefficiency at 
various levels: government min-
istries; the judiciary; financial ser-
vices; and trade facilitating bodies 
(such as customs departments, 
standards institutes, and national 
development corporations). 
Second, enterprise compet-
itiveness relies on the existence of 
well- developed intermediate 'spe-
cialised trade support services'. Ex-
amples of these include credit and 
insurance, transport and freight 
forwarding, trade and investment 
information, training, research and 
development, standards institutes, 
hygiene control bodies and export 
standard certification systems. 
Third, at the enterprise 
level, easy access to raw materials, 
imported inputs or technology, im-
provements in production process-
es and quality control, manage-
ment skills and financial control, 
distribution and marketing prac-
tices, may all be crucial factors to 
increase competitiveness (see box). 
Any strategy relies on an 
understanding of the integrated 
nature of the trade development 
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process, and any intervention pro-
gramme must ensure that all nec-
essary support factors are in place 
or are being put in place in a co-
herently sequenced manner. 
Market economy focus 
The integrated approach 
implies a degree of involvement in 
the creation or maintenance of 
conditions for successful trade de-
velopment. Experience shows, 
however, that the fostering of 
trade development is best left to 
the forces of supply and demand. 
There is no substitute for a com-
petitive market. Even interventions 
at government level, or by inter-
mediate support services, should 
be geared towards the creation of 
an environment that favours the 
development of the market econo-
my and of the private sector (one 
of the aims of the revised Lomé 
Convention set out in Article 6). 
Having said this, if a fair 
and competitive marketplace al-
lowing for the expansion of a dy-
namic private sector is wanting, 
donor intervention in trade devel-
opment is justified. Such interven-
tions should, however, be based 
on the following general princi-
ples: 
- Donors should not intervene un-
less the government has made a 
clear commitment to take the nec-
essary steps to create an enabling 
and transparent environment for 
trade development. More than the 
mere promise of change is needed. 
This could involve a conditional 
agreement, with phased support 
from donors being contingent on 
actual changes made by govern-
ment; 
- Donors should not substitute 
themselves for governments of the 
recipient countries. The precise di-
rection of the intervention should 
reflect the actual needs of the 
beneficiary. Donor support pro-
grammes should thus be comple-
mentary and demand-driven, re-
sponding to the lack of availability 
of resources, both material and 
human, necessary to overcome the 
problems and achieve the objec-
tives of the beneficiary; 
- Donor interventions should not 
distort the market. Any interven-
tion in the market should only be 
made to overcome market failures 
and to kick-start market forces. 
Any intervention should therefore 
be temporary and for a finite 
period of time. 
Implications of donor 
intervention 
So it should be underlined 
that to be effective, trade develop-
ment support must be integrated 
in nature, and have a private sec-
tor focus. On the donor front, 
there is also a checklist to ensure 
the success of such projects. The in-
tegrated approach implies that 
prior to any donor intervention in 
the trade development process, a 
Trade Health Check (THC) is carried 
out to identify obstacles to com-
petitiveness. A regular partnership 
dialogue will be instigated secur-
ing a commitment from all stake-
holders, coordinating interven-
tions and leading to the design of 
an integrated programme with 
different roles for the different ac-
tors. 
A sequence of interven-
tions will be defined on the basis 
of the THCs. In circumstances 
where the trade-related environ-
ment is inadequate, or it has a dis-
tinct bias against exports, the pri-
mary thrust of the intervention 
should be to assist the government 
directly. Where, however, a dy-
namic private sector is already op-
erating within a liberal and sup-
portive trade environment, no 
such intervention is normally nec-
essary or desirable, and donor sup-
port for this should be phased out. 
In circumstances where the situa-
tion is somewhere between the 
two above-mentioned scenarios, 
multifaceted intervention will be 
necessary. In such cases, govern-
ments can be targeted, and institu-
tions and service providers 
Hangar facilities for a company that exports 
cashew nuts from Mozambique 
Trade development support must be integrate 
in nature, and have a private sector focus 
strengthened. Sector chains ('fil-
ières') can be supported and enter-
prises can be given incentives to 
access skills and create networks. 
Such a focus means that 
development assistance - whether 
to governments, institutions and 
service providers, or the enterpris-
es themselves - should support the 
creation of a truly competitive, 
transparent and equitable playing 
field for the private sector. This 
should activate the market for ser-
vices by providing temporary and 
demand-driven support. Participa-
tion and commitment through 
cost-sharing instruments should be 
ensured. 
Trade development and 
the EC 
Community trade develop-
ment support activities must be in 
line with the objectives of the EC's 
overall development policy. In this 
context, trade development pri-
marily serves the objective of 
smooth and gradual integration 
into the world economy. Commu-
nity trade development support 
does not blindly foster growth by 
enhancing competitiveness, but 
ensures that such growth is sup-
portive of the broader objective of 
sustainable and socially equitable 
development. 
This implies a commitment 
to supporting sound macro-eco-
nomic policies, the establishment 
of social and environmental safe-
guards through a fair regulatory 
framework, participation of all 
major stakeholders and appropri-
ate impact assessments during pro-
gramme design and implementa-
fl 
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New trade development strategy in action 
The AII-ACP Export Business Assist Scheme (EBAS) 
Cost sharing schemes are presently regarded as one of the 
more effective instruments for catalysing exports from de-
veloping countries' private sectors. They are based on the 
principle of activating the market for skilled support ser-
vices that will enable firms to enhance their competitive po-
sitions. In essence, all the firm wishing to obtain a grant has 
to do is draw up a simple plan, describing where it is today, 
and the direction it intends to move over the coming few 
years, to enhance its competitive position. If the plan is fea-
sible, the enterprise can be reimbursed for 50% of the cost 
incurred in accessing the specialised services needed to 
achieve the plan's objectives. 
The advantages of such schemes are that they are directly 
linked to enterprises and associations and are driven by the 
needs and demands of the companies in question. Further-
more, they avoid public sector administrative rigidities and 
are relatively simple to operate. 
The Export Business-Assist Scheme (EBAS) Scheme will be a 
more developmental form of cost-sharing system which has 
been designed to be available to all ACP States under Arti-
cle 138 of the Lomé Convention. The scheme, just approved 
by the EDF Committee, has been specifically designed to ac-
commodate the differentiation that exists amongst ACP 
States. 
Objectives 
The scheme has a single overriding target: to expand re-
ceipts from exports and tourism. Specific objectives are the 
activation of a sustainable market for export and tourism-
related services, and ensuring that a larger share of the ser-
vices market goes to local service providers. 
The major purpose is, first, to encourage enterprises and 
groups to buy or rent external business development ser-
vices, as a way of improving their export competitiveness 
and second, to encourage local service providers to develop 
their supply of specialised skills. 
Three components 
The scheme will encourage an active market in business de-
velopment services with a three-pronged approach. 
The first component, which will be a major element of the 
EBAS Scheme, consists of providing firms with free 'hand-
holding' assistance on how to go about making the best 
possible use of business development services, in order to 
acquire the skills and information that will boost their re-
ceipts from exports and tourism. This provides a longer term 
and more comprehensive basis than that contained in the 
second component alone. The idea is to build confidence 
for entering what is, for many firms, the new and unknown 
activity of buying business development services. 
The second component is the core of the scheme. This in-
volves providing services related grants and is subdivided 
into two parts. The first is for the provision of services user 
grants to private enterprises, covering half the costs of 
using business development services, to increase competi-
tiveness. A broad range of services is covered, including 
marketing, production and general business strategy. Firms 
will be allocated grants on the basis of presentation of ac-
ceptable business plans.The second is the provision of 
grants to local suppliers of specialised services to encourage 
further an active local market in business development ser-
vices. In many cases, the lack of sufficiently sophisticated 
local services will require the import of skills. The intention 
is that this will be temporary and that local organisations 
wishing to build their capacity to supply such services to the 
local market will receive grants to cover half their develop-
ment costs. Within a specified period of time, the aim is 
that the increased demand for services will be increasingly 
matched by the development of a local response capacity 
on the supply side of this market - and that a sustainable 
market dynamic will be created. 
This component will also include a significant promotional 
campaign to ensure that ACP enterprises are aware of the 
existence of EBAS, understand how to use it, and know 
where they can access it. 
The third and final component provides a contingency back-
up should the private sectors of certain countries not be 
making effective use of EBAS. In most cases, this will be be-
cause of an anti-export bias in the economic environment 
surrounding the private sector. Lack of EBAS activity or con-
tinual failure of business plan applications associated with 
particular countries will trigger an opportunity for Trade 
Health Checks (THCs). As part of the overall scheme, these 
will be provided to the governments of the countries con-
cerned on request. 
The THCs will assist governments in identifying the prob-
lems facing the exporting private sector and in taking ap-
propriate corrective action. They will be in the form of 
'needs analyses' but will be targeted directly at the prob-
lems of the private sector - so that, within a reasonable 
time frame, local private enterprise will be able to make ef-
fective use of the opportunities offered by the EBAS 
Scheme. 
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tion. The Community should fur-
thermore ensure that support to 
the trade related elements of 
structural adjustment programmes 
are coherent with the principles of 
the social market economy. 
A strategy for trade devel-
opment also has to take account 
of the Community's comparative 
advantages in this area. Because of 
its special relationship with the 
ACPs, and its position as major 
market and major donor, it should 
be prepared to take a leading role. 
Consequently, it should have an 
open approach to trade develop-
ment support and, as a matter of 
principle, be prepared to support, 
in each ACP country, all the inte-
grated and private sector-oriented 
activities which might be necessary 
to enhance ACP trade. 
It should also assume re-
sponsibility for the identification, 
design and coordination of inte-
grated trade development pro-
grammes, developed through part-
nership dialogue. 
While maintaining a gen-
eral flexibility, there are obviously 
areas which will fall more 'natural-
ly' within the Community's remit 
because of its unique experience. 
In particular, the Community has 
the greatest practical experience in 
regional integration. It should 
therefore assume particular re-
sponsibility for supporting region-
al economic integration, and trade 
liberalisation initiatives. MM P.V.D. 
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new millennium 
by Manuel Lopez Blanco* 
Eighteen months before the expiry of Lomé IV on February 29 2000, 
ACP and EU states will start negotiations to define a new relation-
ship. This will involve a major overhaul of their cooperation system 
and particularly of trade arrangements. Gearing up for these talks, 
the European Commission has launched a wide debate starting with 
the publication of the 'Green Paper' last autumn. The author of this 
article, who is one of the Commission's specialists, describes the im-
plications for ACP nations of the rapidly changing global trends. He 
takes stock of past trade achievements of the ACPs and the chal-
lenges and constraints ahead as they seek further integration into 
the international economy. 
Globalisation is 
rapidly transforming the 
world economy. The phe-
nomenon results from technologi-
cal advances that reduce interna-
tional transaction costs and from 
rapid liberalisation of internation-
al exchanges of goods, services, 
and capital. At the same time, ac-
cess to international markets is be-
coming more complex and depen-
dent on other trade-related issues. 
In the market access equation, tar-
iff levels are lessening in impor-
tance and other factors such as 
competition policies, standards, 
subsidies, anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing policies, environmental 
and social regulations, intellectual 
property laws, and investment 
codes, are increasingly coming to 
the fore as major determinants of 
market access. Despite the consid-
erable success of multilateral liber-
alisation in the wake of the 
Uruguay Round agreement, many 
of these trade-related areas are 
still insufficiently regulated by the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
This could give rise to discriminato-
ry action by multinational corpora-
tions and trading nations, impair-
ing access to international 
markets. 
Globalism ν regionalism 
The Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
* Head of EC Commission Unit VIII.D.2 (West 
Africa II). The author is a member of the Euro-
pean Commission's reflection group on the 
'Green Paper' with special responsibility for the 
trade and economic chapter. 
Trade (GATT), the forerunner to 
the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), has not slowed the interest 
in regionalism which gathered 
pace in the late 1980s. Trading na-
tions, industrial and developing 
alike, fuelled by their desire for 
freer and fairer trade and for more 
certainty and harmonisation in the 
new trade-related areas, are, it 
seems, looking beyond the 
achievements of the Uruguay 
Round to a more limited geo-
graphical sphere. 
A distinctive feature of this 
renewed interest in regionalism is 
that North-South trading arrange-
ments, involving both developed 
and developing economies, are 
now viewed as bringing for both 
parties in many areas so-called 
'non-traditional' benefits (of a 
trade, economic and political na-
ture), on top of direct trade cre-
ation. 
The added benefits include 
enhanced security of market access 
and increased policy credibility for 
the less developed countries (LDCs) 
that are involved. The arrange-
ments offer higher investment; 
both domestic and foreign, in-
creased competition, better re-
source allocation, fuller use of 
economies of scale, improved ac-
cess to technology and an insur-
ance about future policy develop-
ments in trade-related areas. 
Furthermore, North-South regional 
integration, by providing an exter-
nal anchor - or, in economists' jar-
gon, 'agency of restraint' - enables 
less developed countries to lock in 
economic policy reforms and make 
credible signals to economic 
agents, both domestic and foreign, 
about their commitment to reform 
and to a private sector environ-
ment. This is because of the impor-
tance of sanctions in the event of 
policy reversal. 
Multilateral liberalisation 
and the growing move towards re-
gionalism change the economic 
playing field for the less developed 
countries. Those that have tradi-
tionally benefited from non-recip-
rocal preferential treatment under 
the GSP or other preferential 
regimes like Lomé, are seeing a 
gradual erosion of trade prefer-
ences. 
Meanwhile, LDCs excluded 
from regional blocs, (as is the case 
for the Caribbean and some of 
their Latin American neighbours 
vis-à-vis NAFTA), are likely to face 
losses due to trade and investment 
diversion, and higher tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to market access 
in regional bloc markets. 
In a nutshell, there are de-
velopments on the international 
scene at two levels. Multilaterally, 
trading nations are pushing ahead 
with an agenda within the WTO, 
whereas regionally, three major 
trading blocs seem to be emerging 
and consolidating - around the 
USA, the EU and the Asia-Pacific 
region. Clustering around these 
groups meanwhile, are the region-
al schemes of other developing 
countries. Such schemes are prolif-
erating, leading to the creation of 
viable economic spaces seeking 
'hooks' and 'anchors' with the 
major blocs to secure market ac-
cess and insure against adverse 
trade policy developments. 
For LDCs, increased inte-
gration towards a global economy, 
either down the multilateral or 
unilateral road, can yield poten-
tially high rates of economic 
growth, if accompanied by sound 
internal policies. This is because a 
definite empirical association is 
proven between openness, inte-
gration (speed and level) and 
growth. On the whole, less devel-
oped countries have actively par-
ticipated in globalisation of the in-
ternational economy and have 
experienced high growth rates en-
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gap with more mature industrial 
economies. 
However, there are 
marked differences in this good 
overall performance. Countries 
presently more fully integrated 
into the world economy, show 
higher rates of growth. Converse-
ly, many less developed nations 
(notably ACPs), have experienced 
both low growth and further mar-
ginalisation in the global econo-
my. 
LDCs that lag in the 
growth and integration stakes 
need to reverse the negative 
trends and have to make difficult 
decisions about how much and at 
what pace they should liberalise. 
In particular, they must choose the 
best strategy of integration into 
the world economy; the multilater-
al or unilateral way? Alternatively, 
should they engage in regionalism 
and if so, should they opt for 
South-South and/or North-South 
links? Or, would a combination of 
these options be more preferable? 
And what about the ACP group in 
particular? 
ACPs and the global 
economy 
Over successive Lomé Con-
ventions, ACP nations have failed 
to increase, or even maintain, their 
share of the EU market, while less 
preferred exporters have been 
able to raise theirs. The European 
market remains relatively impor-
tant for the ACP countries. Be-
tween 1990 and 1992, the latter 
depended on the EU for an aver-
age of 41% of their export earn-
ings. Trade dependency on the EU 
varies among ACP regions, being 
higher for Africa (46%) than for 
the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(18% and 23%, respectively). By 
comparison with the group of less 
developed countries as a whole, 
the ACPs trade performance over 
the last decade has been modest . 
Between 1986 and 1992, ACP ex-
ports to the world rose at just 
5.7% as compared with 13% for 
the LDCs taken together. 
Another worrying trade 
trend is that the ACPs have not 
managed to diversify their exports 
significantly and most still depend 
on a few primary products. Their 
ten top products accounted for no 
less than 61% of total exports to 
the EU between 1988-92. Com-
pared with other LDCs' perfor-
mance in manufacturing and pro-
cessing, the ACPs are also clearly 
trailing. 
Between 1988-1993, they 
registered negative growth rates 
in trade for such products, while 
other LDC exports grew by almost 
9% (taken from 'Europe's Pre-
ferred Partners', ODI 1995 report). 
From the mid-1980s to the 
early 1990s, Foreign Domestic In-
vestment (FDI) to African ACP 
countries doubled in percentage 
terms reaching 1.18% of GDP. 
However, Africa's share of all FDI 
to the LDCs (excluding China) 
dropped from 6% to 4%. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that most 
foreign investment destined for 
Africa goes to the oil-producing 
countries led by Nigeria - which 
absorbed 44% of all FDI to the 
continent between 1991 and 1993. 
Caribbean countries and some Pa-
cific ones managed to attract sig-
nificantly more FDI at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. 
When measured against 
the World Bank's set of integra-
tion indicators (Global Economic 
Prospects, 1996), as far as the ACP 
group is concerned, sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) appears marginalised. 
This poor integration performance 
is reflected in the low income lev-
els, worsening poverty and poor 
growth performance of SSA coun-
tries during the last decade. 
Over the period 1971 to 
1991, SSA achieved GDP growth 
rates below the average for all the 
less developed countries (3.4% as 
against 5.2%). More recently, be-
tween 1991-1994, their relative 
performance deteriorated further. 
Allowing for population increases, 
the performance was particularly 
dismal. Between 1974 and 1990, 
SSA recorded annual GDP growth 
Clothing factory in the Philippines. 
Compared with the performance of other less-de-
veloped countries, the ACPs are clearly trailing 
per capita of -0.7 %. By contrast, 
the figure for the world as a whole 
was 1.2%. 
Lomé trade preferences 
Three key principles under-
pin Lomé trade preferences; stabil-
ity , 'contractuality' and non-reci-
procity. The last-mentioned is 
linked with a non-discrimination 
clause which states that ACP coun-
tries should not offer better treat-
ment to exports from other devel-
oped countries than those granted 
to the EU. Stability and contractu-
ality are essential elements of 
Lomé trade preferences, since they 
provide a degree of security for ac-
cess of ACP exports to the EU mar-
ket. This is unmatched by any 
other existing non-reciprocal pref-
erential arrangements (such as the 
GSP schemes). For economic opera-
tors, this takes away some of the 
risk involved in investing in export-
oriented activities. 
Lomé trade preferences 
continue to be of great value to 
ACPs. In addition to complete 
duty-free access for manufactured 
and processed exports, and the ex-
emption of the preferences grant-
ed on textiles and clothing from 
MFA disciplines, many ACP coun-
tries have benefited from the gen-
erous prices and guaranteed access 
for specific quantities of products 
under the Lomé Commodity Proto-
cols (bananas, sugar, beef and 
veal, and rum). 
However, the value of the 
preferences has been eroded over 
time by multilateral liberalisation, 
by the pre-EU membership 
arrangements with the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, and 
by the surge in EU-centered re-
gional trade arrangements (in par-
ticular the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements, and other preferen-
tial arrangements in the pipeline 
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with Latin-American countries). 
Various studies and evaluations 
also cast doubt on the contribu-
tion of Lomé preferences to 
achieving their primary goals -
growth and diversification of ex-
ports. What stands out is the dete-
rioration of ACP countries' export 
performance and of their capacity 
to attract FDI over the period they 
have enjoyed these preferences. 
The impact of the Lomé 
preferences is not all negative. 
There are individual success stories 
of export growth and diversifica-
tion. Several areas of export, that 
have enjoyed relatively large pref-
erential margins in terms of tariffs 
and quota exemptions, have ex-
panded. And a few countries -
that have made the fullest use of 
the preferences - have attracted 
significant amounts of FDI. Mauri-
tius, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Ja-
maica, and Zimbabwe, are among 
those in this category that have 
gained, either through direct ben-
efits under the protocols, or by di-
versifying. 
No single reason explains 
the poor overall export and 
growth performance of the ACP 
countries. Political instability, poor 
resource endowments, lack of in-
frastructure, weak entrepreneur-
ship, scarce physical and human 
capital, low levels of savings and 
investment, and undeveloped fi-
nancial sectors have all limited, on 
the supply side, the benefits that 
could be derived from preferences. 
Added to these are high depen-
dency on a few basic commodities 
subject to major price fluctuations, 
and a substantial deterioration in 
the terms of trade. 
On top of these common-
place, but relevant explanations, it 
is widely believed that sound poli-
cies play a major role in influenc-
ing exports and growth. Macro-
economic stability, realistic and 
stable exchange rates, good insti-
tutions and good governance, effi-
cient resource allocation policies 
and, in particular, stable and credi-
ble import and tax regimes which 
allow transparent transmission of 
world price signals to domestic 
producers, are significant determi-
nants of competitiveness and ex-
port performance. 
As a group, the ACPs, and 
many SSA countries, in particular, 
have failed to fulfil the precondi-
tions for achieving export-led 
growth. With poor initial resource 
endowments, they have also failed 
in the past to adopt the right poli-
cy mix. Implementation has been 
lax and they have frequently re-
versed policies. Consequently, SSA 
countries' economic policies, and 
eventual policy reforms, suffer 
from very low credibility in the 
eyes of domestic and foreign in-
vestors. This situation undermines 
and blunts not only the supply re-
sponse to trade preferences, but 
also any future policy reform. 
A more direct threat to the 
preferences has come from the 
world trade body. The legal battles 
fought by the EU and the ACP, ini-
tially in the GATT following the 
setting up of the single market for 
bananas, prompted the European 
Community in 1994 to seek a 
'waiver' for the Lomé Convention's 
entire trade package. This fol-
lowed the conclusions of a first 
panel - not adopted by the GATT 
Council - that the Lomé Conven-
tion was inconsistent with GATT 
rules due to its non-reciprocal na-
ture. This meant that it could not 
be considered as a Free Trade Area 
and it was also found to be dis-
criminatory vis-à-vis other LDCs -
and thus not covered by the en-
abling clause permitting GSP 
schemes. The principles underpin-
ning the Lomé trade preferences -
in particular that of non-reciproci-
ty now permitted by the waiver -
are undermined by the fact that 
this lasts only until the end of the 
present Convention. Also, like all 
other waivers, it must be renewed 
every year. To cap it all, the ba-
nana conflict has finally concluded 
with a definitive WTO ruling 
Swazi beef. 
A number of ACPs have benefited from generous 
prices and guaranteed access under the Lomé 
commodity protocols 
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against the EU relating to this spe-
cific system. 
Challenges, constraints, 
opportunities 
As they look ahead to the 
next century, the ACPs have to en-
sure optimal integration into a 
world economy which is undergo-
ing rapid change. Some of the 
trends and features of the new 
global situation, notably the need 
to comply with stricter GATT rules, 
make the simple continuation of 
traditional non-reciprocal prefer-
ences an unlikely option. Other 
options, such as multilateral and 
regional liberalisation, will result 
in the gradual erosion of the value 
of the preferences. EU-centered re-
gionalism leads to a further weak-
ening of the beneficial impact of 
the preferences as other EU part-
ners are offered more stable and 
secure trade and investment deals. 
This creates a potential for trade 
and investment diversion to the 
detriment of the ACPs. 
Furthermore, the burgeon-
ing of international and national 
regulations implemented by the 
EU, as well as other major trading 
nations, on new issues like the en-
vironment, social standards, com-
petition policy, and technical and 
health standards, impose new 
obligations on all developing 
countries including the ACPs. 
These could well develop into new 
non-tariff barriers and obstacles to 
trade. Such obstacles, likely to in-
crease in importance in the short 
and medium term, are becoming 
more relevant as the ACPs attempt 
to diversify their exports, and they 
are wholly outside the scope of 
Lome's traditional preferential 
package. Thus, the latter appears 
increasingly irrelevant to the inte-
gration needs of the ACP group. 
Régionalisation, driven by 
other major developed economies, 
is pulling apart the various ACP re-
gions, in particular, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific which are not such 
'natural' trading partners of the 
EU. On the one hand, they are 
confronted by the erosion of tradi-
tional, non-reciprocal, preferences. 
On the other, they have to make 
difficult choices between compet-
ing integration strategies in order 
to preserve, consolidate or estab-
lish trade positions in respect of 
emerging trade blocs. 
The new EU-ACP trade 
arrangement after the year 2000 
should be assessed according to its 
ability to meet the challenges, con-
straints and problems the ACP 
countries have to confront in the 
new world context. It should com-
ply with GATT rules to provide the 
necessary security and stability in 
the trade regime. It should also 
preserve the current level of mar-
ket access, taking account of the 
differentiation of ACP countries in 
terms of their level of integration 
into the global economy, their 
level of development and their pri-
orities. And it should secure, as far 
as possible, in compliance with the 
WTO, the benefits provided by the 
commodity protocols. The new sys-
tem needs to offset the impact of 
preference erosion as well as the 
trade and investment diversion ef-
fects resulting from multilateral 
liberalisation and EU-led regional-
ism. It should provide an interna-
tional anchor of enhanced credibil-
ity, certainty and stability for the 
trading and regulatory framework 
of the ACP countries, as a precon-
dition to achieve better export 
performance and attract FDI - and, 
ultimately, obtain higher growth 
rates. It should actively promote 
and facilitate the success of re-
gional integration among 'natural' 
ACP partners, as well as help ACP 
countries to insure against the pro-
liferation of national and interna-
tional regulations, in new trade-re-
lated areas, which may give rise to 
additional obstacles to market ac-
cess. Different ACP regions must 
also be allowed to join different -
even overlapping - trading 
arrangements if they are more 
convenient to their development 
needs and geographical location, 
providing a counterweight to the 
pull they would experience from 
new regional blocs. 
Turning the page 
The Commission's Green 
Paper lays down a series of options 
for a future trade regime between 
the EU and the ACP countries. It 
considers possible integration 
strategies (status quo, unilateral 
liberalisation, multilateralism, 
South-South and North-South re-
gional integration) and assesses 
how well each of these would 
meet the challenges, constraints, 
and problems that the ACP group 
faces at the eve of the 21st centu-
ry. However, it does not state a 
preferred option. 
This article was written 
prior to the Commission's decision 
on a negotiating mandate for sub-
mission to the Council and the Eu-
ropean Parliament. But from the 
debate on the Green Paper trade 
options, the general conclusion 
one can draw at this stage is that, 
faced with the challenges, risks 
and opportunities of globalisation, 
both partners should be attempt-
ing to formulate a more proactive 
trade arrangement. This implies in-
tegrating a wider spread of trade, 
trade facilitation and FDI consider-
ations, beyond simple tariff con-
cessions, thus enabling ACP coun-
tries to formulate sound 
integration strategies, adapted to 
their level of development, geo-
graphical location and trade pat-
terns. 
Three themes have re-
curred in the debates. The first is 
the need to secure full compliance 
with the WTO rules. The second is 
to take account of the diverse na-
ture of ACP countries - which en-
tails assessing the need and conve-
nience of keeping non-reciprocal 
preferential treatment for the 
Least Developed Countries (both 
ACP and non-ACP), graduating 
other less (but not least) devel-
oped ACP countries into the GSP, 
and bringing the more developed 
ACPs into reciprocal arrangements. 
It also means enhancing the credi-
bility of ACP countries' economic 
reforms as a precondition for 
achieving higher levels of invest-
ment (foreign and domestic), and 
hence a stronger supply response. 
Last but not least, a reasonable 
transition period is needed to 
switch from the present trade 
regime to a new one. MM M.LB. 
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by Dr. Christopher Stevens 
When Lomé I was signed in 1975, the Convention stood apart from 
Europe's links with other developing countries, not least because of 
its innovative trade relationship based on extensive preferences. 
These have since been whittled away by the proliferation of EU 
trade agreements around the globe and developments in the WTO. 
Increasingly, they are being seen as an anomaly. The author of this 
article, who is Fellow of the Institute of Development Studies at 
Sussex University in the UK, considers what can be done to restore 
the uniqueness. 
Lome's faults are 
i evident enough: It is dis-
| criminatory, which is the 
I source of its problems in 
! the WTO; it excludes some 
I very poor states and in-
I eludes some middle-income 
I ones, and it has demonstra-
bly failed to result in ACP 
trade growth and diversification. 
How can it be changed in a way 
that removes these deficiencies 
but does not simply 'throw out the 
baby with the bath water'? The 
main problem with moving be-
yond Lomé to a more coherent, 
poverty-focused European trade 
system, is that there is nothing in 
the EU's extensive arsenal of ac-
cords that offers an adequate al-
ternative. 
The replacement of Lomé 
could represent a move forward, 
but it could also be a retrograde 
step. The creation of a new type of 
regime, melding the desirable fea-
tures of the current Convention 
into a more coherent universal 
framework, would be a plus. But 
the replacement of today's Con-
vention with one of the inferior 
off-the-peg existing systems, 
would be a minus. 
Lome's place 
in EU trade policy 
Lomé is now only one ele-
ment of the EU's wider trade poli-
cy system. This system provides dif-
ferent degrees of preference to 
various groups of countries, devel-
oped and developing. The depth 
and breadth of these preferences 
are not necessarily related to any 
objective criteria, such as the recip-
ient country's level of develop-
ment. 
There are at least five 
bands in the EU's trade policy hier-
archy (or more, if the Europe 
Agreements are considered as a 
separate category). In addition to 
Lomé, these are the EU's bilateral 
agreements with over 30 states, 
the 'superior' layer of the Gener-
alised System of Preferences (the 
'Super' GSP), the standard GSP 
and, the bottom tier - Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) terms. 
Since the first three have much in 
common and are distinguishable 
as a broader grouping from the 
bottom two, it is helpful to think 
of the EU's trade policy as defining 
three groups of states. Each is of 
roughly equal importance in trade 
terms since each accounted for 
about a third of European imports 
in 1995. 
First, most favourable ac-
cess is available to the 121 devel-
oped, developing and transition 
states in the three top bands of 
the hierarchy. Next come the 
newly industrialised, middle-in-
come and poor countries that ben-
efit only from the standard GSP. 
They number some 54. At the 
base, with the least favourable ac-
cess, are the five industrialised 
states that receive the somewhat 
misnamed 'most-favoured-nation' 
treatment by virtue of their WTO 
membership. Also in this group are 
states not in the WTO, but to 
which the EU autonomously offers 
MFN access. 
Why have ACP trade 
preferences failed? 
Lomé I claimed to herald a 
New International Economic 
Order, yet the subsequent eco-
nomic performance of the ACPs 
has been dismal. Although their 
economic performance without 
Lomé might have been even 
worse, it is important to identify 
what has gone wrong and how 
things can be improved. 
The trend in EU-ACP trade 
starkly illustrates the extent of the 
decline and its implications for a 
relationship billed when it was ne-
gotiated as a 'partnership' of mu-
tual interest. In 1976, the ACPs 
were the second most important 
source of EU imports from five 
broadly defined developing coun-
try 'regions' - providing over 6% 
of the total. At that time, they 
were second only to the Mediter-
ranean and well above Latin 
America, East and South-East Asia 
and South Asia. The 1995 figures 
reveal a glaring contrast. By then, 
the ACPs were the second least im-
portant source of EU imports from 
these country groups - and the 
only one with a declining share. 
Not only had imports from East 
and South-East Asia soared ahead, 
as might be expected, but the ACP 
had also fallen behind Latin Amer-
ica, seen their share decline fur-
ther relative to the Mediterranean, 
and witnessed South Asia emerg-
ing as a much closer competitor. 
Unfortunately, the two 
common explanations for this poor 
record are only partly correct and 
the more fundamental causes will 
take longer to overcome. One ex-
planation is that the preferences 
themselves have had a malign in-
fluence, accounting for the ACPs' 
loss of market share - whilst the 
East Asian and ASEAN states, with 
modest preferences, have in-
creased theirs. There may be some-
thing to this argument - especially 
in relation to the commodity pro-
tocols, that have made traditional 
exports to Europe much more at-
tractive than they would be other-
wise - but it is important to re-
member that the ACPs are not the 
only 'preferred' group, and East 
Asia/ASEAN are not the only less 
'preferred' group. 
A comparison of the 
Mediterranean, which has high 
preferences and 'low preference' 
South Asia and Latin America, sug-
gests that the existence of a so 
called 'inverse relationship' is not 
so clear. The problem with an 
analysis which concentrates just on 
the EU's most and least successful 
trade partners, (East Asia/ASEAN 
and the ACP respectively) is in dis-
entangling market access from the 
domestic supply position, for 
which the two groups are almost 
polar opposites. 
Moreover, just because 
some ACP states have guaranteed 
high prices in Europe, it does not 
follow that their flaccid efforts to 
diversify are an automatic conse-
quence of preferences. Mauritius 
has based its impressive export 
growth on exploiting to the hilt 
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two of the most valuable Lomé 
preferences - on sugar and cloth-
ing. And Mauritius is not alone. 
Since preferences may be a disin-
centive, the first reaction should 
be to encourage more states to 
use them wisely, as Mauritius has 
done, rather than to erect new 
barriers. 
The second partial expla-
nation for trade decline is ACP 
economic mismanagement. This 
has undoubtedly exacerbated the 
problems of many states, some-
times in the extreme, and the cor-
rection of inappropriate policies 
and practice is a necessary condi-
tion for growth. But this in itself is 
not enough in those ACP states 
that do not possess particular nat-
ural or other resources that hap-
pen to be in great demand in the 
world, such as rare minerals. 
Europe's changed 
economy 
If ACP problems were just 
the result of economic policy er-
rors, then improved management 
might fundamentally alter the di-
rection of change, but in most 
states this is not the case. The 
deep-seated element of the trade 
problem is that the nature of the 
European economy has changed, 
and will continue to change, in 
ways that affect its relative de-
mand for the types of goods that 
the ACP can currently produce. 
Other OECD countries are under-
going similar change with the re-
sult that the foreign exchange 
earnings of ACP states are falling 
and, hence, their capacity to im-
port. 
The structure of Europe's 
merchandise trade and its relation-
ship to economic growth is alter-
ing, with the result that there has 
been a decline in the relative im-
portance of primary product im-
ports and an increase in imports of 
manufactured goods. The decline 
in the value of primary trade re-
flects and, in turn, influences the 
drastic fall in world prices for most 
of the ACPs' primary exports over 
the last 15 years. When Lomé I was 
signed, primary products account-
ed for roughly 50% of EU non-oil 
imports. By 1995, this had fallen to 
just one-third of the total, while 
manufactured items accounted for 
two-thirds. 
For the ACPs, the effect is 
more acute because of their con-
tinued heavy dependence on pri-
mary products in comparison with 
other developing countries. 
Whereas 'primaries' have fallen 
from over 60% to under 40% of 
EU imports from all developing 
countries over the period 1976-95, 
in the case of the ACPs, they have 
declined only marginally and are 
still around two-thirds. 
Would regional 
integration help? 
The ACPs need to diversify 
both their range of exports and 
their markets, so that traditional 
goods are sold to countries where 
demand may be growing more 
rapidly than in Europe. Increased 
trade between African states and 
the Caribbean and its neighbours, 
may serve both purposes. It is im-
portant to erode the barriers that 
might exist to such trade - such as 
lack of infrastructure, poor infor-
mation, and tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. 
The need to foster greater 
integration within ACP sub-regions 
has been sucked into the broader 
debate on the compatibility of the 
present Convention with the WTO 
rules. How great a problem is this? 
The answer is that it is serious, not 
just because of the structure of 
Lomé but, more importantly, be-
cause few elements of EU trade 
policy sit wholly comfortably with-
in the existing WTO approach. 
One WTO path that ap-
pears to provide a solution are the 
provisions covering Free Trade 
Areas (FTAs). Might not the cre-
ation of a set of FTAs, perhaps be-
tween the EU and ACP sub-re-
gions, serve the triple objective of 
overcoming WTO objections, en-
couraging regional integration 
and also dealing with economic 
mismanagement by prodding ACP 
states towards trade liberalisation? 
Unfortunately, there are question 
marks over all three of these aims. 
Presently WTO rules on FTAs are 
vague. Although they contain cer-
tain objective criteria, such as the 
proportion of trade to be covered 
and the implementation period, 
these are couched in rather gener-
al terms. Exemptions under Article 
XXIV of the WTO accord need 
unanimous support by other WTO 
members. It is far from clear that 
any 'FTA' between the EU and an 
ACP state would obtain such an 
exemption, since it will fall short 
of fundamental economic integra-
tion. The reaction of the WTO to 
the EU-South Africa FTA, currently 
being negotiated, will be a useful 
'straw in the wind', if it is eventu-
ally concluded. 
Actions to foster intra-ACP 
trade are not alternatives to devel-
oping exports with Europe and the 
rest of the world; they are addi-
tional. Lomé already provides op-
portunities to support intra-ACP 
trade, and the logical next step is 
to extend these to cover trade 
with non-ACP neighbours. As for 
contributing to ACP trade liberali-
sation, the FTA method of advanc-
ing can be described as 'crabwise'. 
The direct way to gain the benefits 
that supporters of liberal trade an-
ticipate from improved market ac-
cess, is for MFN tariffs to be cut 
under WTO auspices. Tariff cuts 
which apply to just one trade part-
ner, the EU, could have undesir-
able economic effects. 
A better approach 
An alternative, that would 
represent a step towards a univer-
sal system justifiable under the 
WTO, while retaining low EU tar-
iffs and contractuality for the 
ACPs, is to extend Lomé treatment 
to other developing countries as 
soon as this is politically feasible 
for Europe. Since differences be-
tween the top three bands in the 
hierarchy are small, this may not 
be too difficult to achieve. As a 
transitional step, an umbrella 
arrangement, available to all de-
veloping states, could be created. 
Initially, the precise details of each 
state's trade relationship with the 
EU would be subject to individual 
and regional negotiation, with the 
proviso that no ACP state would 
be worse off than at present. 
Although Lome's 'exten-
sion' to other developing countries 
would erode the protocols, their 
value will be undermined anyway 
by the fundamental reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy that 
should be in place by 2010. A tran-
sitional regime for the first decade 
of the new century will protect 
ACP preferences until European 
liberalisation has made them obso-
lete at the same time giving WTO 
members the assurance that the 
present system is being trans-
formed into something that is 
both more coherent and li-
beral. ■■ cs. 
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preference - a Pacific perspective 
by Dr Roman Grynberg* 
Trade preference, as a concept, has been much maligned of late. 
Broad-based economic studies have largely demonstrated that it has 
not had a significant impact in stimulating economic growth, diversi-
fication and development among the beneficiaries. The problem 
with such studies, based on aggregated international data, is that 
they cannot pick up the effects of trade preferences. This does not 
mean that such effects do not exist, but simply that they are not per-
ceptible at this level, given the tools and data employed. If the ap-
propriate tools are used, the benefits are clearly seen at the micro-
economic level. 
In the Pacific, pref-
I erences have played a vital 
I role in developing interna-
I tional trade in countries 
I that either have an abun-
I dant natural resource, such 
as Solomon Islands with its 
canned tuna, or have achieved a 
sufficiently high level of economic 
development to make some indus-
trial diversification possible. Fiji is 
an example of the latter (together 
with Mauritius in the Indian Ocean 
where preferences have provided 
the foundation for the country's 
economic transformation). 
The counter-argument, so 
frequently heard, is that trade 
preference has permitted the de-
velopment and perpetuation of in-
efficient industries, and that its 
eventual elimination will force 
these to confront the economic re-
alities of a liberalised trading envi-
ronment. There can be little doubt 
that the system has created distor-
tions in the operation of several 
key export sectors in the Pacific 
ACP states. But, to a considerable 
extent, these distortions have oc-
curred because of the way the 
preferences have been applied, 
notably in respect of rules of ori-
gin. And few would dispute that 
trade preference has also been a 
'midwife', assisting in the birth of 
new export industries as well as 
helping to stabilise the position of 
existing ones. Pacific ACPs do not 
have many export success stories 
but one should mention here the 
electrical harnesses made in 
Samoa, the tuna canning opera-
tion in the Solomons, and the 
tuna, sugar and garment sectors in 
Fiji (Fiji's garment industry de-
pends mainly on trade preferences 
into the Australian and New 
Zealand markets under a non-reci-
procal trade agreement). Some-
thing which may be almost as sig-
nificant are the advantages 
Pacific exports to the EU 
Country 
Papua New Guinea' 
Solomon Islands
2 
Fiji' 
Vanuatu
2 
Tonga
2 
Samoa
2 
% of total 
exports 
16.4 
20.5 
25.6 
50.6 
2.4 
16.4 
* Multilateral Trade Adviser, Pacific Forum 
Secretariat. The views expressed are the au-
thor's and not those of the Forum Secretariat 
or any of its member states. 
Source: Australian National University: 
South Pacific Regional Economic Database. 
' 1990-94 average. 
1 1990-92 average. 
granted to tropical tree crops such 
as cocoa and coffee. Nowadays, 
the margins of preference are very 
small but they have nonetheless 
enabled Pacific nations to over-
come the inherent - and largely in-
surmountable - cost disadvantages 
involved in exporting relatively 
small amounts from dispersed lo-
cations far removed from the main 
markets. 
In a sea of islands, located 
as far as one can conceivably be 
from Europe, trade preferences 
have been crucial, providing the 
basis for investment decisions in 
export market development. De-
spite its putative benefits, the EC's 
Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) - which applies to non-Lomé 
developing nations - has had rela-
tively little impact on investment 
decisions. This is largely because of 
its non-contractual nature and the 
resulting capacity of donors to re-
move access privileges by unilater-
al action. While Lomé has not 
been without fault in this regard, 
its quasi-contractual nature has 
provided potential investors with 
greater security of market access 
than is available under the GSP. 
For a region on the other 
side of the world, the EU remains 
an unexpectedly significant export 
destination (see table). This is 
largely due to trade preferences 
and the impact of Stabex arrange-
ments in the past. There is a sharp 
contrast when one looks at im-
ports from the EU, which are non-
preferential. Vanuatu has the 
highest dependence on imports 
from Europe and even here, the 
figures are modest (6% from 
France and a further 7% from New 
Caledonia in 1995). In all other Pa-
cific ACP states, imports from Eu-
rope account for less than 5% of 
the total. 
Trade preferences gener-
ate what economists call an 'eco-
nomic rent'. In seeking to exploit 
this, entrepreneurs set up indus-
tries, but also introduced market 
distortions. Inefficiencies have de-
veloped in some export industries 
which owe their existence to these 
preference-induced economic 
rents. There is little doubt that cer-
tain work practices in these sectors 
are well below the optimum that 
could be achieved if the prefer-
ences did not exist. 
However, in terms of trade 
preferences, Lome's net impact has 
been unambiguously positive. 
Take the example of sugar. In 
1975, Fiji received an annual quota 
for the EU market of 163,000 
tonnes. This sugar has been sold at 
the intervention price set by the 
EU under its own Common Agri-
cultural Policy - which in most 
years has been two or three times 
the world price. In 1995, this was 
supplemented by a further 40,000 
tonne quota of 'Special Preferen-
tial Sugar'. As a result, in 1995, Fiji 
received a net transfer from the 
EU of $110 million, or approxi-
mately 5% of GDP. For the aver-
age sugar farmer, the Protocol 
means a net addition to operating 
profit of about $20 per tonne of 
cane. 
As for tuna, the one natur-
al resource that Pacific ACPs have 
in relative abundance, the 24% 
margin of trade preference into 
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uct enabled the establishment of 
canning facilities in the Solomons 
and Fiji. The two canneries in ques-
tion now employ some 3,000 
workers, most of whom are 
women. These people would al-
most certainly join the ranks of the 
unemployed in the event of the 
loss or serious erosion of the exist-
ing preference. The men, who tra-
ditionally work on the pole and 
line vessels, would not lose their 
jobs because unprocessed tuna ex-
ports are not trade preference-de-
pendent. So women would be 
more seriously affected by the ero-
sion of Lome's trade advantages. 
It is widely accepted that 
whatever emerges from the forth-
coming renegotiation of Lomé, 
trade preferences will eventually 
cease to have any real commercial 
value. This is due to the lowering 
of MFN tariffs through successive 
WTO negotiating rounds, com-
pounded by the EU's own policy of 
expanding preferences to new as-
sociates. The Commission's Green 
Paper also explicitly recognises 
that the waiver granted by the 
WTO to the Lomé arrangements 
will expire in the year 2000. This 
prospect is already having an im-
pact, with investors less willing to 
make long-term investments based 
on a trade system that is likely to 
undergo radical revision in the 
next three years. The Lomé com-
modity protocols, which have been 
vital to Fiji, are also seriously un-
dermined by the recent WTO rul-
ing against the EU's banana 
regime. 
So the trade preference 
system clearly has a limited shelf 
life. This raises two fundamental 
questions. First, what does one do 
with industries such as sugar, gar-
ments and fish, that are founded, 
and remain dependent, on prefer-
ences? Second, and more awk-
wardly, how does one attract new 
investment to countries such as the 
Pacific ACPs that are so heavily dis-
advantaged by isolation and size? 
The more doctrinaire advocates of 
laissez-faire often argue that all 
one needs to do is create an envi-
ronment attractive to foreign in-
Textile production in the Pacific 
Trade preference has created some 
success stories 
vestment and the investors will 
come. But given the problems in 
achieving economies of scale, iso-
lation from the markets and the 
physical dispersion, there are good 
reasons for believing that serious 
private sector decisions to invest in 
the South Pacific will not occur 
without some counterbalancing 
advantage. Trade preferences 
played precisely this role, and in-
stead of being replaced by a more 
'market- friendly' source of advan-
tage, we are seeing a tidal wave of 
technical assistance, driven by lais-
sez-faire economics. 
For industries dependent 
on preferences, a two-pronged ap-
proach is suggested: first, to ex-
tend the current WTO waiver on a 
limited range of products that re-
quire trade preference for a period 
of ten years beyond the year 2000; 
and second, to develop simultane-
ously a sectoral reform programme 
for the industries in question. 
If globalisation is to be of 
any benefit to small island states 
(and least-developed countries), it 
will only come from direct private 
investment which enhances these 
countries' exporting capacity. 
Trade preference was aimed at 
providing this investment incentive 
- and did so with varying degrees 
of success. From an ACP perspec-
tive, it would be highly beneficial 
if the preferences could be pre-
served indefinitely. But such an op-
tion would involve using up a 
great deal of political capital to 
obtain an instrument whose future 
would inevitably remain in doubt. 
Another approach would be to 
find an alternative to trade prefer-
ences in the shape of a mechanism 
for stimulating private sector in-
vestment in least-developed and 
highly vulnerable countries. This 
would not be as complex and 
daunting as might first appear. In-
deed, the Lomé Convention al-
ready has some potentially excel-
lent 'investment preference' 
instruments. Facilities provided by 
the European Investment Bank 
dossier 
(EIB) could, if properly reformed, 
be the basis of a system of incen-
tives for EU and ACP investors to 
move into new projects that diver-
sify exports. 
The problem with the Con-
vention in this area is neither the 
EU's intention, nor the instruments 
per se, but rather the administra-
tion and delivery mechanism. The 
fact that the government's agree-
ment is needed to gain access to 
EIB risk capital funds means that, 
like so many other Lomé mecha-
nisms, it has become an instrument 
of state that is not readily and di-
rectly accessible to the private sec-
tor. 
The Green Paper makes 
play of the fact that government 
has grown bigger in ACP countries. 
But paradoxically, it does not 
recognise that the Lomé instru-
ments have encouraged govern-
ment Ownership' and very often 
subsidised it as well. Likewise, 
state-owned development finance 
institutions have had a 'mark-up' 
from managing EIB loans - rev-
enues which have assisted the 
growth of government. The bene-
fits of low interest loans with long 
pay-back periods - just the sort of 
help that investors need to under-
take high risk investments in ACPs 
- have been very limited. If trade 
preference is be replaced by an in-
strument that will ensure the de-
velopment and not the marginali-
sation of the ACPs, then the most 
obvious option is to give the pri-
vate sector direct access to low in-
terest loans and risk capital in the 
small quantities appropriate to the 
scale of the enterprises and coun-
tries in question. 
As the Green Paper has so 
emphatically and correctly argued, 
trade preference (or indeed 'in-
vestment preference') is no substi-
tute for sound and prudent eco-
nomic policy. However, the EU's 
analysis would be enhanced if it 
were willing to work with the 
ACPs to ensure genuine decentrali-
sation of EU cooperation and aid 
delivery. Direct access, which is in-
creasingly being urged by the pri-
vate sector and NGOs, needs to be 
given real meaning. MM R.G. 
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fl Trading fairly 
by Brid Bowen* 
'Fair Trade' products are increasingly being marketed in the EU de-
spite the competition from the lower-priced 'mainstream' trade. The 
author of this article, who works for the umbrella lobby, the Euro-
pean Fair Trade Association (EFTA - not to be confused with the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association), tells us about this alternative ap-
proach - which provides greater financial returns to developing 
country producers. 
A short history 
of fair trade 
A lot of consumers 
in Western nations recog-
nise that the world's wealth 
is distributed very unequal-
ly and that products are far 
too cheap to provide devel-
oping country producers 
with a decent living. They 
want to help change the 
situation, but don't know 
how to go about it. 
The 'fair trade' approach 
aims to alleviate poverty in the 
South by establishing a trading sys-
tem based on equal partnership 
and respect, allowing marginalised 
producers to gain access to North-
ern markets. Certain criteria are 
agreed by both sides. As a mini-
mum, the producers commit them-
selves to democratic functioning 
and decision-making procedures 
within their organisations. In re-
turn, fair trade bodies agree to 
provide direct access to the Euro-
pean market for their products -
avoiding middlemen and specula-
tors as far as possible. They pay a 
fair price for the goods: enough to 
cover the producers' basic needs 
and production costs with a mar-
gin for investment. 40%-50% of 
the price is paid in advance, and a 
long-term working relationship is 
created between the two sides. 
In addition to these basic 
elements, several other issues are 
usually agreed. For instance, the 
activity of the Southern partner 
should be economically, environ-
mentally and socially sustainable. 
It should provide acceptable work-
ing conditions and contribute to 
the development of the communi-
ty, creating jobs, where possible. 
The development of an export 
product must not jeopardise local 
* Advocacy and Campaigns Officer, EFTA, 7a 
rue E.Michiels, B-1180 Brussels. 
food security, and the processing 
should be done, as far as possible, 
in the South. 
The North's 'Alternative 
Trading Organisations' (ATOs) 
agree to provide regular feedback 
to producers on market trends, 
and health and safety regulations. 
They provide finance and training 
to build up the management ca-
pacity of the producer groups, and 
enable participation in campaigns 
to promote fair trade and create 
an international trade structure 
that benefits producers. The role 
of women in the decision-making 
process, both within the Southern 
producer group and the Northern 
fair trade organisations, is also em-
phasised. 
Who are the producers? 
These include federations 
of producers, cooperatives, work-
shops for the handicapped, state 
organisations, private companies, 
and increasingly, Northern groups 
producing goods in the context of 
the 'social' economy. Any group 
respecting the aforementioned cri-
teria is a potential partner of the 
fair trade movement. However, for 
a producer group to be accepted, 
it must be able to produce a mar-
ketable product, at a reasonable 
price, and in sufficient quantities. 
EFTA currently imports products 
from some 800 trading partners in 
45 different countries in the South 
- representing 800,000 producer 
families or approximately five mil-
lion people. 
Producers gain direct ac-
cess to the EU 'fair trade' market, 
often leading to subsequent sales 
in the mainstream market. They 
are guaranteed a fair price and de-
cide themselves how the extra pre-
mium they receive should be dis-
tributed in the best interests of 
I _ 
^^™ satlon was set up by Oxfam (UK) 
in 1964 and the first fair trade shop was 
established in the Netherlands in 1969. 
Fair trade importing organisations were 
subsequently set up in several European 
states and they now number approxi-
mately 70 in 16 countries. These buy 
products directly from Southern produc-
er partners and sell through fair trade 
shops, solidarity groups, mail order cata-
logues, organic shops, local markets and 
increasingly, institutional outlets (such 
as canteens, businesses and public au-
thority off ices). During the 1970s, fair 
trade shops began to spring up all over 
Europe, and they now number 3000 in 
18 countries. 
Until the mid-1980s, the movement was 
involved mostly in an alternative trade 
circuit. Thereafter, it began to exploit 
mainstream channels too - focusing on 
wholesaling to institutional outlets. 
1988 saw the establishment of the first 
fair trade label - Max Havelaar - in the 
Netherlands. Mainstream businesses 
which respect fair trade criteria and ac-
cept external monitoring by the la-
belling organisation are awarded a seal 
of approval and the products can then 
be sold through mainstream outlets. 
Other labels have since been established 
- Transfair International and the Fair 
Trade Foundation. Labelling organisa-
tions now exist in 12 European countries 
as well as in Canada, Japan and the 
United States. 
Taken together, the sector represents an 
important alternative market. In 1995, 
the retail sales value of ATOs reached 
S250 million - generating income op-
portunities for an estimated half million 
artisans and workers in the South. In Eu-
rope, fair trade products are now being 
soldat 70,000 outlets and the trade is 
growing at an average of 5% annually. 
In Spain, turnover doubled between 
1994 and 1996. France did almost as 
well over the same period while the 
market is expanding at 10% a year in 
Italy. In some countries, certain products 
have achieved impressive market pene-
tration. Thus, fair trade bananas now 
represent a stable 8% of the Dutch mar-
ket and 13% of sales in Switzerland. 
70% of the organic coffee sold in Aus-
tria comes from fair trade sources. 
their communities. Most producers 
only market part of their total pro-
duction under the fair trade 
arrangement, the rest being sold 
under the usual 'mainstream' con-
ditions. But payment of a fair price 
for even a small part of the total 
production can have an upward 
effect on prices. When ATOs buy 
up part of the production at a 
higher price, this reduces the avail-
A 
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dlemen who are forced to offer 
more. This phenomenon has been 
observed in honey production in 
Mexico, cocoa in Bolivia and tea in 
Zimbabwe. The fact that fair trade 
organisations pay part of the price 
in advance is also crucial for small-
scale producers - who can then 
buy inputs and perhaps get 
through the season without hav-
ing to go to the money lenders. 
Likewise, the stability offered by 
guaranteed payment - whether in 
advance or promptly on delivery -
is greatly valued. Many ATOs also 
offer producers training and assis-
tance. Another benefit is that pro-
ducers gain confidence to ap-
proach a trading system they once 
saw as too complicated. Coffee 
farmers in Tanzania, for example, 
now speak of international ex-
changes in London or New York 
with a real understanding of the 
impact these have on their lives. 
A fair price 
The fair trade price covers 
the cost of producing the item, in-
cluding social and environmental 
costs. It must provide producers 
with a decent standard of living 
and a margin for investment. In 
the case of primary commodities 
like coffee or cocoa, where the 
price is determined on internation-
al exchanges, the fair trade move-
ment pays the international price, 
plus an additional margin. 
Fair prices to producers 
need not always mean higher 
prices for consumers. Approxi-
mately half the prices for fair trade 
products are higher than the mar-
ket price, and half are lower. Many 
products are highly competitive. 
This is so for the recently launched 
'fair trade' labelled bananas sold 
in the Netherlands and Switzer-
land (see box). The absence of in-
termediaries in the distribution 
chain, and the invaluable contribu-
tion of the movement's volunteers, 
make this possible. Not all con-
sumers expect to pay a price which 
oes not guarantee a decent stan-
do* <f of living to the producers. Re-
ce. 11 surveys reveal that Europeans 
are becoming increasingly discern-
ing in their choices and are more 
willing to pay a higher price for a 
product reflecting criteria they be-
■ ■> ~- iJJSBftí, : «Tir-»- · -■ - - 1 .. fefeë! 
lieve to be important. For exam-
ple, in the UK, 86% of consumers 
in a survey said they were now 
aware of fair trade labelled prod-
ucts and 68% said they were will-
ing to pay more. The figures for 
Sweden were 84% and 64% re-
spectively. About two thirds of 
Dutch and Belgians also knew 
about fair trade labelling. 
2,500 products 
The Fair Trade Movement 
currently offers a choice of up to 
2,500 products, many of which are 
superior quality. These include 
chocolate with an extra high cocoa 
content, chocolate guaranteed 
free of genetically modified soya; 
coffee that competes with the 
highest quality coffees on main-
stream markets, an increasing 
range of organic products, and 
textiles printed with vegetable 
rather than chemical dyes. 
In the early years, handi-
crafts dominated fair trade almost 
exclusively. The range now in-
cludes jewellery, household items, 
toys, artworks and giftware, while 
clothing has recently been added 
to the list. Hand-crafted products 
are of immense practical and cul-
tural value, reflecting the diversity 
of available materials and the ex-
pertise of the producers. 
In 1973, coffee was intro-
duced for the first time and quick-
ly became one of the fair trade 
range's 'anchor' products. Tea, 
cocoa, chocolate, sugar, wine, fruit 
juices, nuts, spices, rice and other 
cereals followed. The most recent 
addition is 'fair trade' bananas (see 
box article). On average, food 
products represent 60% of fair 
trade retail turnover. Half of this 
figure comes from coffee sales. 
Prospects 
The expansion of fair trade 
is largely due to two complemen-
Coffee has become one of the fair trade range's 
'anchor' products 
tary developments: professionali-
sation and a strong European di-
mension. The building of produc-
tion and managerial capacity 
among Southern producers has led 
to a big improvement in the quali-
ty and choice of products on offer. 
Fair trade organisations in the 
North, meanwhile, have restruc-
tured to ensure greater efficiency 
in the use of their own resources. 
'World shops' are now found in 
many busy shopping centres, 
opening hours have increased and 
window design, packaging and 
management have all improved. 
Good use is made of the media 
and promotional events. 
EFTA was set up in 1990 in 
response to the growing centrali-
sation of decision-making and pro-
duction at a European level, and in 
recognition of the increasingly 
competitive retail market. It repre-
sents 12 importing organisations 
and 60% of European Fair Trade 
imports. The Network of European 
World Shops (NEWS) represents 
2,500 outlets in 16 national associ-
ations. In April 1997, the Interna-
tional Fair Trade Labelling Organi-
sation (FLO) was established. By 
capitalising on the specific advan-
tages of each member, these Euro-
pean networks reduce individual 
costs and hence increase competi-
tivity. 
A key aim of the move-
ment is to raise awareness of the 
degrading conditions under which 
international trade and production 
is carried out, and to campaign for 
an improvement. Mainstream busi-
ness - from the producer to the 
consumer - must recognise their 
responsibility for the economic, so-
cial and ecological effects of pro-
duction and trade. To ensure that 
the fair trade movement's own op-
erations comply with the proper 
the Courier n° 166 - november-december 1997 
fl dossier 
A quality label 
by Rita Oppenhuizen*  I
'After we sold our first cocoa under fair trade 
conditions, the local middlemen immediately 
raised their prices. For the first time, we farm-
ers were able to influence the prices of our cocoa'. 
(Safula, a Sierra Leone farmer) 
Developing country farmers who are able to sell their 
goods under Max Havelaar trading conditions all share a 
sense of pride. Fair trade gives them the feeling that they 
are actors in world trade. No longer are they dependent 
on the arbitrary prices paid by middlemen - a factor which 
is perhaps even more important than the guarantee of 
belter prices. 
The Max Havelaar Foundation was set up in the Nether-
lands in 1988 after a farmers' protest. Mexican coffee 
farmers told an international development agency that 
aid would no longer be needed if they could receive a fair 
price for their coffee beans. The Foundation developed a 
quality mark, in which all trading parties could participate, 
giving small farmers a wider market for their goods. Up 
until then, only specialist shops stocked 'alternative trade' 
goods. Under the new system, all traders, coffee roasters 
and supermarkets could participate - as long as they met 
the Max Havelaar conditions. Direct purchases were made 
from small farm organisations who benefited from higher 
guaranteed minimum prices, credit allowances and long-
term relations with their customers. Coffee farmers were 
able to make use of their expertise in cultivating good 
quality coffee which, by virtue of effective distribution, 
became available to all consumers. People are willing to 
pay a bit more in the knowledge that Third World produc-
ers are benefiting. 
Nine years into the programme, more than 250 coffee 
farming cooperatives now trade under Max Havelaar con-
ditions. They are based in 17 different countries including 
Tanzania, Congo (Brazzaville), Uganda, Cameroon, Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic (the others are in Central and 
South America). New products added to the quality mark 
include cocoa, honey and bananas. 
Fair trade labelling has improved the lives of many disad-
vantaged producers and their families. It has also con-
tributed to society-building - since fair trade bodies only 
work with organised farmers' groups. Recent disturbances 
in the Republic of Congo have highlighted the importance 
of such groups. Farmers' organisations there anticipated 
the trouble at an early stage and exported coffee ahead 
of schedule. The remainder of the harvest was hidden in 
boats. The incomes of more than 20,000 small farmers 
were safeguarded. 
Max Havelaar's most recent challenge was the introduc-
tion of a fair trade label for bananas. Again, it was Third 
World farmers who drew attention to the problem, high-
lighting their inability to sell their product on the Euro-
pean market. The EU's banana regulation controls the 
market and there were hardly any openings for new par-
ties. The banana producers were especially interested in 
achieving more sustainable production and the Max Have-
laar seal opened new opportunities for them. After a suc-
cessful launch, consumer demand took off. This is a factor 
which deserves recognition in any future discussions on re-
organising the European banana regime - so recently con-
demned by the WTO. 
The fair trade label offered the only possibility for the 
Ghanaian plantation, VREL, to have access to the Euro-
pean market. Now, 4,000 boxes of its bananas are being 
sold every week under the brand name Okè. This has 
meant a lot to Joseph Akomah. At 42, he no longer has to 
labour in the fields at harvest time. He now has a job 
washing and packing for export... and his salary has risen 
by 50%. All workers have received new boots to protect 
them against snakes, very common in banana fields, and 
pesticide use has been reduced by four fifths. H R.O. 
* Max Havelaar Foundation. 
standards, it has initiated a system 
of control known as 'Social Audit-
ing', which has aroused consider-
able interest in both commercial 
and political circles. 
The movement has also 
campaigned tirelessly for the intro-
duction of fair trade principles in 
legislation governing EU and 
Member State dealings with the 
South. One campaign, where EFTA 
has taken the lead since 1995, in-
volves the proposed directive al-
lowing vegetable fats to be substi-
tuted for cocoa butter up to a 
maximum of 5% in finished choco-
late products. So far, half a million 
signatures protesting against this 
proposal have been collected. 
Postcards have been sent to gov-
ernments, MEPs and chocolate 
companies. 
European institutions have 
shown some interest in the fair 
trade issue. In 1991, the Parliament 
adopted a resolution on 'coffee 
consumption as a means of active 
support for small producers' and 
on making fair trade coffee avail-
able within the European institu-
tions. This was followed in 1994 by 
another Parliamentary resolution 
on promoting; 'fairness and soli-
darity in North South trade'. The 
Commission responded in 1994 
with a 'memorandum on alterna-
tive trade', stating its support for 
strengthening fair trade and its in-
tention to establish an EC working 
group on the issue. In 1996, the 
Economic and Social Committee 
adopted a positively-worded opin-
ion on the 'European Fair Trade 
marketing movement.' Finally, the 
Parliament recently passed a reso-
lution on bananas which urges the 
Commission to facilitate access for 
new fair trade operators. 
But European institutions 
could do better. Positive incentives 
for fair trade could include prefer-
ential import duties and VAT rates 
for products carrying a fair trade 
label. EU Member States should 
act to award tax breaks to compa-
nies trading fairly and should pro-
vide start-up capital for ATOs. And 
there should be a coordinated ap-
proach to fair trade by the EU and 
its Member States. 
Fair trade has also received 
significant Commission support for 
awareness-raising. But the Com-
mission must also coordinate the 
activities of its various services and 
mobilise the resources more effec-
tively. There should be support, 
notably in the form of credit, tech-
nical assistance and capacity build-
ing for Southern producers - but 
also for fair trade organisations in 
the North. And the EU should 
recognise existing fair trade labels 
which have now been globally har-
monised under the FLO. MM B.B. 
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the Windward Islands 
by Alistair Smith 
It has always been recognised that there will be winners and losers 
in the game of global trade liberalisation even if the overall econom-
ic effect is beneficial. Potentially the heaviest losers are small island 
countries in the Eastern Caribbean whose economies are founded on 
exporting bananas to Europe. The author of this article, who works 
for the NGO, Banana Link, offers his view on the likely effect of the 
recent WTO ruling against the EU's banana regime and, highlights a 
proposal to help alleviate the damage expected if the preferences 
disappear. 
The most complex 
World Trade Organisation 
dispute so far has just con-
cluded in Geneva, involving 
a quarter of all WTO mem-
ber countries. The ruling of 
the organisation's appellate 
body on September 5, upholding 
the original decision issued in 
March, spells danger for the very 
existence of the Windward island 
banana industry'. The local banana 
sector was already in very serious 
trouble - but the Geneva decision 
means that the economies of the 
three most banana-dependent 
Eastern Caribbean nations (St. 
Lucia, St Vincent and Dominica) 
could quite literally collapse be-
fore the end of the decade. 
If the EU is forced over the 
coming months - whether by in-
ternal or external forces, or a com-
bination of the two - to dismantle 
its quota and licence regime for 
banana imports, 25,000 Windward 
Island farmers will be left without 
a market for their fruit. Growers 
and their families - indeed entire 
communities - will be left without 
a livelihood. 
The preferred solution of 
the chief complainants against the 
EU banana regime - the United 
States and its multinational fruit 
company, Chiquita Brands Interna-
tional - is to dismantle the whole 
regime, leaving just a tariff differ-
ential of, at most, 30% between 
' The livelihoods of tens of thousands of 
farmers and plantation workers would also be 
seriously threatened in Jamaica, the Dominican 
Republic, Suriname, Belize, Somalia and Cape 
Verde, not to mention in the EU's own banana 
producing territories (Canary Islands, Mar-
tinique, Guadeloupe, Madeira, Crete and the 
Azores). In Latin America, the few small and 
medium-scale producers would suffer as well 
from further liberalisation of the European 
market. 
Can 'fair trade' secure the future of 
the Windward Island banana? 
'dollar' and ACP bananas. The is-
lands, it argues, could then be 
given more aid to diversify out of 
bananas. But the question is, what 
can they diversify into! We seem 
no nearer an answer to this ques-
tion and the dangers of major 
socio-economic disruption are 
clear. 
'Fair trade': 
a survival strategy? 
In the face of adversity and 
this looming danger, long predict-
ed by some in the Windward Is-
lands, farmers themselves have 
been looking seriously at the dif-
ferent survival options. Prices hav-
ing fallen to historic lows - over a 
third of banana farmers have al-
ready voted with their feet and 
stopped growing the crop. Many 
continue, knowing that every time 
they sell their fruit they lose 
money. 
In 1995, The Windward Is-
lands Farmers' Association (WINFA) 
drew up a major five-year diversifi-
cation programme, following ex-
tensive consultation amongst its 
five member islands. It is a realistic 
programme which includes devel-
oping ecological production of ba-
nanas for both local consumption 
and export, but it has not yet 
attracted the necessary funding to 
implement it. WINFA hopes that 
the present crisis will allow the 
programme to be put into top 
gear, with broad support. In Au-
gust 1997, there was another glim-
mer of hope. Following several 
years of coalition-building with 
NGOs and trade unions in Europe 
and Latin America, farmers at a 
WINFA seminar in St. Vincent 
agreed on a plan to launch a 'fair 
trade' label for Windward bananas 
in the British market. British NGO 
partners in this scheme include the 
Fair Trade Foundation, Banana 
Link, Christian Aid and Oxfam. 
The 'fair trade' concept 
(see preceding article) means that 
farmers will receive a higher price 
for their fruit, calculated on the 
basis of actual production costs 
plus a reasonable margin. Addi-
tionally, a premium will be paid 
whose use will be decided collec-
tively by the local farmers' associa-
tion. This will include the funding 
of social development and envi-
ronment improvement pro-
grammes. Such programmes are 
among the criteria laid down by 
the Fairtrade Labelling Organisa-
tion (FLO) for a producer to be in-
cluded on its Banana Register (the 
FLO also has producer registers for 
coffee, cocoa, tea and honey). In 
the first phase, the initiative will 
involve several hundred farmers in 
five or six communities across the 
islands, but it could spread to in-
volve many more if the consumer 
response is positive. The collabora-
tion of the new Windward-owned 
banana company, WIBDECO, as 
well as of the Banana Growers' As-
sociations, will be crucial to the 
success of this farmer-consumer 
initiative. 
In the longer-term, fair 
trade must become more than sim-
ply guaranteeing a fair price for 
producers. It is an opportunity to 
build a whole new trading rela-
tionship, based on good social and 
environmental production condi-
tions, in which economic equity 
prevails all the way along the 
chain. Whatever Europe decides, it 
must surely take such innovative 
survival strategies of small inde-
pendent banana farmers into ac-
count. This is a historic opportunity 
to be seized. Precious few other 
options to avert the very real dan-
ger are on offer. ■■ A.S. 
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fl Keeping the multinationals 
in check 
by Barry Coates 
Regulating businesses may be unfashionable, but the author, who 
works for the NGO, the World Development Movement, argues that 
there is more need than ever for both voluntary and regulatory mea-
sures in the global economy, to protect the poor and marginalised in 
developing nations. 
Life in the global 
I village is a paradox. As 
I faster and cheaper commu-
I nications bring the world 
I closer together, they also 
I separate consumers of 
I goods and services from the 
producers. Economic deci-
I sions become increasingly 
I impersonal, as market 
\ prices replace any personal 
connection between those 
who make and provide goods and 
those who actually consume them. 
Yet, countervailing move-
ments are springing up in re-
sponse. Consumers in member 
countries of the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) are starting to un-
derstand that their buying choices 
have an impact on other people 
and on the environment. Increas-
ing numbers of people want assur-
ances that their tea or coffee is not 
tainted with the bitter taste of ex-
ploited farmers; that their chil-
dren's toys are not made in plants 
that cost Asian factory workers 
their lives; and that their tables 
and chairs are not taken from in-
digenous peoples' forests without 
their permission. 
Corporate giants 
Most of these traded prod-
ucts are controlled by multination-
al companies. Around a third of in-
ternational trade takes place 
within the multinationals and an-
other third, to or from a multina-
tional. The economists' view of 
trade between many small produc-
ers and consumers is increasingly 
irrelevant in a world where capital 
is mobile, but labour is not, and 
where most commodity transac-
tions are controlled by a handful 
of corporate giants. 
The largest of these com-
panies dwarf many nation states. 
Just eight of the world's largest 
enterprises have an annual 
turnover equal to the GNP of the 
48 poorest countries, comprising 
around half the world's popula-
tion. The decisions of these mas-
sive companies have a profound 
impact on developing countries. 
Yet, the speed at which they have 
become dominant in international 
trade has outpaced the ability, or 
willingness, of governments to 
monitor or regulate their activities. 
NGOs in many shapes and 
sizes have entered this policy-mak-
ing vacuum with pragmatic ap-
proaches to globalisation. New in-
stitutions and established NGOs 
are directly engaging with multi-
nationals to try to improve the 
labour, human rights, consumer 
and environmental standards of 
companies and their suppliers. In-
novative coalitions are emerging 
to wield the stick of public pres-
sure, whilst offering a carrot of 
constructive engagement and, in 
some cases, higher prices. 
The alternative trade 
movement aims to provide con-
sumers with products that offer a 
fair return for the labour involved. 
In parallel, there is a 'green' trade 
movement covering products such 
as timber, cotton and organic 
foods. However, these green or 
fairly traded goods, are still a tiny 
fraction of overall world trade, 
amounting to perhaps $500 mil-
lion per year. 
The challenge remains to 
ensure that mainstream trade, to-
talling around $6 trillion a year, is 
conducted without abusing work-
ers, local communities, consumers 
and the environment. NGOs' ef-
forts are supported by a massive 
number of consumers, concerned 
about the impacts of their pur-
chasing decisions. Surveys in OECD 
countries reveal that most pur-
chasers want to avoid products 
that harm producers or the envi-
ronment. Not surprisingly, compa-
nies are starting to pay attention, 
particularly given recent research 
from New York University showing 
that 30% of a company's value 
comes from its public ¡mage. 
Code of Conduct 
The main instrument for 
reforming mainstream trade is a 
form of voluntary agreement, the 
Code of Conduct. The negotiated 
standards contained in such codes 
may cover working conditions, 
consumer marketing, human rights 
or environmental questions. They 
generally focus on producers of 
consumer items such as Nike, Mc-
Donalds, Nestlé and Pepsi, the vari-
ous oil companies, and raw materi-
als suppliers such as Rio Tinto. 
Other codes affect service 
providers such as supermarkets, 
banks and tourist operators, and 
various industrial sectors. Some 
codes have a more general scope 
such as the Consumer Charter on 
Global Business, the Principles for 
Global Corporate Responsibility 
and the International Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions' pro-
posed Code of Conduct on Labour 
Practices. 
Consumer boycotts, first 
tried in the 1970s, remain one of 
the best-known ways of campaign-
ing against errant companies. But 
the range of strategies adopted by 
NGOs to achieve change has ex-
panded in recent years. Boycotts 
are still sometimes an effective 
tool, but in many cases it is recog-
nised that these would cause hard-
ship and loss of employment for 
the very workers the campaign is 
trying to help. Most actions are 
now explicitly not calling for a 
boycott, but rather pressing for 
multinationals to engage with 
their suppliers in a programme to 
raise standards. 
For example, in response 
to a spate of factory fires in Asia, 
the World Development Move-
ment (WDM) joined with the 
Trade Union Congress and the 
Catholic Institute for International 
Relations to support a campaign 
by the Asia Monitor Resource Cen-
tre, based in Hong Kong. The in-
dustry associations signed a Safety 
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Code for workers, but little has 
been done since to ensure that its 
provisions are implemented. The 
WDM's supporters in the UK have 
been handing cards to toy retailers 
demanding assurances that toys 
for their children are produced 
under safe working conditions. 
And campaigns such as the Rug-
mark scheme are encouraging 
companies to provide children 
with the opportunity to go to 
school, rather than putting them 
out on the street. 
The potential for NGO 
pressure through consumer action 
is blunted where there is no 
branded product. However, many 
of the largest companies are quot-
ed on the world's stock exchanges 
and are vulnerable to public pres-
sure from shareholders. The dra-
matic concentration of equities in 
the hands of institutional in-
vestors, typically holding around 
two-thirds of shares, makes public 
access more difficult. But those in-
stitutions are themselves owned by 
members of the public, through 
pension funds, insurance policies 
and investment trusts. 
Ethical funds have grown 
sharply as people have become 
aware of the connection between 
their financial assets and condi-
tions for people in developing 
countries. WDM and others have 
recently highlighted the linkage 
between individual savers and the 
impact of a well-known company's 
mining investment on indigenous 
people in Indonesia. It has also 
criticised the effect of oil company 
operations on the people and en-
vironment of the Niger delta, and 
the fact that financing from some 
British banks has funded arms ex-
ports. 
Fobbed off 
It should be recognised 
that where some of the more re-
sponsible companies are con-
cerned, campaigns and codes of 
conduct involve 'pushing at an 
open door'. However, the history 
of NGO campaigning on ethical 
standards is also littered with ex-
amples of companies signing up to 
codes of conduct and then ignor-
ing them. Criticisms are often de-
flected by increasingly sophisticat-
ed corporate public relations 
exercises. 'How-to-fob-off-NGOs 
while - not - making - substanti-
ve-changes', has become a growth 
industry! 
Recently, considerable ef-
fort has gone into establishing a 
system of independent monitoring 
and verification, to provide credi-
ble assurances that practice on the 
ground accords with company pol-
icy. Some trials of such systems are 
starting to take place, including 
the Council on Economic Priorities' 
Social Accountability 8000 in the 
USA and the Ethical Trading Initia-
tive in the UK. These systems, still 
under development, are based on 
internationally-agreed codes (ILO 
Conventions, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights and the 
UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child), supported by credible 
procedures for certification and 
auditing. A system for certifica-
tion, tracing and labelling for tim-
ber products has recently been in-
stituted through a new institution, 
the Forest Stewardship Council. 
In the case of working 
practices, the crucial role of unions 
should not only be reflected in 
their central role in negotiating 
codes of conduct, but also in their 
active participation in the system 
of monitoring and verification. 
The existence of a network of 
unions makes feasible the stagger-
ing task of monitoring companies 
that may have 50,000 suppliers 
around the world. 
Even though systems of 
verification are a step forward, 
these voluntary codes of conduct 
are inherently limited. By defini-
tion, they will generally be signed 
by the companies with well-known 
consumer products or shares wide-
ly held by the public in key OECD 
countries. Less visible or 'fly-by-
night' companies will escape pub-
lic pressure. There is no substitute 
for regulation to ensure these 
companies are not able to gain an 
advantage by abusing labour stan-
dards or the environment. Volun-
tary codes also have little power in 
preventing monopoly abuses, 
transfer pricing or corruption. 
Global business needs to be con-
trolled by global regulation. 
Regulation of multination-
als, however, is temporarily out of 
fashion. In the 1970s, following 
revelations about the role of a US 
multinational in Chile, the UN Cen-
tre on Transnational Corporations 
was established. Under pressure 
from the American government 
and after 20 years of talks, the ne-
gotiations aimed at establishing a 
UN Code of Conduct for TNCs was 
abandoned in 1991. 
The momentum for under-
mining the role of governments in 
favour of more freedom for multi-
nationals is still evident in the 
much-criticised Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment, under negoti-
ation in the OECD. A wide coali-
tion of groups from civil society is 
calling for agreements on the re-
sponsibilities of multinationals to 
precede any further strengthening 
of their rights. The MAI, in its pre-
sent form, would severely restrict 
the development options of the 
ACP countries and threatens to un-
dermine social and environmental 
standards. 
Rather sterile debates rage 
about the usefulness of voluntary 
codes or regulation. In truth, both 
are required. Regulation is vital to 
enforce internationally-agreed mi-
nimum standards, particularly to 
stop unscrupulous companies from 
abusing their power. Voluntary 
codes are a powerful means of en-
suring that companies abide by 
those standards, even where they 
are not enforced by regulatory au-
thorities. 
The pendulum is starting 
to swing back from the 'liberalisa-
tion at all costs' approach evident 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. Gov-
ernments are coming back into 
favour as vital actors in the devel-
opment process. NGOs and gov-
ernments have a common agenda 
in ensuring the benefits of globali-
sation reach the poor and the mar-
ginalised in ACP countries. Life in 
the global village depends on it. 
■i B.C. 
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fl The political dimension 
of Lomé 
by Dieter Frisch 
The author of this article, a former Director-General for Develop-
ment at the European Commission, was one of the negotiators of 
Lomé III and IV. We reproduce here, an abridged version of his con-
tribution at a colloquium held in Paris in June. The event was organ-
ised by Gemdev (Groupement Economie mondiale. Tiers monde. 
Développement) and the theme was 'The Lomé Convention: diagno-
sis, evaluation methods and future prospects'
1. Mr Frisch sets out to 
define and evaluate the political dimension of the Lomé Convention, 
as it has developed over the last two decades. 
Has Lomé always 
had a political dimension? I, 
I myself, would unhesitating-
ly say yes. However, we 
I need to look at precisely 
^^^ what ground such an asser-
tion covers - I propose to 
evaluate it on three levels: 
- Is the Lomé Convention a politi-
cal agreement in the sense that it 
seeks common foreign policies on 
the part of our ACP partners or a 
modification of their behaviour to 
conform with the EU economic 
and political options on offer? Is 
the Convention an instrument of 
EU foreign policy? 
- Does Lomé introduce a political 
dimension more specifically linked 
with development by concerning 
itself with people, human rights 
and dignity, greater participation 
in the decisions which affect popu-
lations (democracy), fundamental 
freedoms and good governance? 
- Is there a political dimension at 
the specifically operational level of 
cooperation - in other words, in 
aid-allocation criteria, the choice 
of priorities and the level of inter-
vention - be this by means of dia-
logue or through 'imposed' condi-
tions? 
On all three levels, the po-
litical dimension underwent signif-
icant change in the 20 years be-
tween 1975 and 1995 (covering 
the period from Lomé I to the re-
vised version of Lomé IV). This oc-
curred in terms of geopolitical de-
velopments, - the ending of the 
This text will be published by Karthala in a 
volume which is to appear in late 1997. It will 
contain the bulk of the texts which appeared in 
the Cahier du GEMDEV No. 25, plus the contri-
butions to the June 27 colloquium mentioned 
above. 
Cold War marked a clear cut-off 
point and there was also the trans-
formation of the European Eco-
nomic Community into a European 
Union with the new aim of formu-
lating a common foreign and secu-
rity policy. But it should also be 
seen in the context of the political 
and economic liberalisation (dé-
mocratisation, transition to a mar-
ket economy) that took place 
within the Convention's ACP part-
ner-states, and in the maturing of 
their relationships with Europe. 
For a good 10 years or so 
(the Lomé I and II period) we used 
to set great store by Lome's 'politi-
cal neutrality'. What did we mean 
by this? First, we accepted the 
ACP states into the Lomé 'club' 
without passing judgment on their 
ideological, political or economic 
choices. We showed almost implic-
it respect for our partners' sover-
eignty. Lomé was, therefore, not a 
political agreement as defined by 
the first level. 
Obviously, however, it was 
extremely significant politically for 
the Community to maintain stable 
and constructive relations with 
such a large group of countries -
about 60 altogether including all 
the independent states of sub-Sa-
haran Africa (except South Africa). 
To help transcend the colonial pe-
riod's legacy of division was an 
eminently political ambition, and 
the organisation of relations under 
Lomé with a group of countries 
that addressed the Community 
with one voice gave that group 
hitherto unheard-of negotiating 
power. It, therefore, helped to cre-
ate political balance in the 
North/South relationship. 
During the Cold War, neu-
trality was a political option in it-
self. I have no doubt that the 
Member States were content to in-
dulge in what might be regarded 
as political schizophrenia: develop-
ing their domestic foreign policies 
while following a politically neu-
tral line vis-à-vis the Community. 
The EEC/ACP relationship enabled 
dialogue and cooperation to be 
maintained with countries with 
which bilateral relations were oth-
erwise kept to a strict minimum, 
even placed on the back boiler. 
Thus, it acted as a buffer in periods 
of tension. 
It was because of our polit-
ical neutrality that Angola, after 
much difficult internal debate, 
took the first steps towards rap-
prochement with the West by sign-
ing Lomé III in April 1985 - a deci-
sion Angolans regard as entirely 
political. Moreover, it was by 
maintaining a structured dialogue, 
under Lomé, with President 
Mengistu's Ethiopia that we were 
able, when the period of Marxist 
rhetoric was at its height, to nego-
tiate agricultural policy reform 
with a view to setting up a market 
economy. Everyone, notably the 
US, congratulated us on having 
successfully achieved what the 
World Bank was unable to do. 
On occasion, we used our 
'politically neutral' relations to 
raise specifically political problems. 
For instance, I remember dis-
cussing with President Mengistu in 
1986 the highly controversial issue 
of the forced transfer of popula-
tions (from the north to the south 
and east of the country) - which 
had brought suffering to many 
people - and obtaining a suspen-
sion of such operations. There was 
even a piece in the Sunday Times 
on 23 March 1986 headlined 
'Ethiopia to halt resettlement as 
EEC agrees aid'. This didn't stop 
people from attacking me as the 
'assassins' accomplice'! 
The notion of political neu-
trality, therefore, has to be set 
against the context of the time in 
order to be genuinely measured. It 
is not that we were politically 
naive. The restrictions imposed on 
us by our opting for neutrality 
should not be underestimated. The 
case of Ethiopia demonstrates 
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to our approach. We did not tackle 
the issues of human rights, funda-
mental freedoms, democracy or 
good governance. In this connec-
tion, unfortunately, we had to 
stand back from the situation and I 
do sometimes regret not having 
acted more forthrightly. Yet could 
we have acted differently? We had 
to choose between dialogue -
without being able to address all 
issues - and a complete break. We 
opted to continue the dialogue 
even though we felt no particular 
sympathy for some of our counter-
parts. 
Only in extreme cases of 
serious violation of human rights 
has cooperation been suspended -
much too late, it might be said 
nowadays - as in the case of Idi 
Amin's Uganda, Macias Nguéma's 
Equatorial Guinea and Bokassa's 
Central African Republic. 
I have, in fact, moved on 
from the first to the second level 
of the political dimension - the di-
mension which is more specifically 
linked to development. 
I will not deny that we 
were unable to give much direct 
attention to what we now regard 
as the 'essential elements' of our 
cooperation relationship, namely 
human rights, fundamental free-
doms, democracy and the rule of 
law. But by continuing the devel-
opment effort, we were able to 
make a contribution to improving 
people's welfare, promoting their 
economic and social rights and 
thereby indirectly preparing the 
ground for the promotion of their 
civil and political rights. 
It remains to be deter-
mined whether, at the third level 
of cooperation, in other words, in 
specifically operational terms, 
Lomé has had a political dimen-
sion. Although we would like our 
cooperation to be seen as essen-
tially technical in nature, it has al-
Forced transfers of populations in Ethiopia caused 
suffering to a great many people. 
We used our 'politically neutral' good relations to 
raise specifically political matters. 
ways been felt that it has had a 
political aspect. One can hardly 
claim that determining the 
amount of aid to allocate to a 
country or choosing sectoral priori-
ties - even the route of a road - do 
not involve politically sensitive de-
cisions. However, the Community 
has systematically attempted to 
favour 'developmental' considera-
tions rather than comply with po-
litical entreaties, and its mode of 
behaviour has always been more 
neutral than in the case of bilater-
al aid from Member States. 
At this operational level, 
the political dimension has varied 
in intensity according to the extent 
to which we have 'interfered'. It 
has never been easy to strike a bal-
ance between respect for our part-
ners' sovereign decisions about 
their economic development and 
the development of their societies, 
and the responsibility of European 
institutions to their principals and 
the citizens and taxpayers of Eu-
rope, in respect of managing coop-
eration. While we respected our 
partners' choices, we were not in a 
position to finance just anything! 
In addition, the choices our part-
ners in dialogue made were not 
necessarily - or, at any rate, not 
very often - a reflection of soci-
ety's priority needs. Reference to 
the sacrosanct principle of sover-
eignty meant that we kept quiet 
regarding the degree to which 
those partners genuinely repre-
sented their people. 
Our attitude on this has 
changed a great deal. After a peri-
od of somewhat paternalistic co-
operation, our approach under 
Lomé I was characterised by the 
then Development Commissioner, 
Claude Cheysson. He told the ACP 
analysis 
States 'It's your money! Work out 
your priorities and use it for those. 
We are available to give you tech-
nical advice'. Although it did not 
work out quite like that in reality, 
we did thus open the way to ex-
perimentation. Subsequently it be-
came essential to reformulate this, 
and, at the time of the Lomé III ne-
gotiations (1985) under the aegis 
of Commissioner Edgard Pisani, we 
introduced the concept of 'policy 
dialogue' - which was somewhat 
imperfectly translated as 'dialogue 
on policies'. What it meant was 
that from then on, we wanted to 
maintain genuine dialogue on the 
better use of cooperation instru-
ments and to implement them on 
the basis of duly negotiated and 
formulated mutual undertakings. 
Given the problem of 
human rights, the 'dialogue on 
policies' became the most delicate 
topic of the Lomé III negotiations. 
Our partners saw in it a desire to 
interfere on a political level and to 
bring in the concept of 'condition-
ality' by the back door. In the end, 
we were unsuccessful in our at-
tempt to have that concept includ-
ed in the Convention. 
However, 'policy dialogue' 
in practice proved to be much less 
controversial than the attempt to 
include it in the texts. As a con-
cept, it undeniably included a new 
political dimension - not in the 
sense of politics as a whole, but 
certainly in terms of 'policy'. It 
meant, for example, that prior to 
financing an agricultural develop-
ment programme, we were able to 
discuss policy on prices, marketing, 
imports and so on, enabling us to 
make mutually consistent under-
takings. We were clearly touching 
on politically sensitive aspects. 
That is the point we were 
at when major geopolitical 
changes occurred. I am talking 
here of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in November 1989, on the eve of 
the signature of Lomé IV (which 
took place in December of that 
year). 
If I were to put a date on 
the end of the period of political 
neutrality, I would choose 1990. 
However, the break from the past 
was obviously not totally clear cut. 
Ever since Lomé III in 1985, we wit-
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nessed the gradual politicisation of 
development policy, even if this 
was essentially at the 'policy' level. 
Nor did we have to wait for the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty - which 
codified the European ambition to 
adopt a common foreign and secu-
rity policy - to see the appearance 
of this brand of flexible coordina-
tion. This had long characterised 
European political cooperation 
and was by no means ineffective 
at the level of the Member States' 
foreign policy. We should, per-
haps, remember here that the first 
decision to suspend financial coop-
eration under Lomé for violations 
of human rights - apart from the 
extreme cases mentioned earlier -
dates from March 1990 and con-
cerned Sudan. 
Did Lomé thus become a 
political agreement? Properly 
speaking, no. It is still essentially a 
development cooperation agree-
ment, but its political dimensions 
are becoming increasingly signifi-
cant. 
If I might return to the 
three levels I defined earlier, the 
willingness of the partners to dis-
cuss political issues in the common 
institutions has developed to a 
considerable extent. In former 
times, Europe was very stubborn 
on this point. This was not the pur-
pose of the European Economic 
Community and debates had to be 
restricted to cooperation matters 
covered by the Convention. 
In this respect, the way the 
apartheid issue was dealt with was 
significant. The ACP states suc-
ceeded in incorporating into a 
joint declaration (Annex I of Lomé 
III) their determination to make 
every effort to eradicate 
apartheid. This was the 'price' that 
had to be paid for a text on 
human rights, an issue dealt with 
extremely prudently in the same 
joint declaration and in Article 4 of 
the Convention. In the case of 
Lomé IV, a reference to apartheid 
appeared in the actual text of the 
Convention (Art. 5). Also, fired by 
their negotiating success, the ACP 
states from 1985 onwards always 
insisted that apartheid be included 
on the agenda at each session of 
the Joint Council of Ministers. This 
was something the Europeans 
could not refuse. So 'Heading C' 
on the agenda was invented to in-
clude those topics on which there 
could be exchanges of views, but 
not conclusions. To justify what 
appeared to the Europeans to be a 
potential slide towards political 
matters, and to make this a specif-
ic case, the Community maintained 
that the apartheid issue had a di-
rect link with the development of 
South Africa's neighbours, given 
the destabilising effect of the 
South African system. 
By contrast, as I stated in 
an interview to The Courier in 
1987, in the context of our institu-
tional meetings, there was no 
question of referring to East-West 
relations, disarmament negotia-
tions, the conflict in the Middle 
East, or other major world political 
problems which did not have a suf-
ficiently direct link with ACP-EEC 
cooperation. This shows how we 
were moving towards political de-
bate, but also illustrates the con-
straints we were under. 
These days, this restrictive 
attitude has completely disap-
peared. On the basis of the text of 
the Maastricht Treaty, Europe is 
now able to discuss purely political 
issues and it is at Europe's request 
that the preamble of the revised 
version of Lomé IV (1995) express-
es the wish to strengthen further 
the links between the partners 
'through greater political dialogue 
and its extension to issues and 
problems of foreign policy and se-
curity'. This is no longer Lomé Ill's 
simple 'policy dialogue', but actual 
'political dialogue' with a Europe 
which has itself acquired a foreign-
policy dimension. We have come a 
long way from the 'tightrope' situ-
ation we were in with regard to 
apartheid! 
The evolution has been 
just as significant in terms of the 
second level, namely that of the 
political dimension more directly 
linked to development: human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, par-
ticipation/democracy and good 
governance. Detailed analysis of 
the successive texts is highly illumi-
nating, but further discussion of 
this aspect is beyond the scope of 
this article. Let us simply remem-
ber that Lomé I and II began, in 
Article 1, with trade cooperation, 
while Lomé III (up to the revised 
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Days gone by in South Africa 
When Lomé III was being negotiated, the ACP 
states succeeded in incorporating a joint 
declaration on their determination to make 
every effort to eradicate apartheid 
Lomé IV) began with a 'body of 
doctrine' consisting of about 20 ar-
ticles dealing with the objectives, 
principles and guidelines. The con-
cepts covered have become more 
and more explicit: Lomé III evokes 
human dignity and, in an annex, 
economic, social and cultural 
rights. Lomé IV adds civil and polit-
ical rights and, finally, the revised 
version of Lomé IV, using, to a 
large extent, the vocabulary of 
Maastricht, refers to democratic 
principles, the consolidation of the 
rule of law and good governance 
(Article 5). And these notions are 
qualified in that article as consti-
tuting 'an essential element of this 
Convention'. In terms of interna-
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tional law, this means that applica-
tion of the Convention may be 
partially or totally suspended in 
the event of failure to fulfil an 
obligation in respect of one of 
these essential elements, although 
provision is made for a consulta-
tion procedure (Article 366a), 
which is to be used, in principle, 
prior to any decision on suspen-
sion. 
The application of such 
provisions will always be politically 
delicate. We must guard against 
any overall simplification and ex-
amine each problem in terms of 
the specific context of the country 
in question and with regard to the 
structures of its society, its ethnic 
problems, history and traditions. It 
will rapidly become apparent that 
there is no single way in which to 
approach such issues, nor any ab-
solute criteria. 
However, we need certain 
criteria if we are to avoid an arbi-
trary approach. Curiously, when 
speaking of human rights and 
democracy, the somewhat odd se-
quence is generally 'human rights 
- violation - sanctions'. In point of 
fact, sanctions should be used only 
as a last resort. Under Lomé, they 
are envisaged in only two specific 
cases: when there is a violation of 
the most fundamental human 
rights which relate to human be-
ings' physical integrity, or when 
there is a brutal interruption of a 
genuine démocratisation process. 
Nigeria, after the hanging of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogo-
nis, is an example of the former 
while past or present crises in 
Haiti, Zaire and Togo fit into the 
latter category. 
We have to resist any 
temptation to use this weapon too 
readily; first because cooperation 
pursues long-term development 
objectives and cannot be based on 
'stop-go' everyday politics; second, 
because cooperation is supposed 
to help people and not regimes -
by and large, the latter are seldom 
affected by sanctions. Finally, ex-
perience has shown that a suspen-
sion in cooperation means an in-
terruption of the dialogue and 
therefore a total loss of any influ-
ence over the evolution of events 
in the country in question. It is 
thus a weapon to be used with re-
straint. Our priority must be to 
adopt a positive approach, which 
enables us to promote human 
rights, democracy, the rule of law 
and good governance, and, as far 
as the Community is able under 
Lomé, we should offer wide-rang-
ing support for such actions. This 
must include aid for human rights 
organisations, technical help for 
institutional, constitutional and 
electoral reforms, and assistance in 
setting up a transparent public 
purchasing system (under the 
heading of good governance). We 
shouldn't forget either, aid for the 
organisation and observation of 
elections, the professional training 
of journalists and so on. The politi-
cally sensitive nature of each of 
these actions is obvious and is yet 
another reason for them to be 
handled as part of a dialogue 
which takes place in an atmos-
phere of trust - our views and re-
quirements must never 
posed! 
be im-
I will return now to the 
third level of the political dimen-
sion, namely the specifically opera-
tional side of cooperation. At the 
time of Lomé III, we had got as far 
as the notion of 'policy dialogue' 
though it was highly controversial 
then. This dialogue, which is now a 
totally relaxed and normal exer-
cise, takes place when we are plan-
ning the five-year cooperation 
programme with each ACP state. 
Its results are recorded in the 'in-
dicative programmes' in the form 
of mutual undertakings by the 
parties, and the dialogue is re-
The operational side of cooperation also has 
a political dimension. 
For example, a road programme is no longer fi-
nanced unless the government makes a specific 
undertaking in terms of transport and 
road-maintenance policy, etc. analysis 
sumed whenever we prepare a 
project or programme to be fi-
nanced. Each operation is now dis-
cussed in terms of its sectoral con-
text. To give an example, a road 
programme is now no longer fi-
nanced unless the government 
makes a specific undertaking in 
terms of transport and road-main-
tenance policy, etc. This dialogue 
becomes even more demanding -
and thus politically more delicate -
when it is a matter of financing a 
macroeconomic reform process, 
known as 'structural adjustment', 
through balance of payments aid 
or budgetary aid - and thus with-
out 'visible' projects. In such cir-
cumstances - with financing to 
some extent 'rewarding' good 
policies - we have to examine 
them in detail and to take part in 
the examination of budget priori-
ties. Admittedly, this constitutes 
interference, but it seems to be in-
evitable in order to justify this type 
of financing. In these circum-
stances, much hangs on the way in 
which things are done. If the un-
dertakings to be obtained from 
our partners under the terms of an 
exacting 'policy dialogue' are per-
ceived as externally-imposed con-
ditions, the relationship can be-
come politically strained and, 
ultimately, untenable. In fact, in 
my view, conditionality is incom-
patible with the concept of part-
nership - which entails dialogue 
and negotiation to achieve mutu-
ally acceptable undertakings and 
adaptation of reform on the part 
of our partners. To advocate such 
an approach is not evidence of a 
lax attitude; it is the style and 'cul-
ture' of Lomé. 
As far as the future is con-
cerned, in the discussions which 
have followed on from the Com-
mission's Green Paper, I can al-
ready detect a consensus of opin-
ion in favour of taking the political 
dimension of our partnership fur-
ther. This is a good sign, although 
we need to know what the various 
parties understand by that. For my 
part, I think that from the political 
standpoint, the most recent Lomé 
text (the revised Lomé IV) is com-
plete and up-to-date. I would find 
it difficult to suggest additional 
political provisions for inclusion in 
any future agreement. We ought, 
however, to examine more sub-
stantial implementation of any po-
litical provisions. 
Dialogue on specifically 
political issues which have no di-
rect link with our cooperation pro-
gramme is still practically non-exis-
tent, but can we be sure that the 
various parties involved will gen-
uinely have an interest in an ex-
change of views on major world 
problems? I have my doubts. Per-
haps we would concentrate such 
dialogue on subjects connected 
with development, particularly 
those which are included in the 
agenda of major international 
meetings, and on foreign and se-
curity policy issues of direct inter-
est to the ACP states. As for the 
implementation of provisions con-
cerning human rights and democ-
racy, the partners could draw use-
ful lessons from an initial period of 
experimentation in the field of 
positive actions aimed at support-
ing desirable progress and consoli-
dating proven types of action. As 
regards the negative side - sanc-
tions - it might be more fruitful, in 
the light of experience, to refine 
the 'doctrine' and to avoid any au-
tomatic reaction which has not 
been preceded by in-depth analy-
sis of the specific context of 
events, in preference to a more ro-
bust political approach. 
As far as the management 
of financial cooperation is con-
cerned, the most politically sensi-
tive new element would be im-
proved evaluation of ACP 
countries' performance in the allo-
cation of aid. I am a firm believer 
in the conventional criteria -
which essentially reflect a coun-
try's needs - being supplemented 
by a good governance criterion. 
Prior to the allocation of external 
aid, it would have to be ascer-
tained whether a genuine effort 
has been made to manage all the 
The Lomé Convention 
'For my part, I think that from the political stand-
point the most recent Lomé text (the revised 
Lomé IV) is complete and up-to-date.' 
resources available to a country. 
Indeed, it is no longer sufficient to 
assure oneself that the aid has 
been put to good use if, on the 
other hand, national resources are 
being frittered away on prestige 
projects, excessive military spend-
ing, or even the personal enrich-
ment of a country's leaders. I do 
not think that this more severe ap-
proach would come into conflict 
with safeguarding the 'Lomé cul-
ture' - which is close to my heart -
but it must now be part of an 
adult, exacting and open partner-
ship which does not dodge former-
ly taboo issues such as good gover-
nance, integrity and the 
anti-corruption campaign. 
In 1987, under the appar-
ently pleonastic title of 'Is Lome's 
policy political?', I gave highly 
qualified replies to the Courier 
journalist who was interviewing 
me. Ten years on, my reply to that 
question is unhesitatingly positive: 
Lome's policy is obviously political! 
However, I would continue to 
warn against the temptation to 
turn the Lomé accords - which, 
first and foremost, relate to devel-
opment cooperation - into a mere 
instrument of foreign policy. We 
must guard against over-stressing 
the political nature of any future 
accord. ■■ D.F. 
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by Francis Caas* 
In June, more than 50 heads of government, 75 ministers and some 
4000 representatives of non-governmental organisations attended 
the second Earth Summit in New York to assess the current state of 
the world environment. Five years after the Rio Summit, the New 
York meeting concluded that the sustainable development objective 
advocated at Rio (integrating economic development, social develop-
ment and environmental protection) is still a far-off goal. 
According to most 
of the reports presented in 
New York, the environmen-
tal balance sheet is a 
gloomy one, despite signifi-
cant progress in the area of 
institutional development, 
international cooperation, 
public participation and pri-
vate-sector integration. Al-
though environmental protection 
is now of paramount importance 
in all international dealings, and 
although political and economic 
decision-makers are more aware of 
its importance, the President of 
the General Assembly, Razali 
Ismail, confirmed that the world 
environment has continued to de-
teriorate since Rio. Natural re-
source exploitation has, in fact, ac-
celerated, and consumption and 
production methods, which are 
largely unsustainable, constitute a 
serious threat to the environment 
and health. Meanwhile, the de-
struction of the forests and atmos-
pheric pollution have also in-
creased. A significant part of the 
world's biological wealth has been 
used up or is on the point of disap-
pearing while water courses and 
oceans continue to be polluted by 
human activity. 
From the social standpoint, 
given that almost 1.3 billion hu-
mans still live in conditions of ex-
treme deprivation, poverty allevia-
tion and the campaign against 
underdevelopment are still the 
main objectives as the century 
draws to a close. The leaders meet-
ing in New York once again con-
firmed that poverty and environ-
mental degradation are 
inextricably linked. However, de-
spite the commitment made in Rio 
* Freelance journalist. 
by developed countries to allocate 
0.7% of their GDP to official devel-
opment aid, the figure has actually 
fallen to 0.25%. It is therefore cru-
cial to relaunch the international 
campaign and promote technolo-
gy transfer. From the economic 
standpoint, the consequences of 
trade liberalisation and globalisa-
tion for the environment and so-
cial development should also be 
urgently examined. 
Many problems were ad-
dressed in New York but two de-
serve a special mention: the ex-
ploitation of energy and fresh 
water. It was recognised that sig-
nificant progress was needed - in-
cluding changes in the way these 
resources are used - if sustainable-
development objectives are to be 
met. 
The energy challenge 
The most recent Earth 
Summit advocated diversification 
of energy sources, greater efficien-
cy, transformed production and 
consumption methods, 'internali-
sation' of costs and recourse to re-
newable and less-polluting sources 
of energy. The implementation of 
any measures in this area is likely 
to be some way off, given the cen-
tral role of the energy sector in all 
areas of economic and social life. 
Between 1973 and 1993 alone, 
world energy consumption rose by 
50%. 
During the last 20 years, 
concerns in the energy sector have 
changed radically. Nowadays, the 
main fear is no longer the deple-
tion of non-renewable com-
bustible resources such as coal and 
oil but, rather, the disastrous envi-
ronmental consequences of their 
combustion. 
There is also the fact that 
providing suitable and adequate 
energy supplies in a number of de-
veloping countries is highly prob-
lematic. So the challenge is to give 
everyone access to energy, while 
preventing, or at least limiting, the 
latter's harmful effect on the envi-
ronment. Today, almost two bil-
lion people still do not have regu-
lar and satisfactory access to 
commercial energy sources. This 
severely handicaps economic and 
social development in the coun-
tries in question. In Africa, the vast 
majority of rural people, and in-
deed many city-dwellers, depend 
largely on wood to meet their 
daily energy requirements. It is es-
timated that almost 1.8 billion 
cubic metres of wood are con-
sumed in this way every year. Ac-
cording to the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development, wood 
still meets almost 50% of energy 
requirements in sub-Saharan 
Africa and in certain Asian coun-
tries. This brings with it serious 
and often irreversible problems -
deforestation, soil erosion, impov-
erishment of the land and, ulti-
mately, increased difficulties for 
those who depend on wood for 
their everyday needs. 
In the developed countries, 
it is the intensive use of highly pol-
luting fossil fuels which causes the 
greatest damage to the ecology 
and public health. Pollution of the 
atmosphere by greenhouse gases, 
such as carbon dioxide (C02), is 
principally due to coal and oil 
burning. Most of the international 
scientific community believes that 
the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere has a di-
rect influence on the world's cli-
mate system. In the long term, it 
threatens to raise temperatures to 
dangerously high levels, with obvi-
ous disastrous consequences. The 
industrialised nations are responsi-
ble for about 70% of C02 emis-
sions, although the proportion of 
emissions attributable to develop-
ing countries is increasing. This is 
particularly true of newly industri-
alised countries and certain 'gi-
ants', such as China, India and 
Brazil. As the United Nations puts 
it, countries share a joint, although 
differing, responsibility. In other 
words, the developed nations must 
take the initiative and implement 
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measures to reduce their emis-
sions. The developing countries 
will follow suit. 
Like most environmental 
problems, climate change is an 
issue that affects the entire planet 
and therefore requires global solu-
tions. The attitude of certain coun-
tries in the southern hemisphere is 
easily understood - they do not 
wish to 'pay' for damage which 
has been inflicted mainly by the 
north and thereby handicap their 
economic development. But such 
positions will very soon become 
untenable. To avoid catastrophic 
scenarios such as the melting of 
the polar ice caps and rising sea 
levels, the nations of the world, 
both developed and developing, 
will have to take effective, rapid 
and, above all, joint measures. 
The environmental and de-
velopment challenges posed by 
the energy issue could be met, to 
some extent, by various technolog-
ical, political and financial mea-
sures. Although essential to the 
development of any nation, if en-
ergy is not used and produced on 
Offshore platform 
Pollution of the atmosphere by greenhouse gases 
is principally the result of the combustion of coal 
and petroleum 
a sustainable basis, the result will 
certainly be irreversible damage to 
human health, ecosystems and bio-
logical diversity. We could be 
mortgaging the future of our chil-
dren. 
There are, however, long 
term solutions available. For exam-
ple, there is scope for replacing 
fossil and nuclear fuels with re-
newable energy sources such as 
wind and solar power and less pol-
luting carbon-based fuels. At pre-
sent, the alternatives are not being 
well exploited due to a lack of fi-
nancial resources and political will. 
In addition, technologies allowing 
more rational use of energy and 
less wastage can be put to good 
use. But for such measures to 
work, the energy sector's powerful 
multinationals must be persuaded 
that alternative methods can be 
made viable - and that environ-
mental protection will not neces-
sarily reduce their turnover or in-
crease their costs. Another 
important element is finding ways 
of persuading people to abandon 
'dyed in the wool' attitudes about 
their own energy consumption, so 
as to influence current consump-
tion trends in a positive way. 
The gradual abolition of 
energy subsidies, the implementa-
tion of eco-taxes and a réévalua-
tion of fuel prices - so that these 
reflect their genuine cost - are all 
measures which must be taken if 
unrestrained energy consumption 
and production are not to compro-
mise sustainable development. 
Higher prices should logically lead 
to better performance levels by in-
ducing the adoption of anti-waste 
measures and the promotion of 
less polluting new technologies 
with better yields and greater effi-
ciency. (Currently, barely 10% of 
the money allocated to energy re-
search and development is used to 
finance new forms of energy). Nat-
urally enough, measures of this 
type will not be warmly welcomed 
by energy suppliers and con-
sumers, given that they would in-
volve radical policy changes. Cur-
rently, the energy sector is heavily 
subsidised. In 1992 almost $200 bil-
lion was spent on energy subsidies 
of varying kinds across the planet. 
But some of the obstacles raised by 
a 'greener' energy policy could un-
doubtedly be overcome, particu-
larly if the resources released were 
used to reduce companies' social 
charges. This would help create 
new jobs and the sums saved (by 
suspending subsidies and reducing 
consumption) could be used to 
lighten the tax burden and com-
pensate those most seriously af-
fected by higher energy prices. 
Lastly, by implementing such mea-
sures gradually, and by harmonis-
ing policy at the regional and in-
ternational level, companies would 
have the opportunity to adapt and 
maintain their 'sacrosanct' compet-
itive edge. 
Water supplies at risk 
To a greater extent even 
than energy, water is essential to 
the growth and survival of all life 
forms and to every society's eco-
nomic and social development. De-
spite this, almost a third of the 
world's population lives in coun-
tries where fresh water supplies 
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Kuala Lumpur 
under a cloud 
An air pollution crisis in 
south Asia underlines in 
stark terms, the potential ef-
fects of uncontrolled fossil 
fuel burning. The problem has 
arisen due to a combination of lo-
cally 'produced' traffic fumes and 
huge quantities of smoke generat-
ed by forest burning in Indonesia 
and other parts of the region 
(a drought has caused many fires to 
spread out of control). The problem 
is particularly acute in the 
Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur, 
where the sun struggles to break 
through the blanket of pollution -
and cases of breathing-related ill-
ness have rocketed. At the time of 
writing, some experts were predict-
ing that the people of the region 
might have to wait another six 
months before the air clears. 
are chronically lacking. According 
to the Commission on Sustainable 
Development's 'Comprehensive in-
ventory of world fresh water sup-
plies', more than two thirds of the 
globe's inhabitants will be faced 
with water scarcities by 2025 if ur-
gent and sustained measures are 
not taken to remedy the situation. 
More than 20% of the planet's in-
habitants currently have no access 
to drinking water, the conse-
quences of this for health being 
easy to imagine. Almost half the 
people living in the Third World 
contract infectious diseases directly 
or indirectly linked to poor water 
quality - and 25,000 people die 
from such maladies every day. This 
alarming situation looks set to 
worsen as population numbers in-
crease. It is estimated that the 
world's total population will in-
crease from 5.7 billion to almost 
8.3 billion between now and 2025. 
This kind of demographic pressure 
will have a direct influence on 
food requirements and on the vol-
ume of agricultural production. Al-
most 70% of available fresh water 
is currently used to irrigate crops 
and the industrial sector's water 
requirements are still growing. Ac-
cordingly, it is highly unlikely that 
the planet's fresh water reserves 
will be sufficient to meet the re-
quirements of a constantly increas-
ing population unless measures 
are taken to rationalise use, alloca-
tion and consumption. 
Water may be a renewable 
resource, but its availability is still 
limited and it is extremely vulnera-
ble. Although 70% of the world is 
covered by water, barely 2.5% of 
this is fresh. If you take into ac-
count evaporation, the amount 
locked up in the polar ice caps, the 
water tables that are too deep to 
be exploited and water that exists 
in the form of humidity, you dis-
cover that just 0.007% of the plan-
et's H20 is directly accessible and 
usable for human purposes. This is 
not very much when you consider 
the rate at which humans use it. 
To complicate matters, fresh water 
resources are unevenly distributed 
and vary significantly from one 
year to the next. 
So in the long term, it is 
likely that the limited quantity of 
available fresh water will seriously 
compromise human development. 
In addition, the quality of our 
water courses is a matter for con-
cern. In developed countries, near-
ly 30% of waste water is still re-
leased untreated into the 
environment and there are few 
water courses and aquatic ecosys-
tems these days which are not pay-
ing the cost of our economic and 
industrial development. Moreover, 
the world now has nearly 
38,000 dams higher than 15 me-
tres. These have frequently been 
built without regard to their wider 
effects, and the result has been 
the destruction of natural habitats, 
a rapid decline in biological diver-
sity, the salification of certain 
lands (rendering them unsuitable 
for agriculture), the displacement 
of entire populations and deterio-
ration of water quality. 
The provision of domestic 
water supplies has had a positive 
effect on economic and social de-
velopment, but it is now essential 
to manage the resource better and 
re-examine the way in which this 
element is used. It is an issue which 
is essential to our survival. Water 
has a price, in the true sense of the 
word. Just like energy, it has to be 
properly evaluated, something 
which has not been done so far. 
We only have to look at the extent 
to which the industry is subsidised. 
Non-sustainable exploitation of 
water resources is also costly in en-
vironmental and human health 
terms, and this should be reflected 
in its price. At the same time, there 
should be no question of water 
being sold at exorbitant prices, 
particularly to the most deprived 
in society and to developing coun-
tries in general. Despite heavy 
state subsidies, water does not 
benefit the poorest - who are the 
ones who suffer most from deteri-
oration in quality and scarcity of 
supply. As in the case of energy, 
the gradual 'internalisation' of 
economic and environmental costs 
should logically lead to more ratio-
nal exploitation and consumption 
of our H20 resources. 
Redefining our place in 
the world 
Water and energy are just 
two examples of poor manage-
ment of the planet's resources. If 
we want to build a fairer and 
more equitable world, and to live 
again in harmony with nature, we 
must rapidly change course. There 
is a risk that our planet will soon 
'run out of steam' if we do not 
make our consumption and pro-
duction modes both viable and 
sustainable. 
The 1992 Rio declaration 
stated that human beings were at 
the centre of concerns over sus-
tainable development. We now 
have to expand this somewhat an-
thropocentric view to include all 
life forms on the Earth. Ironically, 
we are the only species whose dis-
appearance would have no effect 
on the planet's natural evolution 
and are also the only species which 
has the capability to destroy the 
world around us. Despite being a 
heavy burden to carry, this respon-
sibility to the Earth and nature 
means we must resolutely follow a 
path to sustainable development 
which fully incorporates the three 
interdependent components: so-
cial development, economic devel-
opment and environmental pro-
tection. This is the price we must 
pay if our species is to survive and 
if we are to bequeath to future 
generations a world where nature 
thrives. Ml F.C 
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fl Conference on World Population 
I Challenges at the brink of a new millennium 
The global population will 
increase to 11 billion by the 
year 2150, from its present 
5.7 billion, according to esti-
mates from the United Na-
tions and the World Bank. 
And virtually all of this 
growth will be in the devel-
oping world, says Dr John 
Bongaarts of the Population 
Council in New York. Popula-
tion growth in the devel-
oped world began to sta-
blilise in the 1990s, after a 
quantum leap in the 1950s. 
Why is there such a diver-
gence between the developed and 
developing nations, and what are 
the implications? These were some 
of the issues discussed at a seminar 
in London on 12 September, organ-
ised by Interscience and sponsored 
by the Rockefeller Foundation
1. It 
brought together a group of experts 
in the area of demography and re-
productive health who presented 
their research on the subject. 
On the agenda was an ex-
amination of the implications of 
demographic change on economic 
growth, quality of life, the envi-
ronment, and the part it can play 
in civil strife. Case studies were 
presented from Bangladesh, 
Ghana, Northern India and Kenya. 
The Asian 'tiger' countries were 
looked at, to see if the slower 
rates of population growth seen in 
these countries had contributed to 
their economic 'miracle'.The pur-
pose of the seminar was to present 
new research which had emerged 
since the end of 1994, when the 
Cairo World Conference on Popu-
lation and Development was held. 
In his introduction, Dr Steven Sind-
ing of the Rockefeller Foundation 
said: 'If we want to fulfil the hopes 
of people around the world for a 
better life through economic de-
velopment, we must provide the 
means for couples to determine 
for themselves the number of chil-
dren they have and the timing of 
their births.' 
The idea of a planned pop-
ulation was very daring not so 
long ago, Ingar Brueggemann, 
Secretary-General of the Interna-
tional Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion (IPPF), pointed out. She told 
the story of a Filipino women who 
had told her: 'I have had 12 chil-
dren... and after the fifth I knew 
there wouldn't be enough food or 
schooling. But I went on to give 
birth to another seven!' Mrs 
Brueggemann stressed the impor-
tance of getting information to 
the people, and enabling them to 
have a choice. 
In an overview of world 
population growth. Dr Bongaarts 
noted that there had been a rapid 
decline in the birth rate in Europe, 
the USA and China - where 80% 
of women of child-bearing age use 
contraceptives. In the developing 
world, contraception use is just 
20%. He identified three compo-
nents in population growth and 
suggested possible responses; 
- Unwanted pregnancy. Up to 25 
million women give birth to chil-
dren they say they do not want. 
- A desire for big families. In most 
developing countries, couples 
want more than two children and 
the figure is highest in sub-Saha-
ran Africa where the average is six. 
There is a strong correlation bet-
ween desired family size and level 
of education. This issue should be 
addressed in population policies, 
according to Dr Bongaarts, with 
measures to empower women and 
stress human development. If in-
fant mortality is reduced, people 
will be encouraged to have fewer 
children. 
- Population momentum. This 
means that population will grow 
in relation to the number of peo-
ple of child-bearing age. In Africa, 
he said, half the population is 
under 18. This is an aspect which 
has largely been ignored in tradi-
tional policies, because it was as-
sumed that nothing could be done 
about it. But delaying childbearing 
by a few years, for example by in-
creasing the age of marriage, 
could have a significant effect on 
fertility. Women with higher edu-
' The Rockefeller Foundation is a philan-
thropic organisation which has been active in 
population research for more than three 
decades. 
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cation levels tend to marry later 
and want fewer children. 
Case studies 
Lessons can be learned 
from Bangladesh, a developing 
country with a successful family 
planning story. There, the average 
desired family size is two, and con-
traceptive use is high. According to 
Dr Sajeda Amin, the bulk of future 
population growth will come from 
'population momentum'. The 
problem which remains to be tack-
led is the very low age of mar-
riage, with women often having 
their first child at 17 or 18. Oppor-
tunities must be provided for 
women to be something other 
than wives or mothers. Dr Amin 
cited the example of garment 
workers in Bangladesh, the vast 
majority of whom are female and 
very young (70% are aged 15-17). 
They have, he said, been a huge 
force for social change, providing 
an opportunity for young women 
to find a role outside the home, 
and bringing about a delay in mar-
riage. 
A less rosy picture emerged 
from a study carried out in a com-
munity in rural northern India. This 
found that health services were in-
accessible, with no infrastructure, 
and that there was a large unmet 
need for contraception. Here, ac-
cording to Professor Sonalde 
Desai, women were at the bottom 
of the social hierarchy, with little 
access to cash... or privacy! Health 
centres seemed in disarray, and in 
one village it took researchers 
three days to locate the assigned 
nurse midwife. There was mistrust 
between villagers and health 
workers, and evidence of elitism. 
In this context, it had been very 
difficult to provide reproductive 
health services. 
Yet another picture 
emerged from Kenya, where, ac-
cording to Dr Susan Watkins, a 
family planning programme has 
made modern contraception wide-
ly available. Yet she found cultural 
obstacles to contraceptive use in a 
rural community which is patriar-
chal and polygamous. Men often 
oppose contraceptives, fearing 
that their wives will be unfaithful, 
or will refuse to have more chil-
dren. She found a significant level 
of 'secret' birth control, with 
women concealing their contra-
ceptive use from husbands and 
families. 
The Asian 'tigers' 
Dr Andrew Mason was in-
volved in a project which set out 
to see whether population policies 
had a role to play in the economic 
performance of the Asian econom-
ic 'tigers' (Japan, Thailand, Singa-
pore, South Korea, Malaysia, In-
donesia, Taiwan and Hong Kong). 
Several of these countries started 
out in the late 1950s and early 
1960s with similar conditions to 
Wot so long ago, the idea of a planned 
population was very daring. ' 
many of today's developing states; 
low standards of living, few re-
sources and rapidly growing popu-
lations. The study found that the 
economic boom could not have 
happened if their populations had 
not stabilised. There was a nation-
al commitment to family planning, 
and the region experienced a 
more rapid fertility decline than 
anywhere else in the world. There 
were three important ways in 
which fertility decline influenced 
economic development. First, from 
the 1950s onwards, the percentage 
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of the total population working 
rose from 50% to 60%. Second, ac-
cess to education improved as fer-
tility fell since fewer births soon 
means fewer children entering 
school. Asian society places a high 
value on education and during the 
period, it was possible to allocate 
extra budgetary resources to this. 
Finally, there were high rates of 
saving and investment, directly re-
lated to population change. In 
short, with smaller families, Asian 
households can afford to save 
more. Also, in the absence of a so-
cial security system to cover one's 
retirement, and being less able to 
rely on one's children in old age, 
savings take on added importance. 
These Asian countries also have 
significant numbers of middle-
aged 'empty-nesters' with money 
to save. 
The question as to whether 
this experience could be replicated 
in other developing countries was 
answered with a resounding 'per-
haps'! The conclusion reached in 
the study was that successful fami-
ly planning programmes leading 
to smaller families provide a 'win-
dow of opportunity', but are not 
enough in themselves. Other fac-
tors are needed, such as an export 
promotion policy, investment in 
education, and investment incen-
tives. 
The Navrongo Experiment 
The Navrongo project - or, to give it its correct name, the 
Navrongo Health and Research Centre (NHRC) - has become fa-
mous in Africa, as a model of how family planning policy can work, 
even in the most challenging of environments. 
Fertility and mortality levels in sub-Saharan Africa rank among the 
highest in the world. But little was known about how to deliver family 
planning on the ground in areas with severe economic, social and eco-
logical obstacles. Ghana's Ministry of Health designated Navrongo as a 
special experimental area. The setting is a poor and isolated tradition-
al community, in a remote rural part of Northern Ghana, with high in-
fant and child mortality, high fertility rates and extremely poor health 
conditions. There were cultural and gender barriers to family plan-
ning, with women being regarded as men's 'property'.Traditionally, 
family planning advice was aimed at women, leaving men misin-
formed. The problem was summed up by a Navrongo woman: 
'You have to tell the man about family planning. If he doesn't accept, 
then the woman won't agree either. That's the problem we have in 
our homes. Many of us don't know what to do if you don't accept the 
husband's decision, and don't know where to go to prevent yourself 
from giving birth. When he comes to you in the night, and you open 
your mouth about family planning, he will beat you. Please help us so 
that we can reach our husbands.' 
Dr Nazzar described the successful strategy of dialogue with the chiefs 
and elders to find out their needs, and the obstacles that would have 
to be overcome. In this way, the village leaders were involved in the 
process. For instance they were to be responsible for putting up the 
health clinic building, while the project would provide staff and train 
local people. 
Since the project was set up in 1994, it has been expanded to sur-
rounding districts. Use of family planning services has increased from 
0% to 15%. Representatives from other African countries have visited 
to learn from what has happened at Navrongo. 
There are salutary lessons to be learned from the project. It shows that 
family planning can succeed even in the most adverse conditions, if 
there is consultation with community leaders in planning and execu-
tion, if they are assigned a meaningful role, and if the service is deliv-
ered in a culturally sensitive way. 
Threatened resources 
What effects do large pop-
ulations have on the ecology? Is 
there a link between environmen-
tal scarcity and civil violence? Dr 
Thomas Homer-Dixon of Toronto 
University concluded from his 
study of 15 cases of civil strife, that 
scarcities of critical resources may 
directly contribute to civil conflict. 
As increasing numbers of people 
compete for the same resources, 
quarrels often arise over resource-
sharing. Some people get more 
than their fair share, while others 
are frustrated. Grievances then 
emerge and demands increase on 
the state to resolve these. Over 
time, the credibility of the state 
may be undermined and, in ex-
treme cases, it may collapse alto-
gether. 
Dr Eric Jensen spoke about 
the effect on children of family 
size, and the intriguing question 
of 'wantededness'; that is, 
whether or not the mother want-
ed the child at conception. Evi-
dence from a survey carried out in 
the Philippines shows that 'un-
wanted' children have a higher 
chance of falling ill than other chil-
dren. The larger the family size, 
the less likely it was that the child's 
illness would be treated. 
Defining commercial sex as 
'sex provided primarily in ex-
change for money, gifts or 
favours', Professor Dennis Ahlburg 
stressed that the commercial sex 
industry represented a major 
health concern. Policies aimed at 
eradicating it had little effect, and 
indeed might increase the health 
risks by driving it underground. 
While the economic motivation is 
so strong - commercial sex pays 
dramatically more than alternative 
occupations - there is little point 
in policies aimed at the retraining 
of sex workers. Professor Ahlberg 
concluded that what was needed 
was more information, greater 
availability of low <sost condoms, 
and improved education and eco-
nomic alternatives for girls. ■■ D.M. 
t 
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by Mohammad Allie* 
Controversial South African 
cricket organiser, Ali Bacher, 
who once helped organise 
'rebel tours' by foreign 
teams willing to break the 
international sports boycott 
against apartheid, now has 
his eyes on the whole of 
Africa. The energetic Dr 
Bacher believes the potential 
is enormous. He wants South 
Africa to act as a launch-pad 
for the game throughout the 
continent, providing crucial 
opportunities, guidance and 
support for emerging cricket-
ing nations. 'People used to 
say Africans only participate 
in soccer and athletics, but 
that's because they have not been 
given the opportunity to play crick-
et,' says Bacher, who is chief execu-
tive of the United Cricket Board of 
South Africa (UCBSA). 
To divert criticisms of his 
boycott-busting tours, he used to 
persuade foreign players to under-
take training stints in South 
African townships. Since the end 
of white rule, he has done much 
for black cricket in the country. 
'We have seen, by virtue of the 
fact that we have taken the game 
to the townships, that black peo-
ple have a wonderful feel for the 
game,' he says. 'They have the 
rhythm, coordination and aptitude 
and can perform with excellence.' 
His board believes strongly 
that the game should be nurtured 
across the continent, in the inter-
ests of South African and world 
cricket. Coaches have already been 
sent to Tanzania, Uganda and 
Malawi, where the sport has ex-
panded beyond the Asian and 
British communities. Players are 
being invited to South African 
cricket schools, and teams from 
other nations are taking part in 
domestic competitions. 'It's all part 
of providing opportunities for new 
cricketers and creating a culture 
where Africans can play the game', 
says Bacher, who is a medical doc-
* South African freelance journalist and Cape 
Town correspondent for the BBC's Africa Ser-
vice. Article from Gemini News Service, 9 White 
Lion Street, London, UK, NI 9PD. 
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tor and former national team cap-
tain. Soccer may be the main sport 
in Africa today but he believes 
that a climate can be created in 
the coming years which will allow 
players of the class of Brian Lara 
and Sachin Tendulkar to emerge 
and 'become world cricketing gi-
ants'. 
His optimism is based on 
the success of the Board's outreach 
programmes in recent years to 
promote what was very much a 
'white' game among young black 
people. Cricket is now probably 
the third most popular sport in the 
townships after soccer and boxing. 
Dr Bacher travelled to 
Kenya recently, and reports 'I saw 
tremendous potential there. I 
spoke to the government, who 
said that whereas they previously 
saw athletics as the sport to bring 
fame and glory to Kenya, they 
now recognise cricket as having 
the ability to do the same.' This is 
especially true since Kenya's victo-
ry over the mighty West Indies in 
last year's World Cup, and the 
team's excellent performance in 
this year's trophy tournament for 
countries not involved in test 
matches. 
Rising stars from several 
countries are being invited to at-
tend South Africa's respected Plas-
con Academy and other cricketing 
schools. 'We have invited Kenya's 
Thomas Odoyo, who is a very tal-
ented all-rounder, together with 
Peter Bungwa, a promising young 
off-spinner from Uganda, says 
Bacher. 'It's a wonderful opportu-
nity for any young cricketer to 
come to the academy to be 
coached by greats like Clive Rice 
and Hylton Ackerman.' Young 
players will also receive advice on 
how to deal with the pressures of 
international cricket, such as 'how 
to handle the media, how to talk 
on television, understanding the 
psychology of cricket and the ef-
fects of drugs and alcohol on per-
formance.' 
Efforts to build the game 
were boosted through last year's 
formation of the African Cricket 
Association. Its chairman, Krish 
Mackerdhuj, who is also President 
of UCBSA, says: 'It took us a few 
years, but we are pleased that we 
now have the forces of African 
cricket together.' Four organisa-
tional 'nerve centres' have been 
set up - in Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbab-
we and South Africa. 'We must 
arrange activities in cricket from 
grassroots level around the cen-
tres. Then we must pick represen-
tatives under 15 years old from 
these regions and get them to-
gether at a centralised tourna-
ment,' says Mackerdhuj. 'We have 
learned from experience that if 
you cannot develop youth cricket, 
you have no future. You also have 
to create the infrastructure to 
move to test status.' He concedes 
that organisers in less wealthy re-
gions might struggle financially to 
set up facilities, but argues that 
there are ways of reducing costs, 
particularly on expensive turf wick-
ets. 'Our experience is that you 
don't need these', he said. 'You 
can lay down a cement pitch with 
an artificial wicket and then play 
in any type of weather. We have 
laid about a thousand of these 
wickets throughout the country. 
You just need a cement company 
and some industrialists to become 
involved and you are on your way.' 
One important aim now is 
to spread the game beyond the 
former British colonies. There has 
already been interest from Egypt. 
Mackerdhuj adds: 'We need to 
take the game to the Francophone 
countries, even it if means translat-
ing the rule book into French.' H 
M .A. 
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agri-foodstuff enterprises 
by J.J. Malgloire Bazabana and Paul C. Bom Konde" 
In both the northern and 
southern hemispheres, small 
businesses are the 'in' thing, 
arousing the growing inter-
est of public authorities, de-
velopment organisations and 
researchers. However, the 
emergence and proliferation 
of small businesses over the 
last few years has often 
been regarded as destructur-
ing production systems and 
weakening the industrial 
fabric. We maintain, on the 
contrary, that the establish-
ment of numerous small production 
units is a form of entrepreneurship 
that creates economic dynamism. 
And whatever one's view about 
this, the trend is having at least one 
benefit: the recognition of small, 
and even extremely small, enterpris-
es as valid and productive organisa-
tions. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, it is 
these small agri-foodstuff enter-
prises (SAEs) that ensure the mar-
kets get their supplies of basic 
foods. For example, there are 
40,000 SAEs working in the maize 
* Research economists with CIRAD/SAR (Cen-
tre for International Cooperation in Agronomi-
cal Research for Development/Department for 
Rural and Agri-foodstuffs Systems) in Montpel-
lier, France. 
Technical Centre for 
Agricultural and Rural 
Cooperation (CTA), 
Postbus 380, 
6700 AJ Wageningen, 
The Netherlands 
Tel. (31)317 467100 
Fax (31)317 460067 
E-mail cta@cta-nl 
Î 
processing sector in Cotonou 
(Benin), 20,000 in the catering sec-
tor alone in Dakar (Senegal), and 
3,000 in the production of chik-
wangue in Brazzaville (Congo). 
The key role played by these enter-
prises in satisfying the needs of 
local markets, creating jobs and 
stimulating the agricultural sector 
raises certain questions - not just 
about the support mechanisms 
needed to help improve their per-
formance, but also about what is 
needed to encourage people to set 
them up in the first place. 
The advantages gained 
from the proximity and network 
structure of localised activities (en-
terprises, banking, training/re-
search institutions, NGOs and local 
groups) is an economic theme that 
has seen a resurgence of interest. 
This appears to give rise to new 
opportunities in areas - such as 
training, dissemination of informa-
tion, logistics, financing and im-
proving product quality - which 
could help consolidate SAEs. Be-
fore considering any schemes to 
strengthen small agri-foodstuff en-
terprises, we first need to look at 
the elements that characterise this 
particular type of business. In 
short, we need to examine the 
way they are organised and how 
they work. 
Entrepreneurs and their 
operations 
Small agri-foodstuff enter-
prises in Africa tend to be ex-
tremely small, the size of the 
workforce ranging from 1 to 10 in-
dividuals. They are set up through 
the motivation of one or more in-
dividuals who decide to produce 
and sell a given product. Numer-
ous case studies show that women 
are omnipresent in running such 
activities. Some enterprises make 
only one type of product, either 
finished or intermediate. Examples 
of finished products made by SAEs 
include chikwangue, gari, fufú, 
bobolo, mintoumba and miondo. 
Among the intermediate products 
one finds netetou, grain and 
maize flour, dry chicory roots and 
cassava flour. Other enterprises are 
involved in a much wider range of 
activities which combine individual 
processing and group operations 
(associations of processors and 
caterers). Associations such as 
AFRES (Senegal), Rinoodo (Burkina 
Faso), and UTRAFEL (Benin) bring 
together businesses in the catering 
industry which then tender for 
contracts to supply the food for 
events such as festivals, fairs, sym-
posia and conferences. The num-
ber of people working in these as-
sociations ranges from 5 to 175. 
SAEs increase their added 
value according to the strategies 
they implement. In addition to the 
aforementioned dual approach -
working individually and in groups 
- the activities of small agr.i-food-
stuff enterprises in Africa are to 
some extent characterised by spe-
cialisation: supplying the market 
with specific products made using 
specific techniques and know-how 
within a specific organisational en-
vironment. 
Originality of products 
In contrast to the products 
offered by mass production, small 
African agri-foodstuff businesses 
offer the market a huge variety of 
different and essentially local 
products. Since eating habits vary 
widely from one region to anoth-
er, these products tend to be ex-
tremely 'culture-specific'. 
Today, for example, over 
40 different products are obtained 
from cassava processing in Benin. 
Likewise, Cameroon boasts 12 
ways of preparing cassava and 23 
methods for processing maize. So, 
in addition to the sheer diversity 
of products, there is also a tenden-
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cy towards local specialities. The 
best known of these are chik-
wangue and fufu in the Congo, at-
tiéké in Côte d'Ivoire, bobolo in 
Cameroon and nére or nététou in 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal and 
Mali. A large number of products 
are also specific to certain towns, 
villages or regions, for example 
mintoumba, ndolé and mböngö 
(Cameroon). The quality of these 
products, and the way they are 
made, are inextricably linked to 
the land from which they are pro-
duced, to environmental and social 
circumstances, and to the mastery 
of certain skills. Taking these as-
pects into account, it is not diffi-
cult to see why small agri-food-
stuff enterprises cater for such a 
segmented market. 
African SAEs offer products 
for a variety of purposes. These in-
clude: 
- 'Ready-to-eat' items, current con-
sumption of which extends well 
beyond national borders, (recent 
years have seen the development 
of intra-African exports): 
'Ready-to-cook' intermediate 
products. Various constraints 
(time, practical circumstances, and 
so forth) mean that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to prepare 
certain products in towns. With 
continuing demand, this has re-
sulted in the development of a 
market for intermediate products 
and thus encourages the setting 
up of other small enterprises. The 
production of paste to make chik-
wangue in Congo-Brazzaville and 
of fermented maize starter to 
make yoghurts in Benin (akpan) 
are examples of such products: 
- Products for the export market. 
These are particularly important 
because they have the potential to 
place small firms within the dy-
namic of the world economy. The 
argument that small African agri-
foodstuff enterprises set their 
sights solely on the local market is 
no longer valid. Continually ex-
panding export potential proves 
that SAEs are competitive, at both 
a national and international level. 
Chikwangue from Congo-Brazzav-
ille and N'dolé from Cameroon are 
just two examples of products 
which have been widely exported 
to Europe over recent years. 
Organisational 
framework 
To achieve their objectives, 
African SAEs structure their activi-
ties within external and local social 
frameworks. One aim of opera-
tions of this type is to reduce 
transaction costs. As far as the en-
trepreneur is concerned, it involves 
making use of social organisations 
and relationships (friends, family, 
tontines, economic interest group-
ings - EIGs) to obtain services free 
of charge or at a reduced cost, the 
transactions being based on rule-
based rights and obligations estab-
lished by the community. Anyone 
benefiting from someone else's 
services is then under an obliga-
tion to do the same for that per-
son if it is requested of him. If he 
does not comply with the rules, he 
runs the risk of some form of sanc-
tion (exclusion from the communi-
ty, payment of a fine, etc.). Entre-
preneurs therefore act according 
to a philosophy whereby 'if you 
scratch my back, I'll scratch yours'. 
For example, apprentice-
ship based on indigenous tech-
nologies does not involve any form 
of monetary payment. Instead, a 
The processors get together to form an associa-
tion and entrust the fruits of their labour to a 
haulage contractor who then guarantees 
to sell their products 
friend or family member is asked 
to provide training. The fact that 
the service is offered free is per-
fectly acceptable since training 
does not cost anything. What is of 
fundamental importance, howev-
er, is whether or not the appren-
tice has the ability to learn the rel-
evant skills and whether or not the 
teacher can offer him a high stan-
dard of training. 
Studies carried out in cer-
tain African countries (Congo-
Brazzaville, Cameroon, Senegal, 
Benin and Burkina Faso) reveal a 
veritable network of small enter-
prises processing and selling agri-
foodstuffs. Within these organisa-
tions the determining factor as 
regards cooperation is social prox-
imity, the networks creating an in-
terdependence between all those 
involved. This interdependence 
can be seen in the supply of raw 
materials, in the provision of funds 
and in the movement of finished 
and intermediate products. As far 
as SAEs are concerned, organising 
themselves into networks is a gen-
uine means of enhancing the value 
of basic agricultural produce. 
Associations such as 
nsalasani (Congo) or yum 
(Cameroon) are systems which 
offer mutual aid to their associates 
by rotating the workload. Thus, 
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work in the fields (on fallow land, 
ploughing, harvesting) and pro-
duction activities in SAEs (process-
ing products) is carried out within 
organisations where each individ-
ual benefits in turn from the ser-
vices offered by the other partici-
pants, with the latter then being 
discharged from the obligation of 
having to pay any money when 
the favour is returned. 
The same is true of selling 
products. The processors get to-
gether to form an association and 
entrust the fruits of their labour to 
a haulage contractor who then 
guarantees to sell their products. 
Associates confined to villages can 
thus significantly reduce transport 
costs and avoid the expense of ac-
commodation in the towns. This, 
in turn, makes the whole business 
of selling products much more effi-
cient. In Congo-Brazzaville, small 
cassava-processing enterprises are 
similarly organised. 
Production techniques 
and know-how 
The productive capacity of 
SAEs mobilises local know-how 
and technical resources. 
Firstly, SAEs or, more accu-
rately, their proprietors, rely on 
the wealth of knowledge available 
in a village, town or region. The 
extent of this knowledge depends 
on the variety of products avail-
able in a given area. The greater 
the variety, the more complex the 
mastery of the skills needed to 
produce them. This development is 
especially noticeable in the major 
urban areas of Africa. 
Secondly, in most cases, 
SAEs mobilise industrial, semi-in-
dustrial and traditional craft tech-
niques, with entrepreneurs gain-
ing their knowledge from 
relationships forged through or-
ganisations such as EIGs. However, 
those enterprises that acquire 
modern techniques come up 
against training problems. Al-
though cooperation agreements 
between entrepreneurs can play 
an important role as far as training 
is concerned (for example, in 
milling), the use of certain 'ready-
to-use' imported techniques often 
involves self-taught skills. 
Financing methods 
As a general rule, the 
foodstuffs industry is financed 
from outside the banking system, 
with small enterprises relying on 
financing arrangements based on 
proximity. Those involved have re-
course to three sources of finance: 
the family, personal resources, and 
savings, and rotary credit associa-
tions (tontines). 
Within the family, funds 
are obtained directly from rela-
tives, investment funds being ad-
vanced by the head of the family 
to his spouse, by a son to his moth-
er, an aunt to her niece, a son-in-
law to his mother-in-law, and so 
on. 
Tontines provide the main 
form of financial support for SAEs, 
offering a set-up whereby zero-
cost credit can be negotiated. It is 
an efficient system - although the 
efficiency must be seen in relative 
terms since a proprietor needs to 
belong to a tontine before he can 
obtain any credit from it. More-
over, the amount given to the par-
ticipant may be less than the total 
investment required for the partic-
ular activity being set up. This fi-
nancial limitation means that en-
trepreneurs tend to seek finance 
for activities in sectors which use 
low-cost traditional technologies. 
SAEs need to be 
strengthened 
Whether we choose to 
praise small agri-foodstuff enter-
prises or condemn them, their 
weaknesses as well as their 
strengths need to be taken into ac-
count. Small enterprises need to 
In most cases, SAEs mobilise industrial, 
semi-industrial and traditional craft techniques 
become more efficient by being 
prepared for change. This means 
that they have to be innovative 
within their particular markets and 
efficient in terms of production, 
not to mention being able to ex-
ploit the ever-expanding opening 
of internal and international fron-
tiers. It is no longer a question of 
reflecting on the enterprising spirit 
and culture of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Small agri-foodstuff enterprises 
are now very much part of the 
African economy, enabling agricul-
tural produce, especially perish-
ables, to be exploited on their own 
territory and making it possible for 
towns to be supplied with prod-
ucts that are suited to local eating 
habits and of the same quality as is 
found in their area of origin. 
The state, development or-
ganisations, local authorities, fi-
nancial institutions and other asso-
ciations, all have a role to play in 
supporting the dynamic impetus of 
agri-foodstuff enterprises. Public 
authorities, especially, need to 
support and promote the excep-
tional innovative potential of 
SAEs, particularly in the context of 
regional development. However, 
the fact that many production 
areas in sub-Saharan Africa are 
landlocked constitutes a major ob-
stacle to the development of these 
enterprises. 
As regards apprenticeship, 
training schemes that reflect the 
requirements of the entrepreneurs 
need to be put in place. The main 
concern for these institutions 
should be to rely on local skills for 
& 
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processing agri-foodstuffs. Sche-
mes designed to disseminate 
knowledge must also take account 
of the profiles of the group of en-
trepreneurs seeking to be trained, 
and the nature and development 
of the techniques used (tradition-
al, modern, semi-industrial, etc.) 
As for financing, it is not 
the usual practice of banking insti-
tutions in Africa to provide SAE 
funding. According to some ana-
lysts, obstacles preventing entre-
preneurs from having access to 
banks' services include the lack of 
education of those concerned and 
the fact that operations are largely 
on a cottage industry scale (using a 
casual workforce). The tontine 
model could offer a significant 
source of inspiration for the vari-
ous participants, but efforts are 
also needed from businesspeople 
to establish accessible banking sys-
tems. Management experiments 
carried out in Congo have shown 
that it is quite possible for banks 
to work together with tontines 
and NGOs. The banks can offer 
credit to the NGOs or the tontines, 
and the latter, in turn, are able to 
lend funds to individual partici-
pants in the financing scheme. In 
Senegal, an offshoot of Enda Graf 
Sahel, the Caisse d'Epargne et de 
Crédit du Grand Yoff (Dakar) has 
brought together nearly 8000 
savers. It has done away with in-
termediate banking transactions 
and stepped up investment by 
buying and stockpiling supplies 
which it then seeks to offer to its 
customers at preferential rates. 
Small entrepreneurs can then get 
credit in kind, in the shape of raw 
materials, without having to go 
through banking channels. 
Whether customer/NGO or 
customer/NGO/bank relations can 
stand the test of time depends 
very much on the sort of trust-
based relationships that are made 
possible by geographical and social 
proximity. 
As for research, SAE re-
quirements involve various tech-
niques in a wide range of sectors, 
involving matters as diverse as 
storage needs, and the appropri-
ate cooking implements. Research 
must also be aimed at improving 
products and production process-
es, with efforts needed across the 
board in this respect (covering re-
gions, towns and rural areas). Any 
programme planning in the con-
text of decentralised regional poli-
cies must take account of the 
human and material resources 
available in each area. Research ac-
tivities should be seen as all the 
more important given that SAEs 
cannot easily make independent 
investments in the design develop-
ment of certain items of equip-
ment. They could do worse than 
follow the example of the innova-
tive experiments carried out by 
CERNA (University of Benin, Coto-
nou). This institute has designed 
equipment and improved the tra-
ditional aklui by promoting a dried 
product that can be exported. Sim-
ilarly, the LBTA/CNRST has installed 
machinery in Burkina Faso which 
processes dried nére. 
Measures need to be taken 
with respect to the entrepreneurs 
so that their activities are in tune 
with both national and interna-
tional markets. Thus, product pro-
motion could be carried out by 
agencies which would promote 
local products, and information 
could be made available so that 
the entrepreneurs could keep up 
abreast of which markets are 
buoyant. As far back as 1948, 
Japan developed policies to sup-
port its small enterprises, creating 
the MITI agency. One of MITI's ob-
jectives was to enable small firms 
to be integrated into international 
trade markets. 
Lastly, local authorities also 
have a role to play in the develop-
ment of 'proximity' institutions. 
Recognising that decentralised 
government bodies are more ac-
cessible to small enterprises and 
entrepreneurs, the idea is that 
these institutions would provide 
auxiliary or back-up services. The 
local authorities need to create a 
dynamic economic environment. A 
specific example of the way they 
could do this is by channelling a 
large proportion of official pur-
chases through small enterprises 
which supply school cantines and 
barracks with processed cassava 
products (such as chikwangue and 
saka-saka). 
From the point of view of 
local development, it is absolutely 
vital that an enterprise culture is 
encouraged and nurtured. We 
would even go as far as to say that 
all those responsible for promot-
ing local development activities 
should themselves be prepared to 
undergo an 'apprenticeship' in re-
gional management. 
In conclusion, given the 
available agri-foodstuff resources, 
it is not exaggerating to say that 
SAEs in Africa have a huge poten-
tial. These niches for development 
within the technology and agri-
foodstuffs sectors are supported 
by social networks - whose effec-
tiveness depends on the correct 
application of community rules 
throughout all stages of the enter-
prise process. Changes in products, 
processes and techniques resulting 
from innovation, and the phenom-
enon of globalisation (which, in 
the agri-foodstuffs industry, is 
characterised by a return to 
'wholesome' local products), point 
the way to the kind of support 
measures needed for those estab-
lishing and running SAEs in Africa. 
The prospects for these SAEs, in 
terms of increasing their added 
value, should then be extremely 
promising. Far from being a mere 
passing fashion, the development 
of SAEs is a vast arena which may 
well shape the eating habits of 
consumers in the next century. MM 
J.J.M.B. & P.C.B.K. 
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Sustainable resources management in the Pacific 
For two years, the CDI has been providing sustained support for the wood industry in the ACP countries of 
the South Pacific. Twenty five companies have received assistance to diversify their activities and extend 
their commercial sphere of influence. As a follow-up to these positive results, the CDI has just organised an 
Industrial Partnership Meeting in Nadi (Fiji). 
With 90% of their 
surface area covered by 
woodland, forestry re-
sources valorise the 
economies of the ACP 
countries of the South Pa-
cific at international level. 
The forestry industry devel-
oped in these countries 
mainly in response to significant 
demand in South East Asia, Korea 
and Japan. Strengthening the pro-
cessing sector for finished or semi-
finished products for export to 
these same markets - but also for 
Europe - is a promising prospect 
for these island countries. 
The industrial partnership 
meeting organised by the CDI in 
Fiji from 29 September to 2 Octo-
ber 1996 was designed to promote 
this potential and involve Euro-
pean companies. Around thirty of 
these, selected on the basis of the 
products they processed and mar-
keted throughout the world, ex-
pressed an interest in the potential 
of this region located in the an-
tipodes. They attended the Nadi 
meeting by invitation of the CDI. 
24 companies from the 
South Pacific region - from the is-
lands of Papua New Guinea, Fiji, 
the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanu-
atu and Samoa - were selected for 
the meeting by virtue of their ca-
pacity to respond to the demands 
of the regional and European mar-
kets. The three main strands of the 
wood sector, the size of which 
varies between countries, were 
represented: initial processing, 
semi-finished products (joists, ve-
neering, plywood, moulding...) 
and finished products (fittings, in-
door and garden furniture). 
From timber to finished 
product 
In Papua New Guinea and 
the Solomon Islands, forestry is of 
major economic importance. De-
forestation, often carried out by 
Asian companies with concessions, 
accounts for a considerable pro-
portion of the financial resources 
of the two countries. However, an 
increasingly successful processing 
Melcoffee, Vanuatu 
Plantation of Endosplemum, a wood specific to 
the South Pacific, the lightness and solidity of 
which are particularly valued for the manufacture 
of mouldings and sections 
CDI 
The Centre for the Development of Indus-
try (CDI) is a joint ACP-EU institution creat-
ed in the framework of the Lomé Conven-
tion linking the European Union with the 
71 ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacif-
ic). Its objective is to support the creation, 
expansion and restructuring of industrial 
companies in ACP countries. To this effect, 
the Centre promotes partnerships be-
tween ACP and European companies. 
These partnerships may take various 
forms: financial, technical and commercial 
partnerships, management contracts, li-
censing or franchise agreements, sub-con-
tracting, etc. 
Editor: 
Mr. Surendra Sharma, 
Director of the CDI. 
Avenue Herrmann Debroux, 52 
B-1160 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel.:+32 2 679 18 11 
Fax: + 32 2 675 26 03 
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The economic 
Country 
Papua New Guinea 
Fiji 
Solomon Islands 
Vanuatu 
Samoa 
Tonga 
importance of the wood industry in ACP countries of the South Pacific 
Population 
(1993) 
-
4,056,000 
771,000 
342,000 
161,000 
170,000 
98,000 
Surface area 
0 Total 
462,800 
18,300 
28,400 
12,300 
2,900 
700 
Forests 
423,000(91%) 
11,900(65%) 
22,000 (77%) 
8,700(71%) 
1,100(38%) 
80 (11 %) 
GNP 1993 
(mECU) 
Total 
2,817 1,745 
1,258 538 
190 143 
151 21 
143 8 
104 14 
Exports 1995 
(mECU) 
Wood sector 
290.846(17%) 
31.759 (6%) 
70.731 (49%) 
2.059(10%) 
0.347 (4%) 
0.005 (0%) 
industry is beginning to take shape 
there in parallel. 
Other countries, such as Fiji 
and Vanuatu, have a more diversi-
fied economic fabric and a propor-
tionally more developed wood in-
dustry. To meet their own needs, 
these islands have built up local 
competence in treating and pro-
cessing wood. Their industries 
have reached a level of quality and 
production capacity that should 
enable them to move beyond the 
regional context and acquire 
greater market shares in powerful 
neighbouring countries such as 
Japan and Australia. 
Diversifying sources of 
supply 
The wood industry in the 
South Pacific is likely to offer many 
benefits to European companies. 
For timber and certain semi-fin-
ished products - such as joists - the 
region offers interesting potential 
in terms of diversified sources of 
supply. This factor will be worth 
considering all the more in the fu-
ture when resources become more 
scarce in traditional supplier coun-
tries such as Malaysia and Indone-
sia. 
'We have to anticipate 
market trends', stresses a French 
importer of semi-finished products 
intended for the construction in-
dustry. 'In France, we can expect a 
recovery and an increase in the 
volume of demand in the building 
industry, which has been in a 
trough for the last few years. That 
is why we are keen to participate 
in meetings of this type. They en-
able us to assess the region's possi-
bilities for diversifying our supplies 
and at the same time gain specific 
knowledge of the quality of local 
species and products.' 
The example of the gubas 
white wood 
ACP countries of the South 
Pacific have very unusual wood 
with a high international commer-
cial value. An example is gubas 
(scientific name, Endospermum 
Medullosum - a member of the 
Euphorbiaceae family). This is a 
white wood which is both light 
and very homogeneous, and it 
grows naturally in Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, the Solomons and 
Vanuatu. Its features make it an 
¡deal material for the manufacture 
of mouldings or joists and it could 
be a serious rival to similar, more 
widely known tropical woods such 
as the African ay'ous or the Indone-
sian ramin. 
The success of Melcoffee 
Sawmill, which has been farming 
and processing gubas for some 
years, and has received CDI sup-
port, confirms the commercial po-
tential of this type of wood. This 
company from Vanuatu currently 
exports almost 90% of its produc-
tion to Japan and New Caledonia. 
Furthermore, certain 
species from the South Pacific, 
such as local varieties of teak, 
which are similar in botanical 
terms to other species known and 
already farmed in other tropical 
regions, also have specific features 
that could provide a commercial 
added value. In this respect, there 
are still many possibilities for for-
Joinery construction, Vanuatu 
The quality of finished products opens the gates 
to large surrounding markets cdi-partnership 
est and industrial experimentation 
in the South Pacific. 
Sub-contracting for large 
European distribution 
chains 
The technical skills ac-
quired by certain companies in the 
wood industry in countries of this 
region have enabled them to suc-
cessfully establish themselves in 
the international market for fin-
ished products, particularly in the 
furniture sector. The Fijian compa-
nies Che International and Starest 
Furniture respectively supply sofas 
to the Swedish Ikea chain and 
parts for garden furniture to the 
German firm Bula. 
Company visits gave Euro-
pean participants the opportunity 
to discover the technological ca-
pacity of local firms and the quali-
ty of the products offered. In this 
respect, some hotels and public 
buildings, where furniture was fit-
ted in situ, are permanent show-
cases. The hotel Méridien in Port-
Vila is fitted with furniture made 
by the company Santo Joinery 
(Vanuatu) and the University of 
the South Pacific (Fiji) is supplied, 
among others, by the Fijian com-
pany Popular Furniture. 
A CDI reference 
guide to the wood 
industry in the 
South Pacific 
The 24 companies of the 
South Pacific chosen to take 
part in the meeting organised 
by the CD! are spread between 
Fiji (10), Papua New Guinea (4), 
the Solomon Islands (4), 
Vanuatu (3), Samoa (2) and 
Tonga (1). 
Information on the situation of 
the wood industry in these six 
countries and a detailed de-
scription of the companies in-
vited - production per species 
and turnover, equipment, staff 
employed, main clients and 
markets, etc. - may be found in 
the technical report prepared 
for the occasion. 
Î 
A sizeable aim: 
renew the forests 
The renewal of forest re-
sources is one of the major chal-
lenges facing the wood industry, 
and the ACP countries of the 
South Pacific are no exception. If 
sustainable solutions enabling the 
renewal of forestry resources are 
not implemented, entire sectors of 
the economy could in fact be 
paralysed by a blanket ban on 
farming, as already occurred on 
the island of Erromango (Vanuatu) 
in 1994. 
Some of the large timber 
exporters such as Papua New 
Guinea are currently implementing 
a code of practice in the forestry 
sector, which is supervised by the 
Société Générale de Surveillance 
(SGS). Companies of the South Pa-
cific are, on the whole, becoming 
more aware of this issue. Over and 
above national regulations forcing 
them to consider this question, 
they realise that good manage-
Starest Furniture, Eiji. which 
makes parts for garden furniture 
for the German company. Bula. 
ment of forestry resources and im-
plementation of a pro-active refor-
estation policy can give a commer-
cial added value to wood-related 
products. 'European public opinion 
is increasingly concerned with the 
environment, and we have to take 
this into account,' says a commer-
cial manager from the Bula com-
pany, a German importer of parts 
for garden furniture produced in 
Fiji using the famous locally grown 
mahogany. 'The ecological label 
under which we sell our products 
is an essential component of their 
quality for our buyers'. 
The reference to renew-
able sources appears increasingly 
in the specifications of European 
importers for tropical wood, even 
though this requirement is not yet 
as widespread as it is for supplies 
from Europe or North America. ■■ 
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markets 
Japan, Taiwan and Korea, are next door to the 
wooded countries of the South Pacific. As they 
have no real forestry resources, these countries 
have a high demand and so provide neighbouring 
ACP companies with significant outlets for finished 
and semi-finished products. This potential has not 
escaped the notice of partners attending the Nadi 
Meeting. 
In 1995, the six countries of the South Paci-
fic represented at Nadi (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu and Samoa) 
exported a total of 450 million dollars in wood 
products. Almost 95% of these exports were to 
Japan, Korea or countries of South East Asia. Al-
though manufactured products accounted for bet-
ween only 5% to 10%, the fact that there are com-
mercial links with large Asian consumer markets is 
an asset worth capitalising upon, especially in the 
processed wood sector. 
Valebagosa - Fiji 
Forestry farming satisfies a considerable demand 
in certain neighbouring countries of Asia 
with scant forestry resources 
South Seas Timber, Fiji 
Strategy of alliances 
The director of a Belgian company produ-
cing wooden articles for domestic use (kitchen 
utensils, decorations, toys), a very keen participant 
at the Nadi Meeting, believes that 'the type of pro-
duct that we market in Europe could well find si-
gnificant outlets in this part of the world. If these 
prospects were confirmed, genuine partnerships 
for production could be established. And this type 
of link is undoubtedly more attainable with small 
companies in the South Pacific than with the large 
groups that have traditionally marketed tropical 
wood from Asia'. 
The level of expertise in some local firms 
could be another recipe for success. The know-
how developed on-site for farming wood from spe-
cific species could also enable us to diversify our 
range of products', continues the industrialist. 'This 
would be all the more beneficial as it would give us 
more direct access to the markets in the east of the 
United States where we are already present today'. 
CDI contacts 
Jordi Tió Rottlan, responsible for the wood industry 
in the Technical Services and EU Network Division 
Peter Ailing, responsible for the South Pacific re-
gion in the Projects and ACP Network Division 
The strategic position of ACP countries in 
the region - both Australia and New Zealand are 
on the Southern edge - could transform them into 
the hub of the region. 'American white wood, very 
much appreciated by the Japanese and Koreans, 
could, for example, transit through processing fac-
tories in the South Pacific if it were to develop ex-
pertise adapted to Asian demand', believes Guido 
Houben, the CDI consultant involved in preparing 
the Meeting. 'Over and above commercial agree-
ments, European companies have an interesting 
card to play with wood companies located in these 
countries. The skilled workforces, coupled with 
their geographical location, could make them ideal 
launchpads for a rapidly expanding regional mar-
ket'. 
Furniture Exports - Papua New Guinea 
The specific features of the wood, quality of the workforce, and geographical 
situation are all assets that help to promote partnerships with Europe 
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Suriname 
ARTLINE combines more with better 
By focusing on quality, ARTLINE gradually achieved a model transi-
tion from a cottage industry to industrialisation. This SME, with 37 
employees and a turnover of one million US dollars, produces 'made-
to-measure' integrated furniture using state-of-the-art CAD tech-
nologies. 
ARTLINE, located in 
Paramaribo (Suriname) 
since 1991 and well estab-
lished in the local market, 
specialises in the manufac-
ture of kitchens, bathrooms 
and integrated office furni-
ture. This 'made-to-mea-
sure' work - from design through 
to installation - has seen impres-
sive growth in just a few years. 
Such success was due to the ability 
of management to control the 
growth of the company, invest in 
technological development and 
pay constant attention to quality. 
In 1993, when its annual 
turnover was $200,000, ARTLINE 
saw new opportunities in the de-
velopment of the tourist industry. 
The company could only take 
these on board if it expanded. Lee 
Sack Fong, the company director, 
invested ECU 500,000 in new build-
Furniture made byARTUNE 
ings and equipment. With CDI sup-
port, it received expert assistance 
for the management of its produc-
tion. For ten weeks, an expert 
helped management to develop 
new production and planned man-
agement methods, and train exec-
utives for these key posts. Produc-
tivity increased and ARTLINE was 
able to meet a big order for 80 
beds for the Torarica Hotel. The 
furniture was manufactured using 
panels imported from Europe 
(United Kingdom, Ireland, the 
Netherlands) and the United States 
and finished, on-the-spot, with a 
layer of paint specially suited to 
the climate. 
Focusing on technology 
In 1995, ARTLINE further 
increased its rhythm of production 
and adopted CAD (computer as-
sisted design) technology. Again 
with CDI support, the company 
hosted, for ten weeks, a CAD ex-
pert to train middle management 
in the use of this new tool. 
In Spring 1996, with the 
Centre's support, Lee Sack Fong 
went to the Scandinavian Furni-
ture Fair (Denmark) where, in par-
ticular, he established contact with 
VON, a Dominican Republic com-
pany likely to expand ARTLINE's 
outlets in the Caribbean· as a 
whole. The person responsible for 
installations received two months 
training in Ireland. The different 
quality improvements have guar-
anteed ARTLINE an impressive 
growth (a production increase of 
more than 300%, a turnover of 
$1,000,000 in 1996). As to future 
prospects, these are particularly 
encouraging, especially in the 
hotel furnishing sector in the 
Caribbean. 
CDI contact: Jordi Tio Rotllan Caribbean flavours out 
to conquer Europe 
The secret of exporting? Pinpoint potential and need. Study the 
ground. Prepare a strategy. Provide original responses tailored to 
specific features. This strict approach, launched two years ago in the 
Caribbean delicatessen sector, with support from the CDI and the 
German organisation PROTRADE, is today being implemented. Six-
teen companies met under the same roof at the famous ANUGA 
trade fair in Cologne, with a range of carefully targeted products. 
The Caribbean arch-
ipelago, a tropical garden 
at the heart of warm seas, 
is becoming increasingly 
popular with travellers the 
world over. Different coun-
tries in the region have re-
alised the potential of this 
magnetism for valorising 
original products made 
from local natural resources. Con-
sequently, in the agro-food sector, 
sugar cane, tropical fruits and 
seafood products are spawning a 
highly diversified range of speciali-
ties (drinks - both alcoholic and 
soft - salted and sweetened 
sauces, syrups, jams, spice mix-
tures, etc.). These vary between is-
lands (see box). They are designed 
by small companies whose manu-
facturing secrets create 'home-
made' , personalised products that 
rely on the entire range of flavours 
and tastes rather than on mono-
chrome competition. Such prod-
ucts have character, are of a high 
quality, and genuinely merit the 
name of delicatessen. Still little 
known in Europe, except perhaps 
for the United Kingdom and 
France, these specialities satisfy a 
real demand among consumers for 
exotic flavours. That is why, two 
years ago and in cooperation with 
PROTRADE, the German trade pro-
motion body, the CDI launched 
significant ground work both in 
the Caribbean and in Europe. It is 
being implemented today through 
the presence of sixteen Caribbean 
companies at ANUGA, the famous 
international food fair in Cologne, 
held from 11 to 16 October 1997. 
ANUGA 95: Initial contacts 
It was during this same 
trade fair in Autumn 1995 that the 
approach first became a reality. 
Following a CDI exploratory mis-
sion, and with the Centre's sup-
port, five Caribbean companies at-
tended the ANUGA trade fair. 
Their aim was to establish contacts 
with European importers, present 
samples of their products, and as-
sess the possible outlets open to 
them. A meeting organised by the 
CDI concluded that there was mu-
tual benefit in and a need for a 
careful strategy guaranteeing the 
penetration of Caribbean speciali-
ties, still little known, into this very 
specific niche of the food sector. In 
the delicatessen sector, 'far-away' 
products add a foreign flavour to 
meals, they evoke the memories of 
travellers and exoticism adds a 
dream-like quality to everyday life. 
This growing need for 'other 
places' is very pragmatically con-
firmed by a market study carried 
out on the initiative of the CDI. 
But why Germany? In the 
delicatessen sector, Germany is an 
excellent springboard for conti-
nental Europe. It has a very specific 
and very active distribution net-
work. Products from all over the 
world are sold in specialised shops, 
which only sell this type of speciali-
ty, selected by virtue of their high 
quality. There you can find the 
best of every continent, and Ger-
mans, great travellers (six million 
of them visit the Caribbean every 
year), quench their thirst for dis-
covery. 
In this respect, the CDI co-
operates with a professional deli-
catessen syndicate in Germany, 
which brings together 120 sales 
outlets, is very active in marketing, 
and regularly organises promotion 
campaigns throughout all of these 
shops. 
Selection in the 
Caribbean, test in 
Wiesbaden 
In October 1996, a consul-
tants' mission, supported by the 
CDI and PROTRADE, visited six 
Caribbean countries (Barbados, Be-
Tropical fruits and vegetables -whose 
flavours are increasingly 
appreciated by European consumers 
lize, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago) to 
study the possibilities for export-
ing delicatessen products to Ger-
many and more widely to conti-
nental Europe. The experts 
selected some twenty five compa-
nies whose high quality and varied 
products (fish and crustacean spe-
cialities, rums, coconut-based 
drinks, sauces and syrups) were 
likely to interest importers. They 
were faced with SMEs accustomed 
to exporting - mainly to the Unit-
ed States - and which have mas-
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tered the constraints imposed by 
international trade. They also met 
companies that complied with 
quality requirements (the ISO in-
ternational standard, in particu-
lar), were supplied by the best 
sources, and satisfied hygiene cri-
teria throughout the entire pro-
duction chain - from initial han-
dling through to final packaging. 
The experts selected 145 products: 
fruit juices, alcohol and liqueurs, 
tropical fruit jams, 'hot' and 
'sweet' sauces, spice mixtures -
and also bakery products, tinned 
fish and frozen products. 
These specialities were pre-
sented in Wiesbaden, in March 
1997. Around sixty German profes-
sionals from the food sector - im-
porters and distributors of deli-
catessen products, restaurateurs... 
- were asked to assess whether or 
not the products were ready for 
launching on the German market 
on the basis of different criteria: 
quality, specific taste, originality, 
packaging, labelling (information 
on the product), price, etc. The ob-
jective was to carry out a pre-test 
so as to present the most appropri-
ate selection at the ANUGA trade 
fair. The response of the European 
professionals was very positive. 74 
of the products were thought to 
be particularly interesting and al-
ready perfectly suitable for the 
market. The other 67 simply need-
ed changes to labelling (composi-
tion according to Community di-
rectives, language, etc.) and 
packaging (recyclable material, 
such as cardboard and glass). Cer-
tain prices also had to be re-
viewed. 
An image strategy 
In July, two workshops 
were held in Jamaica and Trinidad 
to fine-tune, together with the 
SMEs selected, the preparations 
for their participation in the 
ANUGA 97 trade fair. A range of 
Caribbean products was presented 
at the trade fair in a single room 
on a stand which also had an area 
set aside for tasting. There people 
could taste BON Agroindustrial's 
ice creams, jams and fruit juices, 
CARIBEX Dominicana's juices and 
nectars, ILGUIFLOD Industrias Em-
pacadoras Dominicanas' coconut-
based specialities, LICOCO 's co-
conut liqueur, and ANGOSTURA'S 
rums. 
'I think that the Caribbean 
industrialists do not simply see 
their participation in ANUGA as an 
opportunity to develop their ex-
ports to Europe', points out a CDI 
expert involved in the initiative. 
'Over and above commercial crite-
ria, if you think in terms of image, 
they certainly appreciate the fact 
that their products meet with the 
satisfaction of a continent reputed 
for the importance it gives to culi-
nary pleasures and quality.' 
CDI contacts: Paul Chotard - Orlan-
do Pérez Diaz 
The Caribbean of many flavours 
Jamaica 
With a population of 
2.5 million, Jamaica is 
one of the largest 
Caribbean exporters of 
food products, export-
ing mainly to the Unit-
ed States and Canada. 
Jamaica has successful 
industries, a tested 
marketing technique 
and many companies 
active in the food and 
drinks sector. Sugar 
cane, fruit and coffee 
are its main agricultur-
al resources. Tourism is 
one of the island's 
main economic assets. 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Trinidad & Tobago, the 
most industrially ad-
vanced country in the 
Caribbean, owes its de-
velopment to the petrol 
resources that have 
been extracted since the 
sixties. The limited do-
mestic market (1.5 mil-
lion inhabitants) means 
significant exports to 
other countries in the 
Caribbean, the United 
States and Canada. The 
agro-food sector - of 
high quality and very 
dynamic - is based on 
different crops - sugar, 
cocoa, coffee, lemons 
and bananas. j 
Angostura - Monitoring the distillation of rum 
Dominican Republic 
One of the most highly populated countries in 
the region, with a population of 8 million, the 
Dominican Republic has a large number of SMEs 
many of which already have solid experience of 
exporting to Europe, to Germany in particular. 
The island's speciality is based on processing 
coconut (ice cream, liqueurs, coconut milk 
and cream). 
Barbados, Grenada and Belize 
These countries, all with a highly developed tourism 
sector, each have their own specific features. With a 
wealth of sugarcane, Barbados produces rum and has 
a large fishing industry. Grenada, whose predominant 
crop is nutmeg, is called 'the spice island' and has a 
number of agro-food SMEs (rum, jams, sauces...) Belize, 
focusing mainly on 'ecological' tourism, has a wealth 
of crustaceans and has made the manufacture of jams 
. and exotic and spiced sauces its speciality. > 
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African breeders at 
Utrecht International 
Trade Fair 
Around a dozen entrepreneurs 
from Western and Central 
Africa specialising in poultry 
farming will attend the Inter-
national Trade Fair on Inten-
sive Animal Production taking 
place in Utrecht from 18 to 21 
November. The visit, organised 
with CDI support, will enable 
them to become familiar with 
the latest technological devel-
opments in the sector, estab-
lish business contacts, and visit 
a number of Dutch companies. 
The initiative is organised in 
cooperation with IPC Livestock 
International Barneveld Col-
lege, a Dutch agronomic edu-
cational institute. The IPC is, in 
particular, organising further 
training in poultry farming and 
in small-scale breeding, dealing with 
the various facets of the profession 
(genetics, growth and husbandry, mar-
keting, economics and management). 
CDI contact: Chérif Touré 
Honours for Ivoirienne de 
Géobéton 
At the 2nd National Day of Excellence, 
the President of Côte d'Ivoire, His Ex-
cellency Henri Konan Bédié, awarded 
the prize of best 'Promoter of Self-Em-
ployment' to Mr Assale Adou, head of 
Ivoirienne de Géobéton (IGB), an SME 
specialising in the manufacture of 
compressed earth blocks. The compa-
ny, which started modestly, mod-
ernised its equipment and hired 
around fifteen people in 1996. Thanks 
to CDI support, the employees have 
followed different training pro-
grammes (preparation of raw materi-
als, production and mounting of 
blocks). This strategy of investment in 
material and human resources means 
that today IGB is able to meet signifi-
cant public demand for the construc-
tion of publicly-funded housing, dis-
pensaries and schools in different parts 
of the country. 
Spain, Portugal and ACP 
countries 
A series of meetings held in September 
demonstrates the links between 
Mediterranean Europe and ACP coun-
tries. With 60% of Spanish investment 
abroad channelled to developing 
countries, ICEX (Instituto Español de 
Comercio Exterior) and COFIDES (Com-
pañía Española de Financiación del De-
sarrollo) organised two meetings - one 
in Barcelona and another in Madrid -
for Spanish industrialists and investors. 
The objective was to inform them of 
the different bodies providing cooper-
ation and support to companies - Eu-
ropean and national - likely to back 
projects in these countries. Mr Matos 
Rosa, Deputy Director of the CDI, at-
tended the two meetings, to which 
representatives of the European Invest-
ment Bank, ECIP (European Communi-
ty Investment Partners) and the Com-
munity PHARE-TACIS programme were 
also invited. 
On 25 September 1997, in Brussels, on 
the initiative of the Associação Indus-
trial Portuguesa, a working meeting 
brought together the CDI and a joint 
delegation of around forty industrial-
ists and economic chiefs from Portugal 
and five African Portuguese-speaking 
countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea 
Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tomé & 
Principe). Delegates were welcomed to 
the CDI by Mr Matos Rosa. 
Industrial partnership meeting 
on concrete components 
For some years, the growth of the 
building industry in the CEDEAO (Com-
munauté Economique des Etats de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest) area has boosted 
demand for light concrete compo-
nents, which are particularly economic 
and well adapted tc these regions. The 
CDI, which has supported African com-
panies in this sub-sector for several 
years, is organising an Industrial Part-
nership Meeting in Abidjan, from 11 to 
14 November 1997. Heads of around 
thirty West African companies with 
specific projects, and an equivalent 
number of European companies spe-
cialising in this area and interested in 
the transfer of technology and know-
how, have been invited by the Centre. 
Much of the four days will be set aside 
for discussions and negotiations be-
tween potential partners. Company 
visits (cement manufacturing, gravel, 
concrete components) will be organ-
ised. Three topics will be discussed in 
the workshops: the market and invest-
ment prospects; trends in the sector 
(products, technologies, qualifications, 
standards, etc.); mounting projects, 
particularly financial packages. 
CDI contacts: Sid Boubekeur - Alioune 
Ndiaye 
Natural stone: Italy-Namibia 
At the International Trade Fair in 
Verona on natural stone, which took 
place from 25 to 29 September 1997, 
the CDI and the Italian Institute for 
Foreign Trade (ICE) organised a work-
shop on the ornamental stone sector in 
Namibia. The two institutions had al-
ready cooperated on the organisation 
of the Industrial Partnership Meeting 
on natural stone that took place in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea in March 1997 (see 
Courier n° 164 p. 100). The encourag-
ing results of this initiative prompted 
them to organise a similar meeting in 
Namibia, at the beginning of 1998. 
Around a dozen Italian entrepreneurs 
(mining companies, heads of process-
ing and marketing companies...) 
should visit Namibia in order to imple-
ment technical, financial or commercial 
partnerships with companies in the 
stone sector. 
CDI contacts: Paolo Baldan - Sid 
Boubekeur 
African meats at ANUGA 
Eight meat exporters (beef and ostrich 
meat) from Southern and Eastern 
Africa attended the International 
ANUGA Trade Fair held in Cologne 
(Germany) from 11 to 16 October 1997. 
The visit, which received the Centre's 
support, enabled them to upgrade the 
image of African meat products at this 
important food industry trade fair. 
CDI contact: Chérif Touré 
CDI publications  I
Rose farming in Southern Africa 
As part of Its CDI Dossiers collection, which summarises the ACP-EU Industrial 
Partnership Meetings organised by the Centre - and was launched with a first 
publication on lake fishing in Uganda - the CDI is currently producing Rose farm-
ing in Southern Africa. The dossier summarises the meeting held in Nairobi 
(Kenya) in November 1996. The initiative was in response to two developments. 
Firstly, that of a European market increasingly geared towards imports and where 
new distribution networks are emerging, and that of an increasingly skilled and dynamic 
African horticultural sector. 
The publication presents the prospects and challenges resulting from this situation, which 
were discussed at length during this meeting between African producers and European 
importers and distributors. The dossier is intended to be pragmatic and presents an overall 
view of the flower market in Europe and Africa, reviews the possibilities for upgrading 
and diversifying African horticulture, and takes a specific look at the financing problems 
faced by entrepreneurs in the sector. 
The conclusions and recommendations made by the industrialists who attended the Nairo-
bi meeting can be found in the guide, together with a complete list of participants which 
provides a 'mini-guide' to the African horticultural sector. 
CDI contacts: Patrick Keene - Paul Chotard 
How to benefit from CDI facilities 
This new manual provides a detailed description of eligibility conditions and the proce-
dure for submitting a request for assistance under each of the facilities granted by the CDI 
(identification of projects and partners, preparation, financial package, start-up and devel-
opment of projects). 
CDI contacts: Patrick Keene - Jean-Marie Delchambre. 
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information society 
support for users and by setting up 
new agencies to promote these 
techniques. Mark Leysen 
To help the ACP states join 
the 'information society', the 
Commission proposes to ex-
tend applications of new in-
formation techniques to 
cover social services and eco-
nomic issues. This is foreseen 
in the Lomé Convention pro-
visions governing coopera-
tion in the field of informa-
tion and communication. At 
a political level, ACP govern-
ments should be made 
aware of the problems in-
volved in networking and in 
the area of new information 
technologies, as well as of 
the need to set up a regula-
tory framework to promote 
their development. 
These, at any rate, were the con-
clusions to be drawn by the ACP 
states from the Commission's Com-
munication to the Council, Parlia-
ment, Economic and Social Com-
mittee and the Committee of the 
Regions on the subject of the in-
formation society and develop-
ment. 
The Communication comes in the 
wake of the Midrand Conference 
held in May 1996. It gives an 
overview of the current situation 
and proposes concrete actions to 
be taken by both developing coun-
tries and the Community. 
The Communication states that the 
principal challenges facing the de-
veloping countries relate not just 
to infrastructure and telecommu-
nications, but also to information 
techniques (PCs, servers, etc.), the 
establishment of a regulatory 
framework, liberalisation of tele-
com services, and the training and 
development of human resources 
in the fields of télécoms and com-
puters. 
As regards Community action, the 
Communication notes that the 
Commission, European Investment 
Bank and Member States have al-
ready made significant efforts in 
this field. Both the Community and 
the developing countries are now 
aware of the need to integrate the 
latter into the global information 
society. 
To achieve this integration, the 
Commission's Communication does 
not propose new financing. In-
stead, it suggests breathing new 
life into the 'information-society' 
dimension already included in ex-
isting programmes. Eight modes of 
action are recommended: 
- an awareness campaign and fur-
ther dialogue at international level 
and within the developing coun-
tries themselves; 
- support for the establishment of 
an appropriate regulatory frame-
work; 
-the use of existing financial in-
struments, which are managed by 
the Commission and the EIB in co-
ordination with other donors; 
- action aimed at encouraging re-
gions to adopt common standards, 
thereby facilitating the intercon-
nection of networks and services; 
- pilot projects to demonstrate the 
benefits to be gained by applying 
new information techniques and 
to test their feasibility and cultural 
acceptance; 
- an examination of information 
and communication technologies 
in industrial development; 
- the training and development of 
human resources; 
- participation by the developing 
countries in Community research 
and development programmes 
and, specifically, their inclusion in 
research networks. 
When they are actually imple-
mented, the actions in question 
must, however, be adapted to suit 
each major region individually. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission propos-
es to give priority to two types of 
action in the case of the ACP 
states, given that they already 
have a regulatory framework in 
the Lomé Convention provisions 
on information and communica-
tion. The Commission's proposals 
are as follows: 
- pilot applications in the field of 
social services and economics; 
- the stepping-up of ACP govern-
ment-targeted awareness cam-
paigns to promote the concept of 
new information and communica-
tion technologies by providing 
4000 questionnaires 
Two years ago, we put a ques-
tionnaire in the The Courier to 
ask our readers what they 
thought of the magazine. 
The bulk of replies, as one 
would expect, were sent back 
within the following six 
months, but ever since then, 
we have been receiving a reg-
ular trickle of completed 
forms from people who have 
since come across the relevant 
issue. 
On 18 September, we received 
our 4000th questionnaire -
from Obaya Mouhyedine of 
the Comores. 
The table gives a breakdown 
by region of those who re-
sponded. 
Readers in 139 countries sent 
back forms and the respQnse 
rate was significantly higher 
than would normally be ex 
pected with surveys of this 
kind. 
We don't have any plans at 
present for another question-
naire, but are always interest-
ed in hearing your views -
both about The Courier itself 
and about the issues we cover. 
Feel free to drop us a line. 
Questionnaire responses 
Nationality 
EU 
ACP 
- Africa 
(1872) 
- Caribbean/Pacific 
Other 
Information not provided 
1509 
1990 
(118) 
240 
261 
Total  4000 
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Growth targets 
on schedule 
The least-developed countries 
(LDCs) receive a 'satisfactory' eco-
nomic progress mark in the 1997 
report from UNCTAD (United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and De-
velopment) covering the 48 poor-
est countries. The report considers 
the issue of globalisation but also 
looks closely at the economic and 
social situation, the agricultural 
sector and primary products, the 
role of the state, and the impact of 
conflict on economic decline. 
Chapter 1 analyses the economic 
and social situation in various 
groups of LDCs and reports that 
relatively vigorous growth has led 
to a rise in the real value of manu-
factured output and per capita in-
come. Taking the figures as a 
whole, the differences between 
the African and Asian LDCs are 
small, but significant variations can 
be identified if one looks at indi-
vidual countries. Thus, for exam-
ple, the gap between the highest 
and lowest GNP growth rates is 
more than 20%. For the first time 
in many years, the prospects for 
Africa's least-developed countries 
appear brighter. Although in 1996, 
growth in the LDC group as a 
whole was lower than in the previ-
ous year, the African countries 
recorded a bigger increase, contin-
uing a trend which began in 1994: 
19 LDCs in Africa achieved GNP 
growth above 4% and 10 others 
topped the 5% mark. This trend 
looks set to continue, if the predic-
tions of Lev Komlev, a top-ranking 
UNCTAD economics expert, are to 
be believed. He maintains that 
poverty alleviation now seems 
genuinely to be on the cards. For 
the LDCs in the CFA franc zone, it 
is reported that devaluation was a 
godsend. In 1996, positive growth 
was reported in nine countries in 
the zone. There was, notably, an 
increase in cotton production. This 
is a key export crop of a number of 
the states in question. 
The second part of the UNCTAD 
report deals with agriculture in the 
LDCs. The authors point out that 
these countries have a tendency to 
neglect their farming sectors de-
spite the significant contribution it 
can make to overall GNP. The re-
port recommends that, in their 
global growth strategies, the LDCs 
give priority to agriculture so as to 
guarantee food supplies and a 
basic income for their people. Ac-
cording to the authors, a dynamic 
farm sector will promote wider 
and more equitable development. 
They point out that, in the early 
1990s, agriculture generated al-
most a third of the GNP of the 
LDCs taken together, and provided 
jobs for two thirds of the work-
force. The sector's performance, 
however, has not kept pace with 
population increases. 
According to UNCTAD's Robert 
Sevenier, there are at least four 
good reasons why agricultural 
should have priority. First, higher 
growth will lead to increased in-
comes for rural populations, help-
ing to reduce poverty and improve 
the quality of life. Second, rising 
incomes in rural areas will bring 
about an expansion of domestic 
markets. Third, in order to main-
tain current food consumption lev-
els, agricultural expansion and 
food imports must keep up with 
demographic trends. Finally, a dy-
namic farm sector would provide 
the impetus for 'industrialisation' 
in agri-foodstuffs, with the poten-
tial to generate employment in 
both urban and rural areas. 
To overcome stagnation in agricul-
ture in the LDCs, the report sug-
gests a break with traditional pro-
duction structures and current 
rudimentary technology by re-
structuring the land-ownership sys-
tem - which impedes access to the 
land. To deal with the effects of 
the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) agreements on the liberali-
sation of trade in agricultural 
products, it advises LDCs to exploit 
the possibilities of vertical diversifi-
cation in the production of 
processed agricultural foodstuffs. 
By offering genuine opportunities 
to develop home-grown capabili-
ties, such diversification is much 
more profitable than the export of 
agricultural raw materials under 
the special clause of the Uruguay 
Round's agriculture agreement. 
This provides a number of conces-
sions in favour of agriculture in 
the LDCs. 
The third part of the document 
looks at the nature and scope of 
the difficulties facing LDCs as a re-
sult of the decline suffered in the 
1980s and early 1990s. It cites gov-
ernment weaknesses and failures 
to act, and the consequences of 
these for the LDCs themselves, 
their regional partners and the in-
ternational community. It high-
lights the need to tackle the ef-
fects of the decline which can be 
seen in the deterioration of a 
whole range of economic and so-
cial indicators (including per capita 
production, food availability, ac-
cess to education, health levels, 
mortality levels and displacements 
caused by conflict). By way of ex-
ample, between 1980 and 1994, 
22% of LDCs saw their GDP drop 
by more than 10% in real terms 
and no fewer than 12 countries 
suffered a GDP fall of more than 
20%. Today, many LDCs find them-
selves on the fringes of the world 
economy and are outside the 
major trade and investment 
streams. 
In addition, for some countries, 
the amount of international aid on 
offer has gone down whilst inward 
investment has been discouraged 
by political instability, the lack of 
security and degradation of physi-
cal infrastructures. There are three 
possible reasons for this: 
- governments' weakness and fail-
ure to act (the authorities' dimin-
ishing capability to fulfil basic 
functions such as the maintenance 
of law and order and the provision 
of fundamental administrative 
structures); 
- complex urgent situations (giving 
rise to humanitarian crises caused 
by external or internal conflict); 
and, 
- regression (the marked deterio-
ration of one or more significant 
economic or social indicators, such 
as per capita income or infant 
mortality). 
To conclude, the report calls on 
the international community to 
provide urgent aid to the LDCs, to 
help them solve their problems of 
socio-economic decline, govern-
ment weakness and inactivity, 
and internal conflict. ■■ M.F 
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Learning more 
about the law 
Lawyers, government officials and 
businesspeople in Uganda have a 
new opportunity to brush up on 
their legal skills thanks to a 
scheme supported by the World 
Bank. The African Law and Devel-
opment Initiative - run by the 
Washington-based International 
Law Institute under the aegis of 
Uganda's Justice Ministry - has 
been designed to offer a series of 
two-to-four week courses (in Eng-
lish) on practical legal issues. These 
will held at a training centre estab-
lished in Kampala, with teaching 
staff drawn from the United 
States, Africa and elsewhere. The 
main focus will initially be on at-
tracting Ugandan participants but 
applications from elsewhere - par-
ticularly English-speaking Africa -
will also be welcomed. 
For more information, contact: 
Swithin Munyantwali, 
Project Field Director, 
International Law Institute -
Kampala Training Centre, 
Nile International Conference 
Centre-Suite 328, 
Kampala, Uganda. 
Tel (256-41) 347 523 
Fax (256-41) 259 130 
e-mail: ili@starcom.co.uga 
Fast track to 
mining in Africa 
The first EU-West and Central 
African Mining Forum (MINES '98) 
will be held in Accra from March 
30 to April 2, 1998. The European 
Commission and the Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) are sponsoring the 
event with the support of the Cen-
tre for the Development of Indus-
try (CDl) and UDEAC. 
The improving mining law and in-
vestment climate in the region has 
encouraged the sponsors to organ-
ise the event in which selected EU 
and 'Third Country' companies in-
volved in exploration, extraction 
and mineral processing will be in-
vited to participate. On the African 
side, more than 100 promoters of 
exploration and mining projects 
will be invited. 
MINES '98 is a unique event offer-
ing participants the chance to up-
date their knowledge of the min-
ing sector and project 
opportunities in West and Central 
African countries. This will be 
achieved by a series of one-to-one 
private meetings to discuss the 
pre-identified projects, supported 
by practical workshops and coun-
try presentations. 
The mineral potential of the re-
gion is unquestionably good and it 
is now actively trying to attract 
foreign investors. Despite the 
giant strides taken in development 
over the last decade, however, in-
vestment in exploration and min-
ing in West and Central Africa still 
lags behind that of other develop-
ing regions. Much still needs to be 
done and under the changing cir-
cumstances, it can now be 
achieved. 
Further information may be ob-
tained from: 
Metra Sofres Ltd. 
tel: +44-181-688-5535 
fax: +44-181-688-4005 
(for the UK, Ireland and third 
countries) 
AGORA' 2000 
tel: +39-6-324-1719 
fax: +39-6-321-6915 
(for Southern Europe) 
G.F.E. GmbH 
tel: +49-241-91 83 00 
fax: +49-241-15 56 46 
(for Northern Europe) 
umber-december 1997 Operational 
summary 
n° 99 - November 1997 
(position as at 20 October 1997) 
European Development Fund schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of schemes funded by the European 
Community under the EDF (Lomé Convention). 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups 
• Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) country 
projects. 
• Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) 
projects. 
• Regional projects 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical order). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority 
Int. Tender: International invitation to tender 
Ace. Tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated 
procedure) 
Restr. Tender: Restricted invitation to tender 
T.A.: Technical Assistance 
EDF: European Development Fund 
(e.g. EDF 7 = 7th European development Fund) 
mECU: million European currency units 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
• The title of the project. 
• The administrative body responsible for it. 
• The estimated sum involved (prior to financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided 
(post-financing decision) 
• A brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, equipment supplies, 
technical assistance etc.) 
• Any methods of implementation for example, 
international invitations to tender). 
• The stage the project has reached 
(identification, appraisal, submission for 
financing, financing decision, ready for 
implementation) 
Blue Pages on the 
INTERNET 
Enter the DGVIII Home Page 
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg08/dgviii.htm 
Choose the option 
Projects for tender 
Note: Participation in EDF schemes is strictly 
confined to ACP or EU firms. 
Correspondence about this operational 
summary can be sent directly to: 
Mr Franco Cupini, 
Directorate-General for Development 
European Commission 
G12 4-14, 200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. SECTOR CODE DESCRIPTION 
AAz Planning and public administration 
AAa Administrative buildings 
AAb Economic planning and policy 
AAc Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
AAd Police and fire protection 
AAe Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
AAf Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
AAg Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
AAi Demography and manpower studies 
ABz Development of public utilities 
ABa Power production and distribution 
ABai Electricity 
ABb Water supply 
ABc Communications 
ABd Transport and navigation 
ABe Meteorology 
ABf Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
ACz Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
ACa Agriculture production 
ACb Service to agriculture 
ACc Forestry 
ACd Fishing and hunting 
ACe Conservation and extension 
ACf Agriculture storage 
ACg Agriculture construction 
ACh Home economics and nutrition 
ACi Land and soil surveys 
ADz Industry, mining and construction 
ADa Extractive industries 
ADai Petroleum and natural gas 
ADb Manufacturing 
ADc Engineering and construction 
ADd Cottage industry and handicraft 
ADe Productivity, including management, 
automation, accountancy, business, 
finance and investment 
ADf Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
ADg Research in industry technology 
AEz Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
AEa Agriculture development banks 
AEb Industrial development banks 
AEc Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
AEd Export promotion 
AEe Trade, commerce and distribution 
AEf Co-operatives (except agriculture and 
housing) 
AEg Publishing, journalism, cinema, 
photography 
AEh Other insurance and banking 
AEi Archaeological conservation, game 
reserves 
AFz Education 
AFa Primary and secondary education 
AFb University and higher technical institutes 
AFbi Medical 
AFc Teacher training 
AFci Agriculture training 
AFd Vocational and technical training 
AFe Educational administration 
AFf Pure or general research 
AFg Scientific documentation 
AFh Research in the field of education or 
training 
AFi Subsidiary services 
AFj Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
AGz Health 
AGa Hospitals and clinics 
AGb Maternal and child care 
AGc Family planning and population-related 
research 
AGd Other medical and dental services 
AGe Public health administration 
AGf Medical insurance programmes 
AHz Social infrastructure and social welfare 
AHa Housing, urban and rural 
AHb Community development and facilities 
AHc Environmental sanitation 
AHd Labour 
AHe Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
AHf Environmental protection 
AHg Flood control 
AHh Land settlement 
AHi Cultural activities 
Alz Multisector 
Ala River development 
Alb Regional development projects 
AJz Unspecified ACP STATES 
EDF BEN 7200/003 - AAc 
BOTSWANA 
ANGOLA 
Rehabilitation of theTchivinguiro 
Institute. 8.24 mECU. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ANG 7014-AFb 
Reconstruction support programme. 
55 mECU. Relaunch of economic and 
social activities. Improvement of basic 
social services and living conditions, 
poverty alleviation, increase of production 
and of basic communication possibilities, 
amelioration of basic infrastructures, 
participation in mine-clearing operations, 
support for demobilisation. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ANG 6036/001 - AGz, AHz. 
Rehabilitation in rural areas of 
Huambo province. 3 mECU. To repair 
health and education infrastructure and 
help to get farming and other productive 
activities up and running again. Projects 
managed by Save the Children Fund 
(UK), Olkos (P), Concern (Ireland) and 
Halstrust (UK) for mine clearance 
operations. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ANG 7255/012 - ACz 
Support for training of lawyers and 
academics in the Law Faculty of 
Agostinho Neto University (FDUAN). 
0.800 mECU. Training, supply of 
equipment. Project in execution. 
EDF ANG 7018/000 - AFb 
BELIZE 
Improvement of Hummingbird 
Highway (2nd segment - Sibun River 
Bridge to Belmopan). Resp. Auth.: 
Govt, of Belize. Estimated cost 13.7 
mECU. Construction, T.A., studies. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF BEL 6001/002 - ABd 
Specific assistance for the banana 
industry. Two tenders for equipment 
(nos. 4270 and 4271 to be launched at 
end of October. Opening of bids for no. 
4270 (supply often lots of packaging 
équipement) and forno. 4271 (supply of 
two lots of equipment for handling and 
road transport) 23.1.98 at 10.30 local 
time. 
Financed from budget CE B7-5023/95. 
BENIN 
Improvement works on the Sémé-
Porto Nova road. (12.711 km). Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et 
des Transports. 20 mECU. Infrastructure 
works and installation of road signing. 
Work supervision by KFW(D). Works by 
int. tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7132-ABd 
Support programme for structural 
adjustment (PAS - 1997/99). Resp. 
Auth.: Ministre des Finances. 27,5 
mECU. Strengthen the country's macro-
economic policy. Financing date October 
97. EDF 7. 
Sysmin - support to base metal 
industry (Copper-Nickel-Cobalt). Resp. 
Auth.: BCL Ltd., 33.7mECU. To deepen 
the shaft of the Selebi-North mine, to 
reach a new ore-body, equipping it and 
carrying out new prospective drilling to 
identify new ore-bodies. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF SYSMIN BT 9999/001 - ADa 
Botswana Tourism Development 
Programme (Foundation phase). Resp. 
Auth. : Department of Tourism (DoT) of 
Commerce and Industry. 1.91 mECU. 
Short- and long-term T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF BT 5019/001 - AEc 
Trade Development Programme 
(Phase I). Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Trade and Investment Promotion. 
Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. To support 
trade diversification and export 
promotion. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF BT 7008-AEe 
Vocational training programme, 
Francistown. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education. Estimated cost 17 mECU. 
Vocational Teacher Training College and 
Vocational Training Centre (VTTC/VTC). 
Constmction, supplies of equipment, 
T.A., works, feasibility study. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF BT 7004/001 - AFd 
BURKINA FASO 
Support project for the reform of the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé -
Direction des Services Pharmaceutiques 
(DSPh) and CAMEG 1.6 mECU. Line of 
credit, works, equipment and T.A. Project 
in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF BK 7017 - AGc 
SYSMIN - Rehabilitation of the Poura 
mine. Resp. Auth.: I.G.R.International 
Gold Resources Corporation. 11 mECU. 
Works by direct agreement. Supplies and 
T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF SYSMIN BK 9999 - ADa 
Ouagadougou dam classified forest 
development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Environnement et de l'Eau. Estimated 
total cost 1.200 mECU. EDF part 0.300 
mECU. Cofinancing with CFD (F), The 
Netherlands (possible). Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF BK 7023 - AHf 
Support for decentralisation. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère Administration 
Territoriale et Sécurité. Estimated total 
cost 2 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A., 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF BK 7024 - AAb 
Support for the structural adjustment 
programme 1996-1997. General import 
programme. EDF 6.4 mECU. T.A. 
foreseen. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF BK 7200/004-AAc 
Support for the judicial system. 
Estimated total cost 1 mECU. Training of 
magistrates and improvement of judicial 
services. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 
EDF BK7027-AAZ 
Support for rural development. 
Estimated total cost 23 mECU. Financing 
of action for rice-growing, for support 
action, financing the rural environment 
and for information about markets. T.A, 
works and supplies. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8 
EDF BK 7032/000 - ACa. 
Periodical maintenance of asphalt 
roads (594 km). Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
des Infrastructures, de l'Habitat et de 
L'Urbanisme. Estimated total cost 37 
mECU. T.A., Works. Project on appraisal. 
EDF-8 
EDF BK 6017/002-ABd. 
CAMEROON 
Lagdo fishing project. Resp. Auth.: 
MINEPIA. Estimated cost 3.500 mECU. 
Preservation and improvement of the 
social-economic situation around Lake 
Lagdo. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF CM 6002/002 - ACa 
Regional economic integration 
programme in Central Africa - regional 
infrastructures. 98 mECU. Building of 
the Bertoua-Geroua Bulai road. Works 
and management of the works. Works will 
be launched in 3 international tenders. 
For the management of the works, a 
preselection will be launched. Project in 
execution. EDF 6,7 and 8. 
EDF CM 7002/001 -ABd. 
Rural development project in the 
Lagone and Chart regions. Food supply 
security. Combatting poverty. Estimated 
cost 9 mECU. Constmction, T.A., 
studies, supplies, training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF CM 5004/002 - ACh 
Programme of road maintenance 
(PERFED II). Resp. Auth.: MINTP. 
Estimated cost 55 mECU. Construction, 
T.A., studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 
8. 
EDF CM 6031/002 - ABd 
CAPE VERDE 
Maio island rural electrification. 
Estimated total cost 1.945 mECU. 
Improvement of living conditions. Supply 
of electricity, Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF CV 7009/000 - ABa.i 
Santo Antao water supply and 
sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Economic Coordination. 1.4 mECU. 
Works, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF CV 7011 - ABb 
CHAD 
Relaunch of the fishing sector. 
Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Sectoral 
study: shortlist done. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF CD 7011 -ACa River Chari embankment protection. 
Estimated total cost 5 mECU. To improve 
living conditions in N'Djamena. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF CD 5027 - AHf.g 
Support for the electoral process. 
Resp. Auth.: UNDP(PNUD). Estimated 
totalcost 0.500 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 6. 
EDF CD 7015 - AAc 
Eré-Kélo road improvement. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère des TP., des Transports 
et de l'Habitat. 13.500 mECU. Works and 
supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 6 
and 7. 
EDF CD 7012-ABd 
Restoration of bridges that fall within 
the framework of the Second 
Transport Sectoral Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: MINTP Chad Estimated total cost 
4 mECU. Urgent work to be carried out to 
restore 15 bridges under the Transport 
Sectoral Programme. Works, T.A. Project 
in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF CD 6001 - ABd 
Support for structural adjustment. 10.2 
mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF CD 7200/001 - AAc 
Support for Health Programme in 
Mayo Kebbi 1.980 mECU T.A. Training 
of doctors, medical supplies. Project in 
execution. EDF 7 
COMOROS 
Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement -
Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 
3.250 mECU. Works, by int.tender.T.A.for 
further investigations, tender dossier and 
works supervision. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF COM 6006/7003 - ABd 
CONGO (REPUBLIC) 
Support programme for the visual arts. 
1 mECU. Global development in the 
visual arts sector. Project suspended. 
EDF 7. 
EDFCOB7010-AEZ 
CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC) 
Rehabilitation Support Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Coordination and 
Management Unit Estimated total cost 
EDF 84 mECU. and an indicative amount 
of 6 mECU from the Commission's 
budget under heading B7-5076 
'Rehabilitation and reconstruction 
measures for developing countries'. 
Regions selected: Kinshasa's economic 
hinterland, the Greater Kivu and the two 
provinces of Kagai. Rehabilitation and 
maintenance of roads and farm access 
roads. Support for production and 
marketing, support for basic social 
infrastructure. T.A. and evaluation. 
Project suspended. EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF ZR 6033 - AAc 
Support programme for the 
resinsertion of displaced persons in 
Kasai province (PARK). 2 mECU. The 
programme will be implemented by 
Caritas (NI), Oxfam (UK), Nuova 
Frontiera (I), Gret (F), and Raoul 
Follereau (F). Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF ZR 7255/001 - ACa 
Strengthening of the provisional 
health support programme. 45 mECU 
Rehabilitation of health service structures 
in Kinshasa, Kasai and Kivu. Support for 
the health service at the basic and 
intermediate levels. Reinforcement of 
basic juridical services. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. 
Support programme for the 
preparation of elections. Resp. Auth.: 
Commission Nationale des Elections 
(CNE). 30 mECU. T.A., support for 
démocratisation. Project suspended. EDF 
7. 
EDF ZR 6034/00 - AAc 
COTE DWOIRE 
Support for the structural adjustment 
programme (GIP V). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance. 25.5 mECU. General 
import programme. T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF IVC 7200/004 - AAc 
Electrification of banana production 
sites. International tender no. 4249 
already launched for the supply, in one 
lot, of electrical equipment. Opening of 
bids on 30 12.97 at 09.00 local time. 
Financed from budget CE B7-5023 
DJIBOUTI 
Support for the structural adjustment 
programme. General import programme. 
4.100 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF DI 7200/001 - AAc 
DOMINICA 
Eco-Tourism Site Development. Resp 
Auth.: Ministry of Trade Industry and 
Tourism (MTIT) Estimated total cost 
0.558 mECU. Works, equipment and 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF DOM 6002/001 - ACa 
Agricultural Diversification 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Diversification 
Implementation Unit. (DIU). 2.25 mECU. 
Production Credit Scheme. Abattoir 
Project, Citrus Processing Study, 
Shipping and Transportation System 
Project, Quality Assurance, Market 
Information Service, Export Credit 
Programme, Monitoring Evaluation, T.A. 
Works by ace. tender. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF DOM 7002-ACa 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Support programme to prevent 
STD/HIV/AIDS. EDF part 1.350 mECU. 
Training, T.A., supplies, evaluation. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF DO 7016 - AGz 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Conservation and rational utilisation of 
the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture. 5,070 mECU. 
Land classification and use master plan, 
national system of conservation units, 
forest training and research centres, T.A. 
and supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 6. 
EDF EG 6001 - ACe, ACe, ACi 
ERITREA 
Sector study on national water and 
irrigation potential. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Water 
resources 4.5 mECU. Assess the various 
demands for those resources, determine 
the potential for their sustainable 
development, present strategies for their 
development, and lay the foundations for 
their management. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF ERY 7002 - ABb 
Upgrading of the Nefasit-Dekemhare-
Tera Imni road. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of 
Construction. Estimated total cost 20 
mECU. Road works. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7 
EDF ERY 7004 - ABd 
Rehabilitation of transmission lines, 
substations and distribution system in 
Massawa area. Resp. Auth.: Eritrean 
Electric Authority. Estimated total cost 
10-12 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Feasibility study: INYPSA(Sp) Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ERY 7001 - ABa.i 
Livestock Promotion, support for the 
Improvement of the Sanitary 
Environment of the National Herd. 
Estimated cost 1.2 mECU Equipment, 
infrastructure, vaccines, training of 
veterinary services personnel Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ERY 7005/000 -AGz, AFd 
Short-term assistance programme for 
reconstruction and restoration. 
International tender no 4285 to be 
published in the supplement to the 
Official Journal in the first half of 
November 97. Supply, in a single lot, of 
ten photovoltaic systems for producing 
electricity. Opening of bids on 4 2.98 at 
10.00 local time. 
ETHIOPIA 
Reintegration of displaced Ethiopian 
nationals from Eritrea. Estimated cost 2 
mECU. Works, training, line of credit, 
T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in 
execution EDF 7. 
EDF ET 7255/001 - AHb.e 
Rehabilitation of the Addis Ababa-
Jima road, Addis Ababa-Abelti (180 
km). 
Estimated total cost 35 mECU. 
Improvement of the road network. Works 
and supplies. T.A. Feasibility studies and 
dossiers projects preparation. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ET 7005/002 - ABd 
Addis Ababa's water supply and 
sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Addis Ababa 
Water Supply Authority. AAWSA. 
Estimated total cost 35 mECU. Works, 
equipment, T.A.,. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. EDF ET 5006/002 - ABb 
Training programme. Trainers' training, 
staff, supply of equipment. Estimated 
cost 6.900 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF ET7016-AFC 
Support programme for the transport 
sector (TSSP). Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian 
Road Authority, 2 mECU. Works, 
equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF ET 7005/001 -ABd 
Support at the national level for 
economic training and research 
capacity. Resp. Auth. : Department of 
Economics, Addis Ababa University. 1.05 
mECU. T.A. short and long term, 
purchase of equipment and material, 
evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ET 6101/001 - AFb 
Lake fishing development project. 
International tender no. 4269 already 
launched for the supply, in three lots, of 
pick-up trucks, motorcycles and 15hp 
outboard motors. Opening of bids on 
9.12.97 at 10.30 local time 
FIJI 
Rural Health Infrastructure, Naitasiri. 
Construction of a new hospital in 
Vunidawa, construction, modification and 
upgrading of various health centres and 
nursing stations. Estimated total cost 
4 315 mECU. Study: short-list already 
done. Project on appraisal. EDF 4, 5, 6 
and 7. 
EDF FU 7007 - AGa 
GAMBIA 
General Import Programme. Support for 
Structural Adjustment. Hard currency 
allowance to import ACP and EC goods, 
with negative list. 1.400 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GM 7200/002 - AAc 
GHANA 
Human resources development 
programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Local Government and Rural 
Development 3.8 mECU Supply of 
equipment, T.A., evaluation. Projectin 
execution. EDF 7 
EDF GH 7003 - AFz 
Western Region Agricultural 
Development Project. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 12 
mECU. T.A., buildings and training, 
supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GH - ACa 
Woodworking Sector Development. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Lands and 
Forestry 4.85 mECU. Training and 
equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GH - ACc 
Small towns water supply project. 
Resp. Auth.: Ghana Water and Sewerage 
Corporation. Estimated total cost 15 
mECU. Construction of water supply 
systems. Strengthening of institutions 
responsible for operations and 
maintenance. Works. T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GH 6006 - ABb 
Decentralised Cooperation 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Finance. 1.500 mECU. Equipment, 
construction, training and current inputs 
of grassroots programmes. TA for 
implementation and evaluation. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GH 7008 - AJz 
4th Microprojects Programme, 2nd 
tranche. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Finance. 4 mECU. Improvement of 
health, water and educational facilities. 
T.A., evaluation and contingencies. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GH 6102/000 - AHb 
Rural electrification programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Mines and Energy. 9.5 
mECU. Supply and erection of electirivty 
lines, supervision, training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDFGH-Aba.i 
GRENADA 
Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry Labour, Social Service 
Community Development. 0.220 mECU. 
Water supply, road improvements repairs 
and extension of schools, medical and 
community centre and sports grounds. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GRD 7102 - ABz 
Rehabilitation of the Bellevue-
Grenville Section of the Eastern Main 
Road - Gren ville - Mama Cannes 
section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 
2 mECU Works by direct labour, small 
T.A. and supply of equipment for repairs. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GRD 7002/00 - 1ABd 
GUINEA 
Development of secondary towns. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement 
du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 mECU. 
Buildings, market, railway stations, roads 
T.A. and training management,work 
supervision, supply of equipment. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GUI 7008 - AHab 
Extension of the Family Plantation 
Programme in Soguipah. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture. Water and Forests. 
Estimated cost 5.5 mECU. Cultivation of rice 
fields and rubber plantations and the 
development of transport infrastructures. 
Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF GUI 6008/001 - ACe, AHe, Ahf 
Urban health support project. 
Estimated cost 12m ECU. T.A., studies 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GUI 6005/000 - Agz 
Road infrastructure programme. 
International tender no 4262 for works, in 
two lots. Construction of the Kouroussa-
Kankan road and of a bridge over the 
Niger. Opening of bids on 11.12.97 at 
10.30 locai time. 
Construction of a bridge over the 
Fatala. Notification of preselection no. 
4273 already published. Opening of bids 
on 5.11.97 at 11.00 local time. 
Improvement of living conditions in 
the interior of the country. International 
tender no. 4273 already launched for the 
supply, in one lot, of 26 photovoltaic 
pump systems. 
Opening of bids on 7.1.98 at 11.30 local 
time. 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Bridge construction in Sao Vincente. 
Resp.Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 
Estimated cost 27 mECU. Works and 
works supervision. Project on appraisal 
EDF 8. 
EDF GUB 7014/000-ABd 
Support for road maintenance. 
Estimated cost 8 mECU. Construction, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF GUB 6013/001 - ABd 
Institutional support for the road 
sector. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Public 
Works. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. T.A. 
Project in execution. EDF 8. 
EDF GUB 6003/002 - ABd 
GUYANA 
Rehabilitation of sea defences and 
shore zone management. Estimated 
cost 20 mECU. Construction, T.A. 
studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDFGUA 6003/004-ABd 
Private sector development support 
programme. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. 
T.A., feasibility study, training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF GUA 7002/000 - AEd 
HAITI 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme II. 10.800 mECU. Date 
foreseen for financing December 96. EDF 
7. 
EDF HA 7200/001 - AAc 
Support for the structural programme. 
Utilisation of satellite imagery for the 
exploitation of Haitian territory. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de la Planification et de 
la Coopéiation Externe (MPCE). 
Estimated cost 1.8 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF HA 7007/000 - AAz 
JAMAICA 
Credit scheme for micro and small 
enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning 
Institute of Jamaica. Implementation by 
Apex Institution and Coordination and 
Monitoring Unit 7 mECU. Line of credit, 
T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 5, 6 and 7. 
EDF JM 5020 - ADz, AEz 
Institutional strengthening 
programme. Resp. Auth.: National Water 
Commission (NWC). Estimated cost 3 
mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF JM 7005 - AHa.b.c . 
Agricultural sector support 
programme (ASSAP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture - Rural and 
Agriculture Dev. Auth. (RADA). 5m ECU. 
More sustainable fanning systems,soil 
conservation, reafforestation and 
Community education. Works, supply of 
vehicles, equipment, T.A. studies. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF JM 7004 -ACa 
Return and reintegration of qualified 
nationals II. Estimated cost 0.647 
mECU. Supply of technical equipment, 
training, information and support system. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF J M 7002/001 -AFe. 
Northern coastal highway 
improvement project. Segment 3 
(Ocho Rios - Port Antonio - Fair 
Prospect- 116 km). Resp. Auth.: 
Government of Jamaica. Estimated cost 
80 mECU. Constmction, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7, 8 
EDF JM 9999/000 - ABd 
Regional project - University of the 
West Indies. International tender no. 
4268 already launched for supply, in four 
lots, of electronic equipment for 
administration. 
Opening of bids on 2.12.97 at 14.30 local 
time. 
Institutional strengthening and road 
rehabilitation. International tender no. 
4279 already launched for supply, in ten 
lots, of various equipment. 
Opening of bids on 16.1.98 at 11.05 local 
time. 
KENYA 
Farming in tsetse infested areas. 
Estimated total cost 14.600 mECU. 
Refine the techniques to trap the tsetse 
fly and develop better technologies to 
prevent infections. Monitor the 
environmental impact of the techniques. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF KE 7011 -ACa 
Family Health Programme. Estimated 
total cost 28.710 mECU. Reproduction 
health status of Kenyans family planning 
services broadened. EDF 14.810 mECU, 
ODA (UK) 13.900 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 6 
EDF KE 7015 - AGb 
Technical Education. 5 mECU. Raising 
the level of performance of existing 
teaching institutions. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF KE 6005/001 - AFb 
Trade Development Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Export Promotion Council and a 
Special TDP Committee composed of 
private and public sector members and 
the European Commission. 4 mECU. 
Trade Promotion and Marketing 
Programme, Training, Equipment, T.A. 
and Monitoring and Evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF KE 7008 - AEz 
Small scale and informal sector 
enterprises. Estimated total cost 10 
mECU. Development of micro-enterprises 
and informal sector of the economy. 
Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF KE 7009-AEe.f 
Sultan Hamud-Mtito Road 
rehabilitation. Estimated total cost 30 
mECU. To rehabilitate priority roads and 
establish sustainable maintenance 
organisation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 
EDF KE 7010/002-ABd 
Mai-Mahiu/Naivasha Road 
rehabilitation Estimated total cost 25 
mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF KE 7010/003-ABd 
Community development. Poverty 
alleviation. Estimated total cost 12.500 
mECU. Financial facility aimed at priority 
activities identified by local communities. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF KE7018-AHb 
Support for the establishment of key 
functions and programmes at the 
Kenya Institute for Public Policy 
Research and Analysis (KIPPRA). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Planning and 
National Development and Finance and 
Office of the President. 1.993 mECU. 
Training, Consulting and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF KE 7016/00 - AAb 
Establishment of sustainable tourism 
development Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Tourism and Wldlife. 1.970 mECU. 
Advice on and design of a financially self-
sustainable Tourism Board. T.A., 
equipment, training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDFKE7014-AEC 
EDF KE 7012-AAc 
Agriculture/livestock research 
programme. Estimated total cost 8.3 
mECU. Projectin execution. EDF 6. 
EDF KE 6003/001 - ACa 
KIRIBATI 
Recycling programme in South 
Tarawa. Resp. Auth. Ministries of 
Environment & Natural Resources, and of 
Works & Energy. Estimated total cost 
0.495 mECU. Building and equipping a 
treatment centre for the recycling of 
machines and abandoned vehicles. 
Supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF Kl 7008 - AHf 
LESOTHO 
Urban Water Supply and Sanitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Water and Sanitation 
Authority. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. 
Implementation of urgent water-supply 
and sanitation systems in the urban and 
peri-urban areas. Feasibility study and 
contract document. Preparation for urgent 
water supply and sanitation intervention. 
Short-lists to be done. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF LSO 7002 - ABb, AHa 
Fourth Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SASP4). General Import 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of 
Lesotho. 8.6 mECU. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF LSO 7200/003 - AAc 
Transport infrastructure programme, 
phase I. 18 mECU. Construction, 
supplies, T.A., studies, training. Projectin 
execution. EDF 8. 
EDF LSO 6016/001 - ABd 
Transport infrastructure - axle load 
control. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 
0.850 mECU. Constmction, evaluation. 
T.A., equipment - restricted tender. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF LSO 6016/000 - ABd. 
LIBERIA 
Support for the electoral process. 
Resp. Auth.: Govt, of Liberia. T.A and 
financial assistance for organisation of 
the election. 1.9 mECU. Projectin 
execution. EDF 7 
FED LBR 7001/001 - AAc 
MADAGASCAR 
Road infrastructure rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth. Ministère des Travaux 
Publics. 72.500 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supervision. Project in execution. 
EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF MAG 7004 - ABd 
Support programme to rehabilitate 
social and economic infrastructures. 
Interventions after cyclones. EDF part 
17.500 mECU. Railways and road 
rehabilitation, small hydraulic works. 
Social infrastructure rehabilitation. 
Technical expertise study to be done for 
roads. Works, supplies, supervision and 
control, evaluation. Project in execution. 
EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF MAG 7009 - ABd 
First decentralised cooperation ' 
programme. Resp. Auth.: National 
Authorising officer and Head of EU 
Delegation and authorized NGOs. 1.900 
mECU. Works Purchase of equipment by 
direct agreement, restr. tender or int. 
tender. Project in execution EDF 7 
EDF MAG 7022/000 - AGz, AHz 
Support-training for rural 
development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du 
développement rural et de la réforme 
foncière. 1.200 mECU. Developing the 
farmer's organisations role. Training, 
supplies and technical cooperation. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAG 7029/000 - ACb 
Decentralised training programme for 
regional private tourism operators. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Tourisme. 
1.910 mECU. T.A. training, evaluation. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
EDF MAG 6039 - AEc 
Professional organisation of rural 
sector and agricultural loans. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du 
Dév. Rural. 1.910 mECU. T.A., training, 
evaluation. Works, supplies, T.A. and 
services. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAG 7003-ACa 
Support for Training Programme 
(FORMFED) Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance. 0.900 mECU. T.A, 
equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAG 7028 - AFd 
6 Support for the Structural Adjustment 
programme 1997-98. 27 mECU. General 
Import Programme. Project in execution. 
EDF MAG 7200-AAc 
Improvement of the income of the 
coastal population In the South-
western region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Agriculture et du Développment 
Rural. Estimated cost 0.613 mECU. 
Increasing seaweed production. 
Recruitment, shipbuilding, T.A, equipment 
and training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 6. 
EDF MAG/7024/001 - ACd, AHd 
Priority Health Action Programme. 
Support for a national health service to 
alleviate poverty. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Health. 1.95 mECU. EDF 6. 
EDF MAG 6041/000 - AGe 
Priority health project Support for a 
national health service to alleviate 
poverty. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 
Estimated cost 15 mECU. EDF 8. 
EDF MAG 6041/001 -AGe 
MALAWI 
Soil Conservation and rural 
production. Resp. Auth.: MOALD. 23 
mECU. EDF 15.500 mECU, local 1.3 
mECU, counterpart funds 5.7 mECU. 
Water supply, sanitation, supply of 
fertilizers, T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI 5001/002 - ACa 
Information, education and 
communication population 
programme. Resp. Auth.: NAO -Ministry 
for Women and Children's Affairs, 
Community and Social Services -
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 
Estimated total cost 4 mECU. Increase 
awareness and promote behaviour 
change as regards reproductive health, 
including disease prevention. Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF MAI 6009/001 - AGb.c 
Support to the Forestry Department 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural 
Resources. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. 
T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. EDF 7 
EDF MAI 5001/003-ACa 
Health Programme. Strengthening 
Health Ministry capacities in the 
framework of planning, 
decentralisation and equipment 
maintenance. Training, infrastructures, 
equipments and T.A. Estimated total cost 
20 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI 6009/002 - AGe 
2nd Lomé IV Micro-project 
Programme. Improvement of 
infrastructures in the farmer framework 
with the EC participation. Building, 
school's rehabilitation, health centres, 
water points. Estimated total cost 6 
mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI 7012/038 - AGz, AHz, ABb 
Customary Land Utilisation Study. 1 
mECU. Studies. T.A. survey. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI 6029 - AAg 
Karonga-Chilumba-Chiweta Road. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Works and 
Supplies. Estimated total cost 25.2 
mECU. Construction, supervision of 
works, training of technical staff. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAI 6022 - ABd 
Physical assets management In the 
health sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Works and Supplies. Estimated total cost 
4 mECU. Constmction, supervision of 
works, training of technical staff. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI 7018/000 - AGe 
Rehabilitation of Chipoka Port - Lake 
Malawi. Estimated cost 3 mECU. 
Constmction, supplies of equipment. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF 6022/001 - ABd 
Urgent maintenance to roads and 
bridges. Resp. Auth.: Government of 
Malawi. 1,994 mECU. Works. 
Supervision - restr. tender. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI 6022/002 - ABd 
Programme for the prevention of 
HIV/AIDS among high risk groups. 
0.780 mECU. T.A., equipment, training. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI 7001/000 - AGz 
MALI 
Support for the electoral process. 
Resp. Auth.: Commission Electorale 
Nationale Indépendante (CENI). 
Estimated cost 1.950 mECU.Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MLI 7019-AAc 
Geological and mining sector survey. 
Adm. Resp: Ministère de l'Energie et des 
mines. Estimated cost 15 mECU. Aerial 
geophysical prospecting, geological 
mapping, mining prospecting, sector-
based survey. Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF MLI 9999 - ADa 
Support for the central unit of the 
National Authorising Officer. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères. Total estimated cost 1.88 
mECU. Improving the services of the 
National Authorising Officer in the 
programming, management and follow-up 
of the projects financed by the EDF. T.A., 
training, supply. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF MU 6007/002 - AAc 
Support for decentralisation. Resp. 
Auth.: Mission de Décentralisation 
(MDD). 1.3 mECU. Training, Τ Α., study. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MLI 7009/001 - AAz 
MAURITANIA 
Kaédi and Mederda water supply. 
Estimated total cost 2.8 mECU. 
Improvement of the living conditions. 
Works and T.A. Rehabilitation, 
strengthening and improvement of water 
systems. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAU 7012/000-ABb 
Support for the programme to 
strengthen institutional capacity 
(PRCI). Resp. Auth. Ministry of Planning 
and Finance. 1.865 mECU. T.A. to 
strengthen the effectiveness of 
administration. Supply of equipment. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAU 7200/002 - AAc 
MAURITIUS 
Irrigation of the Northern Plains. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated 
cost 9 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. 
Restricted tender for T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7 
EDF MAS 7002 - ABb 
Mahebourg market. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Local Government. Estimated 
cost 1.850 mECU. To promote 
agricultural diversification, and also to 
upgrade the city centre. Feasibility study. 
Works, supplies, TA. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAS 7008 - ACe 
Phoenix-Nouvelle France road. 
Estimated cost 4 mECU. Upgrading the 
existing Phoenix-Nouvelle France road to 
a dual carriageway. Works, T.A. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAS 7010/001 -ABd 
Upgrading of sewerage infrastructure 
of housing estates. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Works. Estimated cost 7.4 
mECU. Rehabilitation/provision of 
sewerage infrastructure to 10 housing 
estates. Works. T.A. for supervision. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAS - AHa 
Training of police officers. Estimated 
cost 0.43 mECU. T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7 
EDF MAS - AAd 
St. Martin sewage treatment plant. 
Provide adequate treatment of sewage 
from the Plains With ems area. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Environment and 
Quality of Life. Estimated cost 15 mECU. 
Feasibility study, T.A., services. EDF 8. 
EDFD MAS 7005/000 - ABz 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Socio-economic reintegration of young 
people. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. 
Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 6. 
EDF MOZ 7017-AHb 
Rehabilitation of the rural health 
system. Estimated cost 22mECU. 
Rehabilitation and renovation of 3 rural 
hospitals and 2 health centres. Supply of 
essential medicines and equipment, T.A. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MOZ 7018-AGa.e 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme. GIP II. 15 mECU. Projectin 
execution. 
EDF MOZ 7200/001 - AAc 
Social reintegration in Zambezia and 
Niassa provinces. 5.600 mECU. Health, 
education, rural life (farming, 
fishing,setting up of micro-enterprises), 
urban economic development. The projects will be carried out by NGO's and 
the provincial authorities. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
Support for the judicial system. 
Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Project on 
appraisal EDF 7. 
EDF MOZ 7022 - Ajz 
Computerised system for the 
population register and issue of 
identity cards. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. Estimated cost 1.995 
mECU. Supplies, T.A. Int. Tender. Project 
in execution. EDF 6. 
EDF MOZ 7024 - AAz 
NAMIBIA 
Namibia Integrated Health Programme. 
Resp. Auth.. Ministry of Health and Social 
Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastructures, 
equipment, training and T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM 7007 - AGz 
Expansion of NBC transmitter network 
and production facilities for 
educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: 
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Estimated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 
mECU, local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply 
of equipment, technical training and 
technical consultancies. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM 7005 - AFi 
Rural Development Support 
Programme for the Northern 
Communal Areas. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water and Rural Development. 7.7 
mECU. Strengthening of the agricultural 
extension service, training of extension 
officers and establishment of a rural 
credit system. Supply of office 
equipment, vehicles, agricultural inputs, 
T.A., training, evaluation. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM 7011 - ACa 
Rural Towns Sewerage Schemes. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF NAM 7015 - AHc 
Namibia Tourism Development 
Programme. (Foundation Phase). Resp. 
Auth.. Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism. 1.882 mECU. Implementation of 
programme. Staff training. T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM 7010 - AEc 
Livestock Marketing Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Directorate of Veterinary Services 
- Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Dept, 3.750 mECU. Construction of 
buildings, water and road infrastructure, 
provision of equipment materials, tractors 
for quarantine farms in the Northern 
Communal Areas. All by ace. tenders or 
restr. tenders. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF NAM 7020 - ACa 
Support for the regional control 
programme against the Tsetse fly and 
trypanosomiasis (RTTCP), phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Veterinary 
Services, Min. of Agriculture, Water and 
Rural Devt. 3,75 mECU. Construction of 
buildings and infrastructures, provision of 
equipment, vehicles, tractors. All by ace. 
tender or restr. tender. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM 7020 - ACa 
Support for implementation of the 
Cross Border initiative. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. 5.370 
mECU. To promote an strengthen 
Namibia's economic integration. T.A., 
supplies and line of credit. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 70012/22 - AEd.e 
AIDS Programme. Estimated total cost 
1.5 mECU. Reduction of sexual 
transmission of HIV/AIDS. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF NAM (REG) 8000/003 - AGz 
Education programme. Estimated cost 
12 mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A., 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF NAM 7001/001 - AFa, AFb. AFd. AFi 
Rural development support 
programme (RDSP). Phase II. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and 
Rural Development. Estimated cost 7 
mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF NAM 7001/001 - ACa 
Seed production project. To support the 
establishment of an efficient, sustainable 
staple crop seed production system. 
Estimated cost 2 mECU. Feasibility study 
to be carried out. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8 
EDF NAM 7011/002 - ACa 
NIGER 
Fishery development in the southern 
Zinder zone. Resp. Auth.: NGO under 
control of Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de 
l'Environnement. Estimated total cost 
0.500 mECU. Professional sector 
organisation, strengthening offish 
marketing. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF NIR 7014-ACa 
Environmental protection programme 
in the lower Tarka Valley. Estimated 
total cost 10 mECU. To stop ecological 
and economical destruction of the zone. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF NIR 6002/002 - ACa 
NIGEPAC. Safeguarding cultural 
heritage. Estimated total cost 1 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF NIR 7017 - AHi 
Support for the 1996 Structural 
Adjustment Programme. General import 
programme 14 mECU. Imports on basis 
of negative list. T.A. for implementation 
and institutional support. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 6 and 7. 
EDF NIR 7200/002 - Aac 
Support for the craft industry. 
PROFORMAR II (2nd phase). Improved 
training facilities for rural crafts. 
Estimated cost 1.8 mECU. Training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF NIR 7101/011 -AFd 
Institutional support for the NAO. 
Assistance to maximise the effectiveness 
of Community aid. Sectoral reforms and 
macro-economics. Estimated cost 1.3 
mECU. EDF 7. 
EDF NIR 7110/003 - AAb 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme 1997-98 Estimated cost 
15.8 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7,8. 
EDF NIR 7200/004 - AFe. AGe 
Strengthening basic education in the 
Tillabéri department in the framework 
of the large-scale irrigation 
programme in the Niger valley.. Resp. 
Auth . Ministry of National Education. 
1.77 mECU. Construction, training, 
equipment, T.A., evaluation. Projectin 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NIR 7011/000 - AFa 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Human resources development 
programme, phase il (HRDP II). 
Estimated cost20mECU. Construction of 
and improvements to educational 
buildings. Scholarships, training and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF PNG 6008/002 - AFb 
RWANDA 
Return and social reintegration of 
students currently still in the central 
and east European states. Estimated 
cost 0.996 mECU. T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7 
EDFRW7012/002-AAC 
SAMOA 
Rural water supply programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Finance. Estimated cost 
16.7 mECU. Preparatory study, works, 
supplies, project management. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7 and 8. 
EDF WSO 7002/000 - ABb 
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme. 0.900 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF STP 7200/001 - AAc 
SENEGAL 
St-Louis regional development 
programme. 22.5 mECU Job creation, 
lines of credit, T A to the S.M.E's, 
training studies Health centres, clinics, 
medical equipment and consumables, 
training, information, T.A. to the Direction 
Régionale in St-Louis and to the Service 
des Grandes Endémies in Podor. 
Drainage network, sanitation. 
Environmental protection with wind 
breaks. T.A. Study of a water-engineering 
scheme in Podor. Works by ace. tender. 
Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. 
tender. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF SE 6002/7002 - ACa 
SEYCHELLES 
Victoria market rehabilitation. Resp 
Auth.. Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated 
total cost 1 mECU. EDF 0.770 mECU, 
local 0.230 mECU. Works and 
3 improvements. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDYSEY7011 - ACb 
Anse Royale landfill. Estimated cost 3 
mECU. Construction of a fully-engineered 
landfill. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF SEY - AJz 
Le Niol water treatment plant 
extension. Estimated cost 3.5 mECU. 
Rehabilitation and extension of water 
treatment works. Works. T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDFSEY-AFh 
SIERRA LEONE 
Improvement of Freetown - Conakry 
road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. 
Reconstruction of about 120 kms of road 
from Masiaka in Sierra Leone to 
Farmoreah in Guinea. Works and 
supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF SL 7004 - ABd 
Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) 
support programme. Resp. Auth.: 
SLRA. 22.500 mECU. To strengthen 
SLRA's management capacity, to support 
maintenance operations, rehabilitate 160 
km of road, provide training and 
equipment to enable local private 
contractors to increase their role in road 
works. Rehabilitation works, equipment, 
T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF SL 7002 - ABd 
Management and protection of wildlife 
in Outamba Kil i mi National Park 
(OKNP). Resp Auth. NAO. Estimated 
cost 1.980 mECU Development of sound 
management plan for sustainable 
protection of wildlife and ecosystem in 
park. Improvement of local infrastructure 
and community development. Works, 
supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal EDF 
7. 
EDF SL 7003-AEi.AHi 
West and North West Artisanal 
Fisheries and Community 
Development, phase II. 1.98 mECU. 
Technical cooperation in fisheries. T.A. 
and training. Financing date January 97. 
SL 6004/001 - AC d 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
Guadalcanal road: Aola-Matau. Resp. 
Auth. Ministry of Transport. Works and 
Utilities. Estimated total cost 6 mECU. 
Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF SOL 7001 - ABd 
SOMALIA 
2nd rehabilitation programme. 47 
mECU. Inter-sectoral approach. The 
project will be implemented by NGOs and 
T.A. Project in execution. EDF 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5 and 6. 
EDF SO 6029 - AAc 
SURINAME 
Timber Institute. Control of logging and 
reafforestation activities. Estimated total 
cost 3.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7 
EDF SUR 7005-ACc 
Road from Nickerie to the Suriname-
Guyana ferry terminal. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Public Works. Estimated total 
cost 8.4 mECU. Construction of 29.4 km 
road. Project on appraisal EDF 6. 
EDF SUR 5602/001 - ABd 
Strengthening STD (including HIV) 
health services among Maroon and 
indigenous populations in the 
hinterland. Resp. Auth.: NAO. Estimated 
cost 680,000 ECU. Supplies, works, 
services, medical training and education. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF SUR 7010/000 - AGe 
SWAZILAND 
Support for implementation of the 
Cross Border Initiative. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 1.5 
mECU. T.A., training, supply of 
equipment. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7012/024 - AAz 
Development of smallholder irrigation 
in the Lower Usuthu River Estimated 
cost 84 mECU. Construction, supplies, 
studies, TA Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF SW 7007/001 - ACa 
TANZANIA 
Mwanza-Nyanguge Road and Mwanza 
urban roads rehabilitation, and 
Nyanguge-Musoma overlay. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. Estimated cost 55 
mECU. Rehabilitation of 67 km of trunk 
roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza 
airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza 
sewerage system (main works). Design 
study on-going. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF TA 6021 - ABd 
Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. Resp. 
Auth Ministry of Water energy and 
minerals Estimated cost 21 mECU. 
Works, pumping equipment, studies and 
supervision. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF TA 5005(7)-ABb 
Irlnga Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. 
Estimated cost 22 mECU Pumping, 
treatment, storage and distribution. 
Works, equipment, design and 
supervision. Short-list done Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF TA 7009 - ABz 
Rehabilitation of the 
Mwanza/Shinyanga-Nzega road. Resp. 
Auth. Ministry of Works. Estimated total 
cost 70 mECU Pioject on appraisal. EDF 
6, 7 and 8. 
EDF TA 7012-ABd 
Rehabilitation of the Dodoma to 
Singida Road. Estimated cost 90 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF TA 7024/000 - ABd 
Institutional strengthening for the 
education sector development 
programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education and Culture. Estimated cost 
1.91 mECU. T.A. (short term), training 
and equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF TA 7023/000 - AFd 
Special programme for refugee-
affected areas. Resp. Auth.: Prime 
Minister's office. Estimated cost 22 
mECU. Rehabilitation of the Mwanza 
Airport runway, contribution to the Kagera 
road maintenance programme, 
improvement of the Kigoma-Nyakanasi 
gravel road (335 km). Shortlists 
established. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF TA - ABd 
Institutional strengthening for 
improved water supply and sewerage 
services in four towns. Estimated total 
cost 1.985 mECU. T.A., training, works 
and supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 
EDF TA 7014/000 - ABb 
TOGO 
Aid for the voluntary reintegration of 
refugees from Togo. Resp. Auth.: Min. 
Du Plan. Estimated cost 0.430 mECU. 
Project under the direction of CARE 
Togo. Socio-economic contribution for the 
reintegration of 17 000 Togo refugees in 
their place of origin. EDF 7. 
EDF TO 7006 - AHn 
Support for a group of producers in 
the Savanes region. Estimated cost 1.8 
mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A., 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 5. 
EDF TO 6003/002 - ACa 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Training project for young farmers 
(AYTRAP). Assistance for the young 
farmer to create rural enterprises. 
Estimated cost 7.300 mECU. EDF 5 
mECU. local 2.300 mECU. Line of credit, 
T.A. and monitoring. Projectin execution. 
EDF 6 and 7. 
EDF TR 7002 - ACa 
Support for Caribbean Business 
Services Ltd. (CBSL). Resp. Auth : 
NAO. Estimated cost 347,000 ECU. 
Support for SMEs through management 
advice and the transfer of technology. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF TR 7006/000 - ADe 
Rehabilitation of the L'Anse Fourmi -
Charlottemme road. Estimated cost 3.5 
mECU. Construction, T.A., feasibility 
study. Project on appraisai. EDF 8. 
EDF TR 5013/000 - ADc 
TUVALU 
Outer Island Primary School 
Rehabilitation. (Nukufetau and 
Nanumea). Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Education. 0.300 mECU. Works and 
supplies by restr. tender. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 5 & 7. 
EDF TV 7004 - AFa 
UGANDA 
Water supply in Hoima, Masindi and 
Mubende. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Natural Resources. Estimated total cost 12 mECU. Rehabilitation of catchments, 
treatment plants and water distribution 
network. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF UG 7010-ABb 
Road maintenance programme in the 
South-West. International tender no. 
4247 already launched for the supply, in 
13 lots, of wori<shops and maintenance 
equipment. Opening of bids on 3.12.97 at 
11.00 local time. 
Health programme. International tender 
no. 4282 published in October 97 for the 
supply, in two lots, of various two-
wheeled and four wheeled motor 
vehicles. Opening of bids on 14.1.98 at 
10.30 local time. 
VANUATU 
Expansion of the National Technical 
Institute of Vanuatu (INTV) - tourism 
section. Resp. Auth. Ministry of 
Education. Estimated total cost 0.950 
mECU. Works and supplies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF VA 7008 - AFb 
Education development programme. 
Estimated total cost 7.5 mECU. To 
increase enrolment in junior secondary 
school and to improve the quality of 
education delivered. T.A., supplies, 
training EDF 8. 
EDF VA 7005/001 - AFa. 
Rehabilitation of rural primary 
schools, phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Departments of Finance and Education. 
0.639 mECU. T.A., materials and works. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF VA 7005/001 - AFa, AFi 
ZAMBIA 
Forestry management for sustainable 
woodfuel production in Zambia (along 
the railway line). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Environment. Estimated total cost 2 
mECU. Training supply of equipment, 
studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF ZA 7009 - ACe 
Rehabilitation of the Kabwe-Kapiri 
Mposhi and Chisamba Road. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Works and Supply. 
Estimated total cost 15.360 mECU. 
Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ZA 6014/001 -ABd 
Capacity building in the Bank of 
Zambia. Strengthening of the banking 
and financial sector. Macroeconomic 
management and planning. Resp. Auth.: 
Bank of Zambia. Estimated cost 1 mECU. 
T.A., supplies and training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 7020/000 - AEh 
Technical assistance to the Roads 
Department. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of 
Roads. Estimated cost 1.8 mECU. 
Provision of long-term T.A. to the Roads 
Department and implementation of a 
formal training programme for the 
department's professional and technical 
staff. T.A., studies, training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 7022/000 - ABd 
Educational capacity-building 
programme. To plan and deliver 
effective and relevant education and 
training. Estimated cost 10 mECU. 
Feasibility study, T.A., construction, 
budgetary aid and training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 7003/003 - AFz, AFh, AFi 
Development and rehabilitation of 
urban markets in Lusaka, Kitwe and 
Ndola. Estimated cost 7 mECU. 
Construction, T.A. including studies. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 7011/000 - ACf 
Private sector development 
programme. Trade and enterprise 
support facility/micro-credit project. 
Estimated cost 8 mECU. T.A., studies 
and training. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 7010/001 - AEz, AEe 
Export Development Programme 
Phase II. To increase exports of non-
traditional goods. Estimated cost 5 
mECU. T.A. and training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 5017/002 - AEd 
Assistance to the wildlife sector, 
phase II. Improvement in management of 
wildlife resources. Estimated cost 10 
mECU. Feasibility study. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 7002/001 - AEc 
Agricultural private sector 
development (SME) - microprojects. 
Estimated cost 10 mECU. T.A., study, 
credit facility. Project on appraisal. EDF 
8. 
EDF ZA 7023/000 ACa 
Economic management support 
programme, phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development. Estimated cost 6 mECU. 
T.A., feasibility study, financial aid, 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 7018/001 -AAc 
Rehabilitation of the Monze-Zimba 
road. Estimated cost 34 mECU. 
Constmction, T.A. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF REG 7323/001 - ABd 
Improvement of the Zambian Safe 
Blood Transfusion Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Health. Estimated cost 
3.735 mECU. T.A., equipment, training. 
Project in execution. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA 7003/002-AG d 
ZIMBABWE 
Gokwe north and south rural water 
supply and sanitation project 6.100 
mECU. Rehabilitation of existing water-
points, new domestic water points, 
latrines, maintenance, health education. 
T.A., training, evaluation. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ZI M 7001 -ABb 
Minefield clearance in N.E. 
Zimbabawe. Rural development, 
clearance of landmines. Zimbabwe 
minefields survey. Shortlist to be done. 
Estimated 10 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ZIM 7004-ACa 
Trade development programme -
import/export. Estimated cost 9 mECU. 
Feasibility study - Phase II. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM 6001/002 - AEd, AEe 
Tourism development programme -
master plan. Resp. Auth.: Government 
of Zimbabwe. Estimated cost 1 mECU. 
Feasibility study - short list established. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM 6008/002 - AEc 
Health sector development 
programme. Estimated cost 14 mECU. 
Feasibility study. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM 7002/000 - AGe 
Education sector support programme. 
Improvement of education system. 
Estimated cost 14 mECU. Feasibility 
study - phase II. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM 7009/000 - AFa, AFe 
OVERSEAS 
COUNTRIES AND 
TERRITORIES 
ARUBA 
T.A. for managerial training. 1.900 
mECU. A training unit will train private 
and public executives and will advise 
companies on demand. Supplies T.A. and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ARU 6006 - AFb 
FRENCH POLYNESIA 
Bora-Bora Island Sanitation. Tourism 
Development. Resp. Auth.: Direction 
Territoriale de l'Equipement. 1.250 
mECU. Lagoon environmental protection. 
Works by acc.tender.Project on 
appraisal. EDF 6 and 7. 
EDF POF 6009/000 - AHb, AGe 
Agricultural development. Aid project 
for the management of land and 
hydraulics to install young farmers. 
1,234 mECU. Study. Project in execution. 
EDF 6. 
EDF POF/6010/000 - ACg 
MAYOTTE 
Water supply. Estimated cost 7.2 
mECU. Works, T.A., study. Main works 
completed. Supervision completed. Study 
on remaining works in execution. Project 
in execution. EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF MY-ABb 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES - ARUBA 
Tourism development programme. 5 
mECU.Training, T.A., marketing in 
Europe. Project on appraisal. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7835-AEc 
Technical Assistance to the National 
Authorising Officer. Technical 
assistance will be given to promote sound 
10 and effective management of external 
aid. 1.3 mECU. T.A supplies Restricted 
tender. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ΝΕΑ 7012/000 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Support for the diversification and 
development of the mining sector. 
Resp. Auth.: Le Service des Mines et 
l'Energie de Territoire. 2.670 mECU. 
Works, feasibility study of the re-opening 
of an established chromite mine, 
identification of new ore deposits, 
redevelopment of former mining sites. 
Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF NC 9999/000 - ADz 
Wetv aquarium. To increase the capacity 
and improve the infrastruture of the 
aquarium. Estimated cost 4 mECU. 
Constmction, T.A. and supplies. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF NC 6009/001 - AEc ; 
ST. HELENA 
Wharf improvement project. Resp. 
Auth.: Public Works and Service 
Department. Estimated total cost 1.743 
mECU. To increase the safety and 
efficiency of Jamestown Port by 
upgrading wharf facilities for passenger 
and cargo handling. Works, supplies. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF SH 7001 -ABd 
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 
Water and sewerage in Providenciales. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works, 3.700 
mECU. Water supply works and pipes. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDFTC 7001 -AHb.c 
WALLIS AND FUTUNA 
Holo-Fakatoi Road in Wallis (RT2). EDF 
0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF WF 7001 - ABd 
Construction of territorial road N° 1 in 
Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and 
rehabilitation. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF WF 7003 - ABd 
Creation of improved structures for 
pig-rearing. Resp. Auth. EDF authorising 
officer for the territory. Total estimated 
cost. 110,000 ECU. To establish viable 
production structures adapted to market 
conditions. T.A., training, follow-up. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF WF 7009/000 - ACa 
REGIONAL 
PROJECTS 
AFRISTAT 
Support for AFRISTAT (economic and 
statistical control). 0.900 mECU. 
Improvement in the quality of statistical 
information. T.A., supplies and 
equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7106/004 - AAc, AFd 
10 MEMBER COUNTRIES OF AGM -
BURKINA FASO, CAMEROON, COTE 
D'IVOIRE, GHANA, MALI, NIGER, 
NIGERIA, SENEGAL, CHAD, TOGO 
Promotion of a regional grain market 
in West and Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: 
ΝΑΟ-Mali. Estimated cost 12 mECU. 
Creation of a regional grain market. 
Promotion and strengthening of initiatives 
by private operators. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 6175 - ACf 
INTRA-ACP 
Strengthening of fisheries and 
biodiversity management in ACP 
countries. Resp. Auth. : ICLARM, Manila 
(Philippines). 5mECU. T.A., 
management, supply of equipment, data 
base creation. Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF REG 70012/016 - ACa 
COLEACP, Interim Project Commercial 
development in exports and in the field of 
horticulture. Estimated cost 1.860 mECU. 
Training, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF REG 6900/002 - AEe 
Business Assistance Scheme for 
Exports (B.A.S.E.) Total estimated cost 
30 mECU. To expand receipts from 
exports and tourism by improving 
enterprises' export competitiveness and 
trade facilitation skills. T.A. training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG 70001/020 - AEd. 
Support to regional cooperation for 
HIV/AIDS control. Estimated cost 20 
mECU. T.A., studies, supplies, 
equipment, training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF REG 8000/004 - AGz, AGe, AGe 
Interuniversity support programme -
Level 3 - in French-speaking sub-
Saharan countries. Estimated cost 
1.976 mECU. Training, equipment and 
educational material. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7004/014 - AFb 
CARIBBEAN REGION 
University level programme. Resp. 
Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 21 mECU. To train 
a critical mass of Caribbean ACP 
nationals at masters degree level in 
development economics, business 
administration, public administration, 
agricultural diversification, natural 
resources, management and architecture, 
works, educational equipment, T.A., 
scholarships. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF REG 7604 - AFb 
Caribbean Postal Union. 
Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 
mECU. T.A. and other action necessary 
for the creation of the Caribbean Postal 
Union. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7605 - ABc 
Caribbean Telecommunications Union. 
Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 
MECU. T.A. for the accomplishment of 
the C.T.U. and the harmonisation of 
legislation on telecommunications within 
the Cariforum member states. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7605/001 - ABc 
Education policy and dialogue. Resp. 
Auth.: Cariforum S.G. 0.450 mECU. T.A. 
for regional common policies in three 
education areas: basic education, 
technical and vocational training, 
language teaching. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7607 - AFa.d 
Tertiary level programme. Estimated 
total cost 5.946 mECU. Upgrading tertiary 
level education and teacher training. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 6628/001 - AFb 
Cariforum Regional Environment 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: SG Cariforum. 
Estimated total cost 11 mECU. 
Environmental management action, 
programme for protected areas and 
community development, management 
and expansion of marine and coastal park 
and protected areas. Terrestrial parks. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7613-AHf 
CARIFORUM Programming Unit. Resp. 
Auth.: CARIFORUM. Total estimated cost 
5 mECU. T.A. to the Secretary General of 
CARIFORUM to help in the allocation, 
preparation and implmentation of regional 
funds under Lomé IV. T.A., supply. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7 and 8. 
EDF REG 7615/001 - AAb 
Caribbean News Agency Development 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Regional 
Authorising Officer. Total estimated cost 
4.179 mECU. Establishing a 
CARIFORUM Information Network by 
setting up a coordinating centre and 
mechanisms and archives and increasing 
radio, TV and Cana wire services. T.A., 
supply. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7605/003 ABc 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE 
CBI 
Regional Integration in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Assistance to 
COMESA Secretariat. 1.950 mECU. 
Training, supply of equipment, evaluation 
and services. T.A. short-term. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7316-AAc 
Standardisation and quality assurance. 
Resp. Auth.: COMESA (Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
Estimated cost 2,543 mECU. TA and 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7321 AEe 
CENTRAL AFRICA 
CIESPAC, Public Health Education 
Centre in Central Africa. 1.980 mECU. 
Student accommodation, equipment, 
scholarships. T.A. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
11 EDF REG 7205-AFb 
ECOFAC II, Forest ecosystems. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère du Plan. République du 
Congo. Estimated total cost 16.000 
mECU. To develop national and regional 
capacities for good management of forest 
resources. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution EDF 7. 
EDF REG 6203/001 - ACc 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for Eastern 
Africa in Tanzania. 
Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 5 
mECU, Widening of capacity. 
Construction of class-rooms, offices and 
housing. Project on appraisal. EDF 5. 
EDF REG 5311 (7)-AFb 
Combatting the tse tse fly in East 
Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda). 20 
mECU. Evaluation, training and research. 
T.A.., equipment. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG 736 -ACa, ACe 
KENYA, UGANDA, TANZANIA 
Lake Victoria Fisheries Research 
Project (Phase II). Project headquarters 
in Jinja, Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries 
Research Institute. EDF part 8.4 mECU. 
T.A., supplies, training, monitoring and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 5316/001 - ACd 
Tanzania rehabilitation programme for 
refugee affected areas and related 
infrastructure. Estimated cost 20 
mECU. Rehabilitation of roads and 
conserving the environment in refugee 
areas. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7322/001 - ABd 
Uganda - Kampala by-pass. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Works. Road 
construction. Estimated cost 35 mECU. 
T.A. works. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7,8. 
EDF REG 6304/001 - ABd 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS 
Guarantee Fund for Private Investment 
Financing in Western Africa. FGIPAO, 
Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee Fund to 
cover partially credit risks given by Banks 
to the private sector. Total estimated cost 
22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU, Others: 
France, Germany, EIB., Commercial 
Banks (E.U.). Development Agencies. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG7115-AEZ 
Regional programme to combat drugs. 
Estimated total cost 5.1 mECU. 
Elaboration of training programmes and 
national plans. Date foreseen for 
financing first half 97. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7135-AGz 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF IGAD 
IGAD Household Energy Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: IGAD Executive Secretary. 
Estimated total cost 1.900 mECU. T.A. to 
initiate pilot projects in the area of 
household energy, define the role and 
organize the setting up of a regional unit 
to coordinate activities, and develop 
working relationships with national and 
sub-region institutions in IGADD's 
member countries. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG - ABa 
Development of the artisanal fisheries 
sector. The promotion of artisanal 
fisheries and fisheries trade. 
Improvement of the level of services 
available in the post-harvest field of 
artisanal fisheries in IGADD member 
states. Estimated total cost 7.8 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7314/000 - ACd. AFd 
Grain marketing training programme. 
Resp. Auth. IGADD Executive Secretary. 
1.990 mECU. T.A., equipment, 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 5359 - ACa 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE INDIAN 
OCEAN COMMISSION (IOC) -
COMORES, MADAGASCAR, 
MAURITIUS, SEYCHELLES 
Establishment of a University in the 
Indian Ocean region. Resp. Auth.: 
Indian Ocean Commission. Estimated 
cost 2.150 mECU. Creation of a network 
of research and training institutions 
providing support for existing institutions. 
T.A. Project on appraisal EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7501 - AFb 
Indian Ocean University Resp. Auth.: 
IOC. Estimated cost 1,925 mECU. 
Training. Project on appraisal. EDF /. 
EDF REG 7506/000 - AFd 
PACIFIC ACP STATES 
Pacific regional civil aviation. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Fiji. 4.9 
mECU. Supply of security, air traffic 
control, navigation and meteorology, and 
training equipment. T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 6 and 7. 
EDF REG 7704 - ABc.d 
Pacific Regional Waste Awareness and 
Education Programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Forum Secretariat. 0.600 mECU. T.A. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7714 - AHf 
Air communications - upgrading of 
Fu a'am o tu Airport in Tonga. Resp 
Auth.: Ministry of Works Estimated cost 
0.340 mECU. Construction, supplies of 
equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7704/001 - ABc 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF P.T.A. 
Regional integration in East and 
Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA 
Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). 
Short and long-term. T.A., studies, 
training. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG7316-AAb 
SA DC 
SADC Hydrologicai Cycle Observing 
System (SADC-HYCOS) Resp Auth.: 
SADC Secretariat. 1.964 mECU. 
Programme for the improvement of 
regional integrated water resources. 
Supply of equipment by int. Tender. T.A. 
by restricted tender. Projectin execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG 6450-ABb 
ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, NAMIBIA, 
SOUTH AFRICA AND TANZANIA 
SADC monitoring, control and 
surveillance (MCS) of fishing 
activities. Resp. Auth.: SADC - Sector 
Coordinator for Marine Fisheries. 
Estimated cost 13.3 mECU. To improve 
national and regional capacity to manage 
marine fishery resources. Feasibility 
study, T.A., supplies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG 6406/000 - ACd 
SAHEL COUNTRIES 
Support to strengthen vaccine 
independence in Sahel Africa. 9.5 
mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7012-ACa 
MISCELLANEOUS 
CAMEROON, CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
Bertua-Garoua Boulai Road. Resp. 
Auth. Ministère des Travaux Publics 
(Cameroon). Rehabilitation and 
improvement of transport infrastructures 
between Douala and Bangui. Estimated 
total cost 50 mECU. Prequalification for 
services. Project on appraisal. EDF 6. 
EDF REG, CM-CA-7002/001 - ABd 
MALI, GUINEA 
Flood forecast and control, 
hydrologicai simulation for the Niger 
upper basin. Estimated total cost 6 
mECU EDF, 5.175 mECU, France 
(foreseen) 0.375 mECU, Denmark 
(foreseen) 0.150 mECU, Mali-Guinea 
(foreseen) 0.300 mECU Flood forecast 
system, hydrological model of local 
simulation with parametric 
régionalisation. Warming system via 
telecommunication and satellite 
teletransmission. Statistical studies. 
Project on appraisal EDF 7. 
EDF REG 6181 -AHf, AHg 
BURKINA FASO, CAPE VERDE, 
GAMBIA, MALI, MAURITANIA, NIGER, 
SENEGAL, CHAD 
Regional environmental training and 
information programme. Resp Auth.: 
Institut de Sahel in Bamako. 16 mECU. 
T.A. training, supply of equipment. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 6147/001 - AFz, AHz 
BENIN, BURKINA FASO, COTE 
D'IVOIRE, MALI, NIGER, SENEGAL, 
TOGO 
Support for the West Africa Economic 
and Monetary Union (UEMOA). 
Promotion of regional economic 
integration. Resp. Auth. UEMOA 
12 Commission. 12 mECU. Projectin 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7106/02-AAf 
Support for the ENAREF. 0.900 mECU. 
T.A., training, equipment. Projectin 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7106/003 - AAc, AAf, AFd 
BENIN, CAMEROON, COTE D'IVOIRE, 
GHANA, GUINEA, TOGO 
Regional Programme to relaunch 
pineapple production in West and 
Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: Execution 
unit composed of one senior expert, T.A. 
and one junior expert. 1.995 mECU. T.A. 
studies, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7138-ACa 
DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION IN ACP 
COUNTRIES AND OCTS 
Angola 
Rue Rainha Jinga 6, 
Luanda C.P. 2669 
Tel. (244 2) 303038 - 391277 
Telex 3397 DELCEE - AN 
Fax (244 2) 392531 
391339 
Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean 
James Fort Building 
Hincks Street, Bridgetown. 
Tel. (1 246) 4274362 - 4297103 
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB -
BRIDGETOWN 
Fax (1 246) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue de Clozel, 
01. B.P. 910 Cotonou. 
Tel. (229)312684-312617 
Telex 5257 DELEGFED - COTONOU 
Fax (229)315328 
Botswana 
P.O. Box 1253, 
North Ring Road, Gaborone 
Tel (267) 314455 - 314456 - 314457 
Telex 2403 DECEC - BD 
Fax (267) 313626 
Burkina Faso 
B.P. 352, 
Ouagadougou. 
Tel. (226) 307385 - 307386 - 308650 
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU - BF 
Fax (226) 308966 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre, 
B.P. 103, Bujumbura. 
Tel. (257) 223426 - 223892 
Telex FED BDI 5031 - BUJUMBURA 
Fax (257)224612 
Cameroon 
105 rue 1770, Quartier Bastos, 
B.P. 847 Yaoundé. 
Tel. (237) 201387 - 203367 
Fax (237) 202149 
Cape Verde 
Achada de Santo Antonio, 
C.P 122, Praia. 
Tel. (238) 621392 - 621393 - 621394 
Telex 6071 DELCE - CV 
Fax (238) 621391 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre, 
B.P. 1298, Bangui. 
Tel. (236)613053-610113 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU - BANGUI 
Chad 
Route de Farcha, 
B.P. 552, N'Djamena. 
Tel. (235) 528977 
Telex 5245 KD 
Fax (235) 527105 
527276 
Congo 
Avenue Lyautey (opposite Italian 
Embassy), 
B.P. 2149 Brazzaville. 
Tel. (242) 833878 - 833700 
Fax (242) 836074 
Côte d'Ivoire 
18 rue du Dr. Crozet, 
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01. 
Tel. (225) 212428 - 210928 
Telex 23729 DELCEE -Abidjan 
Fax (225)214089 
Djibouti 
11 Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre, 
B.P. 2477, Djibouti. 
Tel.(253)352615 
Telex 5894 DELCOM - DJ 
Fax (253) 350036 
Dominican Republic 
Calle Rafael Augusto Sanchez 21, 
Ensanche Naco, Santo Domingo. 
Tel. (1 809) 5405837 - 5406074 
Telex 4757 EUROCOM - SD DR 
Fax (1 809) 5675851 
Eritrea 
Gainer Street 1, 
P.O. Box 5710 Asmara. 
Tel. (291 1) 126566 
Fax(2911)126578 
Ethiopia 
P.O. Box 5570, 
Addis Adaba. 
Tel. (251 1)612511 
Telex 21738 DELEGEUR - ET 
(251 1)612877 
Gabon 
Lotissement des Cocotiers, 
B.P. 321, Libreville. 
Tel. (241)732250 
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO -
LIBREVILLE 
Fax (241 ) 736554 
Gambia 
10, 10th Street South, 
Fajara 
Tel. (220) 495146, 497846, 497847 
Fax (220) 497848 
Ghana 
The Round House, 65 Cantonments 
Road, 
P.O. Box 9505, (Kotoka International 
Airport), Accra. 
Tel (233 21 ) 774201 - 774202 - 774236 
13 Telex 2069 DELCOM 
Fax (233 21) 774154 
GH 
Guinea 
Commission Central Mail Department, 
(Diplomatie Bag Section - B1/123), 
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Brussels. 
Tel. (224)414942 
Fax (224) 411874 
Guinea Bissau 
Bairro da Penha, 
C.P. 359, 1113 Bissau. 
Tel. (245) 251027 - 251071 - 251469 -
251471 
Fax (245) 251044 
Guyana 
72 High Street, Kingston, 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown. 
Tel. (592 2) 64004 - 65424 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY -
GEORGETOWN 
Fax (592 2) 62615 
Haiti 
Delmas 60, Impasse Brave n°1, 
B.P. 15588, Petion Ville, Portau Prince. 
Tel. (509) 494480 - 493491 
Fax 490246 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, P.O. Box 463, 
Constant Spring, Kingston 8. 
Tel (1 809) 9246333/4/5/6/7 
e-mail eucomhod@infochan.com 
Fax (1 809) 9246339 
Kenya 
Union Insurance Building, Ragati Road, 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi. 
Tel. (254 2) 713020 - 713021 - 712860 -
712905-712906 
Telex 22483 DELEUR - KE 
Lesotho 
167 Constitution Road, 
P.O. Box MS 518, Maseru. 
Tel. (266)313726 
Fax (266) 310193 
Liberia 
EC Aid Coordination Office, 
UN Drive, Mamba Point, Monrovia. 
Tel. (231)226273 
Fax (231) 226274 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana, 67 Ha., 
B.P. 746 Antananarivo. 
Tel. (261 2) 24216 
Telex 22327 DELFED - MG 
Fax (261 2)32169 
Malawi 
Europa House, 
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City, Lilongwe 3 
Tel. (265) 783199 - 783124 - 782743 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml -
LILONGWE 
Fax (265) 783534 
Mali 
Avenue de I'OUA, Badalabougou Est, 
B.P. 115, Bamako. 
Tel. (223) 222356 - 222065 
Telex 2526 DELEGFED - BAMAKO 
Fax (223) 223670 
Mauritania 
llotV, Lot 24, 
B.P. 213, Nouakchott. 
Tel. (222 2) 52724 - 52732 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN -
NOUAKCHOTT 
Fax (222 2) 53524 
Mauritius 
8th floor, Bâtiment St. James Court, 
Rue St. Denis, 
Port Louis, B.P. 1148 
Tel. (230) 2116295 (6 lines) 
Fax. (230)2116624 
E-mail. Europe@bow.intnet.mu 
Mozambique 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe, 
C.P. 1306, Maputo. 
Tel. (258 1) 490266 - 491716 - 490271 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Fax (258 1)491866 
Namibia 
4th Floor, Sanlam Building, 154 
Independence Avenue, 
Windhoek. 
Tel. (264 61 ) 220099 
Telex 419 COMEU WK 
Fax (264 61 ) 235135 
Niger 
B.P. 10388, Niamey. 
Tel. (227) 732360 - 732773 - 734832 
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED - NIAMEY 
Fax (227) 732322 
Nigeria 
Lagos 
Knorr House, 
Ozumba Mbadiwe Avenue (opposite 1004 
flats) 
Victoria Island 
P.M.B. 12767, Lagos 
Tel (234 1) 2617852, 2610857 
Fax (234 1)2617248 
E-mail: ecnig@infoweb.abs.net 
Abuja 
Tel. (234 9) 5233144 - 5233145 -
5233146 
Fax (234 9) 5233147 
Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Western Samoa, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) 
4th Floor, Development Bank Centre, 
Victoria Parade, 
Private Mail Bag, Suva. 
Tel. (679)313633 
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ - SUVA 
Fax (679) 300370 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge (3rd Floor), Bampton street, 
P.O. Box 76, Port Moresby. 
Tel. (675) 213544 - 213504 - 213718 
Fax (675) 217850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi 14, 
B.P. 515 Kigali. 
Tel. (250) 75586 - 75589 - 72536 
Telex 22515 DECCE RW 
Fax (250) 74313 
Senegal 
12 Avenue Albert Sarraut, 
B.P. 3345, Dakar. 
Tel. (221 ) 231314 - 234777 
Fax(221)236885 
Sierra Leone 
Wesley House, 4 George Street, 
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown. 
Tel. (232 22) 223975 - 223025 
Fax (232 22)225212 
Solomon Islands 
2nd floor, City Centre Building, 
P.O. Box 844, Honiara. 
Tel. (677) 22765 
Fax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
EC Somalia Unit 
Union Insurance House (first floor), 
Ragati Road, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Tel. (254 2) 712830 - 713250 - 713251 
Fax (254 2) 710997 
Sudan 
3rd floor - AAAID Building, 
Osman Digna Avenue, 
P.O. Box 2363, Khartoum. 
Tel. (249 11) 775054 - 775148 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Fax (249 11) 775393 
Suriname 
Dr. S. Redmondstraat 239, 
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo. 
Tel. (597) 499322 - 499349 - 492185 
Fax (597) 493076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'Ubeka Building (3rd floor), 
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets, 
P.O. Box A 36, Mbabane. 
Tel. (268)42908-42018 
Telex 2133 EEC WD 
Fax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
38 Mirambo Street, 
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam. 
Tel. (255 51) 117473 (pilot) - 117474 -
117475-117476 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR TZ 
Fax (255 51) 113277 
Togo 
14 Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 37, 
B.P. 1657 Lomé. 
Tel. (228) 213662 - 210832 
Fax (228)211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The Mutual Centre, 
16 Queen's Park West, 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain. 
Tel. (809) 6226628 - 6220591 
Fax (809) 6226355 
Uganda 
Rwenzori House, 1 Lumumba Avenue, 
P.O. Box 5244? Kampala. 
Tel. (256 41 ) 233303 - 233304 
Telex 61139 DELEUR UG 
Fax (256 41 ) 233708 
Zaire 
71 Avenue des Trois Ζ, 
B.P. 2000, Kinshasa. 
Tel. and fax (by satellite) 00871 1546221 
Telex 581 154 62 21 DECEKIN ZR 
Zambia 
Plot 4899, Los Angeles Boulevard, 
P.O. Box 34871, Lusaka. 
Tel. (260 1 ) 250711 - 251140 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA 
Fax (260 1 ) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
6th floor, Construction House, 
110 Leopold Takawira Street, 
P.O. Box 4252, Harare. 
Tel. (263 4) 707120 - 707139 - 752835 
Telex 24811 DELEUR ZW 
Fax (263 4) 725360 
OFFICES OF THE COMMISSION IN ACP 
COUNTRIES AND OCTS 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Upper St George's Street, 
P.O. Box 1392, St. John's. 
Tel. (1 268) 462 2970 
Fax (1 268) 462 2670 
Bahamas 
2nd floor, Frederick House, Frederick 
Street, 
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau. 
Tel. (1 242) 325 5850 
Fax(1 242)323 3819 
Belize 
1 Eyre Street, 
P.O. Box 907, Belize City. 
Tel. and Fax (501 2) 72785 
Telex 106 CEC BZ 
Comoros 
Boulevard de la Comiche, 
B.P. 559, Moroni. 
Tel. (269) 732306 - 733191 
Telex 212 DELCEC - KO 
Fax (269) 732494 
Equatorial Guinea 
Route de l'Aéroport, 
B.P. 779, Malabo. 
Tel. (240 9)2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 - EG 
Fax (240 9) 3275 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 
Scharlooweg 37, 
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad (Curaçao). 
Tel. (599 9)4618488 
Fax (599 9) 4618423 
New Caledonia (OCT) 
21 Rue Anatole France, 
B.P. 1100, Noumea 
Tel. (687) 277002 
Fax (687) 288707 
Samoa 
4th floor, Loane Viliamu Building, 
P.O. Box 3023, Apia. 
Fax (685) 24622 
São Tomé and Principe 
B.P. 132, São Tomé. 
Tel (239 12) 21780-21375 
Telex 224 DELEGFED ST 
Fax (239-12) 22683 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530, Victoria, Mahé. 
Tel. (248) 323940 
Fax. (248) 323890 
Tonga 
Malle Taha, Taufa'ahau Road, 
Private Mailbag n° 5-CPO, Nuku'Alofa. 
Tel. (676) 23820 
Telex 66207 DELCEC TS 
Fax (676) 23869 
Vanuatu 
Ground floor, Orient Investment Building, 
Kumul Highway, 
P.O. Box 422, Port Vila. 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Fax (678) 23282 
15 Austria 
Belgium 
Den mark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
G recce 
Ireland 
Irai) 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
France 
(Territorial coUecãvides) 
Mayütrc 
Si Ficrrs and Miquelon 
(Overseas territories) 
New Caledonia and dependencies 
French Polynesia 
French Southern and Antarctic 
Territories 
Wallis and F utuna Ulands 
Netherlands 
(Overseas countries) 
Netherlands Antilles 
(Bonaire, Curaçao, 
St Martin, 
Saba, St Eustache) 
Aruba 
Denmark 
(Country having special 
relations with Denmark) 
Greenland 
United Kingdom 
(Overseas countries and 
terri : 
Anguilla 
British Antarctic Territory 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Falkland Islands 
Southern Sandwich Islands 
and dependencies 
Montserrat 
Pitcairn Island 
St Helena and dependencies 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Generai Secretariat 
of die ACP Group 
of Stalin 
Avenue Georges Henri, 45 1 
1200 Bruiteli 
TeL: 743 06 00 
This lui does noi prejudice 
the ',IJtUJ of iheje countries and territori« 
now or in the future. 
The Courier utei imp* from a variety 
of ïouicci. Their use docs not imply 
recognition of ¿any pj.ilii_ul.ti bouinJaiic. 
nor prejudice the tutu« of any nate 
or territory 
\ngola 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
(. !apc Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Congo (êXrZaire) 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Equatorial (. îutnea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
N Igeria 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Vincent 
and tlie < 'renadines 
Samoa 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa* 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
'Nut .ill provisions i>t die I muí 
Convention apply to South Africa 
16 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY 'A highly suspicious character'! 
It is said that 'every picture tells a 
story'. This photo of the Abidjan 
skyline may not appear to say very 
much, but the tale of how we got it is 
worth recounting. 
The Courier journalist who visited 
Côte d'Ivoire recently was touring the 
capital looking for suitable photo-
opportunities to illustrate the Country 
Report which appears in this issue. 
Thinking a view of the city would be a 
good idea, he stopped to take some 
shots. What he failed to take into 
account was the fact that the entrance 
to the Head of State's private residen-
ce is about a hundred metres further up the 
road featured in the photo. His activities 
were immediately spotted by members of 
the President's guard who arrived hot-foot 
on the scene to seize the camera... and the 
journalist. 
He protested, pointing out that he was just 
doing his job and, on request, produced the 
relevant documents which proved that he 
was preparing a Country Report. But it was 
to no avail, because he didn't have a piece 
of paper specifically authorising him to take 
photographs. He was duly taken into 
custody while further efforts were made 
to establish his bona fides. 
The efficient guards began by telephoning 
the CID (criminal investigation department) 
to report that they had apprehended 'a 
highly suspicious character' who had been 
using a camera near the President's home. 
What was to be done with him? Our journa-
list is a clean-cut individual - and wasn't too 
happy with the description 'highly suspi-
cious', but he kept his cool. 'Get the pictures 
developed', suggested the CID man at the 
other end of the line, so off they all went to 
find a photographic outlet. It wasn't so easy, 
because by now, all the shops had closed. 
Eventually, someone was found who was 
willing to open up his lab and process the 
film. After a time, the pictures began to 
emerge from the machine and there was an 
anxious moment as the guards scrutinised 
them closely. Would they find anything that 
'compromised' security? If they did, what 
would happen next? 
In the event, it all ended happily. The 
pictures were given the all-clear and, after 
a nerve-racking four hours, the Courier man 
was free to go. It gives a new meaning to 
the expression 'an arresting picture'! eS.H. *ν*' 
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